



CRIME IMPACT STATEMENT

Refurbishment and extension of the existing building to create a new women's training facility (use class F1) with associated parking

AT Land enclosed by Ashton New Road, Alan Turning way, Wilson Street

FOR: Manchester City Football Club Ltd

Greater Manchester Police

VERSION A: **08.01.24**

designforsecurity

2011/0215/CIS/02

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Development Supported

The proposed development is suitably located and well-designed and poses few issues from a crime prevention and personal safety perspective.

In terms of improving security at the facility, I have made several minor recommendations, and these are set out in section 3.4 of the Statement.

We welcome the proposals and are happy to support the planning application.

Adrian Murphy *MRTPI*

Consultant

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
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1 The Site and Surroundings

The photographs and plan below show the development site and its surroundings. The site, edged in red on the plan, is located on the south side of Ashton New Road at the northern-eastern fringe of City Football Academy, CFA, Manchester City's Football Club's training complex. The complex, along with the Etihad Stadium, for the Etihad Campus. Ashton New Road, A662, is a heavily-trafficked, radial route that connects Manchester city centre, 3 miles to the west, with Ashton-under Lune 5 miles to the east. In the immediate vicinity of the site, the Ashton to Eccles Metrolink line runs parallel to the road and includes a station, Velopark, obliquely opposite the site, on the north side of the road. There is a large ASDA supermarket and Decathlon store immediately north of the station. The access to the service yard is opposite the site. The Ashton Canal is situated to the north-east of the site. The canal's towpath, a popular recreational route, lies adjacent to the site boundary but at a level around 2-3metres below the level of the site.


The North Gate entrance to the Etihad Campus on the south side of Ashton New Road



Looking east along the landscaped verge of Ashton New Road towards the site



A single storey building occupies the part of the north-eastern corner of the site.



A close-up view of the building that stands on the site



Looking across the Ashton Canal and towpath towards the site's north-eastern boundary



A tall, welded-wire, mesh fence secures the Campus and its North Car Park



The application site lies within the domain of the City Football Academy, which includes: the Academy Stadium - a 7,000-capacity stadium predominantly used to host Elite Development Squad, youth and women's team games; the Performance Centre - First Team training pitch, a full size indoor synthetic pitch, Academy and the First Team Training Centre with a gym, medical, therapy and training spaces, refectory, relaxation lounge, teaching rooms, pools and office/administration space, bedrooms for Academy residents; City HQ (offices of the Club and City Football's operations, meeting rooms and staff and visitor restaurant; multiple, grassed training pitches; and, car parking. Access into the City Football Academy is gained via one of four entrances, including the north gate, the nearest to the application site, which is fitted with both automated, vehicle-barriers and gates, manned by staff during the day. The remainder of the complex is enclosed with high, welded-wire mesh, security fencing. Dense planting around the periphery maintains the privacy of staff within the complex and helps to soften the appearance of the fencing, whilst comprehensive CCTV and lighting systems complement site security. The part of the Academy site that is the subject to this application is situated at the north-eastern corner, with shared boundaries with Ashton New Road and the Ashton Canal. There is an undistinguished, single-storey building on the site the north-eastern elevation of which abuts the canal towpath. The remainder of the site includes a service road, a modest car park, partly overgrown landscaping, and several mature trees; the north car park is excluded. Access to the application site is gained via the northern entrance on Ashton New Road.

2 Crime Statistics & Analysis

2.1 Crime in the neighbourhood

The data below relates to signal crimes recorded between 1st November 2022 to 31st October 2023 within 500m of the site.

Domestic Burglary	Non-Domestic Burglary	Criminal Damage	Crimes involving the use or threat of violence	Theft (including shoplifting)	Robbery	Drug related offences	Theft from Motor Vehicle	Theft of Motor Vehicle	Bicycle Theft
8	5	45	228	167	8	16	16	15	6

2.1.1 There were 688 recorded crimes in the neighbourhood around the development site during the period analysed. This volume of crime is above the average for a typical suburban neighbourhood within Manchester. The most common crimes recorded were:

- the use, or threat, of violence - 43%
- theft - 35%
- criminal damage – 8%
- vehicle crime, i.e., theft of and theft from a vehicle - 7%.



2.1.2 Typically, crimes involving the use or threat of violence are most common in many neighbourhoods, however, the percentage of violent crimes is a little lower than usual although the number of thefts is higher.

2.1.3 The top 5 streets/places for recorded crime were:

1. ASDA – 179 crimes
2. Starbucks – 40 crimes
3. Ashton New Road – 21 crimes
4. Bamford Street – 20 crimes
5. McDonalds – 18 crimes

2.1.4 There were just 7 offences committed at, and immediately adjacent to, City Football Academy, which includes incidents that occurred during events when the public were allowed access to the Academy Stadium. Crimes included theft, use or threat of violence and vehicle-related crimes.

Vehicle crime





2.1.5 The risk of vehicle crime is extremely low. Vehicle-related crimes are more common on Tuesday, Wednesday, Friday and Saturday and around midnight.


2.2 Crime at sports venues in Greater Manchester

The data below relates to burglary at sport venues recorded in the Greater Manchester during 2018 - 2019.

Burglary





- 2.2.1 The risk of sports venues being targeted by offenders is low. Burglary offences tended to occur at night, during afternoon and in the evening.



- 2.2.2 Entering a venue via an unsecured door or entering restricted areas of a venue as well as forcing security shutters were the most common means of entering and was employed in more than half of all burglaries. Forcing doors and gaining entry via the roof were the next most common means of entering. Out-buildings were also targeted on two occasions. Entry by forcing a window or by forcing a way through an external wall were each recorded on one occasion.

Theft



- 2.2.3 The risk of theft is also exceptionally low. Offences are slightly more common on Saturdays, with offences taking place in the afternoon and evening. Private property belonging to staff and customers, such as mobile phones and cash, are the most routinely targeted items – taking place most often in changing/locker rooms and staff-only areas.

2.3 Typical modus operandi used in committing crime at sports facilities in Greater Manchester & measures to reduce vulnerabilities

2.3.1 Doors and shutters have been forced open with bodily pressure and tools

To minimise the risk of offenders forcing doors:

- prevent entry to the site by outside of opening hours by erecting suitably high, perimeter fencing and gates;
- external doors, roller shutters, window frames and glazing/curtain walling should be security rated;
- all external doors and shutters should be illuminated with dusk-to-dawn light. Light suggests a presence of people and may deter offenders from targeting the building. Lighting will also support the CCTV system and highlight the actions of an offender, increasing the chance of a crime being detected; and,
- CCTV should be installed to record activity within, and around, the exterior of buildings, particularly around the entrance and means of escape doors.

2.3.2 Theft of equipment, and of customer and staff property

To minimise the risk of offenders stealing property from the premises:

- provide a continuous, visible staff presence whilst the facility is open;
- access control systems should be employed to gain entry and within the building to prevent unauthorised persons from entering staff-only, changing and storage rooms, where sensitive information, ICT or other expensive, portable equipment, or staff belongings may be stored;
- overt signage can also assist in deterring casual entry; and,
- include space for staff and customers to store personal/valuable items securely e.g., small lockers or lockable drawers.

2.3.3 Offenders prised open windows or smashed glazing in windows and doors to gain access

In order to reduce the risk of damage to doors and windows, and breaking and entering:

- Window frames should be security-rated and include tamper-proof, opening restrictors;
- glazing in doors and windows should include both laminate and toughened layers;
- lighting should illuminate all elevations of buildings; and,
- landscaping should be managed in order to promote surveillance (natural and electronic) across the site.

2.3.4 Bikes were stolen by offenders

In order to reduce the risk of bicycle theft:

- install a secure shelter(s) for customers and staff to park their bikes;
- locate the shelter(s) in a secure area that benefits from regular supervision by staff and customers; and,
- install CCTV cameras to monitor movements around, and in and out of, the cycle shelter(s).

2.3.5 Offenders damaged fencing and smashed glazing of buildings in acts of criminal damage

In order to reduce the risk of criminal damage to fencing and glazing;

- Install a security-rated, perimeter fence;
- glazing in external doors and windows should include both laminate and toughened panes - the toughened glass should form the outer pane;
- install shutters or grilles to the most vulnerable openings; and,
- avoid glazed openings on the most secluded elevations.

2.4 Environmental features that might influence crime patterns

2.4.1 Features of the physical environment can influence patterns of criminal and anti-social behaviour. They affect potential offenders' perceptions about a possible crime site, their evaluations of the circumstances surrounding a potential crime site, and the availability and visibility of one or more witnesses, who might intervene, at or near a site. Offenders may decide whether or not to commit a crime in a location after they determine the following:

- How easy will it be to enter the area?
- How visible, attractive, or vulnerable do targets appear?
- What are the chances of being seen?
- If seen, will the people in the area do something about it?
- Is there a quick, direct route for leaving the location after the crime is committed?

2.4.2 Aspects of the local environment that might help to reduce the risk of crime and disorder on the site are as follows:

- the site is located within an area where crime levels are not excessive;
- the City Football Academy is enclosed with suitably high, secure fencing and gates and the entrance gates are staffed;
- the entire Academy site is monitored by CCTV and suitably illuminated;
- there is a constant staff presence, including those visible at the entrance gates, which will deter many offenders from attempting to enter the site;
- the presence of passing vehicle, tram and pedestrian traffic may help to deter trespassers;
- users of the canal towpath add another, albeit intermittent, level of supervision to the site perimeter, which may also help to deter intruders; and,
- the quality of the environment surrounding the site is good; MCFC and the City Council appear conscious of the need maintain a high environmental quality in the vicinity of an internationally important facility and intolerant of crime and anti-social behaviour. They are both likely to report any issues arising and assist in their suppression.

2.4.3 There are also some features that might facilitate crime and disorder, and these include:

- crime analysis suggests that sports venues in this neighbourhood are targeted by offenders;
- being adjacent to Ashton New Road, well-trafficked route, the site is visible to the passing public. Offenders may notice the development as it emerges from early in the construction phase, and be aware of, and potentially exploit, any criminal opportunities;
- because of limited oversight by nearby residents and users of the local footpath network, in the hours when the facility is closed, offenders may feel that they can act with little prospect of being witnessed or apprehended;
- the City Football Academy has a large, boundary. Offenders can easily approach the site when attempting to carry out crime. However, the crime analysis indicates that the Academy is not a focus for crime, which suggests that existing management and security features deter offenders;
- the proximity of the Metrolink stop opposite the site attracts offenders to the neighbourhood, who may then navigate toward the Academy to carry out crime; and,
- the footpath and towpath that adjoin the northern and, north-eastern boundaries of the site provide offenders/trespassers with an easy, and secluded in the case of the towpath, approach to the site where they may attempt to scale or undermine the boundary as a means to enter the Academy grounds.

3 Development Appraisal

3.1 Proposed development

- 3.1.1 The proposed development involves the retention, refurbishment and extension of the existing single-storey building to create a women's football training centre. The proposed extension will have accommodation over two-storeys and will include the centre's main entrance with reception desk and lobby. The building will house, *inter alia*, a gym and changing rooms, as well as hydrotherapy and physiotherapy rooms. Externally, a pair of automated, multi-folding gates will secure the access to the building; there will also be ramped and stepped access to the adjacent training pitches, a drop-off area, an entrance plaza and peripheral landscaping.

3.2 Positive aspects of the proposal

- 3.2.1 The proposed development will be located in a neighbourhood area where the level of crime and disorder are not excessive. There have only been a modest number of crimes in the immediate vicinity of the application site.
- 3.2.2 The development will be located within the secure boundaries of the City Football Academy.
- 3.2.3 Entry to the CFA is controlled by staff located at each of the perimeter gates and will continue to be so. The perimeter fence is very secure and shows no obvious signs of decay or having been breached.
- 3.2.4 Access to the facility will be gained via the controlled entry, North Gate.
- 3.2.5 On-site staff, CCTV and lighting, and established security practices have been effective in minimising incidents of crime and disorder.
- 3.2.6 Car parking will be provided in the, adjacent, North Car Park.
- 3.2.7 The existing building is visually poor and, although located within a secure boundary, the building does not appear to present a secure facility for players. Refurbishing and extending the building with modern security features is welcomed. The extended building will be of a good design standard, removal of graffiti from the canal-side elevation and application of a graffiti-resistant coating will improve the appearance of the building whilst also positively impacting upon the visual quality of the environment along the Ashton Canal.
- 3.2.8 The proposed location and arrangement of the reception desk will allow staff to supervise the entrance.
- 3.2.9 The internal layout of the proposed building allows access to the reception area and, with the installation of suitable electronic locks, the ability to control access beyond.
- 3.2.10 Sporting facilities such as those proposed, particularly when available to the community, can help to focus the attentions of young people onto healthy lifestyles and teamwork, and away from crime and anti-social behaviour. Additionally, they can help to nurture pride in a neighbourhood and help build social capital in the community.

3.3 Recommendations to improve the security of the development

- 3.3.1 Poor security-quality doors, windows and glazing on the existing building should be replaced with security-rated doors, window frames, and glazing.
- 3.3.2 The doors, windows and glazing fitted to the proposed extension should meet a recognised security standard.
- 3.3.3 Glazed doors and windows should be omitted from the more secluded, canal-side elevations of the building, unless protected with security-certified, roller shutters which protect the glazing when the facility is secured at the end of the working day.
- 3.3.4 All entrance doors should be fitted with access controls to restrict access to players and other staff. Locks should be activated by a wrist fob or similar. In addition, Secured by Design (SBD) compliant, electronic locks should be fitted to internal doors to which access is further restricted to appropriate staff and players.
- 3.3.5 Fob-activated (or similarly secure) lockers should be available to staff and players to securely store their personal effects.

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- 3.3.6 Cycle parking should be provided. Easily accessed, weather-shielded, cycle stands, or a secure store, with welded wire mesh walls and a robust, weatherproof roof is recommended. Access into the secure store should be controlled with self-closing, self-locking, steel gate that is fitted with a fob-operated, electronic lock.

4 Physical Security

4.1 Doors

- ☐ All external doors that allow entry into the building, including mean of escape and plant room doors, should be compliant with, and certified to, LPS 1175 SR2 or PAS 24. They should be capable of self-closing and self-locking.
- ☐ Internal doors that secure access to rooms to kit stores, sensitive material or personal effects of players and staff should be FD30-rated, fitted with fob-activated, SBD compliant, electronic locks, and be capable of self-closing and lock securely upon closure.

4.2 Shutters

- ☐ Shutters used to enhance security to glazed doors and windows should be tested, and certified, to LPS 1175 SR1 or 2.

4.3 Window frames

- ☐ Window frames should be compliant with, and certified to, LPS 1175 SR2 or PAS 24.

4.4 Glazing

- ☐ Glazing in external doors and windows should incorporate at least one pane of laminated glass that complies with the BSEN 356 P1A or P4A standard. The remaining pane in a double-glazed unit may include toughened glass.

4.5 Intruder alarm

- ☐ An intruder alarm should be fitted to the entire building. It should include contacts on all external doors with PIR detectors in all ground and first-floor rooms that are accessible from the flat roofs.
- ☐ The alarm system should be monitored by the Etihad Campus security team.

4.6 Access controls

- ☐ The main entrance door should be fitted with an SBD compliant, electronic lock, operated with a suitably programmed fob, to restrict access to staff and players when the entrance is unsupervised. Similarly, external doors to the boot room should be fitted with an electronic lock, operated with a suitably programmed fob, to restrict access to staff and players
- ☐ Controls should also be installed to the doors connecting the entrance reception/lobby to the changing facilities to restrict access when the facilities are not in use.

4.7 Boundary fencing

- ☐ The existing boundary fencing should be retained.

4.8 Lighting

- ☐ Dusk-to-dawn, low intensity, 'white' lighting, operated by photoelectric cell/daylight sensor should illuminate all external doors, whilst the car and cycle parking should be illuminated during the hours of operation of the facility.

4.9 Landscaping

- ☐ Care should be taken to ensure trees and shrubs do not compromise the operation of CCTV cameras, and the site and building lighting.

4.10 CCTV

- ☐ Cameras, with movement detectors, should be capable of monitoring: the site access road; all external doors; circulation corridors; reception area; cycle storage; and, the car park. A public address system should be installed to complement the cameras so that camera and alarm monitoring staff can issue a warning to would-be intruders.

4.11 Cycle storage

- ☐ Weather resistant, cycle shelters should be provided in a well-supervised location, for example, close to the building entrance. Securely anchored, Sheffield stands should be installed within the shelter to allow cyclists to secure the wheels and frame to the stand.

5 Secured by Design (SBD)

- ☐ Secured by Design focuses on crime prevention at the design, layout and construction stages of a development and promotes the use of security standards for a wide range of applications and products. To apply for Secured by Design certification for your development, visit our online application form at: <http://www.designforsecurity.org/secured-by-design/sbd-accreditation/>

A Contact Register

Date	Contact	Summary of Contact
07.11.23	Samantha Lee, P4 Planning	Request for Crime Impact Statement
01.12.23		Site visited
08.01.24	Samantha Lee, P4 Planning	Report issued

B Associated Documents

This report is based on the following drawings:

Drawing No.	Drawing Title	Date	Rev
407-WP4A	Landscape Masterplan-A1		
407-WP4C	Landscape Masterplan-A1		
1130	Proposed Elevations - Sheet 1		
1131	Proposed Elevations - Sheet 2		
1132	Proposed Elevations - Sheet 3		
1140	Proposed Isometric View from South		
1141	Proposed Isometric View from East		
1142	Proposed Isometric View from North		
1143	Proposed Isometric View from West		
SKM_C30823103114590	Site Location Plan - Draft		

In the event of any changes to the scheme, it may be necessary for Design for Security to review the recommendations in this report.

C CIS Version History

Version	Revisions	Date
A		08.01.24