



CRIME IMPACT STATEMENT

Change of use and conversion of existing buildings into 21 self-contained apartments with associated car parking

AT The Big Western, 87 Great Western Street, Manchester

FOR: Mr Mustafa Alchelabi

VERSION A 18.05.21

2021/0030/CIS/01

Greater Manchester Police

design**for**security

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Development supported

From a crime prevention perspective, there are many positive elements to the design of the proposed development and, with the adoption of the recommendations set out in this report incorporated into the design, I am satisfied that it will provide a safe and secure environment for future residents.

Positive aspects of the scheme include:

- a residential use is compatible with the immediate neighbourhood;
- the development is at an appropriate scale, with variation in the size of the apartments;
- the retained front and rear entrances are well positioned;
- there is some defensible space around the street facing elevations and to the side and rear of the buildings;
- windows on all elevations will facilitate natural surveillance over the surrounding public realm, building entrances and the car park; and,
- secure car parking and a refuse store are provided within the site.

The principal recommendations to improve the security of the development include:

- installing appropriate pedestrian and vehicle gates to secure the courtyard and the car park;
- providing a secure, cycle store for residents;
- fitting security-certified doors, windows and glazing;
- adapting any retained doors and windows to ensure that they are adequately secure;
- fitting access controls at the entrance gates and entrance doors; and,
- creating a high quality space around the building.

We strongly recommend that the developer makes an application for the Secured by Design Bronze award, and accordingly, suggest that, as a condition of our support for the scheme, should the Local Planning Authority be minded to approve the application, a planning condition requiring the Secured by Design Bronze accreditation be imposed. Should the developer adhere to the specification set out in section 4 of this report, I have every confidence that the development can achieve the award.

Adrian Murphy *MRTPI*

Consultant

e: adrian.murphy@designforsecurity.org

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
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1 Visual Audit


The photographs and plan below show the development site and its surroundings. This rectangular, 0.2 hectare, site, edged in red on the plan, is located on Great Western Street, between Whitnall Street (to the west) and Grierson Street (to the east), on the south-western fringe of Moss Side, about 2 miles south of the city centre. Great Western Street is a lightly trafficked, east-west street that connects the western fringes of Moss Side to Princess Road, the principal north-south arterial route out of the city centre, and beyond, towards Rusholme. The neighbourhood around the site comprises almost exclusively of two-storey, social housing. The houses north, east and south-east of the site are arranged in short terraces and date from the 1970's or 1980's; those west and south of the site are more modern and are laid out in pairs or short terraces, including those immediately opposite the site on Great Western Street. Tugford Close, a cul-de-sac of modern semi-detached houses, is situated immediately west of the site. A public footpath, aligned with Great Western Street connects Alexandra Road to the west, through the Tugford Close, to Whitnall Street and Great Western Street. Alexandra Road is a locally important north-south route with a mix of land uses including community facilities, business premises, schools as well as residential property, which includes houses and apartments.





The site is occupied by The Big Western, a vacant former public house



A view of the northern and eastern elevations of the pub and boundary wall and railings to its car park




The rear entrance and car park



Looking north-east across the car park from Whitnall Street towards the gable ends of houses that adjoin



The main entrance to the pub on Great Western Street



Modern housing opposite the site, on the south side of Great Western Street

The development site itself is occupied by an imposing Victorian, public house, The Big Western, a stable block and car park. The pub is sited at the south-eastern part of the site; it has three floors and a single-storey outbuilding at the rear. The main entrance door is located on the Great Western Street elevation. There is a secondary entrance door at the rear and a door on the western elevation that provides a means of escape from the upper floors. The stable block lies east of the pub and comprises an L-shaped, two-storey, building. A gated, archway, with an 1879 date stone, is situated between the pub and stable block, and controls access from Great Western Street into a courtyard between the two buildings. The rear car park occupies around half of the site. Access into the car park is gained via Whitnall Street, where a pair of 1600mm high, steel palisade gates secures the entrance. The Whitnall Street and Grierson Street boundaries to the car park are defined with brick wall with railing infill around 1600mm high. An 1800mm high brick wall separates the car park from adjacent houses that face Grierson Street and Whitnall Street.

2 Crime Statistics & Analysis

All data below is based on crimes recorded between 1st July 2018 and 30th June 2019.

2.1 Crime in the neighbourhood



Recorded Crime within 500m of Site									
Domestic Burglary	Non-Domestic Burglary	Criminal Damage	Less Serious Wounding	Theft	Robbery	Serious Wounding	Theft from Motor Vehicle	Theft of Motor Vehicle	Bicycle Theft
34	7	55	155	32	32	8	30	19	16

- 2.1.1 In the period analysed, there were 467 recorded crimes in the neighbourhood in which the site is located, which, when compared with other neighbourhoods within Manchester is higher than the average. It is a densely populated neighbourhood so the crime rate is lower than many areas within the city. The stand-out crimes in this neighbourhood are crimes involving the use or threat of violence, criminal damage, burglary and robbery.
- 2.1.2 Comparing all streets in the neighbourhood, Moss Lane (East and West combined) was the only street with more than 40 crimes recorded. There were two streets with more than 30 recorded crimes; they were Princess Road and Great Western Street. Whitnall Street and Grierson Street recorded 10 and 9 crimes respectively. There are several crime hotspots in the neighbourhood, including: around Princess Road to the west; Sedgeborough Road to the east; Moss Lane East north of the site; and, close to the entrance to Alexandra Park, at the junction of Whitnall Street and Claremont Road, immediately south of the site.
- 2.1.3 Almost 50% of all recorded crimes in this neighbourhood involve the use, or threat, of violence (including robbery). These crimes were spread throughout the neighbourhood with clusters of offences at Sedgeborough Road and Great Western Street.
- 2.1.4 Vehicle crime accounts for 16% of the total volume of crime recorded in the neighbourhood; there are no specific hotspots.
- 2.1.5 Criminal damage, including damage to cars, makes up 11% of the recorded crime. There are no criminal damage hotspots as such but the more heavily trafficked streets around the periphery of the neighbourhood seem most affected. Vehicles and houses are equally targeted.
- 2.1.6 Crimes affecting residential property (but excluding violent crimes), i.e., damage to property, and theft, of parcels and other mail, from cars, burglary, and, theft from gardens, garages, and garden sheds, account for about 21% of the total, one third of which are involve burglary. The analysis indicates that there the main focus of burglary were the streets immediately north and south of Claremont Road to west of Alexandra Road.


2.2 Crime rate comparison

Comparing crime rates in the neighbourhood around the site to those in Manchester, Greater Manchester and England & Wales

The rates below relates to crime committed within 500m of the site. England & Wales data was last recorded for January – December 2020.





- 2.2.1 The rate of burglary per 1000 dwellings in this neighbourhood is **58% lower** than the Manchester rate, **24% higher** than the Greater Manchester rate and **4% higher** than the rate for England & Wales.
- 2.2.2 The rate of wounding per 1000 dwellings in this neighbourhood is **21% lower** than the Manchester rate, **24% higher** than the Greater Manchester rate and **33% higher** than the rate for England & Wales.




- 2.2.3 The rate of incidents of criminal damage per 1000 dwellings in this neighbourhood is **51% lower** than the Manchester rate, **30% lower** than the Greater Manchester rate and **5% higher** than the rate for England & Wales.
- 2.2.4 The rate of incidents of vehicle crime per 1000 dwellings in this neighbourhood is **42% lower** than the Manchester rate, **6% higher** than the Greater Manchester rate and **85% higher** than the rate for England & Wales.

2.3 Burglary

The data below relates to domestic burglaries committed within 500m of the site.




- 2.3.1 **Day/Time Range:** The risk of burglary is greatest on Monday, Thursday and Friday. Offences are spread throughout the day with a very slight increase in risk in the evening and middle of the night.



- 2.3.2 **Point of Entry:** The most frequently targeted points of entry during burglaries were doors, both front and rear doors, with offenders entering through unsecured doors or applying force to gain entry. Windows were also targeted; offenders smashed glass, forced windows forced or entered through open windows. On one occasion an offender entered a property by forcing a wall. Only one garden shed, or other outbuilding, was targeted.

2.4 Vehicle crime

The data below relates to vehicle crime committed within 500m of the site.



- 2.4.1 **Day/Time Range:** The risk of vehicle crime is greater on Wednesday and Sunday, and marginally greater during the afternoon, into the evening.

2.5 Modus operandi used by offenders in committing burglary and theft in Manchester & measures to reduce vulnerability

2.5.1 Doors have been forced open with bodily pressure and tools to drill locks

To minimise the risk of offenders forcing doors:

- all external doors should be certified to PAS 24 security standard - PAS 24 rated doors are very difficult to force open;
- front doors should be visible to neighbouring properties and from the 'street' rather than set within recesses or on more secluded elevations. Offenders will be less inclined to target properties where their actions may be witnessed;
- side or rear gardens should be enclosed with appropriately high fencing and locking gates so that rear doors are only accessible to residents; and,
- secluded passageways to the sides and rear of properties should be avoided wherever possible as such routes can facilitate offender access to rear gardens, as well as attract anti-social behaviours such as graffiti, fly-tipping or damage to fencing.

2.5.2 Doors have been targeted when left insecure

To minimise the risk of 'walk-in' burglaries:

- front doors should be fitted with a fixed handle or a 'split spindle', so that the only way in is with a key;
- communal entrance doors to apartments should be self-closing and lock automatically upon closing.
- defensible space should be provided between dwellings and the 'street', i.e. a small front garden enclosed with a 1000mm high fence. A degree of separation between public and private space can act as a psychological barrier to some offenders, who are then less willing to cross from public to clearly defined private space. Such boundary definition can also reduce the risk of criminal damage to property; and
- dusk-to-dawn lighting should be fitted to all external doors. Light suggests a dwelling is occupied and highlights the actions of intruders.

2.5.3 Windows have been prised open by offenders

To minimise the risk of prising windows open:

- all ground floor windows should include key operated locks and opening restrictors; and,
- access to the rear of the dwellings should be controlled by the erection of robust boundaries and locking gates. Pedestrian routes alongside the rear boundaries should be avoided. As a means to break and enter dwellings, offenders are more likely to target windows on secluded side or rear elevations.

2.5.4 Glazing in rear doors and windows has been smashed to gain entry

To minimise the risk of offender smashing glazing in doors and windows:

- laminate glass should be fitted to all external doors and to all windows on the ground floor of the development; and,

- access to rear gardens should be restricted with the installation of high fencing and locking gates.

2.5.5 Bikes were stolen from cycle stores and when secured to railings or street furniture

To minimise the risk of bicycle theft:

- provide convenient, secure cycle parking in a secure store within the building, or in an external store, which has self-closing, self-locking doors or gates, and is only accessible to residents in possession of a programmable access control fob.

2.5.6 Cars stolen, parts and property stolen from a vehicle, and bodywork damaged

To minimise the risk of offenders targeting resident and visitors cars:

- a secure car park should be provided. It should be within, or adjacent to, the building and under the casual supervision of the residents;
- high fencing and automated gates should be erected around the car park to restrict access to residents; and,
- lighting and CCTV should be installed to illuminate cars and record activity in the car park.

2.5.7 Theft of plant and machinery, and criminal damage during the construction period.

To minimise the risk of offenders targeting the construction site:

- a secure boundary should be erected around the site;
- access should be restricted to contractors and authorised visitors;
- security staff should patrol or visit during non-working hours;
- lighting and CCTV should be installed to illuminate and record activity;
- at the end of the working day, plant and machinery should be arranged so as to prevent forced access onto the site; and,
- plant and machinery should be fitted with tracking devices.

2.6 Environmental features that can influence crime patterns

2.6.1 Features of the physical environment can influence criminal and anti-social behaviour. They affect potential offenders' perceptions about a possible crime site, their evaluations of the circumstances surrounding a potential crime site, and the availability and visibility of one or more witnesses, who might intervene, at or near a site. Offenders may decide whether or not to commit a crime in a location after they determine the following:

- How easy will it be to enter the area?
- How visible, attractive, or vulnerable do targets appear?
- What are the chances of being seen?
- If seen, will the people in the area do something about it?
- Is there a quick, direct route for leaving the location after the crime is committed?

2.6.2 Aspects of the local environment that might help to reduce the risk of crime and disorder at the site currently and in the future are as follows:

- the number of acquisitive crimes (burglary, theft and vehicle crime) where residential property is targeted is quite low - the burglary rate is particularly low;
- the presence of residents in the houses in the vicinity of the site offer a reasonable prospect of passive surveillance over the public realm and the development site; the boundary walls and railings have restricted access through the car park, which had it remained open, would have resulted in damage to the property and disturbance to neighbouring residents,
- other than boarded up windows on the ground floor of the pub, which may indicate issues with breaking windows, and overgrown shrubs around the edges of the car park, there are few signs

of neglect or vandalism at the site or in the immediate neighbourhood - neighbouring residential properties are very well maintained; and,

- there are no street facing windows on the stable block, making it particularly secure and less likely to be targeted by vandals.

2.6.3 There are also some features of the locality that might facilitate crime and disorder, and the fear of crime and reduction in residential amenity, these include:

- the overall volume and nature of crime, particularly violent crime and robbery in the vicinity of the site are a concern;
- the site is prominently located - pedestrian and vehicle traffic is likely to include offenders who will quickly become aware of any opportunities to exploit opportunities presented by the redevelopment or target individuals coming and going from the site;
- the northern elevation is not well overlooked and is relatively secluded, an area where offenders may seek to exploit; and,
- the pub has two, prominent elevations that adjoin the street, which results in greater exposure of those parts of the building to the public.

3 Development Appraisal

3.1 The proposed development

- 3.1.1 The development, for which full planning permission is sought, involves the retention of the pub and stables and its conversion to apartments, and the re-use of the car park for the benefit of future residents.
- 3.1.2 The pub will be converted to 19 apartments, a mixture of 1, 2 and 3 bedroom apartments over four floors, as well as a studio apartment in the single-storey outbuilding at the rear. The front and rear entrance will both be retained. The front entrance will be accessible to residents and visitors, whilst the rear entrance will allow residents only access to and from the car park. The works will involve: the creation of an additional floor in the pub; removal of the existing, covered, means of escape stair and its replacement with an external staircase; and, remodelling of existing windows and installation of several new windows to all elevations.
- 3.1.3 The stables will be converted into a pair of three-bedroom apartments, one on each floor. Each apartment will have its own front door, which will face the courtyard. Access to visitors to these apartments is assumed to be via the gates on Great Western Street boundary. A further set of gates will secure the courtyard from the car park, through which residents will be able to access in order to reach the car park. External works will be limited to the installation of new windows to the courtyard and clerestory windows to the street facing elevations.
- 3.1.4 Externally, the car park will be resurfaced and lined with space for 25 vehicles. The steel-palisade, entrance gates on Whitnall Street will be replaced with a single sliding gate. The existing pedestrian gate on the Grierson Street boundary will be retained. The boundary walls and railings will be retained.
- 3.1.5 A refuse store will be installed on the edge of the car park between the stables and the vehicle entrance gates.
- 3.1.6 There is no indication of secure cycle storage on the plans.
- 3.1.7 There is no outdoor amenity space proposed, but Millennium Park is a park very close-by on Great Western Street and, the much bigger, Alexandra Park, is a short walk away, south of the site.

3.2 Positive aspects of the proposals

- 3.2.1 Bringing forward these proposals will result in the re-use of this impressive, Victorian building, which, if it continued to be unused, may attract criminal and anti-social behaviour, compromising the security of and amenity of local residents.
- 3.2.2 A residential development seems to be an appropriate use for the site, providing good quality accommodation in a sustainable location with easy access to a range of services.

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- 3.2.3 The building is slightly set back from the pavement and the ground floor apartments are elevated above street level. This modest zone of 'defensible space' between the building and the adjacent streets will reduce the risk of crime and anti-social behaviour affecting the development as well as contributing to a preserving the privacy of ground floor residents.
 - 3.2.4 Twenty-one apartments are proposed. Such a number of dwellings will provide a good chance of at least some residents being present throughout the day, particularly at night and at the weekend, and so casual surveillance is likely to be maintained around the development. In addition, given the reasonably, small number of apartments proposed, residents should become familiar with their neighbours and distinguish between residents and non-residents as they come and go, positively influencing community safety in and around the development.
 - 3.2.5 A development with a mix of apartment sizes is more likely attract a broader age range of residents, perhaps young singles and couples, older singles, people seeking to share and families seeking to settle in the neighbourhood. It is more likely that residents of developments with a broader resident age range and family arrangements will develop a sense of neighbourliness, interacting and actively supervising the shared spaces within the development. Any anti-social activities and behaviours by residents may be moderated by the presence of older people and families.
 - 3.2.6 The plethora of windows, including substantial bay windows, of routinely occupied rooms overlooking Great Western Street, Grierson Street, the courtyard and the car park, will facilitate natural surveillance. Along with the sight of residents coming and going and, at times, residents being visible within their apartments, the sense of passers-by being under scrutiny will help to deter offenders.
 - 3.2.7 On balance, whilst the clerestory windows to be installed in the stables apartments means that natural surveillance of the street is compromised, they do allow light to penetrate the living space without compromising security or privacy.
 - 3.2.8 The communal entrance door is prominent on the Great Western Street elevation. Providing the rear of the development is secure, visitors and delivery staff will have no issues finding and identifying the appropriate entrance to approach.
 - 3.2.9 The main entrance and lobby of the pub can be fitted with access controls in order to reduce the risk of visitors or intruders tailgating into the building and entering the circulation space without due supervision. Similarly, the gates securing the courtyard can be fitted with access controls to restrict access to residents and *bona fide* visitors.
 - 3.2.10 Car parking spaces have been included in a secure part of the site, and whilst limited in number, the site is in a sustainable location, with good access to regular bus services and local amenities.
 - 3.2.11 Residents are easily able to access the car park via the rear entrance door or gates securing the courtyard.
 - 3.2.12 Provision has been made for a secure refuse store within the development.

3.3 Recommendations to improve the security of the development

The following points have been identified for further consideration or clarification, and will need to be addressed in order for Design for Security to support the scheme.

Car park

- 3.3.1 Rather than a tarmac surface, which can appear austere, the inclusion of a variety of materials in the surfacing of the car park will enhance the appearance of the development and emphasise the private nature of the space.
- 3.3.2 The car park, vehicle gate should be secured with a 1600mm-1800mm high, automated gate. The pedestrian/cyclist gate should be fitted with an electronic lock with a holding force of around 4500N. A residents' entry fob should be used to operate the gates. The pedestrian/cyclist gate must also be self-closing and lock upon closure.
- 3.3.3 The car park should be illuminated from dusk to dawn and the bays clearly marked out.
- 3.3.4 Signs should be clearly visible at the entrance gates indicating the name of the development, reinforcing the private nature of the car park and directing visitors to the appropriate entrance door or gate to the apartments.

Boundary treatments

- 3.3.5 The existing site boundary walls and railings at the rear of the building should be retained.
- 3.3.6 The existing stone wall that defines the Great Western Street and Grierson Street edges of the site should be repaired and retained and, ideally, a 1000mm high railing erected on the top. The space between it and the building filled with appropriate landscaping.

Mail delivery

- 3.3.7 Mail boxes for each apartment in the pub should be mounted on the wall of the front entrance lobby.
- 3.3.8 Letter boxes should be installed in the entrance doors to the stables apartment or boxes mounted on the wall adjacent to the entrance doors.

Control entry into the main building

- 3.3.9 The 'front' (if not the street facing doors, then the inner doors) and the rear, communal entrances, and the means of escape door, must be fitted with security-certified, self-closing and lock upon closure doors. Additionally, the front and rear entrance doors must be fitted with an electronic lock that is operated with a programmable fob.
- 3.3.10 If the current front entrance doors are retained, they must be fitted with an electronic lock that has a holding force of 4500N and a self-closing mechanism that forces the door to engage the lock and secure it automatically upon closure.
- 3.3.11 An audio-visual unit with a link to each apartment should be installed at the Great Western Street entrance door, so that residents can vet callers prior to allowing access to *bona fide* visitors only.
- 3.3.12 To minimise the risk of offenders 'tail-gating' legitimate residents/visitors, the inner lobby doors should have fob activated, electronic locks fitted. These doors should also be self-closing and lock securely upon closure.
- 3.3.13 The front and rear entrance doors should be particularly well illuminated.
- 3.3.14 The rear entrance should be for use by residents only.

Control entry into the courtyard

- 3.3.15 The front and rear gates securing the courtyard should be replaced/refurbished and adapted. Each entrance should include an independent, personnel gate.
- 3.3.16 The personnel gates should be at least 2000mm in height and be fitted with an electronic lock with a holding force of around 4500N and be self-closing and self-locking.
- 3.3.17 An audio-visual unit with a link to each of the stables apartment should be installed at the Great Western Street gate so that residents can vet callers prior to allowing access to *bona fide* visitors only.

Apartment/studio security

- 3.3.18 In both the main building and the stables, each apartment should be fitted with a security-rated entrance door, a door viewer and an opening limiter.
- 3.3.19 Any new, ground floor, opening windows should be security-rated, fitted with key-operable locks and have restrictors fitted that limit opening to 100mm. Retained window frames at ground floor level should also be fitted with window locks and opening restrictors.
- 3.3.20 New and replacement glazing in doors and windows should include laminate glass.

Intruder alarm and CCTV

- 3.3.21 Ideally, each apartment should be fitted with an intruder alarm,
- 3.3.22 The developer should install a CCTV system, with cameras capable of monitoring: the communal entrance doors; entrance lobby; the courtyard gates; the vehicle and pedestrian gates; the car park; and, the cycle store. Images should be recorded and securely stored by the building's management company and retained for 30 days for review and for use as evidence in any prosecutions arising.

Secure cycle storage

- 3.3.23 A secure cycle store should be provided. It should be located in a private part of the site, out of view of passer-by, for example, within the courtyard. The store should be made weatherproof, robust (e.g. steel mesh) and secured with a steel gate secured with an electronic lock operated by a residents' fob. The

door should be self-closing and lock upon closure. Securely anchored cycle stands to which residents can secure their bicycle should be installed within the store. Anything less than a very secure store in a secluded location is unlikely to be worth the investment.

4 Physical Security

The following checklist forms the physical security requirements for this scheme to achieve Secured by Design accreditation.

4.1 Doors

- ☐ The front and rear communal entrance doorset (door, frame, lock and hardware) of the pub should be compliant with, and certified to, BS PAS 24, STS202, or LPS 1175 SR2, and include a multi-point electronic lock, (which is an integral part of the certification), The doors should be self-closing and lock securely on closure.
- ☐ If the existing front door is retained, it should be fitted with a Secured by Design accredited, single or multi-point lock. In either case, the entrance door should be self-closing and lock securely on closure. If this is the case, then the inner lobby doors should be compliant with, and certified to, BS PAS 24, STS202, or LPS 1175 SR2, and include a multi-point electronic lock, (which is an integral part of the certification), The doors should also be self-closing and lock securely on closure.
- ☐ Individual entrance doors to all apartments must be compliant with and certified to BS PAS 24, STS201, or LPS 1175 SR2.
- ☐ Apartment entrance doors should have a fixed external handle or split spindle fitted, meaning access is only possible with a key when it is closed.
- ☐ Apartment entrance doors should have fixed sidelights or a door viewer, as well as an opening limiter fitted, so that residents can identify visitors prior to opening the door fully.
- ☐ The external means of escape doorset (door, frame, lock and hardware) of the pub should be compliant with, and certified to, BS PAS 24, STS202, or LPS 1175 SR2, The door should be self-closing and lock securely on closure.

4.2 Access control

- ☐ So that residents can vet visitors prior to allowing entry, a remote, access control system should be installed at the Great Western Street entrance door and the pedestrian gate on Great Western Street. Visitors should be able to call the relevant apartment from a robust, audio-visual unit at the door/gate. Residents should have a handset in their apartment that allows them to communicate and identify the visitor, and to release the door or gate to allow *bona fide* visitors entry into the lobby or courtyard where they can then be met and escorted to the relevant apartment by the resident.

4.3 Window frames

- ☐ Any new, ground floor, opening windows must be compliant with and certified to BS PAS 24 and, escape requirements permitting, must be key-lockable, and have fixed/lockable opening restrictors (not releasable from the outside) limited to 100mm.
- ☐ Retained windows at ground floor level must have key-operated locks and restrictors that limit opening to 100mm fitted.

4.4 Glazing

- ☐ New or replacement glazing within, and surrounding, the internal and external entrance doors, and the windows on the ground, ground, must incorporate at least one pane of glass rated as P1A under EN 356 (laminated glass). The remaining pane in a double glazed unit may be toughened glass.

4.5 Intruder alarm

- ☐ An intruder alarm should be fitted with each apartment and be linked to contacts on the front door of each apartment and with PIR detectors covering all ground floor rooms that have windows.

4.6 Boundary fencing and gates

- ☐ The existing, boundary walls and railings should be retained and where modified, should replicate the existing arrangement of wall and railings.
- ☐ The proposed pedestrian gate on the Grierson Street boundary should be around 1600-1800mm high and be secured with an electronic lock that can be activated with a residents' fob. It should be self-closing and self-locking.
- ☐ The automated, vehicle entrance gate should be operated by a residents' fob to enter and leave the car park.
- ☐ The front and rear gates securing the courtyard should be at least 2000mm in height and include an independent, personnel gate. The gates should be at least 2000mm in height and be fitted with an electronic lock with a holding force of around 4500N. They should be self-closing and self-locking.

4.7 Cycle store

- ☐ The cycle store should be constructed using steel mesh with a weatherproof roof. The store should be secured with either a steel gate that is set within a steel frame. The gate should be fitted with an electronic lock that has a holding force of around 4500N and a self-closing mechanism that allows it to engage the lock as it closes.
- ☐ Securely anchored, cycle stands should be installed that allow residents to secure both wheels and the frame to the stand.

4.8 Lighting

- ☐ Low intensity, dusk-to-dawn, LED lighting should be installed to illuminate the all external doors, the refuse store, car and cycle parking, and the entrance gates.
- ☐ Fittings should produce 'white' light, as opposed to yellow/orange light. Metal halide (or bulbs with a comparable output) should be used, as these offer superior colour rendition over alternatives such as high and low pressure sodium bulbs.

4.9 CCTV

- ☐ A CCTV system should be installed.
- ☐ The location of cameras should help to provide clear facial identification of individuals. Suitable locations for cameras are: the communal entrance doors, entrance gates, ground floor lobby, courtyard, car park and the cycle store.
- ☐ Images should be recorded, with recording equipment located in a secure store room within the building, or off-site at a suitable monitoring company.

5 Management & Maintenance

- ☐ A plan should be drawn up to address repairs and maintenance to communal areas, including: circulation spaces, entry gates, CCTV, lighting, signage, access controls, and communal area maintenance.

6 Construction

- ☐ The developer should take appropriate measures to secure their site during construction, and control pedestrian and vehicle access.
- ☐ The contractor on this scheme should be a member of the 'Considerate Constructors Scheme'.
- ☐ Site security contractors should be Security Industry Authority, SIA, approved.

7 Secured by Design

- ☐ Secured by Design focuses on crime prevention at the design, layout and construction stages of homes and promotes the use of security standards for a wide range of applications and products. To apply for Secured by Design certification for your development, visit our online application form at: <http://www.designforsecurity.org/secured-by-design/sbd-accreditation/>

A Contact Register

Date	Contact With	Summary of Contact
14.04.21	Saghir Hussain, Create It Studio Architects	Request for Crime Impact Statement
28.04.20		Site visited
18.05.21	Saghir Hussain, Create It Studio Architects	Report issued

B Associated Documents

This report is based on the following drawings:

Drawing No.	Drawing Title	Date	Rev
A1312(01)001	Existing Site and Location Plan	11/11/20	
A1312(01)002	Existing Ground Floor Plan	11/11/20	
A1312(01)003	Existing Floor Plan	11/11/20	
A1312(01)004	Existing Second Floor Plan	11/11/20	
A1312(01)005	Existing Roof Plan	11/11/20	
A1312(01)006	Existing North Elevation	11/11/20	
A1312(01)007	Existing East Elevation	11/11/20	
A1312(01)008	Existing South Elevation	11/11/20	
A1312(01)009	Existing West Elevation	11/11/20	
A1312(01)010	Outbuilding - Existing Plans	11/11/20	
A1312(01)011	Outbuilding - Existing Elevations	11/11/20	
A1312(01)012	Single Storey Elevations	11/11/20	
A1312(02)000	Proposed Location Plan	18/11/20	A
A1312(02)001	Proposed Site Plan	18/11/20	A
A1312(02)002	Proposed Ground Floor Plan	18/11/20	A
A1312(02)003	Proposed First Floor Plan	18/11/20	A
A1312(02)004	Proposed Second Floor Plan	18/11/20	A
A1312(02)005	Proposed Third Floor Plan	18/11/20	A
A1312(02)006	Proposed Roof Plan	18/11/20	A
A1312(02)007	Proposed North Elevation	18/11/20	A
A1312(02)008	Proposed East Elevation	18/11/20	A
A1312(02)009	Proposed South Elevation	18/11/20	A
A1312(02)010	Proposed West Elevation	18/11/20	A
A1312(02)011	Outbuilding - Proposed Plans	18/11/20	A
A1312(02)012	Outbuilding - Proposed Elevations	18/11/20	A
A1312(02)013	Proposed Single Storey Elevations	18/11/20	A
A1312(02)014	Section AA	18/11/20	A
A1312(02)015	Bin Store	18/11/20	A

Any changes to the scheme may require a review of the recommendations made within this report.

C CIS Version History

Version	Revisions Made	Date
A		17.05.21

D Glossary

Burglary Resistance Standards

BS 7950, 1997

Specification for enhanced security performance of casement and tilt/turn windows.

BS 4873, 2005: Specification for aluminium windows.

BS 7412, 2007: Specification for plastic windows made from PVC-U extruded hollow profiles.

BS 644-1, 2003: Wood windows. Specification for factory assembled windows - various types.

BWF:TWAS: Timber window accreditation scheme.

BS 6510, 2005: Specification for steel windows, sills, window boards & doors.

BS PAS 23-1, 1999

General performance requirements for door assemblies.

A performance standard for door sets, which certifies that a particular door set is fit for purpose. Door products must also have BS PAS 24 certification.

BS PAS 24-1, 2012

General security performance requirements for door assemblies.

An attack test standard for door sets, which certifies that a particular door, frame, lock and hardware set has withstood a series of physical tests. This is the minimum police requirement for Secured by Design dwellings, and is also applicable to French/double doors, and sliding doors.

ENV 1627-30 (Security Ratings WK1 to WK6)

Windows, doors, shutters - Burglar resistance Requirements and classification

The classification system used in ENV 1627-30 is aimed at the commercial market and is based on five elements:

- Resistance of glazing
- Performance of hardware
- Resistance to static loading
- Resistance to dynamic loading
- Burglary resistance by manual intervention

LPS 1175 (Security Ratings 1 to 6)

Specification for testing and classifying the burglary resistance of building components

This includes doors, shutters, garage doors and grilles typically for commercial premises and higher risk domestic premises and is acceptable to the ABI and the Police. The standard has 6 levels, 6 being the highest, with levels 1 and 2 equivalent in many respects to BS PAS 24 and BS 7950.

STS01 Issue 4: 2012

Enhanced security requirements for doorsets and door assemblies for dwellings to satisfy the requirements of PAS23 and PAS24

As the title suggests this is an equivalent test standard to PAS 24, incorporating PAS 23 (fitness for purpose), published by Warrington Certification.

STS02 Issue 3: 2011

Requirements for burglary resistance of construction products including hinged, pivoted, folding or sliding doorsets, windows, curtain walling, security grilles, garage doors and shutters.

This specifies a broadly similar range of attack tools and times to those specified at the lower levels of LPS1175. However, STS02 does not extend to cover the higher levels of risk addressed within LPS1175 and the attack methods used differ.

EN 356, 2000 (Ratings P1A to P8A)

Glass in building. Security glazing. Testing and classification of resistance against manual attack.

A performance standard for manual attacks on glazing. P2A is comparable to the performance of a 6.8mm laminated glass, and P4A to that of a 9.5mm laminated glass.

Commonly Used Acronyms

CIT

Cash in transit (refers to vehicles, personnel and routines).

CPTED

Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design
(Learn more at www.designforsecurity.org/about/cpted)

CRS

Crime Reduction Specialist. Sometimes known as CPO (Crime Prevention Officer)

INPT

Integrated Neighbourhood Policing Team.

PVB/PolyVinyl Butyral (Glazing interlayer)

A commonly used interlayer used in the production of laminated glass.

LPCB (Loss Prevention Certification Board)

A brand of the BRE Global (Building Research Establishment) family. The LPCB work with insurers, Government, police, designers, manufacturers, contractors and end users to develop methods of assessing performance and reliability of security products to ensure their fitness for purpose.

UKAS (United Kingdom Accreditation Service)

The sole national accreditation body recognised by government to assess, against internationally agreed standards, organisations that provide certification, testing, inspections and calibration services.

Useful Websites

Design for Security

www.designforsecurity.org

Secured by Design

www.securedbydesign.com

RIBA Product Selector

www.ribaproductselector.com

LPCB – Red Book Live

www.redbooklive.com

Crime Reduction (Home Office)

www.crimereduction.homeoffice.gov.uk

DAC (Design Against Crime) Solution Centre

www.designagainstcrime.org

Building for Life

www.buildingforlife.org

CLG (Communities and Local Government)

www.communities.gov.uk