



CRIME IMPACT STATEMENT

High Lane, Chorlton

6 No. Apartments & 17 No. Houses

FOR: Cube Homes

VERSION B: 14th June 2023

REFERENCE: 2023/0110/CIS/01

Greater Manchester Police

design**for**security



EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Security Recommendations

This development has been assessed against the principles of 'Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design' (CPTED), to reduce the opportunities for crime and the fear of crime. The development is broadly acceptable, in terms of designing out crime; however, the points raised in section 3.3 should be addressed including the following:

- Access from the front of the apartment building to the rear parking area should be restricted to residents.
- It is recommended that the houses and apartment building should be built to Secured by Design standards.

If the recommendations contained within section 3.3 are implemented, we would be generally supportive of the planning application.



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

1 Visual Audit

The proposed development site can be seen on the adjacent map edged in red. The site is located in the Chorlton area of Manchester.

The site is bound to the North by High Lane, to the East the site is bound by Acres Road, to the South the site is bound by the alleyway to the rear of Hardy Avenue (gated), and to the West to the site is bound by Stockton Road and the rears of dwellings on Stockton Road.

The site boundaries are defined with a number of treatments, including a low blockwork wall to the front (North), a c. 3000mm blockwork wall to the East/South, and to the West the site boundary is defined with a low blockwork wall and railings.

The local area is predominantly residential, with a large amount of terraced houses in the local area and a number of larger properties converted into apartments/HMOs.



2 Crime Statistics & Analysis

All data below is based on crimes recorded between 1st Mar 2022 to 28th February 2023.

2.1 Crime Summary

Recorded Crime within 500m of Site									
Domestic Burglary	Non-Domestic Burglary	Criminal Damage	Less Serious Wounding	Theft	Robbery	Serious Wounding	Theft from Motor Vehicle	Theft of Motor Vehicle	Bicycle Theft
40	23	42	259	37	12	5	27	12	9

- 2.1.1 The overall rate of crime is low for the Manchester district, with less serious wounding, criminal damage and domestic burglary being the most common offence taking place in the local area. There is a large hotspot of offences at the junction of Barlow Moor Road and Wilbraham Road, and a smaller hotspot along Beech Road.
- 2.1.2 Less serious woundings have occurred throughout the local area, with a hotspot of offences at the junction of Barlow Moor Road and Wilbraham Road. Assaults, harassment, and public order offences have been the highest recorded less serious woundings taking place, with domestic disputes and incidents between known associates most commonly reported.
- 2.1.3 Criminal damage offences have taken place throughout the local area, whereby offenders have targeted dwellings, retail properties, with smashed glazing being the most common MO. Offenders have also targeted vehicles left unattended in the streets around the site, especially towards Wilbraham Road.
- 2.1.4 Domestic burglary offences have also occurred throughout the residential areas surrounding the site. Offenders have in most used implements in order to gain access to properties via secure doors and windows.

2.2 Common Local M.O.s (Modus Operandi)

- 2.2.1 Forcing open secure doors using bodily pressure and implements in order to gain access to apartments
Possible Solution - All apartment entrance doorsets should be certified to a burglary resistant standard (i.e. BS PAS 24).
- 2.2.2 Entering apartment buildings by means of insecure doors/ tailgating residents and gaining access to communal areas.
Possible Solution - There should be access controlled secure doorsets restricting access to the circulation core of the building to reduce the possibility of would-be offenders from tailgating residents and visitors into the building.
- 2.2.3 Exploitation of insecure windows and doors to gain access into communal areas and apartments
Possible Solution – All ground floor communal doors should be fitted with door closers and lock automatically, to prevent these doors from being left open and insecure. Any publicly accessible apartment entrance doors should be fitted with a split-spindle, or fixed external handle, to prevent them from being opened from the outside when unlocked. Any accessible windows should be restricted in opening to prevent them from being fully opened if left insecure.

2.3 Risk Factors




The typical security risks for a development of this nature are:

- Domestic burglary
- Theft from gardens, sheds or garages
- Criminal damage to dwellings and vehicles

- Theft of, or from, vehicles
- Bogus callers and distraction burglary
- Anti-social behaviour
- Neighbour disputes
- Theft and criminal damage during the construction period
- Unauthorised access to private spaces
- Poor maintenance of access control systems

2.4 Crime Rate Comparison




The rates below relates to crime committed within 500m of the site. England & Wales data was last recorded for January – December 2021.



- 2.4.1 The rate of domestic burglaries per 1000 dwellings is **29% lower** than Manchester as a whole, **8% lower** than Greater Manchester and **6% lower** than England & Wales.
- 2.4.2 The rate of woundings per 1000 dwellings is **57% lower** than Manchester as a whole, **41% lower** than Greater Manchester and **12% higher** than England & Wales.
- 2.4.3 The rate of incidents of criminal damage per 1000 dwellings is **61% lower** than Manchester as a whole, **50% lower** than Greater Manchester and **39% lower** than England & Wales.
- 2.4.4 The rate of incidents of vehicle crime per 1000 dwellings is **60% lower** than Manchester as a whole, **34% lower** than Greater Manchester and **20% lower** than England & Wales.

2.5 Domestic Burglary: Risk Analysis

The data below relates to domestic burglaries committed within 500m of the site.





2.5.1 **Day/Time Range:** The risk of domestic burglary peaks on a Monday during the early hours of the morning. Offenders often target properties during this time when it is dark and there is less footfall in the area, giving offenders the perception that they are less likely to be caught or identified.

2.5.2 **Point of Entry:** In the local area the following entry points and MO's have been utilised most frequently:

- Exploitation of insecure windows and doors.
- Forcing open secure windows and doors using bodily pressure and implements in order to gain access to the property.
- Smashed glazing in windows and doors

2.6 Vehicle Crime: Risk Analysis

The data below relates to vehicle crime committed within 500m of the site.



- 2.6.1 **Day/Time Range:** The risk of vehicle crime peaks on a Monday and Tuesday during the at midnight and into the early morning. Offenders often target vehicles at this time as it is dark with less footfall, creating a perceived low risk opportunity.

3 Layout Appraisal

3.1 Proposed development

- 3.1.1 The proposed development is of 6 no. houses and 17 no. houses.

3.2 Positive Aspects of the Proposal

The following proposed features would make a positive contribution to the prevention of crime and fear of crime.

- 3.2.1 The apartment building has a simple footprint with no opportunities for an offender to conceal themselves.
- 3.2.2 Front doors of the houses and the entrances to the apartments are positioned where they can be easily seen, allowing for natural surveillance opportunities.
- 3.2.3 The apartments and dwellings will all have car parking spaces located at the front of the dwelling where they can be easily overlooked by residents.
- 3.2.4 The layout of the houses allows for good levels of natural surveillance and those on Acres Road offer plenty of opportunities for mutual surveillance.

3.3 Changes Needed and Recommendations

The following points have been identified for further consideration and would need to be addressed for Design for Security to support the proposed scheme.

- 3.3.1 Access to the rear of the apartment from the front of the building should be restricted to prevent members of the public from accessing the parking area and rear entrance which could leave these areas vulnerable to criminality. Vehicular gates should be operated using a key fob/proximity reader system with no automatic egress (i.e. access control both 'in' and 'out'), so that criminals cannot gain access to the area, attack the vehicles or dwellings and escape. Any communal pedestrian gates should also be of steel construction, self-closing and 'slam to lock', which cannot be left unlocked when shut. Gates should not feature any midrails, exposed hinges, or similar, that would allow climbing; additionally, there should be minimal ground clearance to prevent crawling.
- 3.3.2 The gable end of plot 13 should be protected with a low boundary treatment or shrubbery, to reduce the potential for antisocial behaviour such as ball games and loitering.
- 3.3.3 How mail is delivered to the apartments should be carefully considered. Postal workers/couriers should not be permitted unfettered access around the development as this can potentially provide offenders with opportunities to commit crime by impersonation. For an apartment building of this size it is recommended that secure through-the-wall mailboxes are used.
- 3.3.4 The external apartment communal access doors must be compliant with and certified to BS PAS 24, STS202, or LPS 1175 SR2, including a lock capable of being operated via an electronic access control system. The communal entrance doors should be self-closing and secured with a multi-point electronic lock and capable of being operated via an electronic access control system, these features should be permitted under the scope of the certification.
- 3.3.5 Access into the building should be controlled by a video entry phone system (with the picture viewable on the phone unit, rather than on a television set) so that residents can vet visitors before allowing them access into the building. There should be no unrestricted trade access into the building. Ideally a secondary access controlled door should be provided to reduce the risk of offenders tailgating and gaining access to residential areas of the building.

4 Physical Security

The following checklist forms the physical security requirements for this scheme to achieve Secured by Design accreditation.

4.1 Doors (Apartments)

- ☐ External communal access doors must be compliant with and certified to BS PAS 24, STS201, or LPS 1175 SR2, including a lock capable of being operated via an electronic access control system. The communal entrance doors should be self-closing and secured with a multi-point electronic lock and capable of being operated via an electronic access control system, these features should be permitted under the scope of the certification. Access into the build should be controlled by a video entry phone system (with the picture viewable on the phone unit, rather than on a television set) so that residents can vet visitors before allowing them access into the building. There should be no unrestricted trade access into the building.
- ☐ Where secure postal lobbies are to be created, the secondary communal door must be to the same specification as the outer door - certified to BS PAS 24, STS201, or LPS 1175 SR2, including a lock capable of being operated via an electronic access control system.
- ☐ Apartment entrance doors must be compliant with and certified to BS PAS 24, STS201, or LPS 1175 SR2. Apartment entrance doors must have a door viewer.
- ☐ External apartment entrance doors should not be capable of being opened externally without a key. These doors should have a fixed external handle or a split-spindle.
- ☐ External escape-only doors (as with external doors in general) should be certified to BS PAS 24, or LPS 1175 SR2. It is crucial that the door ironmongery is permitted for use on these doors under the security certification of the product.

4.2 Doors (Houses)

- ☐ Front and rear doors to dwellings must be compliant with and certified to BS PAS 24, STS201, LPS 1175 SR2, or LPS 2081 SRA
- ☐ Any external French/double doors or sliding doors must be compliant with and certified to BS PAS 24.
- ☐ Front doors to properties should have fixed external handles or split spindles, meaning access is only possible with a key.
- ☐ Front doors should have either fixed sidelights or door viewers.
- ☐ Chain limiters are recommended but not generally essential.
- ☐ Letterboxes within doors must be located a minimum of 400mm away from internal handle and locking hardware.

4.3 Windows

- ☐ Windows must be compliant with and certified to BS PAS 24.
- ☐ Ground floor and easily accessible opening lights (escape requirements permitting) must be key-lockable and have fixed/lockable opening restrictors (not releasable from the outside) limited to 100mm. Windows can be fully openable from the inside to allow ventilation of the dwellings in accordance with Approved Document O but the window restrictor must reengage when the window is closed.

4.4 Glazing

- ☐ Glazing to a height of 2400mm (or if otherwise accessible) must incorporate at least one pane of glass rated as P1A under EN 356. The remaining pane in a double-glazed unit may be toughened glass.

4.5 Alarms

- ☐ If an alarm is installed, then it should comply with either:
 - BS EN 50131 and PD 6662 for wired systems
 - BS 6799 for wireless systems
- ☐ If an alarm is installed, it should be linked to contacts on all external doors, (including internal doors into garages) and, PIR detectors should cover all ground floor rooms with windows.
- ☐ If an alarm is not to be provided, there should be a 13amp, non-switched fuse spur to allow future residents to connect an alarm.

4.6 Boundaries

- ☐ Rear boundaries should generally be 1800mm high and of close boarded timber construction. It is recommended that the top 300mm consist of trellis structure.
- ☐ Rear boundaries that are adjacent to public space should have a masonry (or other hardwearing) base, with timber fence above to a total height of 2100mm. It is recommended that the top 300mm consist of trellis structure.
- ☐ Rear boundaries adjacent publicly accessible open space should have a strip of defensible planting should protect rear boundaries.
- ☐ Sub-divisional rear boundaries may be as low as 1500mm.
- ☐ The fronts of properties should be demarcated by low boundaries such as planting and/or railings to an approximate height of 1000mm.
- ☐ Any low boundaries that adjoin high boundaries should have transition panels/sections to prevent the low boundary being used as a climbing aid over the higher.
- ☐ Gates into the rear curtilage of dwellings should be in keeping with the height of adjacent boundary treatments and incorporate either:

- A pad lockable bolt to the midpoint of the internal face, or
- A key operable deadlock

4.7 Gates

- ☐ Vehicular gates should be operated using a key fob/proximity reader system with no automatic egress (i.e. access control both 'in' and 'out'), so that criminals cannot gain access to the area, attack the vehicles or dwellings and escape. Any communal pedestrian gates should also be of steel construction, self-closing and 'slam to lock', which cannot be left unlocked when shut. Gates should not feature any midrails, exposed hinges, or similar, that would allow climbing; additionally, there should be minimal ground clearance to prevent crawling.

4.8 Landscaping

- ☐ In vulnerable locations such as entrances, parking areas and footpaths, low planting should not exceed 1000mm in height, and tree canopies should fall no lower than 2m from the ground. This is in order to allow people to see their surroundings better, make a rational choice of routes and eliminate hiding places. A maintenance agreement should stipulate that these planting dimensions would be adhered to.
- ☐ Loose surface materials in the publicly accessible areas of the scheme should be avoided. Small fragments of ground covering can be used as missiles against people and premises (both to gain entry and to commit criminal damage).

4.9 Lighting

- ☐ External lighting must be provided to the front and rear of dwellings, operated by photoelectric cell/daylight sensor (manual override is also permissible). PIR security lighting is not recommended for these locations and should not be employed unless advised.
- ☐ Fittings should produce 'white' light, as opposed to yellow/orange light. Metal halide (or bulbs with a comparable output) should be used, as these offer superior colour rendition over alternatives such as high- and low-pressure sodium bulbs.
- ☐ Lighting fixtures must not be positioned to provide climbing aids over boundary treatments. Electrical and architectural layouts should be developed together to avoid this.
- ☐ The proposed access road should be illuminated to adoptable standards.
- ☐ Parking spaces positioned to the side of dwellings should be illuminated with dusk-til-dawn lighting.

4.10 Other

- ☐ Meter cupboards should be located to the fronts of properties only, not in the private areas.
- ☐ Any rainwater pipes should be square in profile and fixed back to the building fabric to prevent climbing to upper floor windows.

5 Management & Maintenance

5.1.1 The upkeep of a development over its lifetime can be crucial to the level of security and safety within. Aspects of a development, which are left to deteriorate, have the potential to attract further crime – a process known as 'the broken window theory'. A maintenance plan should be drawn up to address issues such as:

- Litter removal
- Repair to communal areas (lighting, signage, access controls)
- Trimming and pruning to shrubs and trees

- 5.1.2 Any public open space or amenity areas not under the ownership of residents should be subject to an effective maintenance contract. This should ensure that all damage is rectified in a timely manner, and that any such space will not be detrimental to its surroundings.

6 Construction

- 6.1.1 Untidy sites and their surroundings can be littered with debris accessible to vandals who often use loose materials as missiles to commit crime. The client should take measures appropriate to secure their site during construction, and control pedestrian and vehicular access in to and out of the site curtilage. It is also recommended that the contractor on this scheme is a member of the 'Considerate Constructors Scheme', who has committed to be a considerate and good neighbour, as well as clean, respectful, safe, environmentally conscious, responsible and accountable.
- 6.1.2 Site security contractors should be SIA (Security Industry Authority) approved to ensure professional standards are adhered to (please see <http://www.sia.homeoffice.gov.uk/pages/acs-intro.aspx> for more details).

7 Useful References

7.1 Secured by Design (SBD)

- 7.1.1 Secured by Design focuses on crime prevention at the design, layout and construction stages of homes and commercial premises and promotes the use of security standards for a wide range of applications and products. To apply for Secured by Design certification for your development, visit our online application form at: <http://www.designforsecurity.org/secured-by-design/sbd-accreditation/>

A Contact register

Date	Contact With	Summary of Contact
08/03/2023	Katie Dyson	CIS application received
14/06/2023	Katie Dyson	Revised CIS

B Associated Documents

This report is based on the following drawings and supplementary information submitted by the applicant.

Drawing No.	Drawing Title	Date	Rev
SK06	Sketch layout	Nov 22	
22114_PRE_01	Pre-app Brochure	Mar 23	
01	Planning layout	May 23	

PLEASE NOTE - In the event of any subsequent material changes to the scheme, it will be necessary for Design for Security to reassess the comments made within this report.

C

CIS Version History

Version	Revisions Made	Date
A		