CRIME IMPACT STATEMENT

Plymouth Grove, Manchester

Purpose Built Student Accommodation (263 units)

FOR: Plymouth Grove Developments

VERSION A: 23rd June 2023

REFERENCE: 2023/0291/CIS/01

Greater Manchester Police

designforsecurity

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Plymouth Grove

2023/0291/CIS/01

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Recommendations made

This development has been assessed against the principles of 'Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design' (CPTED - http://designforsecurity.org/about/crime-prevention-through-environmental-design/), in order to reduce the opportunities for crime and the fear of crime. The following areas have been identified as a concern and should be addressed (see section 3.3 for more details).

- Access to the bicycle store should be taken from the front elevation of the building rather than to the rear where it cannot easily be seen.
- The rear of the building should be enclosed and access restricted to residents.
- Access control and physical security of the buildings should be carefully considered. A comprehensive CCTV system should be provided.

Additionally, there are a number of recommendations made in section 3.3 of this report which would enhance the security of the development, and it is highly recommended that these are considered. It is also recommended that the development is built to Secured by Design standards.

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1 Visual Audit

The proposed development site can be seen on the adjacent map, edged in red. The site is located on the periphery of Manchester city centre, close to the Universities and Manchester Royal Infirmary (to the West of the site).

The site is roughly triangular and the boundaries are formed by Dryden Street to the North-West, no. 21 Plymouth Grove to the East, and to the South by Plymouth Grove.

The site is presently undeveloped land, and the site boundaries are defined with temporary herras fencing. The site is generally seeded over and there is vegetation to the boundaries.

The local area is a mix of uses with more residential uses to the North/East and commercial/university buildings to the South/West. Opposite the site on Upper Brook Street is Nick Everton House (student accommodation).













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2 Crime Statistics & Analysis

All data below is based on crimes recorded between 1st June 2022 to 31st May 2023.

2.1 Crime Summary

Recorded Crime within 500m of Site									
Domestic Burglary	Non-Domestic Burglary	Criminal Damage	Less Serious Wounding	Theft	Robbery	Serious Wounding	Theft from Motor Vehicle	Theft of Motor Vehicle	Bicycle Theft
25	27	72	643	134	27	17	72	16	35

2.1.1 The overall crime rate for the local area is high for the Manchester district, with the most frequently occurring offences over the last 12 months having been less serious wounding, theft, and vehicle crime. These types of crime are typical of those experienced within close proximity of district, town or city centres as there is often a concentration of retail, commercial and licensed premises, leading to a higher concentration of crime and disorder issues.

2.1.2 Less serious woundings have taken place throughout the local area, with a large hotspot of offences occurring at the junction of Oxford Road and Grafton Street to the west of the proposed site. Assaults, public order offences and harassment have been the highest recorded less serious wounding offences occurring in the area, with domestic disputes and incidents between known associates most commonly reported. There have also been cases of altercations between security guards in restaurants and at the Manchester Royal Infirmary.

2.1.3 The majority of thefts have also taken place to the west of the site, mainly in the licenced premises, restaurants and retail premises situated around the junction of Oxford Road and Grafton Street. Offenders have primarily used pickpocketing and distraction methods in order to obtain items stored on the person, as well as targeting insecure bags and mobile phones.

2.1.4 Theft from motor vehicle has been the highest recorded vehicle crime occurring, with offenders mainly targeting vehicles parked in the streets and car parks throughout the local area. Offenders have gained access to vehicles by lockpicking and smashing glazing before removing items from within. There have also been cases of offenders removing vehicle parts and registration plates.

2.2 Common Local M.O.s (Modus Operandi)

2.2.1 Forcing open secure doors using bodily pressure and implements in order to gain access to apartments

Possible Solution - All apartment entrance doorsets should be certified to a burglary resistant standard (i.e. BS PAS 24).

2.2.2 Entering apartment buildings by means of insecure doors/ tailgating residents and gaining access to communal areas.

Possible Solution - There should be access controlled secure doorsets restricting access to the circulation core of the building to reduce the possibility of would-be offenders from tailgating residents and visitors into the building.

2.2.3 Posing as a legitimate customer and gaining access to staff only areas by means of tailgating staff and exploitation of insecure doors.

Possible Solution – Any staff-only areas should operate on an access control system with access restricted to authorised personnel.

2.2.4 Exploitation of insecure windows and doors to gain access into communal areas and apartments

Possible Solution – All ground floor communal doors should be fitted with door closers and lock automatically, to prevent these doors from being left open and insecure. Any publicly accessible apartment entrance doors should be fitted with a split-spindle, or fixed external handle, to prevent them from being opened from the outside when unlocked. Any accessible windows should be restricted in opening to prevent them from being fully opened if left insecure.

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2.2.5 Entering premises as legitimate customer and tailgating staff/ exploiting insecure doors to access staff only areas.

Possible Solution – Personnel gates or turnstiles should restrict access from the office foyer into the circulation core of the building. Any external doors should operate on an access control system.

2.2.6 Forcing open shutters using implements and bodily force to gain access.

Possible Solution – Any shutters should be certified to a recognised security standard (i.e. LPS 1175 SR2). Shutters certified to a burglary resistant standard are able to withstand prolonged, opportunist, attacks by criminals.

2.3 Risk Factors

The typical security risks for a development of this nature are:


- Domestic burglary
- Theft from gardens, sheds or garages
- Criminal damage to dwellings and vehicles
- Theft of, or from, vehicles
- Bogus callers and distraction burglary
- Anti-social behaviour
- Neighbour disputes
- Theft and criminal damage during the construction period
- Unauthorised access to private spaces
- Poor maintenance of access control systems

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
2.4 Crime Rate Comparison

The rates below relates to crime committed within 500m of the site. England & Wales data was last recorded for January – December 2017.


Comparison of Domestic Burglary Rates at Site (Km), Manchester, and Greater Manchester




Comparison of Wounding Rates at Site (Km), Manchester, and Greater Manchester



Comparison of Criminal Damage Rates at Site (Km), Manchester, and Greater Manchester



Comparison of Vehicle Crime Rates at Site (Km), Manchester, and Greater Manchester



2.4.1 The rate of domestic burglaries per 1000 dwellings is **10% lower** than Manchester as a whole, **16% higher** than Greater Manchester and **19% higher** than England & Wales.

2.4.2 The rate of woundings per 1000 dwellings is **119% higher** than Manchester as a whole, **198% higher** than Greater Manchester and **469% higher** than England & Wales.

2.4.3 The rate of incidents of criminal damage per 1000 dwellings is **34% higher** than Manchester as a whole, **76% higher** than Greater Manchester and **114% higher** than England & Wales.


2.4.4 The rate of incidents of vehicle crime per 1000 dwellings is **91% higher** than Manchester as a whole, **214% higher** than Greater Manchester and **281% higher** than England & Wales.

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
2.5 Domestic Burglary: Risk Analysis

The data below relates to domestic burglaries committed within 500m of the site.


Burglary Dwelling – Day Range



Burglary Dwelling – Time Range



Burglary Dwelling – Point of Entry



2.5.1 Day/Time Range: The risk of domestic burglary peaks on a Tuesday in the early hours of the morning (01:00-03:00). Offenders are likely to target properties this time when it is dark and there is less footfall in the area, giving offenders the perception that they are less likely to be caught or identified.

2.5.2 Point of Entry: In the local area the following entry points and MO's have been utilised most frequently:


- In cases where the entry point has been recorded as "unknown" it is likely that offenders have exploited insecure windows/doors.
- Posing as a legitimate resident and gaining entry the apartment building, accessing post rooms and communal areas.
- Forcing open secure windows and doors using bodily pressure and implements in order to gain access.
- Smashed glazing in windows and doors.

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
2.6 Vehicle Crime: Risk Analysis

The data below relates to vehicle crime committed within 500m of the site.

Vehicle Crime – Day Range



Vehicle Crime – Time Range



2.6.1 Day/Time Range: The risk of vehicle cream peaks on a Tuesday in the afternoon (13:00-15:00) and in the evening (21:00-22:00). Offenders tend to target vehicles at these times during the working week when vehicles are often left unattended and out of sight of the owner for long periods of time.

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3 Layout Appraisal

3.1 Proposed development

3.1.1 The proposed development is of an eight storey Purpose Built Student Accommodation (PBSA) building comprising of 263 no. student bedrooms and associated amenity space.

3.2 Positive Aspects of the Proposal

The following proposed features would make a positive contribution to the prevention of crime and fear of crime.

3.2.1 The site is presently vacant. Typically, vacant sites are prone to criminal and antisocial behaviour, including flytipping, vandalism, graffiti, loitering, trespassing, and substance abuse. The redevelopment of the site will introduce legitimate activity throughout the day and evening, serving as a deterrent to criminals and individuals with antisocial tendencies from targeting the site or engaging in unlawful activities in the vicinity.

3.2.2 Both Plymouth Grove and Dryden Street will benefit from the building's active frontages, which provide natural surveillance opportunities for the surrounding area.

3.2.3 The building footprint have been designed without any areas of concern, such as deeply recessed sections or protruding features, which could provide hiding spots for offenders or contribute to antisocial behaviour.

3.2.4 The building will feature a large bicycle storage facility, providing residents with a secure place to store their bicycles.

3.2.5 The primary entrance to the building is positioned within the line of sight of the reception desk, allowing staff to screen individuals entering the premises. Additionally, there is a secondary doorset separating the ground floor reception/amenity space from the circulation core of the building, effectively minimising the risk of unauthorised individuals gaining access through tailgating.

3.2.6 To ensure security, the post/parcel rooms will be located in protected areas situated behind the reception area.

3.2.7 All bedrooms are situated on the first floor and above, thereby reducing the potential for noise disturbances caused by passers-by, especially during night-time and early morning hours.

3.3 Changes Needed and Recommendations

The following points have been identified for further consideration and would need to be addressed for Design for Security to support the proposed scheme.

3.3.1 Access to the rear of the building should be restricted to residents, to prevent misuse of these spaces and to prevent criminals from being able to target the building (i.e. doors) without being seen.

3.3.2 The access into the bicycle store should be taken from the front of the building where it can easily be seen, rather than to the rear of the building which is not subject to natural surveillance and can’t easily be viewed from the public highway/footway.

3.3.3 External communal access doors must be compliant with and certified to BS PAS 24, STS202, or LPS 1175 SR2, including a lock capable of being operated via an electronic access control system. The communal entrance doors should be self-closing and secured with a multi-point electronic lock operating with an electronic access control system, these features should be permitted under the scope of the certification.

3.3.4 All cluster and studio unit entrance doorsets must also be compliant with and certified to BS PAS 24, SPS 201 or LPS 1175 SR2.

3.3.5 All internal doors/frames to individual student bedrooms within cluster units should be of robust construction (FD30 or higher), with hinge-bolts and a lock certified to BS 8621 or PAS 8621, to allow each student to secure their own bedroom/possessions. Bedroom doors should have a door viewer and chain).

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3.3.6 Postal workers should not be granted unrestricted access through the development. Instead, their access should be limited to designated post boxes/post rooms. Alternatively, mail and parcels can be delivered directly to the concierge, eliminating the need for postal workers to have access beyond the lobby.

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3.3.7 Entry into cycle stores should be controlled using access control systems. Residents should be required to use their key card or fob for access, ensuring that only genuine users can enter. The design of the cycle stands should allow for secure locking of both wheels and the frame, such as utilizing Sheffield stands or similar alternatives. While two-tier systems are acceptable, it is important to ensure that both the wheels and the frame can be securely locked.



3.3.8 A robust access control system must be in place to regulate entry and movement within the building. It is recommended to have two access controlled doors separating the public area from the circulation core. In a development of this size, it is highly advisable to either install an access controlled door on each floor, limiting access to residents of that specific floor, or configure the lifts to only allow residents to access the floor where their apartment is located.

3.3.9 Access control measures should be implemented to restrict entry into amenity spaces exclusively to residents and authorised visitors. The access control system in these areas should have thorough auditing capabilities, allowing access logs to be reviewed in case of incidents or instances of damage.

4 Physical Security (Residential)

In addition to the layout issues highlighted in section 3, the following checklist (sections 4-7) forms the physical security requirements for this scheme to achieve Secured by Design accreditation if required.

4.1 Doors

☐ External communal access doors must be compliant with and certified to BS PAS 24, STS201, or LPS 1175 SR2, including a lock capable of being operated via an electronic access control system. The communal entrance doors should be self-closing and secured with a multi-point electronic lock and capable of being operated via an electronic access control system, these features should be permitted under the scope of the certification. Access into the build should be controlled by a video entry phone system (with the picture viewable on the phone unit, rather than on a television set) so that residents can vet visitors before allowing them access into the building. There should be no unrestricted trade access into the building.

☐ Where secure postal lobbies are to be created, the secondary communal door must be to the same specification as the outer door - certified to BS PAS 24, STS201, or LPS 1175 SR2, including a lock capable of being operated via an electronic access control system.

☐ All cluster and studio unit entrance doorsets must also be compliant with and certified to BS PAS 24, SPS 201 or LPS 1175 SR2.

☐ All internal doors/frames to individual student bedrooms within cluster units should be of robust construction (FD30 or higher), with hinge-bolts and a lock certified to BS 8621 or PAS 8621, to allow each student to secure their own bedroom/possessions. Bedroom doors should have a door viewer and chain).

☐ Construction of internal walls surrounding internal apartment entrance doors (600mm either side of the door set) should incorporate a resilient layer to reduce the risk of anyone breaking through the wall to access the locking mechanism. The resilient layer should be timber (minimum thickness of 9mm) or expanded metal.

☐ External escape-only doors (as with external doors in general) should be certified to BS PAS 24, or LPS 1175 SR2. It is crucial that the door ironmongery is permitted for use on these doors under the security certification of the product.

4.2 Windows

☐ Ground floor and easily accessible windows must be compliant with and certified to BS PAS 24.

☐ Ground floor and easily accessible opening lights (escape requirements permitting) must be key-lockable and have fixed/lockable opening restrictors (not releasable from the outside) limited to 100mm.

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4.3 Glazing & Building Fabric

- ☐ Glazing to a height of 2400mm (or if otherwise accessible) must incorporate at least one pane of glass with a 1.5mm PVB interlayer (e.g. 7.5mm laminated glass), or a glass rated as P4A under EN 356. The remaining pane in a double-glazed unit may be toughened glass.
- ☐ Any curtain walling panels should include laminated glazing and should be securely fixed directly to the floor slabs where possible, rather than to perimeter columns.
- ☐ There should be a block work wall or material of similar strength (e.g. welded-steel mesh) behind or within any new cladding/insulated panels to the building, to a minimum height of 2000mm from ground level, to ensure that the fabric of the building itself is not vulnerable to attack.

4.4 Alarms

- ☐ If an alarm is installed, then it should comply with either:
  - BS EN 50131 and PD 6662 for wired systems
  - BS 6799 for wireless systems
- ☐ If an alarm is not to be provided, there should be a 13amp, non-switched fuse spur to allow future residents to connect an alarm.

4.5 Access Control

- ☐ Access control systems should be operable by swipe card or fob, and not numeric keypads. The following areas/doors should operate on access control:
  - Communal entrances
  - Communal areas
  - Bicycle stores
  - Circulation cores
  - Amenity space
  - Staff only areas
  - Parcel rooms

4.6 Bicycle Parking Areas

- ☐ Doors into the cycle parking area(s) must be certified to BS PAS 24, STS202, or LPS 1175 SR2, including a lock capable of being operated via an electronic access control system, with access restricted to registered residents (i.e. genuine bicycle owners).
- ☐ Cycle stands should either be U-profile or Sheffield style stands. If rack storage is used it should be possible for both wheels and the frame to be secured.

4.7 Landscaping

- ☐ There should be no hard landscaping that could inadvertently create seating or loitering spots (except within secure designated or otherwise-controlled areas). These features can encourage anti-social behaviour and raise the fear of crime.
- ☐ It is essential that good sightlines are maintained throughout the development to allow residents and visitors to actively survey the area for potential threats. Low level planting should not be in excess of 1000mm in height and tree crowns should fall no less than 2400mm to aid sightlines and natural surveillance.

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4.8 Lighting

- ☐ External lighting must be provided to pedestrian routes within the development in accordance with BS 5489. Lighting should be taken from a variety of sources and levels (i.e. columns, up lighting) to provide a greater level of coverage and avoid shadows/pooling.
- ☐ Fittings should produce 'white' light, as opposed to yellow/orange light. Metal halide (or bulbs with a comparable output) should be used, as these offer superior colour rendition over alternatives such as high- and low-pressure sodium bulbs.
- ☐ Dusk 'til dawn lights, operated by photoelectric cell/daylight sensor, should be installed to all external doors.
- ☐ Elevations of the building should be illuminated.

4.9 CCTV

- ☐ Any CCTV system that may be used within this proposal will require certain specifications and intelligent placement of cameras to compliment the design of the development. Designers should consider the following points when planning a CCTV strategy:
- ☐ CCTV systems (and lighting that support them) require regular cleaning and maintenance to remain effective.
- ☐ Where necessary cameras that are vulnerable to damage should be protected from attack either by relocation to a higher level and using a bigger lens to achieve the view required or through the fitting of a vandal resistant housing.
- ☐ With regards to the retention of footage, the police prefer quality over quantity. The overall retention period should be dictated by what the system is designed to achieve, though it would be better to have good quality images over a 14-day period than poor ones over a 30-day period.
- ☐ Procedures for recovery of recordings are recommended to be established (e.g. trained staff / the CCTV system instruction manual to be readily available). This is to ensure that the images produced will be of an acceptable standard that will allow for identification of an individual which will stand up to scrutiny in court.
- ☐ **Acceptable Standard** - this generally requires a resolution of 720x576 pixels at a real time frame rate of 25 frames per second. (N.B. Both the camera and DVR must be capable of this – if the camera will only send low resolution images, then it does not matter how high the resolution of the recording unit is).
- ☐ **Identification** – One of three levels of field of view. To identify an individual, the image must capture no less than 120% of the field of view (at least from the top of the individuals head to their knees). The remaining two levels of field of view are 'Overview' and 'Recognition', which whilst effective for observational purposes, are less likely to result in the identification of a person/offender.
- ☐ The intelligent placement of cameras helps to provide clear facial identification of individuals.
- ☐ Any public open space or amenity areas not under the ownership of residents should be subject to an effective maintenance contract. This should ensure that all damage is rectified in a timely manner, and that any such space will not be detrimental to its surroundings.

5 Management & Maintenance

5.1.1 The upkeep of a development over its lifetime can be crucial to the level of security and safety within. Aspects of a development, which are left to deteriorate, have the potential to attract further crime – a process known as 'the broken window theory'. A maintenance plan should be drawn up to address issues such as:

- Litter removal
- Repair to communal areas (lighting, signage, access controls)
- Trimming and pruning to shrubs and trees

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5.1.2 Any public open space or amenity areas not under the ownership of residents should be subject to an effective maintenance contract. This should ensure that all damage is rectified in a timely manner, and that any such space will not be detrimental to its surroundings.

5.1.3 A comprehensive security regime for the building must be prepared and remain in place for the day-to-day running of the site. There should be regular reviews/exercises to ensure that it remains accurate, workable, and up to date. All staff should understand and accept the need for security measures, and it should be made east for people to raise concerns or report observations.

6 Construction

6.1.1 Untidy sites and their surroundings can be littered with debris accessible to vandals who often use loose materials as missiles to commit crime. The client should take measures appropriate to secure their site during construction, and control pedestrian and vehicular access in to and out of the site curtilage. It is also recommended that the contractor on this scheme is a member of the 'Considerate Constructors Scheme', who has committed to be a considerate and good neighbour, as well as clean, respectful, safe, environmentally conscious, responsible and accountable.

6.1.2 Site security contractors should be SIA (Security Industry Authority) approved to ensure professional standards are adhered to (please see http://www.sia.homeoffice.gov.uk/pages/acs-intro.aspx for more details).

7 Useful References

7.1 Secured by Design (SBD)

7.1.1 Secured by Design focuses on crime prevention at the design, layout and construction stages of homes and commercial premises and promotes the use of security standards for a wide range of applications and products. To apply for Secured by Design certification for your development, visit our online application form at: http://www.designforsecurity.org/secured-by-design/sbd-accreditation/

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A Contact register

Date	Contact With	Summary of Contact
01/06/2023	Maia Webster	CIS application received

B Associated Documents

This report is based on the following drawings and supplementary information submitted by the applicant.

Drawing No.	Drawing Title	Date	Rev
	Proposed Floor Plans	02/05/23	D
	Proposed Site Plans	02/05/23	F
	Existing Site Plan	05/04/23	C
	Title Plan and Topo Site Plan		

PLEASE NOTE - In the event of any subsequent material changes to the scheme, it will be necessary for Design for Security to reassess the comments made within this report.

C CIS Version History

Version	Revisions Made	Date
A		

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