



CRIME IMPACT STATEMENT

4 Henesy House (Caritas House), Nobby Stile Drive, Manchester
Supported Accommodation (19 No. Bedrooms)

FOR: CARITAS DIOCESE OF SALFORD

Greater Manchester Police

designforsecurity

VERSION A: 8th February 2024

REFERENCE: 2024/0029/CIS/01

4 Henesy House (Caritas House) Nobby Stile Drive

2024/0029/CIS/01

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Recommendations made

The proposed development has been assessed using the principles of 'Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design' (CPTED - <http://designforsecurity.org/about/crime-prevention-through-environmental-design/>), in order to reduce the opportunities for crime, the fear of crime, and anti-social behaviour. The proposed development is generally acceptable; however, homeless accommodation can attract/generate disorder and antisocial behaviour. There are a number of positive aspects of the development including a 24/7 staff presence and the resident will be vetted/low risk.

A number of recommendations made in section 3.3 of the report to increase the security of the building, including but not limited to:

- Access into the building, and into residential/staff areas, should be governed by an access control system.
- A CCTV system should cover the external areas of the building and communal areas within.

These measures will improve the security of the buildings, deter criminals, and alert staff to unwanted/suspicious behaviour. These measures, and those detailed in section 3.3 of this report should be implemented where possible.



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
1 Visual Audit

The proposed development site can be seen on the adjacent map, edged in red. The site is located in the Ancoats area of Manchester, to the North-East of the city centre.

The site boundaries are roughly defined by Nobby Stiles Drive to the North, a car parking area to the East (with green space/wooded area beyond), to the South and West the site is bound by St Patrick's Church.

Hensey House is a two storey building positioned to the rear of, and connected to, St Patrick's Church. The building was originally built as a residential care home but over the years the use of the building has changed to offices in relation to the operation of the church.

The public boundary of the building on Nobby Stiles Drive is a blockwork wall with railings, with a pedestrian and vehicular gate.



2 Crime Statistics & Analysis

All data below is based on crimes recorded between 1st January 2023 to 31st December 2023.

2.1 Crime Summary

Recorded Crime within 500m of Site									
Domestic Burglary	Non-Domestic Burglary	Criminal Damage	Less Serious Wounding	Theft	Robbery	Serious Wounding	Theft from Motor Vehicle	Theft of Motor Vehicle	Bicycle Theft
19	10	66	166	42	8	<5	69	15	7

- 2.1.1 The overall rate of crime in the past 12 months has been average for the Manchester division, with less serious wounding, vehicle crime and criminal damage having been the most reported offences taking place. The majority of these offences have occurred at locations along or close to Oldham Road to the south/southeast of the proposed site, as well as at a hotspot of vehicle crime offences around Gould Street to the southwest of the site.
- 2.1.2 While less serious woundings have taken place throughout the local area, that majority of offences have taken place at locations in the residential neighbourhoods along or close to Oldham Road. Assaults, harassment and public order offences have been the most reported less serious woundings taking place, with the majority of incidents involving disputes between known associates, as well as some cases of domestic violence.
- 2.1.3 Theft from motor vehicle has been the most common vehicle crime taking place. The majority of offences have occurred at the hotspot of offences to the southwest of the proposed site at Gould Street where there is a number of parking facilities often used by commuters visiting the city centre. Offenders have most commonly targeted vehicles by smashing the glazing in windows before removing items from within.
- 2.1.4 Criminal damage to vehicles has been the highest recorded criminal damage taking place within the local area. Offenders have targeted vehicles by smashing the glazing in windows and using objects to damage the body work of cars. There have also been cases of criminal damage to properties whereby offenders have damaged the front doors to both retail properties and dwellings, as well as smashing the glazing in windows.

2.2 Common Local M.O.s (Modus Operandi)

- 2.2.1 Forcing open secure doors using bodily pressure and implements in order to gain access to apartments
Possible Solution - All apartment entrance doorsets should be certified to a burglary resistant standard (i.e. BS PAS 24).
- 2.2.2 Entering apartment buildings by means of insecure doors/ tailgating residents and gaining access to communal areas.
Possible Solution - There should be access controlled secure doorsets restricting access to the circulation core of the building to reduce the possibility of would-be offenders from tailgating residents and visitors into the building.
- 2.2.3 Exploitation of insecure windows and doors to gain access into communal areas and apartments
Possible Solution – All ground floor communal doors should be fitted with door closers and lock automatically, to prevent these doors from being left open and insecure. Any publicly accessible apartment entrance doors should be fitted with a split-spindle, or fixed external handle, to prevent them from being opened from the outside when unlocked. Any accessible windows should be restricted in opening to prevent them from being fully opened if left insecure.





2.3 Risk Factors

The typical security risks for a development of this nature are:

- Domestic burglary
- Conflict between residents
- Criminal damage to dwellings and vehicles
- Bogus callers and distraction burglary
- Anti-social behaviour
- Unauthorised access to private spaces
- Poor maintenance of access control systems

2.4 Crime Rate Comparison

The rates below relates to crime committed within 500m of the site. England & Wales data was last recorded for January – December 2021.




- 2.4.1 The rate of domestic burglaries per 1000 dwellings is **39% lower** than Manchester as a whole, **22% lower** than Greater Manchester and **20% lower** than England & Wales.
- 2.4.2 The rate of woundings per 1000 dwellings is **51% lower** than Manchester as a whole, **33% lower** than Greater Manchester and **27% higher** than England & Wales.
- 2.4.3 The rate of incidents of criminal damage per 1000 dwellings is **9% higher** than Manchester as a whole, **43% higher** than Greater Manchester and **74% higher** than England & Wales.
- 2.4.4 The rate of incidents of vehicle crime per 1000 dwellings is **78% higher** than Manchester as a whole, **193% higher** than Greater Manchester and **256% higher** than England & Wales.


2.5 Domestic Burglary: Risk Analysis

The data below relates to domestic burglaries committed within 500m of the site.


Burglary Dwelling – Day Range



Burglary Dwelling – Time Range



Burglary Dwelling – Point of Entry




2.5.1 **Day/Time Range:** The risk of domestic burglary peaks on Saturday in the evening (22:00-23:00). Offenders tend to target properties at night when it is dark and there is less footfall in the area, giving them the perception that they are less likely to be caught or identified.

2.5.2 **Point of Entry:** In the local area the following entry points and MO's have been utilised most frequently:

- Using tools of implements to snap locks and force open secure windows and doors.
- Smashed glazing as windows and doors.
- In cases where the entry point is recorded as "unknown", it is likely that the offender has exploited insecure windows or doors.

2.6 Vehicle Crime: Risk Analysis

The data below relates to vehicle crime committed within 500m of the site.



- 2.6.1 **Day/Time Range:** The risk of vehicle crime peaks on Thursday in the afternoon (13:00-15:00). Offenders tend to target vehicles at this time during the working week when they are often left unattended and out of sight of the owners for long periods of time whilst they are at work, creating a perceived low risk opportunity for offenders.

3 Layout Appraisal

3.1 Proposed development

- 3.1.1 The proposed development is a change of use from offices to supported accommodation (19 no. bedrooms). The building was originally erected as a care home, but over the year has been used as offices in conjunction with the church (St Patrick's). The building is two storey with some single storey elements, and is connected to the original church building.

3.2 Positive Aspects of the Proposal

The following proposed features would make a positive contribution to the prevention of crime and fear of crime.

- 3.2.1 The building would be staffed 24 hours a day 7 days a week, including security provided overnight. Full time staff including Housing Management, Support Staff and Concierge would also be employed. The ratio for Management/Support Staff to residents would be 1:8.
- 3.2.2 Occupation of the building at all times will potentially deter those antisocially or criminally minded operating in the local area.
- 3.2.3 Residents will meet the strict low-risk/low-need criteria with no drug or alcohol dependent residents and have a low risk of criminal activity or anti-social behaviour.
- 3.2.4 Residents would typically have already had several months to years within supported accommodation and will have demonstrated stability.
- 3.2.5 Referrals would come from the Morning Star Hostel, 104 Denmark Road, Manchester, M15 6JS, or other Housing Related Support or A Bed Every Night (ABEN) services. The strict referral criteria would need to be met along with background checks and interviews prior to being accepted into the accommodation.
- 3.2.6 Residents would be required to sign a license agreement. In any circumstances where the license conditions are breached the resident in question would be moved on to emergency accommodation in another area of the city of Manchester and away from the local area.

3.3 Changes Needed and Recommendations

The following points have been identified for further consideration and would need to be addressed for Design for Security to support the proposed scheme.

- 3.3.1 Any alterations to the building should be to the relevant burglary resistant standards (see section 4).
- 3.3.2 Access into the building should be governed by an access control system to restrict access into the building to resident/staff. Access into residential areas of the building should be further restricted to residents/staff to prevent tailgating into these areas from the communal areas of the building. All areas restricted to staff should be restricted with access control.
- 3.3.3 Any new bedroom doors should be robust/solid core (minimum 44mm thick) and fitted with access controls or be key lockable.
- 3.3.4 Communal facilities and amenity space. The robust management of such areas is essential to encourage active use and enjoyment, whilst making abuse less likely to occur.
- 3.3.5 The main entrance and surrounding areas should be illuminated to a high standard to deter loitering/antisocial behaviour near the entrance of the building.
- 3.3.6 There should be some CCTV coverage provided of the proposed development, with the external areas of the building/entrance and the communal areas of the building covered as a minimum. The presence of a CCTV system will potentially deter unwanted behaviour in and around the building, and capture any incidents.
- 3.3.7 Post and deliveries should be delivered directly to the reception desk rather than allowing postal workers or couriers unfettered access throughout the building.
- 3.3.8 There should be a bicycle store for residents. The bicycle store should be a secure, robust, and weatherproof, Sheffield stands (or similar) should be provided allowing both wheels and the frame to be locked.
- 3.3.9 Residents should be provided with a locker or safe within the bedroom, allowing them to secure personal and valuable possessions

4 Physical Security

The following checklist forms the physical security requirements for this scheme to achieve Secured by Design accreditation.

4.1 Doors

- ☐ External doors must be compliant with and certified to BS PAS 24, STS202, LPS 1175 SR2, LPS 2081 SR B, or STS 222. Staff should be given flexibility over permitting access into the building at different times of the day and night.
- ☐ External escape-only doors (as with external doors in general) should be certified to BS PAS 24, LPS 1175 SR2, LPS 2081 SR B, or STS 222. It is crucial that the door ironmongery is permitted for use on these doors under the security certification of the product.
- ☐ All doors/frames to staff areas/stores/offices should be robust/solid core (minimum 44mm thick) and fitted with auditable access controls. Staff should only be allowed access to areas required for their work. Keys/passes should only be carried if required for duties and should be accounted for at all times.

4.2 Windows, Building Fabric & Shutters

- ☐ Ground floor and easily accessible windows must be compliant with and certified to BS PAS 24, LPS 1175 SR2, LPS 2081 SR A, STS 204, or STS 222.
- ☐ Ground floor and easily accessible opening lights (escape requirements permitting) must be key-lockable and have fixed/lockable opening restrictors (not releasable from the outside) limited to 100mm.
- ☐ Any curtain walling panels should include laminated glazing and should be securely fixed directly to the floor slabs where possible, rather than to perimeter columns.

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- ☐ Any shutters must be tested and certified to STS 202 or LPS 1175 SR2 (or SR1 if perforated laths are required) and installed in accordance with manufacturer's instructions.

4.3 Glazing

- ☐ Glazing to a height of 2400mm (or if otherwise accessible) must incorporate at least one pane of glass with a 1.5mm PVB interlayer (e.g. 7.5mm laminated glass), or a glass rated as P4A under EN 356. The remaining pane in a double-glazed unit may be toughened glass.

4.4 Access Control

- ☐ Access control systems should be operable by swipe card or fob, and not numeric keypads. The following areas/doors should operate on access control:
- External doors
 - Access into residential areas of the building
 - Individual bedrooms

4.5 Lighting

- ☐ Dusk-to-dawn lighting, operated by photoelectric cell/daylight sensor, and producing 'white' light, should be installed to all external doors and the building elevation.

4.6 CCTV

- ☐ A CCTV system should be installed, or the existing system should be extended/repurposed..
- ☐ Cameras should be capable of monitoring all building elevations - with particular emphasis on external doors (cameras should be able to observe people coming and going), and the entrance lobbies.
- ☐ Recording equipment should be located within a secure room or images may be recorded off-site at a suitable monitoring facility.

5 Management & Maintenance

- 5.1.1 The upkeep of a development over its lifetime can be crucial to the level of security and safety within. Aspects of a development, which are left to deteriorate, have the potential to attract further crime – a process known as 'the broken window theory'. A maintenance plan should be drawn up to address issues such as:
- Litter removal
 - Repair to communal areas (lighting, signage, access controls)
 - Trimming and pruning to shrubs and trees
- 5.1.2 Any public open space or amenity areas not under the ownership of residents should be subject to an effective maintenance contract. This should ensure that all damage is rectified in a timely manner, and that any such space will not be detrimental to its surroundings.

6 Construction

- 6.1.1 Untidy sites and their surroundings can be littered with debris accessible to vandals who often use loose materials as missiles to commit crime. The client should take measures appropriate to secure their site during construction, and control pedestrian and vehicular access in to and out of the site curtilage. It is also recommended that the contractor on this scheme is a member of the 'Considerate Constructors Scheme', who has committed to be a considerate and good neighbour, as well as clean, respectful, safe, environmentally conscious, responsible and accountable.

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- 6.1.2 Site security contractors should be SIA (Security Industry Authority) approved to ensure professional standards are adhered to (please see <http://www.sia.homeoffice.gov.uk/pages/acs-intro.aspx> for more details).

7 Useful References

7.1 Secured by Design (SBD)

- 7.1.1 Secured by Design focuses on crime prevention at the design, layout and construction stages of homes and commercial premises and promotes the use of security standards for a wide range of applications and products. To apply for Secured by Design certification for your development, visit our online application form at: <http://www.designforsecurity.org/secured-by-design/sbd-accreditation/>

A Contact register

Date	Contact With	Summary of Contact

B Associated Documents

This report is based on the following drawings and supplementary information submitted by the applicant.

Drawing No.	Drawing Title	Date	Rev
10672	Caritas Diocese of Salford Design and Access Statement Rev A		
J10672	Caritas House - Location Plan		
J10672.001	Caritas House - Existing Plan		
J10672.002	Caritas House - Proposed Plan		

PLEASE NOTE - In the event of any subsequent material changes to the scheme, it will be necessary for Design for Security to reassess the comments made within this report.

C CIS Version History

Version	Revisions Made	Date
A		