



CRIME IMPACT STATEMENT

A development of 22 houses

AT Land off Princedom Street, Harpurhey, Manchester

FOR: Mosscafe St Vincents Housing Group Limited

VERSION A: 29.06.23

2023/0152/CIS/01

Greater Manchester Police

designforsecurity

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Development supported

We consider a residential scheme appropriate and are happy to support the proposals.

From a crime prevention perspective, the positive features of the development include:

- an appropriate number and design of houses;
- houses are orientated appropriately;
- a suitable amount of defensible space around each property;
- parking is included within the curtilage of the houses;
- appropriate boundary fencing will be installed to define semi-private and private space within the development; and,
- outdoor amenity space is provided for all residents.

Advice is included in the report, which we consider will enhance security of the development and this set out in section 3.3. The recommendations are summarised as follows:

- install Secured by Design standard doors, windows, glazing and door hardware for all properties;
- install an intruder alarm to each property;
- install appropriately secure, pedestrian to restrict access from the front to the rear garden of the houses and secure, vehicle gates where parking bays are located in the rear garden; and,
- provide a store or anchor at the rear of the houses to which residents may secure their bicycles.

At the planning application stage, Greater Manchester Police Design for Security will make representations to Manchester Planning to require the inclusion of a condition requiring the completed development to achieve Secured by Design, SBD, accreditation. Should the recommendations included in this report be adopted, I have every confidence that the scheme will achieve the award and the condition met.

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Consultant

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


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1 The Site and Surroundings

The photographs and plan below show the application site and its surroundings. The site is split into two development plots a northern and a southern plot. The neighbourhood is largely residential and contains a mixture of Victorian terraced housing and more modern social housing. Harpurhey district centre is a short distance to the west of the site.

The northern plot is rectangular in shape and is bound by Sequoia Street, to the north, by Princedom Street, to the south, by Simister Street, to the east, and by Jonas Street, to the west. Once occupied by terraced housing, the site has been vacant for many years and has been simply grassed and enclosed with a steel trip-rail to prevent unauthorised access by vehicles. The space is well-maintained and provides an amenity space for local residents. Traditional, terraced housing on Simister Street overlook the eastern side of site whilst more modern terraced houses have an outlook over the site from the north, on Sequoia Street. The rear boundary walls and parking bay access gates of houses that face Saltburn Walk define the western side of Jonas Street.

The development plot at the southern end of the site is irregularly shaped and has just one street boundary, the northern boundary which adjoins Princedom Street. The eastern and western boundaries are defined by high railings associated with alley-gating schemes which are designed to restrict access to the rear boundaries of houses that face Cicero Street to the east and Stanway Street, to the west. A 2000mm high, steel-palisade fence defines the site's southern boundary. The fence separates the rear gardens of houses that face Kingscliffe Street as well as a commercial, motor repair workshop, which is also accessed from Kingscliffe Street. Like the northern plot, the site is grassed, and a similar trip-rail has been installed to restrict vehicle access.



2 Crime Statistics & Analysis

All data below is based on crimes recorded between 1st April 2022 to 31st March 2023.

2.1 Crime Summary

Recorded Crime within 500m of Site									
Domestic Burglary	Non-Domestic Burglary	Criminal Damage	Less Serious Wounding	Theft	Robbery	Serious Wounding	Theft from Motor Vehicle	Theft of Motor Vehicle	Bicycle Theft
98	15	141	716	111	28	11	35	22	14

- 2.1.1 The overall rate of crime in the local area is high for the Manchester division, with less serious wounding, theft and criminal damage offences having been the highest recorded crimes taking place.
- 2.1.2 Less serious wounding offences have taken place throughout the local area, primarily in the streets within the residential neighbourhoods surrounding the site. Harassment and assaults have been the highest recorded offences taking place, with the majority of offences involving domestic disputes and altercations between unknown associates.
- 2.1.3 Criminal damage offences have also occurred, particularly around Batley Street. Offenders have mostly targeted vehicles and dwellings by using objects in order to smash glazing in windows and doors. Offenders have also used implements in order to damage vehicle tyres and scratch paintwork.
- 2.1.4 The majority of thefts have occurred within Harpurhey Shopping Centre where offenders have targeted insecure items left on tabletops and benches and have also used pickpocketing and distraction methods in order to remove items stored on the person such as mobile phones and bank cards/purses.

2.2 Typical modus operandi used in committing burglary, theft, criminal damage, and vehicle related crimes in Manchester, & measures to reduce vulnerabilities

2.2.1 Doors have been forced open with bodily pressure and tools

To minimise the risk of offenders forcing doors:

- all external doors should be certified to PAS 24 security standard;
- front doors should be visible to neighbouring properties and from the 'street' rather than set within recesses or on more secluded elevations;
- side or rear gardens should be enclosed with appropriately high fencing and locking gates so that rear doors are only accessible to residents; and,
- secluded passageways to the sides and rear of properties should be avoided wherever possible as such routes can facilitate offender access to rear gardens, as well as attract anti-social behaviours such as graffiti, fly-tipping and damage to fencing.

2.2.2 Doors have been targeted when left insecure

To minimise the risk of 'walk-in' burglaries:

- front doors should be fitted with a fixed handle or a 'split spindle', so that the only way in is with a key;
- communal entrance doors to apartments should be self-closing and lock automatically upon closing.
- defensible space should be provided between dwellings and the 'street', i.e., a small front garden enclosed with a suitably high fence. Separation of the passing public from a property can also help to reduce the risk of criminal damage; and,
- dusk-to-dawn lighting should be fitted to all external doors.

2.2.3 Windows have been prised open by offenders

To minimise the risk of prising windows open:

- all ground floor windows should include key operated locks and opening restrictors; and,
- access to the rear of the dwellings should be controlled by the erection of robust boundaries and locking gates. Pedestrian routes alongside the rear boundaries should be avoided wherever possible.

2.2.4 Glazing in doors and windows has been smashed to gain entry or commit criminal damage

To minimise the risk of offender smashing glazing in doors and windows:

- laminate glass should be fitted to all external doors and to all windows on the ground floor of the development;
- windows should be fitted with locks and opening restrictors; and,
- access to gardens should be restricted by installing appropriately high fencing and locking gates.

2.2.5 Vehicles were targeted when parked on driveways, in unsecured car parks or on the 'street'

To minimise the risk of vehicle-related crime:

- car parking should be located within the boundaries of the property, within an area that is both very secure and well overlooked by residents or monitored by an effective CCTV system.

2.2.6 Offenders have stolen bicycles

To minimise the risk of offenders targeting bicycles:

- a cycle store or a wall/floor anchor should be provided; and,
- rear garden gates should be robust, tall, self-closing and self-locking.

2.2.7 Offenders have damaged boundary fencing

To minimise the risk of offenders targeting fencing:

- rear garden boundaries should avoid being exposed to the public realm;
- communal pathways providing access to rear gardens should be secured with self-closing, self-locking gates; and,
- fencing should be especially robust when unavoidably exposed to the public realm.

2.2.8 Theft of plant and machinery, and criminal damage during the construction period.

To minimise the risk of offenders targeting the construction site:

- a secure boundary should be erected around the site;
- access should be restricted to contractors and authorised visitors;
- security staff should patrol during non-working hours;
- lighting and CCTV should be installed to illuminate the site and record activity;
- at the end of the working day, plant and machinery should be arranged to prevent forced access onto the site; and,
- plant and machinery should be fitted with a tracking device.

2.3 Risk Factors



The typical security risks for a development of this nature are:

- Domestic burglary



- Theft from garden or garden sheds
- Criminal damage to dwellings and vehicles
- Theft of, or from, vehicles
- Bogus callers and distraction burglary
- Anti-social behaviour
- Neighbour disputes
- Theft and criminal damage during the construction period
- Unauthorised access to private spaces
- Poor maintenance of access control systems

2.4 Comparing crime rates in the neighbourhood around the site to those in Manchester, Greater Manchester and England & Wales

The rates below relate to crime committed within 500m of the site. England & Wales data was last recorded for January – December 2021.



- 2.4.1 The rate of domestic burglaries per 1000 dwellings is **110% higher** than Manchester as a whole, **170% higher** than Greater Manchester and **177% higher** than England & Wales.
- 2.4.2 The rate of woundings per 1000 dwellings is **43% higher** than Manchester as a whole, **94% higher** than Greater Manchester and **271% higher** than England & Wales.




- 2.4.3 The rate of incidents of criminal damage per 1000 dwellings is **56% higher** than Manchester as a whole, **104% higher** than Greater Manchester and **148% higher** than England & Wales.


- 2.4.4 The rate of incidents of vehicle crime per 1000 dwellings is **26% lower** than Manchester as a whole, **21% higher** than Greater Manchester and **48% higher** than England & Wales.

2.5 Domestic Burglary

The data below relates to domestic burglaries committed within 500m of the site.



- 2.5.1 **Day/Time Range:** The risk of domestic burglary peaks on a Saturday during around midnight. Offenders often target properties during at this time when it is dark and there is less footfall in the area, giving offenders the perception that they are less likely to be caught or identified.




- 2.5.2 **Point of Entry:** In the local area the following entry points and MO's have been utilised most frequently:

- Forcing open secure windows and doors using bodily pressure and implements in order to gain access to the property.
- In cases where the entry point is “unknown” it is likely that offenders have exploited insecure windows and doors.
- Smashed glazing in windows and doors using implements.

2.6 Vehicle Crime

The data below relates to vehicle crime committed within 500m of the site.



- 2.6.1 **Day/Time Range:** The risk of vehicle crime peaks on a Thursday during the late evening and at midnight. Offenders often target vehicles late at night as they are often left unattended and out of sight of the owner for long periods of time, creating a perceived low risk opportunity.

3 Development Appraisal

3.1 The proposed development

- 3.1.1 A development of 11 pairs of two-storey, three-bedroom, semi-detached houses is proposed, six pairs will be constructed on the northern plot and five on the southern plot.
- 3.1.2 Three of the pairs on the northern plot will face Jonas Street and three will face Princedom Street. Each house will have a front and rear garden. Seven of the twelve houses will have rear-garden, parking bays (one space per dwelling), whilst the remaining five will have parking bays to the front or side of the house. Front garden, street edge, boundaries will be defined with a 900mm high, brick and railing. Also, at the front of the houses, 900mm high, railings will be erected between adjoining houses. The rear gardens will each be enclosed with 1800mm high, timber fencing with timber, pedestrian and vehicle gates (where appropriate). To reduce the impact of lengths of timber fencing on the streetscene, low maintenance hedges will be planted in front of the fencing
- 3.1.3 All five pairs of houses on the southern plot will face Princedom Street. Again, each house will have a modest, front garden and a generous, rear garden. Car parking, one space per house, will be located to the front or side of the property. The same boundary fencing will be installed on the southern plot as that proposed on the northern plot.

3.2 Positive aspects of the proposals

- 3.2.1 A residential development is an appropriate use for the site given the surrounding land uses.
- 3.2.2 The proposals will result in the redevelopment of land which, if it remains unused may attract criminal and anti-social activity, for example, fly-tipping, which may affect the quality of life of nearby residents and security of their houses.
- 3.2.3 The developer has a proven record in the construction and management of residential developments.
- 3.2.4 The development includes family housing, which helps to diversify the resident population. A broader age range of residents can help to retain a presence throughout the day, e.g., families with young children and working people.
- 3.2.5 There are a significant number of houses within the development, which increases the likelihood of residents of some of the properties being present throughout the day. The presence of residents or even just visible signs of people present - cars on driveways, lights on, external lighting on at entrance doors, for example - will help to deter offenders.
- 3.2.6 Residents of houses adjoining the site will benefit from mutual surveillance of their properties.

-
- 3.2.7 The proposed layout of the dwellings will help to animate the streets and facilitate passive surveillance across the development.
 - 3.2.8 Secure parking is provided at each dwelling.
 - 3.2.9 Front and rear gardens will be defined with suitably high and robust fencing and gates.

3.3 Recommendations to improve the security of the scheme

House security

- 3.3.1 Secured by Design standard, doors, window frames and glazing should be installed within each house. In neighbourhoods with a high burglary rate such as this, the installation of an intruder alarm is strongly recommended.

Rear garden fencing and gates

- 3.3.2 Rear garden access, vehicle gates should be particularly robust and secure.
- 3.3.3 To allow motorist and cyclists to come and go, pedestrian and vehicle, rear garden, entry gates should be fitted with a lock that allows entry and exit with the use of a key.
- 3.3.4 Shared access pathway between houses should be secured with an 1800mm high lockable gate installed as close to the front building line as is feasible.

Cycle parking

- 3.3.5 Include a ground or wall anchor at the rear of each house to which bicycles may be secured or provide an appropriately, secure, cycle shelter (ideally a Secured by Design accredited store) within the rear garden of each property.

4 Physical Security

The following checklist forms the physical security requirements for this scheme to achieve Secured by Design accreditation.

4.1 Doors

- ☐ Front doors and rear doors should all be compliant with, and certified to, BS PAS 24, STS 202 BR2, or LPS 1175 SR2.
- ☐ Front doors should have fixed external handles or split spindles, meaning access is only possible with a key when closed.
- ☐ Front doors should have fixed sidelights or a door viewer, as well as an opening limiter fitted, so that residents can identify visitors prior to opening the door fully.
- ☐ Letter plates should meet the Door Hardware Federation's Technical Standard 008 (TS 008), be fitted with deflector plate, and be located a minimum of 400mm away from the internal handle and locking hardware.
- ☐ Each house should be clearly numbered with the number visible from the street.

4.2 Window frames

- ☐ Ground floor windows of the houses should be compliant with, and certified to, BS PAS 24, be fitted with key-operated locks, and have fixed/lockable opening restrictors (not releasable from the outside) limiting opening to 100mm.

4.3 Glazing

- ☐ Glazing within, and surrounding, all external doors and all ground floor windows of the houses should incorporate at least one pane of glass rated as P1A under EN 356.

4.4 Alarms

- ☐ It is good practice to fit an alarm to each house. Alarms should be linked to contacts on all external doors, with PIR detectors covering all ground floor rooms that have windows. In the absence of an alarm a 13amp fuse spur should be provided to allow future residents to fit their own alarm.

4.5 Boundaries

- ☐ The proposed boundary treatment plan is ideal and should be installed as proposed.
- ☐ Vehicle gates should be especially robust, ideally including a steel frame, and fitted with an integral lock within the frame rather than a rim latch style lock, which provides very poor security.
- ☐ Rear garden gates should include a lock that can be operated from either side of the gate. Ideally, the pedestrian gates should be self-closing and self-locking.

4.6 Lighting

- ☐ Dusk-to-dawn lighting must be provided to all external front and rear doors of all houses. Lamps should produce a 'white' light and be operated by photoelectric cell/daylight sensor.

4.7 Meter cupboards

- ☐ Unless smart meters are installed, meters should be located in ground level boxes to the front of each house, not with the secure area at the side or rear of the properties.

4.8 Downpipes

- ☐ Wherever possible, downpipes should be square in profile and fixed back to the brickwork to prevent climbing to upper floor windows.

5 Construction

- ☐ The developer should take appropriate measures to secure their site during construction, and control pedestrian and vehicular access in and out.
- ☐ Site security contractors should be Security Industry Authority (SIA) approved.

6 Secured by Design (SBD)

- ☐ Secured by Design focuses on crime prevention at the design, layout, and construction stages of homes and promotes the use of security standards for a wide range of applications and products. To apply for Secured by Design certification for your development, visit our online application form at: <http://www.designforsecurity.org/secured-by-design/sbd-accreditation/>

A Contact Register

Date	Contact	Summary of Contact
30.03.23	Daniel Sutton, AEW	Request for Crime Impact Statement
09.06.23		Site visited
29.06.23	Daniel Sutton, AEW	Report issued

B Associated Documents

This report is based on the following:

Drawing No.	Drawing Title	Date	Rev
12192-AEW-XX-XX-DR-A-0001	Existing – Site Layout	03/12/21	P1
12192-AEW-XX-XX-DR-A-0500	Site – Location Plan	03/12/21	P1
12192-AEW-XX-XX-DR-A-0502	Proposed – Site Layout – Presentation	03/12/21	P1
12192-AEW-XX-XX-DR-A-0503	Proposed – Site Layout – Ground Floor	03/12/21	P1
12192-AEW-XX-XX-DR-A-0503	Proposed – Site Layout	03/12/21	P1
12192-AEW-XX-XX-DR-A-0504	Proposed – Site Layout – Boundary Treatment	03/12/21	P1
12192-AEW-XX-XX-DR-A-0506	Proposed – Street Elevations	03/12/21	P1
DALL02-ILK-X-ZZ-DR-IN-0001	Dallington Version 1 No Ensuite	02/02/21	P01

In the event of any changes to the scheme, it may be necessary for Design for Security to review the recommendations made in this report.

C CIS Version History

Version	Revisions	Date
A		29.06.23