



CRIME IMPACT STATEMENT

Development of purpose-built student accommodation (sui generis) comprising 3 interlinked tower blocks with intermediary linking block buildings, associated amenity space and external landscaping

AT Echo Street/Granby Row, Manchester

FOR: IQ Student Accommodation/IQ

Greater Manchester Police

designforsecurity

VERSION A: 18.07.23

2017/0233/CIS/02



EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Development supported

We welcome the continuing investment in this part of central Manchester and support redevelopment of this site for residential purposes. The scheme has been well considered from a crime prevention perspective and it will make a positive contribution to the redevelopment of the neighbourhood into a vibrant, mixed-use area. Design for Security are happy to support the proposals.

Positive aspects of the scheme include:

- staff will be present throughout the day;
- the density of development will generate significant level of street activity as residents and visitors come and go;
- the orientation of buildings and uses within will promote activity and surveillance in the most appropriate areas;
- the location of the residents' entrance is appropriately located on Granby Row;
- the location of the reception desk is suitable to allow staff to monitor activity at the entrance;
- a suitable space has been identified for safe storage of parcels and mail;
- a range of residents' amenity spaces and facilities are proposed; and,
- a cycle hub will be provided.

To improve the scheme from a crime prevention perspective, include:

- a crime awareness/prevention information pack for residents;
- appropriate access controls at relevant doors to control access into and through the building;
- use of security certified doors and glazing throughout;
- ensuring the cycle hub and access to it is very secure
- a good quality CCTV system and complementary lighting.

At the planning application stage, Greater Manchester Police Design for Security will make representations to Manchester Planning to require the inclusion of a condition requiring the development to be constructed in accordance with the security recommendations and specification set out in section 3.3. and 4 of the Statement.

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1 The Site and Surroundings

The application site and its surroundings are shown on the plan and photographs below. The site, edged in red on the plan, is located on the south-eastern fringe of Manchester city centre, immediately adjacent to the ID Manchester (formerly the University of Manchester's North Campus) regeneration area and within the Whitworth Street Conservation Area. Separated by Back Acton Street, Fairfield Hall and Lambert House, both IQSA owned student halls, with accommodation set out over 8/9 floors, are situated on the north side of Granby Row, and they define the northern edge of the site. Granby Row is closed to through traffic between Sackville Street, about 150metres to the west of the site, and Cobourg Street, the southern end of which lies adjacent to the site's north-western corner of the site which connects Granby Row to the heavily trafficked Whitworth Street. The eastern part of Granby Row is only lightly trafficked and is mainly by vehicles servicing the student halls and nearby Bulls Head pub as well as drivers accessing the on-street parking bays. Bainbridge House, a three-storey, largely vacant, office/research building lies to the east of the site on the eastern side of Echo Street. The Manchester, South Junction and Altrincham railway viaduct, defines the southern boundary of the site, which includes brick archways through some of which there are footpaths and steps connecting Altrincham Street, south of the viaduct, with Granby Row. Vimto Gardens, a modest public park with artworks, seating and cycle parking is situated to the west of the site. The Manchester Institute of Science and Technology building, a vacant, grade II listed, dominates Granby Row obliquely west of the site.


Looking east along Granby Row towards the application site with the Institute of Science and Technology building on the left and Vimto Gardens and railway viaduct on the right



A view of the hoarding that encloses the application site and Lambert House from Vimto Gardens



The application site viewed from the south



Looking north-west across the site towards Lambert House and the Institute of Science and Technology building



The western elevation of Bainbridge House adjoins the eastern edge of the site



An easterly view along Granby Row with Lambert House on the left and the site on the right



The application site comprises vacant land formerly occupied by Chandos Hall, 16-storey, student, halls of residence, and several modest buildings alongside it, all of which were demolished in 2019, as well as parts of the carriageways of both Granby Row and Echo Street. Part of the site of the demolished buildings is at a lower level than Granby Row, though at the same level as Altrincham Street and Echo Street, and it has been secured with tall, timber hoardings and steel mesh gates. Access for plant and machinery into the site has been gained from Altrincham Street and Echo Street. The demolition of the buildings and what appears to be some initial groundworks suggests commencement of a scheme for which planning approval was granted in June 2018, which included, *inter alia*, the construction of 3 towers and link buildings that would provide 403 co-living units with associated shared amenity spaces, 94 units of purpose-built, student accommodation with associated shared amenity spaces, ground floor commercial floorspace and a children's day nursery, and public realm enhancements to Granby Row, Echo Street, Cobourg Street and Back Acton Street.

2 Crime Statistics & Analysis

2.1 Crime in the neighbourhood

The data below relates to crimes recorded between 1st February 2022 to 31st January 2023, committed within 500m of the site.

All crime

Domestic Burglary	Non-Domestic Burglary	Criminal Damage	Crimes involving the use or threat of violence	Theft (including shoplifting)	Robbery	Drug related offences	Theft from Motor Vehicle	Theft of Motor Vehicle	Bicycle Theft
56	86	186	1,918	1,402	182	152	225	36	47

2.1.1 There were 4,280 recorded crimes in the neighbourhood around the development site during the period analysed. This is well above the average for a typical neighbourhood within Manchester but not unusual for a neighbourhood within the city centre.

2.1.2 The most common crimes recorded were:

- the use, or threat, of violence - 45%
- theft (including shoplifting) - 33%
- vehicle crime, i.e., theft of, theft from and criminal damage to a vehicle - 7%
- criminal damage – 4%
- drug related offences – 4%
- robbery – 4%
- burglary - 3%.

2.1.3 The streets/places with the most recorded offences were:



- Princess Street – 617 crimes
- Canal Street – 392
- Chorlton Street – 378 crimes
- Sackville Street - 317
- Piccadilly (Place/Station/Approach) -274 crimes
- Bloom Street – 272 crimes
- Portland Street – 211 crimes

2.1.4 The principal focal points for criminal activity largely theft and crimes involving the use or threat of violence, were the licensed premises in the principal night-life areas, particularly in the Village, Princess Street, Portland Street and the Warehouse Project near Piccadilly. Hotspots for vehicle crime were the multi-storey car parks to the north of the site and the surface car parks around Travis Street and Sheffield Street east of the site.

2.1.5 Looking at the streets immediately adjacent to the site, there were 55 crimes of which 43 were recorded as having taken place on Granby Row, 8 on Altrincham Street, 4 on Cobourg Street; there were no recorded crimes on Echo Street. The most common crimes recorded on these streets were theft, burglary (6 residential burglaries and 6 incidents where commercial premises were targeted), violent crime, robbery and criminal damage.

Domestic burglary

2.1.6 There were 56 domestic burglaries committed within the neighbourhood during the period analysed. Buildings or streets where there were more than offences committed included Princess Street (14 offences), Granby Row (6), Whitworth Street (6), Dale Street (5) and Charles Street (4).





- 2.1.7 The risk of domestic burglary is greater on a Saturday. Offences are most commonly committed in around mid-night and in the middle and in the late evening and at mid-night.,
- 2.1.8 Of the 56 incidents of burglary, the offender targeted mail and parcels in post rooms or from within lobbies of apartment buildings on 21 occasions. There were 7 incidents where a bicycle was stolen from a secure car park or a secure, cycle store. The means by which an offender entering a building was often unknown, suggesting doors were not secured or the offender tail-gated a resident or *bona fide* visitor. On two occasions the offender gained entry to an apartment via a balcony door and on one occasion entry was gained through the building's bin store.



2.2 Crime rate comparison

Comparing crime rates in the neighbourhood around the site to those in Manchester, Greater Manchester, and England & Wales

The rates below relate to crime committed within 500m of the site. England & Wales data was last recorded for January – December 2021.



- 2.2.1 The rate of domestic burglaries per 1000 dwellings in the neighbourhood around the site is **60% lower** than the rate for Manchester, **48% lower** than the Greater Manchester rate and **47% lower** than the rate for England & Wales.
- 2.2.2 The rate of wounding per 1000 dwellings in the neighbourhood around the site is **14% higher** than the rate for Manchester, **55% higher** than the Greater Manchester rate but **196% higher** than the rate for England & Wales.



- 2.2.3 The rate of criminal damage per 1000 dwellings in the neighbourhood around the site is **26% lower** than the Manchester rate, **2% lower** than the Greater Manchester rate and **19% higher** than the rate for England & Wales.
- 2.2.4 The rate of vehicle crime per 1000 dwellings in the neighbourhood around the site is **68% higher** than the Manchester rate, **177% higher** than the Greater Manchester rate and **236% higher** than the rate for England & Wales.

2.3 Typical modus operandi used in committing burglary, theft, criminal damage and vehicle-related crimes in residential settings in Manchester, & measures to reduce vulnerabilities

2.3.1 Communal entrance doors and apartment entrance doors were targeted when left insecure

To minimise the risk of offenders tailgating through communal doors or entering apartments through insecure doors:

- communal entry doors should be self-closing and lock securely upon closure;
- install a secondary set of secure doors (airlock/secure lobby), that are also self-closing and self-locking;
- install lifts that are operated by a fob or card access control system;
- install CCTV cameras in the entrance lobby;
- apartment doors should be self-closing with a thumb-turn lock on the inner side that meets fire regulations, with clear, yet discreet, permanent instructions on the door to inform the resident that the door is not secure until the lock is turned; and,
- employ a concierge to supervise the entrance lobby.

2.3.2 Doors have been forced open

To minimise the risk of offenders forcing doors:

- all external doors and apartment entry doors should be certified to PAS 24 security standard - PAS 24 rated doors are very difficult to force open;
- 'recess-free' entrances should be designed so that doors are readily visible - offenders will be less inclined to target properties where their actions may be witnessed;
- all external doors should be illuminated with dusk-to-dawn lighting. Light suggests a property may be occupied and may deter offenders from targeting a premise. Lighting will also support CCTV systems and highlight the actions of an offender, increasing the chance of a crime being witnessed; and,
- CCTV should be considered, to record activity within circulation spaces within the building and around exterior of the building.

2.3.3 Ground floor windows were prised open, or the glazing smashed to gain access

To minimise the risk of offenders prising open windows or breaking glass to gain entry:

- avoid installing opening windows at street level;
- install window locks and opening restrictors to any windows that are accessible from street level; and,
- install laminate glass on street level windows and doors.

2.3.4 Vehicles were targeted when parked on driveways, in unsecured car parks or on the 'street'

To minimise the risk of vehicle-related crime:

- car parking should be located within the boundaries of the property, within an area that is both very secure and well overlooked by residents or monitored by an effective CCTV system. Consideration should be given to installing automatic vehicle gates and fencing around car parks.

2.3.5 Offenders have entered communal cycle stores

To minimise the risk of offenders entering cycle stores:

- cycle stores should be secure rooms or stores;
- appropriate CCTV and PIR lighting should be installed within a store; and,
- doors or gates to cycle stores should be fitted with good quality locks (ideally a maglock or similar with a resistance force of around 4500N), be self-closing and lock automatically upon closure.

2.3.6 Offenders have damaged boundary fencing

To minimise the risk of offenders targeting fencing:

- rear garden boundaries should avoid being exposed to the public realm;
- communal pathways providing access to rear gardens should be secured with self-closing, self-locking gates; and,
- fencing should be especially robust when unavoidably exposed to the public realm.

2.3.7 Theft of plant and machinery, and criminal damage during the construction period.

To minimise the risk of offenders targeting the construction site:

- a secure boundary should be erected around the site;
- access should be restricted to contractors and authorised visitors;
- security staff should patrol during non-working hours;
- lighting and CCTV should be installed to illuminate the site and record activity;
- at the end of the working day, plant and machinery should be arranged to prevent forced access onto the site; and,
- plant and machinery should be fitted with a tracking device.

2.4 Environmental features in the area that may influence crime patterns

2.4.1 Features of the physical environment can influence patterns criminal and anti-social behaviour. They affect potential offenders' perceptions about a possible crime site, their evaluations of the circumstances surrounding a potential crime site, and the availability and visibility of one or more witnesses, who might intervene, at or near a site. Offenders may decide whether to commit a crime in a location after they determine the following:

- How easy will it be to enter the area?
- How visible, attractive, or vulnerable do targets appear?
- What are the chances of being seen?
- If seen, will the people in the area do something about it?
- Is there a quick, direct route for leaving the location after the crime is committed?

2.4.2 Aspects of the local environment that might help to reduce the risk of crime and disorder at the site are as follows:

- the rate of burglary is much that of Manchester, Greater Manchester and England and Wales;
- there is a development framework in place to guide investment in the wider neighbourhood;
- the high level of investment proposed in the neighbourhood is likely to result in more pro-active management and maintenance of the private and public spaces;
- the main part of the site is enclosed with hoardings and steel gates, which provide a secure boundary and restrict movement in and out;
- there is little on the site of value;

- the northern edge of the site is overlooked by residents of the student halls opposite;
- the availability of on-street parking encourages a throughput of vehicles and motorists coming and going from their vehicles during the working day, which will generate street activity and passive surveillance of the streets and the site;
- there are numerous, mature, trees and shrubs on Vimto Gardens. Research suggests that the presence of trees and greenery on/adjacent to streets is thought to calm traffic speeds, encourage walking (which increases street surveillance and can deter criminal activity), and reduce mental fatigue, (which is sometimes a precursor to violent crime); and,
- neither Granby Row, Echo Street or Altrincham Street are well-trafficked routes either by cars or pedestrians; the site is unlikely to be targeted by offenders from outlying areas passing through the neighbourhood.

2.4.3 There are also some features that might facilitate crime and disorder, and these include:

- the site is located in a neighbourhood with a high volume of crime;
- the site is located in a neighbourhood where the rate of violent crime and vehicle crime is above the Manchester, Greater Manchester and England and Wales rates;
- the number of robberies in the vicinity of the site is a concern;
- there are numerous, often infrequently used, pedestrian routes around the site, which may facilitate offenders moving through the neighbourhood intent on targeting individuals or property as they do so;
- the site lies close to a series of well-trafficked routes, i.e., Whitworth Street and London Road. Routes such as these can act as a conduit for crime, with criminals using these routes to seek out criminal opportunities; and,
- due to the relocation of University departments from the UMIST buildings, there is a lack of street activity and passive surveillance of the streets and buildings

3 Development Appraisal

3.1 The proposed development

- 3.1.1 The proposed development comprises the erection of 3 interlinked towers ranging from 27, 21 and 16 storeys, together with intermediary link buildings (15 and 11 storeys), providing student accommodation (1,224 bed spaces), with associated amenity space and external landscaping and other associated works.
- 3.1.2 Block A will be located adjacent to Vimto Gardens with accommodation set out over 16 floors including containing 225 bed spaces, (a mixture of studios and 15 cluster flats) and 371m² of amenity space.
- 3.1.3 Block B will be in the centre of the site. It will have 370 bed spaces and 189m² of amenity space. Accommodation set out over 22 storeys and include 115 studios and 43 cluster flats.
- 3.1.4 Block C will be adjacent to Echo Street. This element of the building will be 28 storeys high and include 437 bed spaces and 110m² amenity space. It will house 162 studios and 55 cluster flats.
- 3.1.5 Link Block AB will be 12 storeys high and contain 80 studio apartments and 284m² amenity space.
- 3.1.6 Link Block BC will be 16 storeys high and contain 112 studio apartments and 155m² amenity space.
- 3.1.7 Cycle stores with a combined capacity for 313 bicycles will be provided in the basement of the development.

3.2 Positive aspects of the proposal

- 3.2.1 We welcome the investment and continuing regeneration of this part of central Manchester.
- 3.2.2 The proposals will result in the redevelopment of an underutilised site, which currently underperforms in its contribution to the vitality and viability of the neighbourhood. The development will help to continue to repopulate this part of the city centre and create activity through the day and at weekends.

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- 3.2.3 The site's proximity to the city centre and the University will make this an interesting place to live. Developments with a strong sense of place tend to have greater longevity and are more likely to attract and retain people.
 - 3.2.4 A residential development is an appropriate use for the site given the existing and emerging land uses in the area.
 - 3.2.5 IQSL have an excellent record in developing good quality, residential schemes.
 - 3.2.6 The footprint of the building is relatively simple and free of recesses and makes securing the entire site quite straightforward.
 - 3.2.7 Residents and visitor entry will be focused at a single entrance on Granby Row.
 - 3.2.8 Staff will be present in the building, including a presence at a reception desk in the lobby where staff can easily supervise residents and visitors entering and exiting the building as well as activity in the lobby. A management presence will not only discourage offender attempts to gain entry to the scheme but also gives residents a readily accessible contact to whom they may report issues. Such provision can help to instil confidence in residents that the development is secure and that maintenance issues will be dealt with promptly.
 - 3.2.9 Similarly, surveillance across the site will be enhanced by the well-considered location of the social facilities within the building, and the location of residential entrance.
 - 3.2.10 The inclusion of amenity/social space provides an opportunity for residents to meet and build relationships, which can help to develop a sense of community within the scheme and deters crime and anti-social behaviour.
 - 3.2.11 Residents and visitors coming and going, particularly on the lower floors, will overlook entrances to the development and public realm including Vimto Gardens. Natural surveillance over the public realm can help to maintain order.
 - 3.2.12 The communal entrance door will be suitably positioned on the Granby Row facade. A secure lobby has been created to reduce the risk of offenders tailgating residents or *bona fide* visitors and delivery staff.
 - 3.2.13 Lighting from the development will contribute to public lighting around the site. Good public, and building, lighting can significantly reduce the public's fear of crime.
 - 3.2.14 Access controls can be deployed at the communal entrance doors and gates to the basement access ramp to restrict access into the development to residents and authorised visitors.
 - 3.2.15 Living accommodation is at upper floor levels, which will result in a greater degree of privacy and security to the residents, without compromising natural surveillance of the public realm by the same residents. Often, residents of ground level apartments/studios in the city centre that lack defensible space suffer from anti-social behaviour, a lack of privacy, and their accommodation is more susceptible to theft and burglary.
 - 3.2.16 Secure, mail delivery has been considered with post lockers provided adjacent to the reception desk.
 - 3.2.17 The proposed enhancements to the Vimto Gardens, will help to improve the environmental quality of the neighbourhood. Well-maintained verdant environments tend to attract less crime and anti-social behaviour.
 - 3.2.18 The development is located in an area with good access to shops, services and public transport so the absence of car parking is not an issue.
 - 3.2.19 Cycle parking has been provided. The stores can only be accessed from within the secure line of the development thus enhancing the security of cycles parked within these stores.
 - 3.2.20 Refuse storage has been included on the site.

3.3 Recommendations to enhance the security of the development and the surroundings

Management

3.3.1 Students should be issued with an information pack containing, *inter alia*:

- crime prevention/awareness - particularly keeping safe at night when returning to the accommodation;
- deterred from car ownership whilst resident due to the lack of available parking;
- respecting the amenity of other residents in the neighbourhood when returning to the accommodation late at night;
- being vigilant in allowing others access to the building; and
- using appropriate entrance doors to enter and leave the building.

Main entrance and reception area

- 3.3.2 All residents and visitors should access the building via the main entrance door or if cyclists via the service route and gates.
- 3.3.3 The outer entrance door should be security-rated, fitted with an electronic locking system and automated, and capable of restricting access to residents or staff holding an appropriate fob or pass card.
- 3.3.4 An audio-visual unit should relay images (one way) and audio (two ways) from the outer entrance door to staff at the reception desk to allow for vetting visitors prior to allowing entry via a remote lock release.
- 3.3.5 To minimise the risk of 'tail-gating' legitimate residents/visitors, the inner lobby doors should also be automated and fitted with electronic locks capable of restricting access to residents or staff holding an appropriate fob or pass card, with a remote lock release activated by staff at reception.
- 3.3.6 Visitors to the building should be required to report to reception, whereupon staff should alert the student; schemes where students admit visitors remotely by way of electronic door lock release from inside their apartment or cluster is considered less secure.
- 3.3.7 The reception desk should be staffed throughout the day and, ideally at night.
- 3.3.8 In order to restrict access to residents and visitors to appropriate areas of the building, management may wish to consider installing card/fob activated, electronic locks to appropriate doors to control circulation or access to social spaces where a 'membership' (e.g., gym and cycle hub) or booking is required.
- 3.3.9 All external doors should be security rated.
- 3.3.10 Internal doors to plant rooms may be secured with FD-30 rate doors fitted with a fob-operated electronic or mechanical lock.

Studios

- 3.3.11 The studio entrance doors should be security-rated and include an electronic lock, which forms part of the security certification.

Cluster flats

- 3.3.12 The entrance door to a cluster should be security-rated and include an electronic lock, which forms part of the security certification.
- 3.3.13 Study bedroom doors should include an electronic lock and a fixed outer handle so that entry is only possible with an appropriately authorised card/fob.

Service/cycle store access gates

- 3.3.14 The access ramp to the basement level should be secured with high-speed vehicle gate and a pedestrian/cyclist pass gate; both should be around 2500mm high. The locking mechanism of both gates should be activated by a fob. The vehicle gates should be automated and include an audio-visual link to management staff so that contractors can be allowed entry remotely. The pedestrian/cyclist gate should be self-closing and self-locking, and the internal release button either hidden or shrouded, or both, to prevent abuse.

Cycle hub

- 3.3.15 The external entrance door to the cycle hub should be security-certified and be self-closing and self-locking. An alarm should sound at reception if this door remains open.
- 3.3.16 The internal circulation doors to the basement from the cores and the cycle stores should be FD-30 rated and secured with a fob-activated electronic lock.
- 3.3.17 A fob should be used to enter and leave the store. These doors should be self-closing and self-locking.
- 3.3.18 Cycle stands/racks should allow the cyclist to secure the wheels and frame to the stand/rack.

CCTV and lighting

- 3.3.19 A CCTV system should be installed capable of monitoring all building elevations and external doors, the lobby and reception area, the service access gates and the cycle stores.
- 3.3.20 All external doors should be illuminated from dusk to dawn.

4 Physical Security

The following checklist forms the physical security requirements for this scheme to achieve Secured by Design accreditation.

4.1 Service/cycle access gates

- ☐ The gates should be around 2500mm high, be self-closing and self-locking, and be designed in such a way that makes scaling them difficult.
- ☐ The cyclist gate should be fitted with an electronic lock that has a holding force of around 4500 Newtons. Access through the gates should be controlled by a card or fob presented to a reader at the side of the gate. An intercom system should be installed at the gate, with an audio link to reception, to enable residents or staff to communicate should fob-less entry be required.
- ☐ The vehicle gates should be motorised. Access in and out should be controlled by a card or fob presented to a reader at the side of the gate, or remotely by staff. An intercom system should be installed at the gate, with an audio link to reception, to enable staff to vet contractors prior to remotely operating the gate and allowing *bona fide* visitors entry.

4.2 Doors

Main entrance

- ☐ The main entrance door should be compliant with, and certified to, BS PAS 24, STS202, or LPS 1175 SR2, and include a multi-point electronic lock, (which is an integral part of the certification), capable of being operated via an electronic, access control system.
- ☐ The doors should be self-closing and self-locking.
- ☐ An audio-visual unit should relay images (one way) and audio (two ways) from the entrance to the reception desk. Staff should be able to open the outer and inner doors remotely.

External means of escape

- ☐ The means of escape doors should be compliant with, and certified to, BS PAS 24, STS202, or LPS 1175 SR2.
- ☐ There should be no external ironmongery on the escape doors.
- ☐ The doors should be self-closing and self-locking.

Cycle store

- ☐ The external cycle store door should be certified to BS PAS 24, STS202, or LPS 1175 SR2.
- ☐ The cycle store doors should be fob activated to both enter and to leave.
- ☐ All cycle store access doors should also be self-closing and lock securely upon closure.

Bin store and external store

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- ☐ The external doors should be certified to LPS 1175 sr 2.
 - ☐ The internal door should be fitted with an electronic lock requiring a fob/card to activate the lock on entry and exit.
 - ☐ In an emergency, panic hardware is acceptable on the inside of the street-facing doors.
 - ☐ All doors should also be self-closing and lock securely upon closure.

Plant room and sub-station

- ☐ The external doors to the plant room and sub-station should be certified to LPS 1175 sr 2, or be of steel construction, set in a steel frame and fitted with two British Standard locks or Sold Secure padlocks fitted at 1/3 points on each set of doors.

Inner lobby doors

- ☐ To minimise the risk of intruders 'tail-gating' legitimate residents/visitors, the inner lobby doors should include an electronic lock activated by a residents' fob. The doors should be self-closing and lock securely upon closure.

Studio and cluster flat entrance doors

- ☐ Entrance doors to the studios and cluster flats should be compliant with, and certified to, BS PAS 24, STS202, or LPS 1175 SR2 and include a door viewer. The doors should be self-closing and self-locking.
- ☐ Study bedroom doors should be FD-30 rated, solid-core doors fitted with a Secured by Design certified electronic lock and include a door viewer.

Administration office and parcel room

- ☐ The doors to the administration office and parcel room should be fitted with a British Standard lock or Secured by Design certified, electronic lock and be self-closing and lock securely on closure.

Roof access

- ☐ Doors providing access to roof spaces should be restricted to key-holding management and maintenance staff. The doors should be FD30-rated and fitted with at least one British Standard lock.

4.3 Windows

- ☐ Any opening windows at ground floor should be certified to PAS 24 or LPS 1175 sr2, have key-operated window locks and tamper-proof opening restrictors (limiting opening to 100mm) fitted.

4.4 Glazing

- ☐ Glazing within all of the ground floor entrance doors or means of escape doors, and ground floor windows/curtain walling, must incorporate at least one pane of glass rated as P4A under EN 356. The remaining pane in a double-glazed unit may be toughened glass. In the city centre it is advisable to use laminate glazing throughout the building.

4.5 Lighting

- ☐ External lighting must be provided to all external doors, the entrance gates and pathways around the development. Lights should be operated by photoelectric cell/daylight sensor.
- ☐ The main residents' entrance and the cyclist's entrance should be particularly well lit.
- ☐ Fittings should produce 'white' light, as opposed to yellow/orange light. Metal halide (or bulbs with a comparable output) should be used, as these offer superior colour rendition over alternatives such as high- and low-pressure sodium bulbs.

4.6 CCTV

- ☐ A CCTV system should be installed.
- ☐ Suitable locations for cameras are:
 - all elevations of the building, with particular focus on all external doors and the approach to the main entrance;

- lobby;
- reception area;
- the means of escape doors (internal view);
- service/cycle store access gates; and,
- the cycle store entrance doors and the within stores.

☐ Images should be, ideally, monitored, but at least recorded, with recording equipment securely located in the administration office, or at a suitable off-site CCTV monitoring/recording centre.

4.7 Cycle hub

☐ The external entrance door to the cycle hub should be compliant with, and certified to, BS PAS 24, STS202, or LPS 1175 SR2.

☐ An alarm should sound at reception if the external door remains open.

☐ The doors securing the cycle stores should be at least FD30 rated and fitted with an electronic lock. A fob/card should be used to activate the door to enter and leave the stores. The doors should be self-closing and self-locking. An alarm should sound at reception if the doors remain open.

☐ Cycle stands/racks should allow the cyclist to secure the wheels and frame to the stand/rack.

4.8 Signage

☐ Signs to indicate the name of the development should be erected at the main entrance.

5 Management & Maintenance

☐ A maintenance plan should be drawn up to address repairs to communal areas – amenity spaces, kitchens, social spaces, lighting, signage, access controls, and CCTV system.

6 Construction

☐ The developer should take appropriate measures to secure the site during construction, and control pedestrian and vehicular access in and out.

☐ The contractor should be a member of the 'Considerate Constructors Scheme'.

☐ Site security contractors should be Security Industry Authority, SIA, approved, (please see <http://www.sia.homeoffice.gov.uk/pages/acs-intro.aspx> for more details).

7 Secured by Design (SBD)

☐ To apply for Secured by Design certification for your development, visit our online application form at: <http://www.designforsecurity.org/secured-by-design/sbd-accreditation/>

A Contact Register

Date	Contact	Summary of Contact
03.02.23	Steven Bell, Turley Associates Ltd	Request for crime impact statement
05.03.23		Site visited
18.07.23	Steven Bell, Turley Associates Ltd	Report issued

B Associated Documents

This report is based on the following drawings:

Drawing No.	Drawing Title	Date	Rev
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ECHO-SRA-ZZ-00-DR-A-02100	General Arrangement Ground Floor Plan	03/02/23	P03
ECHO-SRA-ZZ-01-DR-A-02101	General Arrangement Level 01 Floor Plan	03/02/23	P03
ECHO-SRA-ZZ-02-DR-A-02102	General Arrangement Level 02 Floor Plan	03/02/23	P02
ECHO-SRA-ZZ-03-DR-A-02103	General Arrangement Level 03 Floor Plan	03/02/23	P02
ECHO-SRA-ZZ-04-DR-A-02104	General Arrangement Level 04 Floor Plan	03/02/23	P02
ECHO-SRA-ZZ-05-DR-A-02105	General Arrangement Level 05 Floor Plan	03/02/23	P02
ECHO-SRA-ZZ-06-DR-A-02106	General Arrangement Level 06 Floor Plan	03/02/23	P02
ECHO-SRA-ZZ-07-DR-A-02107	General Arrangement Level 07 Floor Plan	03/02/23	P02
ECHO-SRA-ZZ-08-DR-A-02108	General Arrangement Level 08 Floor Plan	03/02/23	P02
ECHO-SRA-ZZ-09-DR-A-02109	General Arrangement Level 09 Floor Plan	03/02/23	P02
ECHO-SRA-ZZ-10-DR-A-02110	General Arrangement Level 10 Floor Plan		P02
ECHO-SRA-ZZ-11-DR-A-02111	General Arrangement Level 11 Floor Plan	03/02/23	P02
ECHO-SRA-ZZ-12-DR-A-02112	General Arrangement Level 12 Floor Plan	03/02/23	P02
ECHO-SRA-ZZ-13-DR-A-02113	General Arrangement Level 13 Floor Plan	03/02/23	P02
ECHO-SRA-ZZ-14-DR-A-02114	General Arrangement Level 14 Floor Plan	03/02/23	P02
ECHO-SRA-ZZ-15-DR-A-02115	General Arrangement Level 15 Floor Plan	03/02/23	P02
ECHO-SRA-ZZ-16-DR-A-02116	General Arrangement Level 16 Floor Plan	03/02/23	P02
ECHO-SRA-ZZ-17-DR-A-02117	General Arrangement Level 17 Floor Plan	03/02/23	P02
ECHO-SRA-ZZ-18-DR-A-02118	General Arrangement Level 18 Floor Plan	03/02/23	P02
ECHO-SRA-ZZ-19-DR-A-02119	General Arrangement Level 19 Floor Plan	03/02/23	P02
ECHO-SRA-ZZ-20-DR-A-02120	General Arrangement Level 20 Floor Plan	03/02/23	P02
ECHO-SRA-ZZ-21-DR-A-02121	General Arrangement Level 21 Floor Plan	03/02/23	P02
ECHO-SRA-ZZ-22-DR-A-02122	General Arrangement Level 22 Floor Plan	03/02/23	P02
ECHO-SRA-ZZ-23-DR-A-02123	General Arrangement Level 23 Floor Plan	03/02/23	P02
ECHO-SRA-ZZ-24-DR-A-02124	General Arrangement Level 24 Floor Plan	03/02/23	P02
ECHO-SRA-ZZ-25-DR-A-02125	General Arrangement Level 25 Floor Plan	03/02/23	P02
ECHO-SRA-ZZ-26-DR-A-02126	General Arrangement Level 26 Floor Plan	18/01/22	P01
ECHO-SRA-ZZ-27-DR-A-02127	General Arrangement Level 27 Floor Plan	03/02/23	P02
ECHO-SRA-ZZ-B1-DR-A-02099	General Arrangement Basement Plan	03/02/23	P02
ECHO-SRA-ZZ-RF-DR-A-02128	General Arrangement Level Block C Roof Plan	03/02/23	P02
ECHO-SRA-ZZ-XX-DR-A-02201	General Arrangement North Elevation	03/02/23	P02
ECHO-SRA-ZZ-XX-DR-A-02202	General Arrangement South Elevation	03/02/23	P02
ECHO-SRA-ZZ-XX-DR-A-02203	General Arrangement West Elevation	03/02/23	P02
ECHO-SRA-ZZ-XX-DR-A-02204	General Arrangement East Elevation	03/02/23	P02
ECHO-SRA-ZZ-XX-DR-A-02205	General Arrangement Inner West Elevations	03/02/23	P02
ECHO-SRA-ZZ-XX-DR-A-02206	General Arrangement Inner East Elevations	03/02/23	P02
5426-SRA-ZS-XX-DR-A-00-800	Location Plan	15/11/17	P02

In the event of any changes to the scheme, it may be necessary for Design for Security to review the recommendations made within this report.

C CIS Version History

Version	Revisions	Date
A		18.07.23