



CRIME IMPACT STATEMENT

Land at Irk Street, Manchester

Arts, Music, and Cultural Events Space
(513sqm internal space / 868sqm external
space)

Greater Manchester Police

For: **FSC MCR Limited**

design**for**security

Version C: 31/08/23

Land at Irk Street, Manchester.

2023/0230/CIS/01

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Development Supported / security additions advised

This development has been assessed using the principles of 'Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design' (CPTED), in order to expose any opportunities for crime and the fear of crime within the proposal.

The proposed development is welcomed. The design of the scheme is very positive from a pedestrian safety perspective, with an interest in maintaining a safe and secure environment.

Given the high levels of crime in the area currently, it is also likely that offenders will be attracted to the development. Consequently, the site and the premises within it will need to be secure, with security an integral element of the design and management of the development.

The information provided for assessment by the applicant is minimal, but the following issues have been identified as potential generators of insecurity, and must be addressed as described within the report (see Section 3.3 for more details):

- Any new or replacement doorsets, shutters, windows and glazing should be to Secured by Design (SBD) standards and any existing features of the building that may aid an offender to gain access to the roof should be removed or secured to prevent unauthorised access.
- Installing fencing and gates to secure the perimeter of the site when the development is closed for business.
- Installing appropriate lighting, CCTV and intruder alarm systems
- Any storage containers that meet the LPS 1175 standard (or to the principles of LPS 1175) should be used.

Our support for this scheme is subject to the above issues being satisfactorily addressed, as described within the report.

Please note: Greater Manchester Police Design for Security will recommend to the local planning authority that a planning condition to meet Secured by Design certification is added that reflects the physical security specification listed within Section 4 of this report.

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1 Visual Audit

The development site is indicated by the red outline on the plan adjacent and is supported with existing site context photographs taken around the site.

The site is bounded to the north by a railway line, beyond which is Dantzig Street. To the north-east of the site is a microbrewery. To the east and south-east of the site is Gould Street. Adjacent to the south and west of the site is St Michael's Flags & Angel Meadow Park.

The site extends to approximately 0.18 hectares and is located within the administrative boundary of Manchester City Council ("MCC"). The site currently comprises a former MOT testing and vehicle servicing business and associated hardstanding. All buildings within the curtilage of the site are vacant. The Marble Arch PH is located to the southeast of the site and is Grade II listed.






Rochdale Road is a main arterial road in/out of M/cr city centre from East M/cr.

Williamson St has no parking infringements and as such car parking is in high demand within the area due to the proximity to the city centre. The result of this is reflected in the high rate of vehicle crime.

There are several well-established residential buildings to the southwest developed over the last 15 years.

The proposed site sits within the Angel Meadow SRF.

There was visual evidence of graffiti in and around the site and recesses in neighbouring buildings were being used as outdoor toilets. Williamson St are common



2 Crime Statistics & Analysis

All data below is based on crimes recorded between 1st May 2022 to 30th April 2023.

2.1 Crime Summary

Figure 1: Recorded Crime within 500m of Site

Domestic Burglary	Non-Domestic Burglary	Criminal Damage	Less Serious Wounding	Theft	Robbery	Serious Wounding	Theft from Motor Vehicle	Theft of Motor Vehicle	Bicycle Theft
94	64	147	418	170	23	13	287	45	12

- 2.1.1 The volume of crime in the local area is above average for Manchester with less serious wounding, vehicle crime and theft having been the most prevalent types of crime occurring. These types of crime are typical of those experienced in or within close proximity of district, town, or city centres where there is often a concentration of retail, commercial and licensed premises, leading to a higher concentration of crime and disorder issues. The majority of offences have occurred to the South and West of the proposed site towards the city centre.
- 2.1.2 Less serious woundings are taking place throughout the local area, with the highest concentration taking place to the south around Rochdale Road. Assaults, public order offences and harassment have been the highest recorded less serious wounding offences occurring in the area, with domestic disputes and incidents between known associates most commonly reported.
- 2.1.3 Theft from motor vehicle has been the most common vehicle crime occurring. Offenders have smashed the glazing of vehicles parked within the car parks and residential streets around the site, particularly to the south, before removing items from within the vehicle.
- 2.1.4 Thefts in the local area have mostly been taking place in the licenced premises, restaurants and retail premises situated to the south of the site around the junction of Rochdale Road and Ring Road, as well as to the west of the site near to New Century Park. Offenders have targeted mobile phones, wallets, purses, and cash by using pick pocketing and distraction methods to obtain the personal belongings. There has also been many cases of offenders targeting parcels left unattended in communal areas.

2.2 Common Use-Specific M.O.s (Modus Operandi)

- 2.2.1 Implements were used to force locks on doors and force shutters upwards.

Possible Solution - All external doors should be certified to recognised security standards, which are independently proven to reduce the risk of forced entry and thus increase the chances of detection. Security-certified doors are the best long-term measure to address this risk and can be obtained to suit virtually all operational requirements. Good use of perimeter boundaries, lighting and CCTV can deter criminals from attempting this, by discouraging access to private or concealed areas.

- 2.2.2 Offenders posing as legitimate customers, visitors or employees have gained unauthorised access to staff only areas to steal property.

Possible Solution – There should be a secure area for staff to store their belongings while at work and all staff-only, back-of-house areas should be secured to prevent unauthorised public access (see Section 4.4).

- 2.2.3 Walls and roofs were penetrated using tools / implements or bodily pressure.

Possible Solution – The design of buildings should not include features that would allow them to be easily climbed and in this respect, careful consideration of adjacent boundaries, rainwater downpipes, canopies, trees, lighting columns, pallets, bins etc. is essential. Avoid locating stored materials adjacent to buildings where they may provide a step up. Roofing and wall construction should use a system approved by Secured by Design or incorporate reinforcement such as expanded metal mesh.

- 2.2.4 Theft of materials and tools from storage and service yards.

Possible Solution – The site boundaries should be formed of robust fencing with the number of gates / entry points kept to a minimum. Overhanging tree branches and other vegetation should be removed or trimmed back. The location of stored materials and equipment within the service yard can create blind

spots that are difficult to survey and obscure the coverage of cameras. Good management practises will be essential, and consider providing ground markings to designate where storage is and is not acceptable. The condition of fencing along the perimeter should be regularly inspected for damage/attack.


2.3 Risk Factors

The typical security risks for a development of this nature are:

- Burglary
- Theft of personal property
- Unauthorised access to buildings and private spaces
- Acts of criminal damage during the construction period
- Criminal damage
- Theft of/from vehicles

2.4 Non-Domestic Burglary (Event Space): Risk Analysis

The data below relates to non-domestic burglary offences within / against event space, recorded in the Greater Manchester area during 2018/2019.



2.4.1 **Day / Time Range:** The risk of burglary at event spaces in the Greater Manchester Area peaks on a Monday and Sunday during the evening (5pm – 10:30pm). Offenders target properties in the evening



when they are closed or have fewer employees present, giving offenders the perception that there is less of a risk of being caught or identified.

2.4.2 **Point of Entry:** In the local area the following entry points and MO's have been utilised most frequently:

- Forcing open secure windows and doors using implements and bodily pressure in order to gain entry.
- Exploitation of insecure doors and windows.
- Posing as a legitimate visitor and entering restricted areas.
- Broken glazing in windows and doors using implements.
- Forcing open secure shutters using bodily pressure and implements.

2.5 Theft Event Space: Risk Analysis



The data below relates to thefts within / against event space, recorded in the Greater Manchester area during 2018/2019.



- 2.5.1 **Day / Time Range:** The risk of theft at event spaces in the Greater Manchester area peaks on a Wednesday and Saturday during the late evening (10pm – 11:59pm). Offenders have targeted customers and employees personal belongings, mostly mobile phones and purses / wallets. They have used means of distraction and pick pocketing in order to obtain the victims personal belongings.

2.6 Vehicle Crime: Risk Analysis

The data below relates to vehicle crime committed within 500m of the site.



- 2.6.1 **Day/Time Range:** The risk of vehicle crime peaks on a Thursday at midnight and the afternoon into the evening (12:00pm – 22:00pm). Offenders often target vehicles during the afternoon and evening when they tend to be left unattended and out of sight of the owner for long periods of time, creating a perceived low risk opportunity.

3 Layout Appraisal

3.1 Proposed development

- 3.1.1 Full planning permission for the temporary change of use of the site and existing buildings to an arts and cultural venue/event space (Sui Generis), with associated food and drink space (Flexible Use Class E / Sui Generis).
- 3.1.2 The proposed development will play a key role in raising the profile of this area of the City, creating interest in the site and positively promoting the site and wider area ahead of its future redevelopment under planning permission 124120/JO/2019.

3.2 Positive Aspects of the Proposal

The following proposed features would make a positive contribution to the prevention of crime and fear of crime.

- 3.2.1 The proposal will offer a new use within the area and help foster new business relationships within the area between different working groups.
- 3.2.2 The proposal will create a new leisure destination point for the area bringing in a new diverse range of people to the area, thus helping to continue to repopulate this part of the city and generate activity throughout the day and at weekends. Additional activity associated with the site will help support informal policing and natural surveillance.
- 3.2.3 The new development will create a controlled entrance area allowing staff to observe user movement in, out and around the proposal. Increasing the staff control of the entrance and improvements in natural surveillance within the scheme provides a safe and enjoyable experience for all users.
- 3.2.4 The increased activity, improved lighting and natural surveillance associated with the development will greatly enhance the experience of the range of users and pedestrian in this section of Manchester.
- 3.2.5 The proposed development provides the opportunity to include security features built into the design and construction of the building and avoid the need for obtrusive retrofitted security measures that can increase the fear of crime. Security measures carefully incorporated into the design can ensure the building is reasonably secure, without visibly announcing that the design was concerned about crime.

3.3 Changes Needed and Recommendations

The following points have been identified for further consideration and would need to be addressed for Design for Security to support the proposed scheme.

- 3.3.1 Any shipping containers used to accommodate the business(s) and any storage containers used should meet the LPS 1175 standard (or at least adhere to the principles of LPS 1175 certification), to allow management staff too securely store stock and close up the units overnight.
- 3.3.2 Areas restricted to staff should be clearly signed to ensure that patrons cannot use the excuse of getting lost for accessing areas restricted to staff.
- 3.3.3 If any replacements are made to the external fittings of the building (i.e. doors, windows, glazing, shutters) it is highly recommended that they are certified to the standards in the following section (4 - Physical Security).
- 3.3.4 Due to the high levels of crime within the area and the possibility of reusing the existing vehicle door for the main entrance it is recommended that this entry/exit point is staffed
- 3.3.5 Staff lockers should be provided so that staff can safely store personal items during the working day.
- 3.3.6 The cash management strategy at the end of trading day should be robust and remove the opportunity for crime and theft of cash. Consideration should be given to using a Cash & Valuables in Transit company to collect takings at the end of the day, reducing the risk to staff carrying this out presently and reducing the opportunities for theft.
- 3.3.7 Signage should be provided communicating that no cash is stored in the venue overnight.


3.4 Internal Layout & Security – Further recommendations

3.4.1 Restaurants/cafes/bars can, if poorly managed, generate crime for the following reasons:

- **Opportunities** - Large numbers of people congregating in premises, generating opportunities for crime. Unlike on-street populations, patrons are stationary for long periods of time, making them easier to target.
- **Lack of attention** - The movement of people, noise, social interaction and other factors mean patrons can be easily distracted.
- **Cohesion** – Particularly during busy periods, the large numbers and wide variety of groups of people that tend to frequent premises means that such a venue would lack 'community territoriality' (i.e. regular customers displaying an awareness of and care for the environment around them). This can limit any self-policing that might otherwise occur.
- **Customer turnover** – High turnover with high levels of customer movement within an establishment, are more likely to allow offenders to go unnoticed.
- **Valuable goods** – Often available and possibly on show, a particular problem in seating areas. Patrons are likely to carry small, valuable, concealable goods – such as mobile phones, purses/wallets, keys etc.
- **Stealth** - Busy venues provide the anonymity necessary to commit offences.

3.4.2 The internal security and layout of the premises should be carefully considered, to maximise surveillance over customers and reduce the opportunities for criminals to exploit. It is highly recommended that the following good practice principles are adopted where applicable, to minimise the issues highlighted above:

- ☐ The entrance to the premises must be effectively managed at busy periods to control numbers, ensure safe access/egress and avoid potential conflicts arising. Customers entering/leaving the premises should be easily observed by staff.
- ☐ Internal access doors/frames to all other storage/cellar rooms etc. should also be solid-core (min. 44mm thick) and fitted with either auditable access controls (i.e. proximity readers or swipe cards) or secured with key operated locks (carried by staff only if required for duties and accounted for at all times) to secure them when unoccupied. All staff should understand and accept the need for security measures and should be trained to be vigilant and to report any suspicious behaviour.
- ☐ It should not be possible for patrons of the premises to gain unauthorised access to the office area(s) or the back-of-house areas of the building. Any doors between public areas and the office area(s) should be certified to BS PAS 24 or LPS 1175 SR2 and should be self-closing with a multi-point electronic lock permitted as part of the certification, capable of being operated via staff key-fob during normal working hours and be securely locked and alarmed at all other times.
- ☐ Consideration should be given to a high and wide service counter, which increases the distance between staff and any potentially aggressive patrons and aids surveillance of all parts of the premises. Tills should be positioned away from customers' reach, but preferably fronting towards customers. Casual access to the rear of the service counter should be prevented (e.g. with a lockable hatch that cannot be easily scaled). Sufficient levels of service staff should be provided at busy periods to reduce waiting times and the potential for frustration, aggression and conflict.
- ☐ Staff should have clear views of the W/Cs to monitor their use. The internal layout the premises should be generally uncluttered with few places for concealment, allowing staff to monitor customer behaviour. The precise arrangement of internal furnishings should aid circulation and aim to achieve a balance between intimacy and visibility.
- ☐ It is highly recommended that customer tables are fitted with Chelsea Clips, to reduce the opportunities for theft (see below).



4 Physical Security

The following checklist forms the physical security requirements for this scheme to achieve Secured by Design accreditation.

4.1 Doors & shutters

- ☐ It is crucial that the door ironmongery to any external escape-only doors is permitted under the security certification of the product. Any escape-only doors should be alarmed (audible upon opening) and designed without visible external ironmongery.
- ☐ Generally, internal doors should be solid core (minimum 44mm thick) with 3 hinges and a 5 lever mortise deadlock or similar, so that they can be secured when unoccupied.
- ☐ Shutters should be certified to LPS 1175 SR2.

4.2 Windows

- ☐ All new replacement windows, where possible, should be certificated to BS PAS 24. All other window designs/dimensions should take account of the requirements of the above standards, as certified products can carry dimensional restrictions.
- ☐ Ground floor and easily accessible opening lights e.g. above single storey elements (escape requirements permitting) should be key-lockable, and have fixed/lockable opening restrictors (not releasable from the outside) limited to 100mm.

4.3 Glazing

- ☐ Any new ground and first floor glazing (or if otherwise accessible) must incorporate at least one pane of glass with a 0.8mm PVB interlayer (e.g. 6.8mm laminated glass), or a glass rated as P2A under EN 356. The remaining pane in a double glazed unit may be toughened glass.

4.4 Boundaries

- ☐ It is highly recommended that condition of the fencing along the perimeter of the site is regularly inspected for signs of damage/attack and is repaired immediately if any incidents are experienced.
- ☐ The vehicular gate/s to the site off Irk Street should be secured and controlled via staff key reader during opening times. A sliding gate is preferred, but if double gates are used, they should overlap when closed and should not be capable of being forced open. The manual entrance gates off St Michael's Flats should also be secured at night/out-of-hours. Exposed hinges and large sliding bolt apertures/locking points to any gates should be avoided, or fitted with shrouding/protective plates (see opposite) to avoid the creation of footholds. The gap at the bottom of any gates should be small enough to stop anyone crawling through. If panic mechanisms are required on the inner face of any pedestrian gates (for escape purposes), they should not be capable of being reached/operated from the external face of the fence/gate.



4.5 Refuse Store

- ☐ The gates/doors to the store should be secured with a padlock or integrated lock

4.6 Alarms

- ☐ An alarm should be installed to cover the premises, linked to contacts on all doors and PIR detectors. It is strongly recommended that any alarm system is monitored, with a response facility (e.g. linked to an Alarm Receiving Centre, who will alert the key holder).

4.7 Lighting

- ☐ Dusk 'til dawn lights, operated by photoelectric cell/daylight sensor, should be installed to all external doors/lobbies. Fittings should produce 'white' light, as opposed to yellow/orange light.

4.8 CCTV

4.8.1 Any CCTV system that may be used within this proposal will require certain specifications and intelligent placement of cameras to compliment the design of the development. Designers should consider the following points when planning a CCTV strategy:

- ☐ CCTV systems (and lighting that support them) require regular cleaning and maintenance to remain effective.
- ☐ Where necessary cameras that are vulnerable to damage should be protected from attack either by relocation to a higher level and using a bigger lens to achieve the view required or through the fitting of a vandal resistant housing.
- ☐ With regards to the retention of footage, the police prefer quality over quantity. The overall retention period should be dictated by what the system is designed to achieve, though it would be better to have good quality images over a 14-day period than poor ones over a 30-day period.
- ☐ Procedures for recovery of recordings are recommended to be established (e.g. trained staff / the CCTV system instruction manual to be readily available). This is to ensure that the images produced will be of an acceptable standard that will allow for identification of an individual which will stand up to scrutiny in court.

Acceptable Standard - this generally requires a resolution of 720x576 pixels at a real time frame rate of 25 frames per second. (N.B. Both the camera and DVR must be capable of this – if the camera will only send low resolution images then it does not matter how high the resolution of the recording unit is).

Identification – One of three levels of field of view. To identify an individual, the image must capture no less than 120% of the field of view (at least from the top of the individuals head to their knees). The remaining two levels of field of view are 'Overview' and 'Recognition', which whilst effective for observational purposes, are less likely to result in the identification of a person/offender.

- ☐ The intelligent placement of cameras helps to provide clear facial identification of individuals. Suitable locations would be: [the entrance/s to the premises \(including the communal lobby area\)](#), [all till positions](#) and [customer circulation/seating areas](#).

4.9 Other

- ☐ If cash is to be stored overnight on the premises, a safe should be provided adequate capacity, with a deposit facility, certified to LPS 1183. The correct size and category of safe should be determined by an assessment of prospective takings and to meet insurance needs.
- ☐ Property marking. All high value equipment (e.g. computers) should be property marked and securely fixed or stored to deter damage/theft. An accurate record should be maintained which logs all such items.

5 Management & Maintenance

- 5.1.1 There should be a comprehensive security regime in place for the day-to-day running of the site. There should be regular reviews/exercises to ensure that it remains accurate, workable and up-to-date. All staff should understand and accept the need for security measures and it should be made easy for people to raise concerns or report observations.
- 5.1.2 Any high value equipment (e.g. computers, tools, plant/equipment etc.) should be property marked and securely fixed or stored to deter damage/theft. An accurate record should be maintained which logs all such items.
- 5.1.3 Active continuous management and maintenance of the premises can reduce the likelihood of crime and disorder occurring. A security management plan should be created to promote good administration of the premises, this plan should include the following:

- Repairing damaged external and internal fittings, particularly security features e.g. alarm system, CCTV cameras, lighting, access controls, signage.
- Cash management within the premises
- Cash-in-transit collections / deliveries and banking practices
- Regular management to maintain sight lines and lighting / CCTV coverage
- Management of stock deliveries.
- Opening and closing the premises

6 Management & Maintenance

- 6.1.1 The upkeep of a development over its lifetime can be crucial to the level of security and safety within. Aspects of a development, which are left to deteriorate, have the potential to attract further crime – a process known as ‘the broken window theory’. A maintenance plan should be drawn up to address issues such as:
- Litter removal
 - Repair to communal areas (lighting, signage, access controls)
 - Trimming and pruning to shrubs and trees

7 Construction

- 7.1.1 Untidy sites and their surroundings can be littered with debris accessible to vandals who often use loose materials as missiles to commit crime. The client should take measures appropriate to secure their site during construction, and control pedestrian and vehicular access in to and out of the site curtilage. It is also recommended that the contractor on this scheme is a member of the ‘Considerate Constructors Scheme’, who has committed to be a considerate and good neighbour, as well as clean, respectful, safe, environmentally conscious, responsible and accountable.
- 7.1.2 Site security contractors should be SIA (Security Industry Authority) approved to ensure professional standards are adhered to (please see <http://www.sia.homeoffice.gov.uk/pages/acs-intro.aspx> for more details).

8 Useful References

8.1 Secured by Design (SBD)

- 8.1.1 Secured by Design focuses on crime prevention at the design, layout and construction stages of homes and commercial premises and promotes the use of security standards for a wide range of applications and products. To apply for Secured by Design certification for your development, visit our online application form at: <http://www.designforsecurity.org/secured-by-design/sbd-accreditation/>

A Contact register

Date	Contact With	Summary of Contact
28/04/23	Asteer Planning LLP	CIS instructed
11/05/23	Asteer Planning LLP	CIS confirmed
16/05/23	GMP	Invoice issued
16/05/23	FSC MCR Limited	Invoice paid
23/05/23	DfS	Site visit
07/06/23	DfS	CIS completed
17/06/23	Asteer Planning LLP	CIS comments
18/06/23	DfS	Draft CIS completed & issued

B Associated Documents

This report is based on the following drawings and supplementary information submitted by the applicant.

Drawing No.	Drawing Title	Date	Rev
	Irk Street Manchester plan		
	Fairfield Social Club FEC Presentation	Feb 23	
	FSC Operation & Events Strategy - July 2023	July 23	

PLEASE NOTE - In the event of any subsequent material changes to the scheme, it will be necessary for Design for Security to reassess the comments made within this report.

C CIS Version History

Version	Revisions Made	Date
A		
B	CIS updated following comments. CIS issued	18/07/23
C	Section 3.1 amended	31/08/23

D Glossary

Burglary Resistance Standards

BS PAS 23-1, 1999

General performance requirements for door/window assemblies.

A performance standard for door sets and windows, which certifies that a particular door set is fit for purpose. Door products must also have BS PAS 24 certification.

BS PAS 24-1, 2012

General security performance requirements for door/window assemblies.

An attack test standard for door sets and windows. This is the minimum police requirement for Secured by Design dwellings, and is also applicable to French/double doors, and sliding doors.

ENV 1627-30 (Security Ratings WK1 to WK6)

Windows, doors, shutters - Burglar resistance Requirements and classification

The classification system used in ENV 1627-30 is aimed at the commercial market and is based on five elements:

- a) Resistance of glazing*
- b) Performance of hardware*
- c) Resistance to static loading*
- d) Resistance to dynamic loading*
- e) Burglary resistance by manual intervention*

LPS 1175 (Security Ratings 1 to 6)

Specification for testing and classifying the burglary resistance of building components

This includes doors, shutters, garage doors and grilles typically for commercial premises and higher risk domestic premises and is acceptable to the ABI and the Police. The standard has 6 levels, 6 being the highest, with levels 1 and 2 equivalent in many respects to BS PAS 24 and BS 7950.

STS201 Issue 4: 2012

Enhanced security requirements for door-sets and door assemblies for dwellings to satisfy the requirements of PAS23 and PAS24

STS202 Issue 3: 2011

Requirements for burglary resistance of construction products including hinged, pivoted, folding or sliding door-sets, windows, curtain walling, security grilles, garage doors and shutters.

This specifies a broadly similar range of attack tools and times to those specified at the lower levels of LPS1175.

EN 356, 2000 (Ratings P1A to P8A)

Glass in building. Security glazing. Testing and classification of resistance against manual attack.

A performance standard for manual attacks on glazing. P2A is comparable to the performance of a

6.8mm laminated glass, and P4A to that of a 9.5mm laminated glass.

Commonly Used Acronyms

CIT

Cash in transit (refers to vehicles, personnel and routines).

CPTED

Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design

CRS

Crime Reduction Specialist. Sometimes known as CPO (Crime Prevention Officer)

INPT

Integrated Neighbourhood Policing Team.

PVB/PolyVinyl Butyral (Glazing interlayer)

A commonly used interlayer used in the production of laminated glass.

LPCB (Loss Prevention Certification Board)

A brand of the BRE Global (Building Research Establishment) family. The LPCB work with insurers, Government, police, designers, manufacturers, contractors and end users to develop methods of assessing performance and reliability of security products to ensure their fitness for purpose.

UKAS (United Kingdom Accreditation Service)

The sole national accreditation body recognised by government to assess, against internationally agreed standards, organisations that provide certification, testing, inspections and calibration services.

Useful Websites

Design for Security

www.designforsecurity.org

Secured by Design

www.securedbydesign.com

RIBA Product Selector

www.ribaproductselector.com

LPCB – Red Book Live

www.redbooklive.com

Crime Reduction (Home Office)

www.crimereduction.homeoffice.gov.uk

DAC (Design Against Crime) Solution Centre

www.designagainstcrime.org

Building for Life

www.buildingforlife.org

CLG (Communities and Local Government)

www.communities.gov.uk