



CRIME IMPACT STATEMENT

1 PARK PLACE, MANCHESTER

154 no. RESIDENTIAL APARTMENTS, GROUND FLOOR COMMERCIAL UNITS &
MEZZANINE RESIDENTIAL AMENITY SPACE

Greater Manchester Police

designforsecurity

FOR: Benjamin Property Company Limited

VERSION C: 05/10/2023

REFERENCE: 2008/0761/CIS/01

1 Park Place, Manchester

URN: 2008/0761/CIS/01

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Minor design changes/additions required

This development has been assessed against the principles of 'Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design' (CPTED), in order to reduce the opportunities for crime and the fear of crime.

The layout of the proposed scheme is considered acceptable as long as the issues discussed in more detail within Section 3.3 of this report are addressed, namely:

- The hidden pedestrian route/courtyard space to the south of the building (and ideally the service access route to the west) should be enclosed and gated for the use and access of residents/staff only, in order to prevent loitering/gathering, nuisance, anti-social behaviour and mis-use. Through-access to Skip Place should remain closed off until such time as the future development of the wider area improves activity along and surveillance opportunities over the route.
- Robust control of access into the building, including a single-leaf communal entrance if the concierge is not full-time (which can be more effectively secured/operated remotely than a double door).

If these issues can be addressed as described within the report and the other physical security measures are incorporated, we would be happy to support the development.

Please note: Greater Manchester Police Design for Security will recommend to the local planning authority that a planning condition is added that reflects the physical security specification listed within Sections 4 & 5 of this report.



Bradley Hart MTCP

Design for Security Consultant

Contents

1	Visual Audit.....	5
2	Crime Statistics & Analysis.....	6
	2.1 Crime Summary	
	2.2 Crime Rate Comparison (Local Area)	
	2.3 Local Domestic Burglary: Risk Analysis	
	2.4 Non-Domestic Burglary (Manchester Retail): Risk Analysis	
	2.5 Theft (Manchester Retail): Risk Analysis	
	2.1 Non-Domestic Burglary (Manchester Restaurants/Cafés): Risk Analysis	
	2.2 Theft (Manchester Restaurants/Cafés): Risk Analysis	
	2.3 Non-Domestic Burglary (Manchester Offices): Risk Analysis	
	2.4 Theft (Manchester Offices): Risk Analysis	
	2.5 General Risk Factors	
	2.6 Common Use-Specific M.O.s (Modus Operandi)	
3	Layout Appraisal.....	17
	3.1 Proposed Development	
	3.2 Positive Aspects of the Proposal	
	3.3 Points for Further Consideration	
4	Physical Security (Residential).....	19
	4.1 Doors & Access Controls	
	4.2 Windows	
	4.3 Glazing & Building Fabric	
	4.4 Alarms	
	4.5 Boundaries	
	4.6 Lighting	
	4.7 Landscaping	
	4.8 Other	
5	Physical Security (Commercial Units).....	22
	5.1 Doors & Access Controls	
	5.2 Windows & Shutters	
	5.3 Glazing & Building Fabric	
	5.4 Alarms	
	5.5 Lighting	
	5.6 CCTV	
6	Internal Layout Guidance	24
	6.1 Retail Premises	
	6.2 Cafe/Restaurant Premises	
7	Management & Maintenance	26
8	Construction	27
9	Useful References.....	27
	9.1 Secured by Design (SBD)	

Appendix

A	Contact Register.....	28
B	Associated Documents.....	28
C	CIS Version History	30
D	Glossary	31


1 Visual Audit

The site lies on the west side of Cheetham Hill Road – the main route into Manchester city centre from the north. It is currently occupied by a seemingly vacant single-storey commercial building, with off-road pay & display parking spaces along its front and north side elevations. The building itself is fortified with external shutters to its door and window openings, barbed wire along part of its eaves and CCTV cameras – indicating it may have experienced crime and disorder issues in the past. The rear of the building (to the west) is overgrown and enclosed with high railings and vehicular gates accessed off Park Place.

The site lies on the west side of Cheetham Hill Road – the main route into Manchester city centre from the north. On the opposite side of Cheetham Hill Road from the site is a high-rise apartment block, the Park Inn hotel and a Texaco petrol station, beyond which is the Green Quarter residential development. To the immediate south of the site is a home goods retailer and lawyer premises fronting onto Cheetham Hill Road and backing onto a narrow, unlit, cobbled service route (Skip Place) that abuts the rear boundary of the site and also serves a car park on a vacant site to the west.

Park Place is short cul-de-sac route, with a bank on the opposite side from the site and commercial properties along it (with off-road parking spaces along their frontages). There is a 3 storey office/commercial building to the west of the site, with a central parking/service area secured with gates off Park Place. At the end of the route is a pay & display car park on a currently vacant site. There are numerous such facilities around the edges of the city centre, which generally lack activity/footfall/surveillance and have poor lighting levels. The informal nature of such facilities (which often have a lack of formal surveillance/capable guardians such as patrolling guards, monitored CCTV, no formalised bays/clear directional routes, loose surface material that can be used to commit crime/cause damage) mean that vehicle crime is often prevalent. Offenders know that vehicles are often left unattended for long periods at such facilities, leaving them vulnerable.

The wider Cheetham Hill area surrounding the is primarily commercial in nature including a number of warehouse/distribution/storage buildings and wholesale retail units. The streets in the surrounding area are busy with parked vehicles and vehicular traffic during the day, although they are much quieter at night and pedestrian footfall is particularly low – resulting in limited overlooking and surveillance opportunities and leaving the buildings vulnerable to attack and unauthorised access unseen. As a result, many of the buildings are heavily fortified with shutters, external bars/grilles and barbed wire, vehicle barriers/bollards etc. Service yards and parking areas are primarily enclosed with high Palisade fencing and gates, many of which also have barbed wire above them. Such unsightly, overt measures can be visually intrusive and can raise the fear of crime. Some of the nearby streets also suffer from large amounts of graffiti, littering/fly-tipping and scrub vegetation/weeds – such features can create the impression that the environment is not cared for and that abuse is tolerated.



2 Crime Statistics & Analysis

2.1 Crime Summary

All data below is based on crimes recorded between 1st September 2022 to 31st August 2023.





Figure 1: Recorded Crime within 500m of Site

Domestic Burglary	Non-Domestic Burglary	Criminal Damage	Less Serious Wounding	Theft	Robbery	Serious Wounding	Theft from Motor Vehicle	Theft of Motor Vehicle	Bicycle Theft
46	67	115	541	172	31	50	266	34	13

- 2.1.1 The general volume of crime in the local area is high, with the most prevalent types of recorded crime being less serious wounding, vehicle crime and theft. These types of crime are typical of those experienced in, or within, close proximity of city centres – where there is a concentration of retail, commercial and licensed premises, leading to a concentration of crime and disorder issues. A number of the recorded crimes in the area have also occurred at the prison to the north-west.
- 2.1.2 Less serious woundings have taken place throughout the local area, with a hotspot of offences occurring around Victoria Station/AO Arena and around/off Cheetham Hill Road. Assaults and public order offences have been the highest recorded less serious woundings taking place, often occurring late at night/over the weekend with alcohol consumption being a contributing factor. There have also been a number of assault offences at the nearby prison.
- 2.1.3 Theft from motor vehicle has been the most common type of vehicle crime offence, with the risk rising in the afternoon and into the evening (with a particularly hotspot on the streets surrounding the site and to the immediate south). It is likely that offenders target vehicles at these times when people park on streets and in informal car parks in the area for long periods of time, while working in the area/in the city or attending nearby events/attractions. Vehicles parked on streets or within open car parks (particularly when they are not staffed, have poor lighting levels and poor surface/boundary treatments), where they are easily accessible and cannot be easily overlooked by their owners, are often more vulnerable to attack than those parked within secure parking facilities.
- 2.1.4 Theft offences have also taken place throughout the local area, with a hotspot of offences around/off Lord Street to the east and Victoria Station/AO Arena to the south. Theft of parcels/bags left unattended from doorsteps, tables and communal areas of flats have accounted for most of the recorded offences, as well as incidents of personal thefts (with offenders using pickpocketing and distraction techniques to obtain items such as mobile phones or wallets/purses). There have also been cases of clamps placed by the Council being removed and stolen from parked vehicles in the local area.
- 2.1.5 As this CIS report relates to a residential apartments and Class E commercial use, the more detailed analysis below will focus on local residential burglary and use-specific burglary and theft.

2.2 Crime Rate Comparison (Local Area)


The rates below relate to crime committed within 500m of the site. England & Wales data was last recorded for January – December 2017.



- 2.2.1 The rate of domestic burglaries (i.e. incidents per 1,000 dwellings) in the local area is **22% lower** than the rate for Manchester as a whole, **equal to** the rate for Greater Manchester and **3% higher** than the rate for England & Wales.
- 2.2.2 The rate of woundings (i.e. incidents per 1,000 dwellings) in the local area is **8% lower** than the rate for Manchester as a whole, **25% higher** than the rate for Greater Manchester and **139% higher** than the rate for England & Wales.
- 2.2.3 The rate of incidents of criminal damage (i.e. incidents per 1,000 dwellings) in the local area is **1% higher** than the rate for Manchester as a whole, **32% higher** than the rate for Greater Manchester and **60% higher** than the rate for England & Wales.
- 2.2.4 The rate of incidents of vehicle crime (i.e. incidents per 1,000 dwellings) in the local area is **198% higher** than the rate for Manchester as a whole, **390% higher** than the rate for Greater Manchester and **495% higher** than the rate for England & Wales.

2.3 Local Domestic Burglary: Risk Analysis


The data below relates to domestic burglaries committed within 500m of the site.




- 2.3.1 **Day Range:** During the week, the risk of domestic burglary peaks on Tuesday and is lowest on Sunday.
- 2.3.2 **Time Range:** During the day, the risk peaks during the afternoon and in the early hours of the morning. Residents are more likely to be away from home (at work or otherwise) during the day, meaning that offenders can attempt to gain unauthorised access without fear of being disturbed. There tends to be more activity at the communal entrances of large apartment blocks during the day than at night, with residents and visitors coming and going and deliveries being made, meaning offenders can often gain unauthorised access (e.g. via tailgating) without being noticed. At night, when it is dark and streets tend to be quieter than during the day, offenders can perceive a lower risk of being observed or detected when attempting to force entry.
- 2.3.3 **Point of Entry:** In the local area, the following entry points and MOs have been utilised most frequently:
- In the vast majority of cases, the entry point is recorded as unknown. A high proportion of these recorded incidents involve offenders gaining access to insecure lobbies or parcel stores to steal parcels. Offenders have also tailgated/posed as legitimate visitors to gain access to apartment blocks to target cycle stores or apartments themselves.

2.4 Non-Domestic Burglary (Manchester Retail): Risk Analysis

The data below relates to non-domestic burglary offences within/against retail facilities, recorded in the Manchester area 2018-2019.



- 2.4.1 **Day Range:** The risk of burglary at retail premises in Manchester peaks slightly on Wednesday, but remains relatively consistently high across the week.
- 2.4.2 **Time Range:** During the day, the risk of burglary peaks late at night and during in the early hours of the morning. Offenders often target commercial premises at these times when they are closed, it is dark and the areas in which they are typically located are quiet - all of which contribute to offenders perceiving a lower risk of being observed or detected.



- 2.4.3 **Point of Entry:** In burglaries at Manchester retail premises, the following entry points and MO's have been utilised most frequently:
- A large proportion of burglaries have been committed through shutters, forcing them open by various means including using implements to force them upwards, using vehicles to ram them and using tools to cut through them.
 - Offenders have also routinely forced open doors with bodily pressure and tools, as well as smashing glazed panels within them to gain unauthorised access.
 - Windows have also been prised open or smashed by offenders.
 - A high number of burglaries are recorded as having 'legitimate' or 'unknown' entry points. This is likely to have been where offenders have posed as legitimate customers before targeting restricted/back-of-house areas (such as staff rooms, stock rooms etc.) unnoticed.
 - Offenders have gained access to premises by gaining access through the roofs of single-storey elements or by penetrating through walls.

2.5 Theft (Manchester Retail): Risk Analysis



The data below relates to thefts within/against retail facilities, recorded in the Manchester area 2018-2019.



- 2.5.1 **Day/Time Range:** During the week, the risk of theft at Manchester retail premises remains consistently high across the week. During the day, the risk of theft is concentrated in the afternoon and early evening. This is when retail premises are typically at their busiest and, therefore, the opportunities to offend are greater. The majority of thefts are either of staff property or of/from the handbags of shoppers (such as mobile phones, purses etc.). Theft of staff property are more likely to be noticed at either midday, when lunch breaks are taken, or during the late afternoon when staff are leaving for the day.


2.1 Non-Domestic Burglary (Manchester Restaurants/Cafés): Risk Analysis

The data below relates to non-domestic burglary offences within/against restaurants and cafés, recorded in the Manchester area during 2018-2019.



- 2.1.1 **Day Range:** The risk of burglary at restaurants/cafés in Manchester fluctuates throughout the week, peaking on Monday, Thursday and Sunday.
- 2.1.2 **Time Range:** The risk of burglary peaks during the early hours of the morning, when premises are usually closed.

M/cr Restaurant/Cafe Burglary – Point of Entry




- 2.1.3 **Point of Entry:** In the majority of cases where entry points are known, offenders have entered Manchester restaurants/cafes through external doors. Doors have been forced open with bodily pressure and tools/implements and glazing within doors/windows has been smashed to gain entry. Offenders have also posed as legitimate customers before targeting insecure doors, tailgating, or using force to open internal doors to restricted areas when premises are open to the public.


2.2 Theft (Manchester Restaurants/Cafés): Risk Analysis

The data below relates to thefts within/against restaurants and cafés, recorded in the Manchester area during 2018-2019.

M/cr Restaurant/Cafe Theft – Day Range




M/cr Restaurant/Cafe Theft – Time Range



- 2.2.1 **Day Range:** During the week, the risk of theft at Manchester restaurants/cafes peaks over the weekend. Many premises experience higher levels of attendance at the weekend than during the week. Premises are also usually open for longer at the weekend and so the opportunities for offenders to commit theft is greater.
- 2.2.2 **Time Range:** The risk of theft peaks in the afternoon and into the evening. This reflects the times when restaurants/cafes are typically at their busiest and, therefore, the opportunities to commit theft are greater. Handbags, purses/wallets and mobile phones belonging to customers are the most routinely stolen items. Offenders have also targeted I.T equipment within premises, particularly tablets and laptops, as well as alcohol from storage rooms.

2.3 Non-Domestic Burglary (Manchester Offices): Risk Analysis


The data below relates to non-domestic burglary offences within/against offices, recorded in the Manchester area 2018-2019.



- 2.3.1 **Day Range:** During the week, the risk of burglary at office premises in Manchester is greatest on Tuesday, Thursday and Sunday.
- 2.3.2 **Time Range:** During the day, the risk of burglary at Manchester office premises rises into the evening/late at night. Such premises are often targeted at these times when they are closed and unoccupied, meaning offenders can attempt to gain unauthorised access without fear of being disturbed or identified.
- 2.3.3 **Point of Entry:** The majority of burglaries at offices in Manchester have been committed through doors. Burglaries against office buildings in this area do not appear to be opportunistic, with offenders often bringing tools with them that can be used to force open doors and cut locks. Offenders have also smashed glazed panels in doors and windows to gain entry. A large proportion of burglaries have been committed through 'unknown' and 'legitimate' points of entry, which are likely to have been where offenders (posing as legitimate customers, visitors or employees) have gained unauthorised access to staff only areas (i.e. through insecure doors, tailgating etc.) to steal property.

2.4 Theft (Manchester Offices): Risk Analysis

The data below relates to thefts within/against offices, recorded in the Manchester area 2018-2019.



- 2.4.1 **Day Range:** During the week, the risk of theft at Manchester offices is greatest on Monday and Tuesday and is generally lower over the weekend (when many are shut).
- 2.4.2 **Time Range:** During the day, the risk of theft is concentrated during normal working hours – peaking around midday. During these times, many office workers will take their lunch breaks, leaving unattended property at desks or in insecure areas. Thefts can also often happen at the end of the working day, when members of staff are finishing work and premises is likely to be less secure, such as while cleaning operations are carried out.

2.5 General Risk Factors

- 2.5.1 **Residential:** The typical security risks for a development of this nature are:

- Domestic burglary
- Bogus callers and distraction burglary
- Criminal damage to property and vehicles
- Theft from gardens, sheds or garages
- Anti-social behaviour
- Theft of/from parked vehicles
- Unauthorised access to buildings/private space
- Tailgating (pedestrian and vehicular)
- Neighbour disputes
- Poor maintenance of access control systems
- Theft and criminal damage during the construction period

- 2.5.2 **Retail:** The typical security risks for a development of this nature are:

- Burglary
- Robbery
- Shoplifting
- Violence towards staff
- Theft of personal belongings at work
- Criminal damage to property and vehicles
- Unauthorised access to buildings/private space
- Arson

- Employee theft
- Loitering groups
- Theft of/from parked vehicles
- Theft and criminal damage during the construction period

2.5.3 **Cafes/Restaurants:** The typical security risks for a development of this nature are:

- Burglary
- Robbery to business
- Criminal damage to property
- Alcohol-fuelled violence/conflict
- Miscellaneous theft to customers
- Rowdy and inconsiderate behaviour
- Conflict of use with neighbouring venues
- Violence towards staff
- Safety of staff personal belongings
- Robbery/wounding of patrons leaving premises
- Theft and criminal damage during the construction period

2.5.4 **Offices:** The typical security risks for a development of this nature are:

- Burglary
- Violence towards staff
- Theft of personal belongings at work
- Criminal damage to property and vehicles
- Unauthorised access to buildings/private space
- Arson
- Cycle theft
- Employee theft
- Theft of/from parked vehicles
- Theft and criminal damage during the construction period

2.6 Common Use-Specific M.O.s (Modus Operandi)

2.6.1 Having looked at the crime data for the site and the surrounding area, the most frequent M.O.s used by offenders when targeting local residential properties and Manchester hotels, retail premises, cafés/restaurants and offices are listed below, along with suggested measures to reduce the risk of them being utilised at the proposed development:

- **Local Residential:** In the vast majority of cases, the entry point is recorded as unknown. A high proportion of these recorded incidents involve offenders gaining access to insecure lobbies or parcel stores to steal parcels. Offenders have also tailgated/posed as legitimate visitors to gain access to apartment blocks to target cycle stores or apartments themselves.

Possible Solution - All external doors should be certified to recognised security standards (see Sections 4.1), which are independently proven to reduce the risk of forced entry and thus increase the chances of detection. A robust access control system should be in place to allow residents to vet visitors to apartment blocks before allowing them access (see Sections 4.1). The main communal entrance to the block should be located in a highly visible position and should be well-lit to deter offenders from trying to gain unauthorised access. Consideration could also be given to 'airlock' lobby system, which features a secondary entrance door that only releases when the external door has closed, reducing the opportunities for tailgating unnoticed.

There should be a secure system for the delivery of post and parcels that allows them to be stored in a secure location without requiring access to all floors/areas of the building (see Section 4.1). Cycle stores should also be secured with security-certified doors, robust access-controls (to ensure resident-only access) and include stands that allow residents to lock their cycles in two positions (see Section 4.8).

All individual apartments should also be secured with a security-certified entrance doorset (also see Section 4.1), to ensure that any offender who may have gained access to the building (e.g. by tailgating, posing as a legitimate visitor etc.) cannot gain further access without drawing the attention of other residents. Doors off internal corridors should not be located in deep recesses, where an offender could operate without fear of detection. There should be no balconies that would be publicly accessible from street level.

- **Manchester Offices, Retail & Restaurants/Cafes:** Doors have been forced open with tools and bodily pressure to gain entry

Possible Solution - All external doors should be certified to recognised security standards (see Section 5.1), which are independently proven to reduce the risk of forced entry and thus increase the chances of detection. Security-certified doors are the best long-term measure to address this risk and can be obtained to suit virtually all operational requirements. Good use of perimeter boundaries, lighting (see Section 5.5) and CCTV (see Section 5.6) can also deter criminals by preventing access to vulnerable areas and increasing the chances of them being seen by security personnel or passers-by.

- **Manchester Offices:** Offenders posing as legitimate customers/visitors to gain access and steal items of personal property

Possible Solution – There should be robust access control systems in place to ensure that callers to the office building are vetted and/or met and escorted before being allowed access into them (see Sections 5.1). All individual rooms should be capable of being secured when unoccupied and there should be secure areas for staff to store their belongings while at work. All staff should understand and accept the need for security measures and should be trained to be vigilant and to report any suspicious behaviour.

- **Manchester Offices & Restaurants/Cafes:** Glazing in doors and windows has been smashed to gain access

Possible Solution – All ground floor/accessible glazing (including in and around doors) should include a laminated pane (see Section 5.3), which forms a much more robust barrier against shattering and penetration. The strength of the laminated glass should be relative to the strength of the door or window system in which it is fitted. Where possible, the size of any glazed elements within/directly adjacent to doors should be reduced and set well away from locking points.

- **Manchester Retail:** A large proportion of burglaries have been committed through shutters, forcing them open by various means including using implements to force them upwards, using vehicles to ram them and using tools to cut through them

Possible Solution - Roller shutters can appear secure in that they are difficult to penetrate, however physical security products are only as strong as their weakest component. A security-certified shutter (see Section 5.2) has an independently proven level of resistance, and ensures that all aspects of the shutter (locks, rails, laths etc.) have been scrutinised by professionals. If external shutters are used, ideally the shutter boxes and guides should be built into the fabric of the building to deter tampering/attack.

- **Manchester Retail:** Windows have also been prised open or smashed by offenders

Possible Solution - All external windows should be certified to recognised security standards (see Section 5.2) where possible, which are independently proven to reduce the risk of forced entry and thus increase the chances of detection. All ground floor/accessible glazing (including in and around doors) should include a laminated pane (see Section 5.3), which forms a much more robust barrier against shattering and penetration. Vulnerable shopfronts should be secured with security-certified shutters out-of-hours.

-
- **Manchester Retail & Restaurants/Cafes:** A high number of burglaries are recorded as having 'legitimate' or 'unknown' entry points. This is likely to have been where offenders have posed as legitimate customers before targeting restricted/back-of-house areas (such as staff rooms, stock rooms etc.) unnoticed

Possible Solution – There should be a secure area for staff to store their belongings while at work and all staff-only, back-of-house areas should be secured to prevent unauthorised public access (see Section 5.1).

- **Manchester Retail:** Offenders have gained access to premises by gaining access through the roofs of single-storey elements or by penetrating through walls.

Possible Solution - Ideally, single storey building elements should be avoided. If they are absolutely necessary, care should be taken in their design to ensure that roof areas or upper floor windows are not accessible, for example, with the use of high-level/overhanging eaves, high balustrades etc. There should be no features of the building or any nearby hard/soft landscaping features that would facilitate climbing. Any 'accessible' skylights should incorporate at least one pane of laminated glazing and should be secured with internally fixed grilles/bars to prevent unauthorised access. The construction of the roof itself and all external walls should also be robust enough to withstand penetration.

- **Manchester Restaurants/Cafes & Retail:** Theft of personal property from table tops or from bags hung on chairs or stored under tables

Possible Solution – Consideration should be given to tables and chairs designed to facilitate secure storage of belongings or adapted with 'Chelsea Clips' to reduce the opportunities to steal bags/coats (see Section 6). The layout of any bars/restaurants/lounges can also help deter occurrences and increase surveillance opportunities. It should be generally uncluttered, allowing clear views of all spaces and avoiding any pinch points or areas of concealment. External seating areas should be enclosed to clearly define them as separate from adjacent pedestrian routes.

understood that the service access route to the west of the building is intended as a key route linking Park Place to Park Street to the south (via Skip Place), in line with the Strategic Regeneration Framework (SRF) masterplan for the future development of the area. At present, Skip Place is a narrow, unlit, cobbled service route that benefits from little/no overlooking or natural surveillance. If the service route links to Skip Place in its current form, it could form an easy access/escape route for criminals to utilise unseen and is likely to leave the scheme vulnerable. It is highly recommended that access through to Skip Place remains closed off as it is at present, and the service access route is itself enclosed and gated, until such time as Skip Place is improved and the development of the wider area improves activity along and surveillance opportunities over the route. If the service access must remain open/accessible, at the very least the hidden courtyard space and narrow route between the scheme and the existing building to the south should be enclosed/gated to prevent unauthorised access to all but residents and staff (see above for illustration and Section 4.5 for more information). This should be conditioned as part of any approval.

- 3.3.2 The communal residential entrance to the building should be formed by a single-leaf, self-closing doorset secured with a multi-point electronic lock permitted as part of the security-certification, which is easier to secure and operate remotely via an access control system. A double-leaf communal residential entrance doorset is only appropriate where the entrance lobby is staffed by a 24 hour concierge, who can oversee, control and direct all visitor access/egress to/from the building at all times. There should also be a secure system for the delivery of post that does not require access to all floors of the building (see Section 4.1 for more information). Given the issues in the area with parcel thefts (see Section 2), parcel deliveries should be managed and stored within a secure post room by the concierge (if there is to be one). If not, there should be a secure system for depositing parcels, such as the smart parcel boxes used by the major internet shopping companies, incorporated within the secure postal lobby (again, see Section 4.1 for more information).
- 3.3.3 The ground floor and mezzanine level of the building will be set back at the residential entrance to the building, creating a sheltered area with colonnades underneath the upper floors of the building. The area should be well-lit and as high/shallow as possible to reduce the amount of shelter/comfort provided, to ensure it does not foster loitering/gathering that could intimidate residents or visitors. Consideration should also be given to the need for multiple benches along the facades of the building (particular where ground floor elevations are blank), which could also experience similar issues.
- 3.3.4 It is essential that all of the physical security measures listed below are incorporated into the scheme. Integrated, risk-commensurate security measures aim to place secure physical barriers or surveillance in the path of the criminal – making crime harder to commit and raising the risk of detection and possible capture, as well as promoting a feeling of safety in residents, visitors and staff.

4 Physical Security (Residential)

In addition to the layout issues highlighted in Section 3, the following checklist (Sections 4 & 5) forms the physical security requirements for this scheme to achieve Secured by Design accreditation if required.

4.1 Doors & Access Controls

- ☐ All external doorsets should be compliant with and certified to BS PAS 24, STS 201 or LPS 1175 SR2. It is crucial that the door ironmongery to any external escape-only doors is permitted under the security certification of the product. All escape-only doors should be alarmed (audible upon opening) and designed without visible external ironmongery. Security-certified louvered doorsets are also available if required to plant rooms or refuse stores (see www.securedbydesign.com/member-companies/accredited-product-search for SBD-compliant products).
- ☐ If the entrance lobby is not to be staffed by a 24/7 concierge, the main communal entrance to the building should be formed by a single-leaf, self-closing/locking doorset secured with a multi-point electronic lock permitted as part of the certification, which is easier to secure and operate remotely via an access control system. A double-leaf communal entrance doorset is only appropriate where the entrance lobby is staffed by a full-time concierge, who can oversee, control and direct all visitor access and egress to/from the building at all times. The main entrance should be security-certified (see above), self-closing/locking and capable of being controlled by means of a video entry phone system (with the picture viewable on the phone unit, rather than on a television set), so that so that in the absence of a concierge, residents can vet callers to the building before allowing them access.
- ☐ There should be a secure system for the delivery of post without needing to provide access to all floors of the building. Ideally, postal deliveries should be made directly to postboxes within the main entrance lobby under the supervision of the concierge. If there is not to be a concierge present at all times within the entrance lobby, there should be a 'secure lobby' arrangement, with a secondary communal door to the same security specification as the outer door, to allow for deliveries to postboxes within a secure postal lobby without providing access to other areas/floors of the building. The postboxes themselves should be certified to Door & Hardware Federation Technical Specification 009 (TS 009), with letter box apertures to a maximum size of 260mm x 40mm (incorporating anti-fishing measures). There should also be a secure system for depositing parcels within the secure postal lobby, such as the smart parcel boxes used by the major internet shopping companies. All other deliveries should be made directly to residents via the access control system.
- ☐ The communal entrance doorset at the rear of the building (off the landscaped area) should also be a security-certified, single-leaf, self-closing/locking doorset secured with a multi-point electronic lock permitted as part of the certification, operated by staff or resident key-card only on access and egress. The external and internal doorsets to the cycle store should be secured and operated in the same way. Further information relating to the cycle store can be found within Section 4.8.
- ☐ All individual internal apartment entrance doorsets must also be compliant with and certified to BS PAS 24, STS 201, or LPS 1175 SR2. It is advised that these doors do not have fixed sidelights, and are provided with door viewers instead. Chain limiters to apartment entrance doors are recommended, but not generally essential.
- ☐ Internal doors/frames to any back-of-house plant areas or refuse stores should be robust/solid core (minimum 44mm thick), self-closing/locking and secured with an electronic lock operated by resident or staff key-card. The doors to the mezzanine amenity spaces should also be capable of being secured if/when required. If they are to contain valuable items (such as TV screens or portable gym equipment), they should be secured with access-controls to prevent non-resident access.

4.2 Windows

- ☐ Accessible windows (i.e. any at ground/mezzanine level and any accessible from the amenity space at Level 15), where possible, should be certificated to BS PAS 24. All other window designs/dimensions should take account of the requirements of the above standards, as certified products can carry dimensional restrictions. Any curtain walling panels should include laminated glazing and should be securely fixed.

- ☐ Any opening lights at ground floor/mezzanine level or Level 15 must be key-lockable, and have fixed/lockable opening restrictors (not releasable from the outside) limited to 100mm.

4.3 Glazing & Building Fabric

- ☐ All ground/mezzanine level glazing (and any accessible from the amenity space at Level 15) must incorporate at least one pane of glass rated as P1A under EN 356. The remaining pane in a double glazed unit may be toughened glass.
- ☐ There should be a block work wall (or material of similar strength e.g. welded-steel mesh or expamet mesh) behind any ground floor cladding to the building, to ensure that the fabric of the building itself is not vulnerable to attack.
- ☐ Any louvres to plant areas/refuse stores should be robustly constructed and fixed, to ensure they cannot be easily removed, and designed to ensure that they cannot be used as a climbing aid.
- ☐ There should be no features of the building (such as projecting canopies/window cills, projecting brickwork/cladding features etc.) or nearby hard/soft landscaping features (such as nearby lighting columns, trees, handrails, street furniture etc.) that may provide climbing aids up to upper level windows or over boundaries.

4.4 Alarms

- ☐ Each apartment should have an intruder alarm to comply with either:
 - BS EN 50131 and PD 6662 for wired systems; or
 - BS 6799 for wireless systems.

Alarms should be linked to contacts on all doors and PIR detectors should cover any accessible rooms with windows.

4.5 Boundaries

- ☐ The narrow pedestrian route and the semi-private landscaped courtyard to the south side of the building should be defined and enclosed as a private, resident-only space with 2100mm high walls and/or railings and lockable gates. Ideally, the service access route to the west of the building should be included within the enclosure, as illustrated within Section 3.3. Care should be taken to ensure that panels are fixed securely to the posts and that any level changes do not inadvertently facilitate climbing or leave large gaps underneath the panels/gates. There should be no centrally located horizontal bars to aid climbing and there should be no immediately adjacent climbing aids, such as low walls, projecting elements of the building, hard landscaping features, lighting columns, junction boxes etc, which may form a climbing aid. Any boundaries formed by a combination of walls and railings should have railing panels that are fixed flush with the outer skin of the brickwork below, leaving no steps/gaps that would provide a climbing aid. The external AC units should be secured within their own enclosure within the private space described above.
- ☐ Any pedestrian gates to private space should also be 2100mm high, self-closing and self-locking, operated by staff/resident key or fob on access and egress. They should also be located away from other climbing aids, such as low walls, planters/street furniture, lighting columns etc. Mid-point horizontal elements, exposed hinges and large sliding bolt apertures/locking points to any gates should be avoided, or fitted with shrouding/protective plates to avoid the creation of footholds (see illustration opposite). Any double vehicular gates required for servicing/maintenance purposes should overlap when closed and lock securely together and to the floor, again with no exposed hinges and large sliding bolt apertures/locking points. The gaps at the bottom of any gates should be small enough to stop anyone crawling through.
- ☐ Access between the service access to the west of the building and the narrow, cobbled, unlit route of Skip Place to the south should remain closed off with a 2100-2400mm high wall or railing fenceline, until such time as Skip Place is improved and the development of the wider area improves activity along and surveillance opportunities over the route.



4.6 Lighting

- ☐ External lighting must be provided to all routes surrounding the site, in accordance with BS 5489.
- ☐ Dusk 'til dawn lights, operated by photoelectric cell/daylight sensor, should be installed to all external doors and undercroft areas.
- ☐ Fittings should produce 'white' light, as opposed to yellow/orange light. LED or bulbs with a comparable output should be used, as these offer superior colour rendition over alternatives such as high and low pressure sodium bulbs.
- ☐ Lighting fixtures must not be positioned to provide climbing aids over boundaries or up to high level windows. Electrical and architectural layouts should be developed together to avoid this.

4.7 Landscaping

- ☐ All communal landscaped areas to the side/rear of the building should be well-lit and designed to maximise surveillance opportunities and eliminate hiding places. Any landscape features (hard or soft) to the public realm areas should not impede natural surveillance of/from the building or reduce the effectiveness of lighting or any CCTV system. Low planting should not exceed approx. 1000mm in height and tree canopies should fall no lower than approx. 2000mm from the ground. This is in order to allow people to see their surroundings better and eliminate hiding places. A maintenance agreement should stipulate that these planting dimensions would be adhered to. Loose surface materials in publicly accessible areas of the scheme should be avoided. Small fragments of ground covering can be used as missiles against people and premises (both to gain entry and to commit criminal damage).
- ☐ The design of any hard landscaping features or street furniture, in particular any steps or benches, should be designed to withstand and discourage the potential for mistreatment or damage. Any such features should be located where surveillance and overlooking opportunities are maximised from within the building.
- ☐ The robust management and maintenance of any communal landscaping areas is essential to encourage active use and enjoyment, whilst making abuse less likely to occur (see Section 7).

4.8 Other

- ☐ The secure residential cycle store should include either secure lockers or stands that allow residents to lock both wheels and the crossbar to a stand rather than just the crossbar (wheel slots and butterfly racks are not suitable). For further information refer to our cycle storage guidance document: www.designforsecurity.org/all-downloads/.
- ☐ A strategy should be prepared to ensure waste collection can take place whilst retaining a secure development.

5 Physical Security (Commercial Units)

5.1 Doors & Access Controls

- ☐ All external doorsets should be compliant with and certified to BS PAS 24, STS 202 or LPS 1175 SR2. It is crucial that the door ironmongery to any external escape-only doors is permitted under the security certification of the product.
- ☐ All staff areas within retail units or cafe/restaurant premises should not be publicly accessible. Internal doors to storage rooms, staff rooms or offices should be solid-core (minimum 44mm thick) and self-closing - fitted with auditable access controls (i.e. proximity readers or swipe cards) or secured with keys. Any cash office should have solid masonry walls, no adjacent false/suspended ceilings and a certified doorset to BS PAS 24 or LPS 1175 SR2. Staff should only be allowed access to areas required for their work. Keys/passes should only be carried if required for duties and should be accounted for at all times.
- ☐ The main entrance doors to any office/business premises should be capable of being controlled remotely by staff if required to vet visitors or prevent unauthorised access (e.g. into the evening/at night). Any internal doors/frames to individual offices or stores within them should be solid core (minimum 44mm thick) and key-lockable so that they can be secured when unoccupied.
- ☐ Any electric locking system to be used throughout the premises should be fully auditable (i.e. allows the retention of data, such as who accessed where and when), to allow for a better investigation into any incidents. Staff should only be allowed access to areas required for their work and keys/passes should only be carried if required for duties and should be accounted for at all times. Key-coded locks are not recommended as they can be easily observed or shared and are rarely changed.

5.2 Windows & Shutters

- ☐ All windows should be security-certified to BS PAS 24 where possible and should be non-opening. All other window designs/dimensions should take account of the requirements of the above standards, as certified products can carry dimensional restrictions. Any curtain walling panels should include laminated glazing (see below) and should be securely fixed.
- ☐ Any shutters should be certified to LPS 1175 SR2 (or SR1 if perforated laths are required) and installed in accordance with manufacturer's instructions. If shutters are to be installed, they should either be provided internally or, if they are to be externally mounted, shutter boxes and guides built into the fabric of the building (where they would be less visually intrusive and less vulnerable to damage).

5.3 Glazing & Building Fabric

- ☐ All glazing must incorporate at least one pane of glass with a 1.5mm PVB interlayer (e.g. 7.5mm laminated glass), or a glass rated as P4A under EN 356. The remaining pane in a double glazed unit may be toughened glass.
- ☐ Internal walls between the commercial and residential portions of the building (as well as between each of the commercial units themselves) should either be of robust masonry construction or should incorporate timber sheathing (minimum 9mm thick) or expanded metal, in order to ensure that the fabric of the building itself is not vulnerable to attack/penetration.

5.4 Alarms

- ☐ A comprehensive intruder alarm system should be installed to cover each of the premises, linked to contacts on all doors and PIR detectors. It is strongly recommended that any alarm system is monitored, with a response facility (i.e. linked to an Alarm Receiving Centre, who will alert the key holder or a security patrol team).

5.5 Lighting

- ☐ Dusk 'til dawn lights, operated by photoelectric cell/daylight sensor, should be installed to all external doors and undercroft areas.

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- ☐ Fittings should produce 'white' light, as opposed to yellow/orange light. LED or bulbs with a comparable output should be used, as these offer superior colour rendition over alternatives such as high and low pressure sodium bulbs.
 - ☐ Lighting fixtures must not be positioned to provide climbing aids over boundaries or up to high level windows. Electrical and architectural layouts should be developed together to avoid this.

5.6 CCTV

Any CCTV system that may be used within this proposal will require certain specifications and intelligent placement of cameras to compliment the design of the development. Designers should consider the following points when planning a CCTV strategy:

- ☐ CCTV systems (and lighting that support them) require regular cleaning and maintenance to remain effective.
- ☐ Where necessary cameras that are vulnerable to damage should be protected from attack either by relocation to a higher level and using a bigger lens to achieve the view required or through the fitting of a vandal resistant housing.
- ☐ With regards to the retention of footage, the police prefer quality over quantity. The overall retention period should be dictated by what the system is designed to achieve, though it would be better to have good quality images over a 14-day period than poor ones over a 30-day period.
- ☐ Procedures for recovery of recordings are recommended to be established (e.g. trained staff / the CCTV system instruction manual to be readily available). This is to ensure that the images produced will be of an *acceptable standard* that will allow for *identification* of an individual which will stand up to scrutiny in court.

Acceptable Standard - this generally requires a resolution of 720x576 pixels at a real time frame rate of 25 frames per second. (N.B. Both the camera and DVR must be capable of this – if the camera will only send low resolution images then it does not matter how high the resolution of the recording unit is).

Identification – One of three levels of field of view. To identify an individual, the image must capture no less than 120% of the field of view (at least from the top of the individuals head to their knees). The remaining two levels of field of view are *overview* and *recognition*, which whilst effective for observational purposes, are less likely to result in the identification of a person/offender.

- ☐ The intelligent placement of cameras helps to provide clear facial identification of individuals. Suitable locations would be: *all commercial unit frontages/facades, the main entrances to each unit, internal circulation areas, any sales counters/till positions and any customer seating areas.*

6 Internal Layout Guidance

The internal layout of any retail units or café/restaurant premises should be carefully considered, so as to maximise surveillance over customers and reduce the opportunities for criminals to exploit. Design for Security understands that the designers and client may not always know who will be occupying their units once complete, and therefore, the end-user requirements. It is highly recommended that the following good practice principles are adopted where applicable, so as not to undermine the security of the building shell.

6.1 Retail Premises

- 6.1.1 Clear views should also remain from the premises through to the public realm, i.e. large promotional signs should not obstruct views.
- 6.1.2 Careful consideration should be given to the location of paypoints to ensure that staff have full surveillance over the entrance to the unit.
- 6.1.3 Internal aisles and product displays should be aligned to assist surveillance from pay points and avoid blind-spots. There should be no items of high-value displayed close to the entrance of the unit.
- 6.1.4 Consideration should be given to a chute deposit safe (certified to LPS 1183) behind any tills, or an alternative management practice, which would reduce the amount of cash held in tills during busy periods.
- 6.1.5 All back-of-house/staff areas should not be publicly accessible (see Sections 5.1) and there should be a secure area for staff to store their belongings whilst at work.


6.2 Cafe/Restaurant Premises

- 6.2.1 Cafes/restaurants/licensed premises can, if poorly managed, generate crime for the following reasons:
 - **Opportunities** - Large numbers of people congregating in restaurants/licensed premises generates opportunities for crime. Unlike on-street populations, patrons are stationary for long periods of time, making them easier to target.
 - **Lack of attention** - The movement of people, noise, social interaction and other factors mean patrons can be easily distracted.
 - **Cohesion** – Particularly during busy periods, the large numbers and wide variety of groups of people that tend to frequent restaurants/licensed premises means that such a venue would lack 'community territoriality' (i.e. regular customers displaying an awareness of and care for the environment around them). This can limit any self-policing that might otherwise occur.
 - **Customer turnover** – High turnover with high levels of customer movement within an establishment, are more likely to allow offenders to go unnoticed.
 - **Valuable goods** – Often available and possibly on show, a particular problem in external seating areas. Patrons are likely to carry small, valuable, concealable goods – such as mobile phones, purses, wallets, keys etc.
 - **Stealth** - Busy venues provide the anonymity necessary to commit offences.

In order to minimise these issues, it is recommended that the following good practice principles are adhered to:

- 6.2.2 The main entrances to the premises must be effectively managed at busy periods to control numbers, ensure safe access/egress and avoid potential conflicts arising.
- 6.2.3 Customers entering/leaving the premises through the main entrances should be easily observed by staff. Staff should also have clear views of any W/Cs to monitor their use.
- 6.2.4 The internal layout of premises should be generally uncluttered with few places for concealment, allowing staff to monitor customer behaviour. The precise arrangement of internal furnishings should aid circulation and aim to achieve a balance between intimacy and visibility.

- 6.2.5 Consideration should be given to high/wide bars/service counters, which increase the distance between staff and any potentially aggressive patrons and aid surveillance of all parts of the premises. Tills should be positioned away from customers' reach, but preferably fronting towards customers. Casual access to the rear of any bars/service counters should be prevented (e.g. with lockable hatches that cannot be easily scaled).
- 6.2.6 Consideration should be given to a chute deposit safe (certified to LPS 1183) behind any bar/till area, or an alternative management practice, which would reduce the amount of cash held in tills during busy periods.
- 6.2.7 All back-of-house/staff areas should not be publicly accessible (see Sections 5.1/5.4) and there should be a secure area for staff to store their belongings whilst at work.
- 6.2.8 It is highly recommended that any customer tables are fitted with Chelsea Clips, to reduce the opportunities for theft (see below).



- 6.2.9 Public toilets can give rise to problems and the following issues should be considered:
- Fittings should be flush to avoid tampering and concealed cisterns, pipe work etc. should be used.
 - Graffiti and vandal resistant materials, such as stainless steel, laminates and plastics should be considered.
 - Consider hanging cubicle doors as outward opening as this will aid gaining access in an emergency. An alternative measure is to reduce toilet doors in size by a minimum of 200mm from the floor and to reduce the top height.
 - Provide 'Chelsea Clip'/karibina style hooks on the back of cubicle doors or partitions for bags and coats.
 - Consider the safety of vending machines. Cash boxes can be tampered with, consider fitting them with alarms.
 - Consider setting out a rota and putting notices in toilet facilities that make users aware that regular checks will be carried out. A built in visited/checked chart should be provided.

7 Management & Maintenance

- 7.1.1 A comprehensive security regime for the management of the commercial units must be prepared and remain in place for the day-to-day running of the premises. There should be regular reviews/exercises to ensure that it remains accurate, workable and up-to-date. All staff should understand and accept the need for security measures and it should be made easy for people to raise concerns or report observations. The operating/maintenance plan should focus on issues such as:
- Opening and closing of premises, including staff arrival and departure;
 - Any cash management within the premises - consideration should be given to a chute deposit safe (certified to LPS 1183) behind any counter/till area, or an alternative management practice, which would reduce the amount of cash held in tills during busy periods;
 - Any cash-in-transit collections/deliveries and banking practices (which should take place in a secure room with a certified safe to meet insurance needs);
 - Management of any stock deliveries (servicing activities should not require any service doors to remain open unattended for prolonged periods);
 - Details of staff security training;
 - Location and management of any smoking areas;
 - Repairing damaged external and internal fittings, particularly security features e.g. alarm system, CCTV cameras etc;
 - Cleaning and prompt removal of graffiti, litter etc; and
 - Refuse collection arrangements.
- 7.1.2 The opening hours of any retail unit or café/restaurant should not unduly conflict with the upper floor residential use of the building. Sufficient levels of service staff should be provided at busy periods to reduce waiting times and the potential for frustration, aggression and conflict.
- 7.1.3 Any high value equipment (e.g. computers/TVs, tools etc.) should be property marked and securely fixed or stored to deter damage/theft. An accurate record should be maintained which logs all such items.
- 7.1.4 Adequate signage should be deployed in all areas not only to direct people throughout the building, but also to deter unauthorised access to resident or staff-only areas.
- 7.1.5 Refuse collection arrangements should not require bins to be left accessible for extended periods. Servicing activities should also not require any service doors to remain open and unattended for prolonged periods.
- 7.1.6 The upkeep of any residential development over its lifetime can be crucial to the level of security and safety within. Aspects of a development, which are left to deteriorate, have the potential to attract further crime – a process known as ‘the broken window theory’. A maintenance plan should be drawn up to address issues such as:
- Repairs to communal areas (such as access controls, lighting, signage etc.)
 - Litter/graffiti removal
 - Trimming of trees and shrubs
- 7.1.7 Any public open space or amenity areas not under the ownership of residents should be subject to an effective maintenance contract. This should ensure that all damage is rectified in a timely manner, and that any such space will not be detrimental to its surroundings. Low-level defensive planting beds can be used to great effect to funnel pedestrians away from vulnerable areas (such as gable walls, boundaries or hidden corners/recesses).

8 Construction

- 8.1.1 Untidy sites and their surroundings can be littered with debris accessible to vandals who often use loose materials as missiles to commit crime. The client should take measures appropriate to secure their site during construction, and control pedestrian and vehicular access in to and out of the site curtilage. It is also recommended that the contractor on this scheme is a member of the 'Considerate Constructors Scheme', who has committed to be a considerate and good neighbour, as well as clean, respectful, safe, environmentally conscious, responsible and accountable.
- 8.1.2 Site security contractors should be SIA (Security Industry Authority) approved to ensure professional standards are adhered to (please see <http://www.sia.homeoffice.gov.uk/pages/acs-intro.aspx> for more details).

9 Useful References

9.1 Secured by Design (SBD)

- 9.1.1 Secured by Design focuses on crime prevention at the design, layout and construction stages of homes and commercial premises and promotes the use of security standards for a wide range of applications and products. To apply for Secured by Design certification for your development, visit our online application form at: <http://www.designforsecurity.org/secured-by-design/sbd-accreditation/>

A Contact Register

Date	Contact With	Summary of Contact
21 st August 2023	Zerum	Receipt of CIS instruction form & location plan
29 th August 2023	Zerum	Quote issued & request for set of plans
5 th September 2023	Zerum	Confirmation of instruction & receipt of plans
6 th September 2023	GMP Finance Dept	Confirmation of payment
19 th September 2023	Zerum	Receipt of updated plans
25 th September 2023	Zerum	Email correspondence re: details of the scheme & timescales. Receipt of D&A Statement
29 th September 2023	Zerum	Version A of report issued
29 th September to 2 nd October 2023	Zerum	Email correspondence re: issues highlighted within report. Receipt of landscape drawings
2 nd October 2023	Zerum	Receipt of amended plans
3 rd October 2023	Zerum	Version B of report issued
4 th October 2023	Zerum	Receipt of amended plans

B Associated Documents

This report is based on the following drawings and supplementary information submitted by the applicant.

Drawing No.	Drawing Title	Date	Rev
0654 E(--) 500	Existing Site Plan	01/09/23	B
0654 L(--) 000	Ground Floor Plan (SUPERSEDED)	01/09/23	F
0654 L(--) 00R	Roof Plan (SUPERSEDED)	01/09/23	D
0654 L(--) 001	Level 01 – Mezzanine Floor Plan (SUPERSEDED)	01/09/23	D
0654 L(--) 002	Levels 02, 04, 06, 08, 10 Floor Plan (SUPERSEDED)	01/09/23	F
0654 L(--) 003	Levels 03, 05, 07, 09 Floor Plan (SUPERSEDED)	01/09/23	F
0654 L(--) 004	Levels 11, 13 Floor Plan (SUPERSEDED)	01/09/23	F
0654 L(--) 012	Levels 12, 14 Floor Plan (SUPERSEDED)	01/09/23	F
0654 L(--) 015	Level 15 Floor Plan (SUPERSEDED)	01/09/23	F
0654 L(--) 016	Levels 16, 18, 20, 22 Floor Plan (SUPERSEDED)	01/09/23	F
0654 L(--) 017	Levels 17, 19, 21, 23 Floor Plan (SUPERSEDED)	01/09/23	F
0654 L(--) 024	Level 24 Floor Plan (SUPERSEDED)	01/09/23	A
0654 L(--) 250	4Bed 3Person Apartment Plan Alternative Layout (M3 Accessible) (SUPERSEDED)	01/09/23	B
0654 L(--) 300	North Section (SUPERSEDED)	01/09/23	C
0654 L(--) 301	East Section (SUPERSEDED)	01/09/23	C
0654 L(--) 302	South Section (SUPERSEDED)	01/09/23	C
0654 L(--) 303	West Section (SUPERSEDED)	01/09/23	C
0654 L(--) 400	North Elevation (SUPERSEDED)	01/09/23	E
0654 L(--) 401	East Elevation (SUPERSEDED)	01/09/23	E
0654 L(--) 402	South Elevation (SUPERSEDED)	01/09/23	E
0654 L(--) 403	West Elevation (SUPERSEDED)	01/09/23	E
0654 L(--) 404	North Elevation – Park Place Long Elevation (SUPERSEDED)	31/08/23	E
0654 L(--) 405	East Elevation – Cheetham Hill Road Long Elevation (SUPERSEDED)	31/08/23	E

0654 (L--)500	Site Plan	01/09/23	C
0654 (L--)501	Location Plan	01/09/23	B
0654 L(--)000	Ground Floor Plan (SUPERSEDED)	13/09/23	I
0654 L(--)000	Ground Floor Plan	02/10/23	P1
0654 L(--)00R	Roof Plan	13/09/23	F
0654 L(--)001	Level 01 – Mezzanine Floor Plan	13/09/23	F
0654 L(--)002	Levels 02, 04, 06, 08, 10 Floor Plan	13/09/23	H
0654 L(--)003	Levels 03, 05, 07, 09 Floor Plan	13/09/23	H
0654 L(--)004	Levels 11, 13 Floor Plan	13/09/23	H
0654 L(--)012	Level 12 Floor Plan	06/09/23	A
0654 L(--)014	Level 14 Floor Plan	13/09/23	B
0654 L(--)015	Level 15 Floor Plan	13/09/23	H
0654 L(--)016	Levels 16, 18, 20, 22 Floor Plan	13/09/23	H
0654 L(--)017	Levels 17, 19, 21, 23 Floor Plan	13/09/23	H
0654 L(--)024	Level 24 Floor Plan	13/09/23	C
0654 L(--)250	4Bed 3Person Apartment Plan Alternative Layout (M3 Accessible)	01/09/23	B
0654 L(--)300	North Section	13/09/23	E
0654 L(--)301	East Section	13/09/23	E
0654 L(--)302	South Section	13/09/23	E
0654 L(--)303	West Section	13/09/23	E
0654 L(--)400	North Elevation	13/09/23	G
0654 L(--)401	East Elevation	13/09/23	G
0654 L(--)402	South Elevation	13/09/23	G
0654 L(--)403	West Elevation	13/09/23	G
0654 L(--)404	North Elevation – Park Place Long Elevation	06/09/23	F
0654 L(--)405	East Elevation – Cheetham Hill Road Long Elevation	06/09/23	F
0654 L(--)450	Façade Fragment Typical Bays	13/09/23	A
0654 L(--)451	Façade Fragment Typical Inset Balcony	13/09/23	A
0654 L(--)452	Façade Fragment Typical Colonnade	13/09/23	A
0654 L(--)453	Façade Fragment Typical Terrace Parapet	13/09/23	A
0654 L(--)454	Façade Fragment Typical Crown	13/09/23	A
0654 (L--)500	Site Plan	01/09/23	D
0654 (L--)501	Location Plan	01/09/23	B
368-LST-XX-XX-DR-L-0101	Landscape General Arrangement (SUPERSEDED)	19/09/23	P01
368-LST-XX-XX-DR-L-0101	Landscape General Arrangement	27/09/23	P02
368-LST-XX-XX-DR-L-0102	Ground floor Landscape General Arrangement (SUPERSEDED)	19/09/23	P01
368-LST-XX-XX-DR-L-0102	Ground floor Landscape General Arrangement	27/09/23	P02
368-LST-XX-XX-DR-L-0103	Level 15 Landscape General Arrangement	19/09/23	P01
368-LST-XX-XX-DR-L-0104	Lighting Mark-up Arrangement	19/09/23	P01
XX/11/2023 Rev -	Design & Access Statement	-	-
368-XX-XX-RP-L-0001	Landscape Workbook	27/09/23	

PLEASE NOTE - In the event of any subsequent material changes to the scheme, it will be necessary for Design for Security to reassess the comments made within this report.

C CIS Version History

Version	Revisions Made	Date
A		
B	First floor units amended from commercial to residential amenity & secondary residential entrance door removed	03/10/23
C	Internal doors between commercial and residential uses removed	05/10/23

D Glossary

Burglary Resistance Standards

BS PAS 24

General security performance requirements for door/window assemblies.

An attack test standard for doorsets and windows. This is the minimum police requirement for Secured by Design dwellings, and is also applicable to French/double doors, and sliding doors.

BS EN 1627 (Security Ratings RC1 to RC6)

Windows, doors, shutters - Burglar resistance Requirements and classification

The classification system used in BS EN 1627 is aimed at the commercial market and is based on five elements:

- a) Resistance of glazing*
- b) Performance of hardware*
- c) Resistance to static loading*
- d) Resistance to dynamic loading*
- e) Burglary resistance by manual intervention*

LPS 1175 (Security Ratings 1 to 6)

Specification for testing and classifying the burglary resistance of building components

This includes doors, shutters, garage doors and grilles typically for commercial premises and higher risk domestic premises and is acceptable to the ABI and the Police. The standard has 6 levels, 6 being the highest, with levels 1 and 2 equivalent in many respects to BS PAS 24 and BS 7950.

STS 201

Enhanced security requirements for doorsets and door assemblies for dwellings to satisfy the requirements of PAS 24

STS 202

Requirements for burglary resistance of construction products including hinged, pivoted, folding or sliding doorsets, windows, curtain walling, security grilles, garage doors and shutters.

This specifies a broadly similar range of attack tools and times to those specified at the lower levels of LPS 1175.

BS EN 356 (Ratings P1A to P8A)

Glass in building. Security glazing. Testing and classification of resistance against manual attack.

A performance standard for manual attacks on glazing. P2A is comparable to the performance of a 6.8mm laminated glass, and P4A to that of a 9.5mm laminated glass.

Commonly Used Acronyms

CIT

Cash in transit (refers to vehicles, personnel and routines).

CPTED

Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design

CRS

Crime Reduction Specialist. Sometimes known as CPO (Crime Prevention Officer)

INPT

Integrated Neighbourhood Policing Team.

PVB/PolyVinyl Butyral (Glazing interlayer)

A commonly used interlayer used in the production of laminated glass.

LPCB (Loss Prevention Certification Board)

A brand of the BRE Global (Building Research Establishment) family. The LPCB work with insurers, Government, police, designers, manufacturers, contractors and end users to develop methods of assessing performance and reliability of security products to ensure their fitness for purpose.

UKAS (United Kingdom Accreditation Service)

The sole national accreditation body recognised by government to assess, against internationally agreed standards, organisations that provide certification, testing, inspections and calibration services.

Useful Websites

Design for Security

www.designforsecurity.org

Secured by Design

www.securedbydesign.com

RIBA Product Selector

www.ribaproductselector.com

LPCB – Red Book Live

www.redbooklive.com

Crime Reduction (Home Office)

www.crimereduction.homeoffice.gov.uk

DAC (Design Against Crime) Solution Centre

www.designagainstcrime.org

Building for Life

www.buildingforlife.org

CLG (Communities and Local Government)

www.communities.gov.uk