



CRIME IMPACT STATEMENT

Rondin Road

Temporary compound location to a HGV
Carpark

For: **RAPLEYS LLP**

Version A: **29/01/24**

Ref: **2010/0997/CIS/01**

Greater Manchester Police

design**for**security

Rondin Road

2010/0997/CIS/01

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Development Supported – Minor security additions recommended

This development has been assessed against the principles of 'Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design' (CPTED), in order to reduce the opportunities for crime and the fear of crime.

The layout of the proposed scheme is considered acceptable, as long as the issues discussed in more detail within Section 3.3 of this report are addressed, namely:

- External lighting
- Site wide CCTV
- Management & maintenance regime

If these issues can be addressed as described within the report and the other physical security measures are incorporated, I would be happy to support the development.

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1 Visual Audit

The development site is indicated by the red outline on the plan adjacent and is supported with existing site context photographs taken around the site.

The site lies in the Beswick district of Manchester accessed off the busy Ashton Old Road.


The site is bounded by Rondin Road to the west & south and existing commercial businesses to the north and east.

The site is currently unoccupied. Neighbouring commercial businesses are predominately of an industrial use.

The boundaries to the site are poor quality chainlink fencing and a vehicle gates off Rondin Road on the western side of the site.

The site surface appears to be made up of concrete with dense self-seeded foliage around the perimeter and within the site.

There was evidence of fly-tipping at various locations along Rondin Road.



1 – The site & existing vehicle entrance on Rondin Road.



2 – View north along Rondin Road towards Ashton Old Road.




3 Evidence of fly-tipping.




7 – Existing service structure.



6 – Evidence of fly-tipping.



5 – View south east along Rondin Road.



4 – Adjacent site entrance off Rondin Road.

2 Crime Statistics & Analysis

All data below is based on crimes recorded between 1st January 2023 to 31st December 2023.

2.1 Crime Summary

Figure 1: Recorded Crime within 500m of Site

Domestic Burglary	Non-Domestic Burglary	Criminal Damage	Less Serious Wounding	Theft	Robbery	Serious Wounding	Theft from Motor Vehicle	Theft of Motor Vehicle	Bicycle Theft
15	<5	55	113	54	5	<5	21	10	<5

- 2.1.1 The overall rate of crime is average for the Manchester division, with less serious wounding, criminal damage and theft having been most commonly reported. These offences have been occurring throughout the local area, with two main hotspots of offences situated around Ryland Street in the northeast and at Ardwick railway station to the southwest.
- 2.1.2 Less serious woundings have occurred all throughout the residential neighbourhoods to the north and southeast of the site, as well as at the hotspot of offences at Ardwick railway station. Assaults, harassment and public order offences have been the most reported less serious woundings taking place, with the majority of incidents involving disputes between known associates, as well as some cases of domestic violence.
- 2.1.3 Criminal damage has primarily occurred at the hotspot of offences near Ryland Street. Offenders have targeted vehicles using objects in order to smash the glazing in windows or damage the bodywork of cars. There have also been cases of damage being done to the front doors and windows of residential houses and apartments.
- 2.1.4 Theft offences have occurred throughout the local area, where offenders have primarily targeted insecure items, bags and parcels left unattended. There has also been instances of offenders using pickpocketing techniques in order to remove items from the person such as credit cards and mobile phones, as well as many cases of wheel clamps being removed and stolen from cars parked illegally in the nearby car park at the Holland Horticulture centre to the east of the site.

2.2 Common Use-Specific M.O.s (Modus Operandi)

2.2.1 Theft from, and of, motor vehicles.

To minimise the risk of theft of vehicles:

- include vehicle barriers, which can only be activated with a code, token or key card;
- prevent offenders casually entering the car park by installing high, visually permeable, perimeter fencing;
- limit the number of entry points to the car park and try to ensure entrances are in a location where there is an element of passive supervision.
- employ an attendant should supervise the car park and assist customers as required;
- install a CCTV system; and,
- install appropriate lighting.

To minimise the risk of theft from vehicles:

- prevent offenders casually entering the car park by installing high, visually permeable, perimeter fencing;
- limit the number of entry points to the car park and try to ensure entrances are in a location where there is an element of passive supervision.
- employ an attendant should supervise the car park and assist customers as required;

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- signs should be erected to remind customers not to leave valuable visible with their vehicle.
 - CCTV cameras should monitor the car park; and,
 - the site should be illuminated in accordance with the British Standards for car parking lighting.

2.2.2 Criminal / accidental damage to motor vehicles.

To minimise the risk damage to vehicles in the car park:

- prevent desire lines forming between cars by clearly defining pedestrian routes that are connect directly to car park entry points and pay points.
- if defined, parking bays should be large enough to accommodate larger vehicles.


2.3 Risk Factors

The typical security risks for a development of this nature are:

- Burglary
- Robbery to business
- Theft of personal belongings at work
- Criminal damage to property and vehicles
- Unauthorised access to buildings/private space
- Arson
- Cycle theft
- Employee theft
- Theft of/from parked vehicles
- Theft and criminal damage during the construction period

2.4 Non-Domestic Burglary (Manchester Industrial): Risk Analysis

The data below relates to non-domestic burglary offences within/against industrial units, recorded in the Manchester area 2018-2019.




2.4.1 Day/Time Range: During the week, the risk of burglary at Manchester industrial premises peaks on Sunday/Monday. During the day, the risk peaks late at night and during the early hours of the morning. Offenders often target such commercial premises at these times when it is dark, industrial areas/streets are typically quiet, units are usually closed or operate with fewer staff and offenders perceive a lower risk of being observed or detected.

2.4.2 Point of Entry: At Manchester industrial premises, the following entry points and MOs have been utilised most frequently:

- Forcing open secure shutters using bodily pressure and implements (particularly metal bars and vehicles) in order to gain access.
- In a number of cases, the point of entry was 'unknown'. This is likely to have been where offenders have posed as legitimate customers, visitors, or employees before gaining access to back-of-house/staff areas and stealing property unnoticed.
- Doors have been forced open using tools/implements or when they have been left insecure by members of staff.
- Glazing within doors and windows has been smashed to gain entry.
- Offenders have penetrated through walls and roofs to gain unauthorised access.

2.5 Theft (Manchester Industrial): Risk Analysis


The data below relates to thefts within/against industrial units, recorded in the Manchester area 2018-2019.



- 2.5.1 **Day/Time Range:** During the week, the risk of theft from industrial units in Manchester peaks on Saturday. During the day, the risk peaks during the late morning/afternoon. There are two common occurrences of theft – the theft of personal property within buildings (e.g. cash, bags, wallets/purses etc.) and the theft of tools, materials and plant stolen from service yards.

2.6 Vehicle Crime: Risk Analysis

The data below relates to vehicle crime committed within 500m of the site.



- 2.6.1 **Day/Time Range:** The risk of vehicle crime peaks on Wednesday in the evening (18:00-19:00). Offenders tend to target vehicles at this time when they are often left unattended and out of sight of the owners for long periods of time, creating a perceived low risk opportunity for offenders.

3 Layout Appraisal

3.1 Proposed development

- 3.1.1 HGV lorry park (sui generis) and outdoor unmanned storage (B8).
- 3.1.2 The conversion of a temporary compound location to a HGV Carpark (approx. 3,800 m2 for finished car park). This application does not include the allowance for any new buildings within the site boundary.
- 3.1.3 The site will consist of a stone capping which will be utilised as a HGV carpark, with a main vehicular access gate off Rondin Road to the north-west and a pedestrian gate to the south-east.
- 3.1.4 The site is currently secured with a 2.4m perimeter security fence and heavy shrub growth. The fencing will be repaired where required through the construction programme and shrub screening left at the perimeter of the site.

3.2 Positive Aspects of the Proposal

The following proposed features would make a positive contribution to the prevention of crime and fear of crime.

- 3.2.1 The proposed development will reduce demand for parking space on the adjacent streets which has been a source of nuisance for local businesses, and thus it has potential to reduce conflicts which can lead to antisocial activity and more serious crime.
- 3.2.2 The proposal provides a new use and the redevelopment of the site. Greater opportunities for additional natural surveillance within and around the sites will support a safer community.
- 3.2.3 Given the development sites location and the current level of illegal 'fly-tipping' around the vicinity it is important that all boundaries are covered under a site wide CCTV system. A management plan should be developed and submitted, incorporating regular removal and cleaning the pavements of litter and graffiti. Removal of litter on a weekly basis will challenge the 'Broken window' theory whereby it becomes the norm & acceptable that litter & graffiti is allowed to happen. Removal of these issues help create a sense of pride and community within the area in-turn helping to create an atmosphere of order and lawfulness, thereby preventing more serious crimes from happening.

3.3 Changes Needed and Recommendations

The following points have been identified for further consideration and would need to be addressed for Design for Security to support the proposed scheme.

- 3.3.1 Natural Surveillance. The facility does not benefit from much in the way of overlooking from adjacent properties or businesses. The site is likely to be used predominantly by a company (companies) who store their vehicles for the whole day/a period of time, and thus activity levels will be low outside morning and evening peaks. Surveillance will be reliant on legitimate users of the site and must be supported by installation of a monitored CCTV system covering all accessible areas of the facility. Visible security patrols should be present on the site, particularly at off-peak times and when the facility is first opened.
- 3.3.2 Boundary evaluation of the existing fence lines should be reviewed to ensure that it can provide a consistent level of security to the site. Overhanging branches of trees should be removed where they could provide a climbing aid.
- 3.3.3 Supervision of access gates. Entry to the site should use a monitored barrier so that access to and egress from these areas can be effectively controlled.
- 3.3.4 Vegetation Management. The proximity of bushes and trees to the fence line can undermine the security of the boundary by creating cover for an intruder or providing potential climbing aids. Overhanging branches and dense vegetation should be removed where it could be exploited in this way. Care must be taken to ensure the proposed landscaping to the perimeter of the site is maintained at an appropriate height (see Section 4.6), in order to prevent it impeding views to and from the site and avoid the creation of hiding places that could be exploited by offenders.
- 3.3.5 The position of ancillary structures and temporary facilities, external storage and trailer parking areas should be carefully considered in relation to the following: -

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- Potential to block sight lines and create hiding places.
 - Potential to obscure CCTV and lighting.
 - Potential to create climbing aids that would assist unauthorised exit / entry over boundary fencing.
 - Their potential to obscure damage to fence.

4 Physical Security

The following checklist forms the physical security requirements for this scheme to achieve Secured by Design accreditation.

4.1 Boundaries

- ☐ Ideally, the whole of the site should be secured with rigid-panel welded-wire mesh fencing (with no mid-rails that would aid climbing) and gates, minimum height of 2.4m. Care should be taken to ensure that panels are fixed securely to the posts and that any level changes do not inadvertently facilitate climbing or leave large gaps underneath the panels/gates. Exposed hinges and large sliding bolt apertures / locking points to gates should be avoided, or fitted with shrouding / protective plates (see opposite) to avoid the creation of footholds. The fencing/gates should also be located away from any other climbing aids, such as lighting columns, trees, junction boxes etc.
- ☐ The site boundary treatments should be positioned on hard standing ground. Where this is not possible, the ground conditions should be reviewed as extra measures may be required to create a secure boundary.
- ☐ Where exposed, the perimeter fencing should be protected on the inner side from potential damage from large vehicles, using crash barriers or rails to deflect any encroachment and maintain a secure boundary. The condition of fencing along the perimeter of the site should be regularly inspected for damage/attack.



4.2 Lighting

- ☐ External lighting must be provided to pedestrian routes within the site in accordance with BS 5489.
- ☐ Dusk 'til dawn lights, operated by photoelectric cell/daylight sensor, should be installed to all external doors.
- ☐ Fittings should produce 'white' light, as opposed to yellow/orange light. Metal halide (or bulbs with a comparable output) should be used, as these offer superior colour rendition over alternatives such as high and low pressure sodium bulbs.
- ☐ Lighting fixtures must not be positioned to provide climbing aids over boundary treatments. Electrical and architectural layouts should be developed together to avoid this.
- ☐ Internal lighting should be operated by detection devices which will automatically switch lights on with movement activity in each room.

4.3 CCTV

- ☐ Any CCTV system that may be used within this proposal will require certain specifications and intelligent placement of cameras to compliment the design of the development. Designers should consider the following points when planning a CCTV strategy:
- ☐ CCTV systems (and lighting that support them) require regular cleaning and maintenance to remain effective.
- ☐ Where necessary cameras that are vulnerable to damage should be protected from attack either by relocation to a higher level and using a bigger lens to achieve the view required or through the fitting of a vandal resistant housing.
- ☐ With regards to the retention of footage, the police prefer quality over quantity. The overall retention period should be dictated by what the system is designed to achieve, though it would be better to have good quality images over a 14-day period than poor ones over a 30-day period.
- ☐ Procedures for recovery of recordings are recommended to be established (e.g. trained staff / the CCTV system instruction manual to be readily available). This is to ensure that the images produced will be of

an acceptable standard that will allow for identification of an individual which will stand up to scrutiny in court.

- ☐ **Acceptable Standard** - this generally requires a resolution of 720x576 pixels at a real time frame rate of 25 frames per second. (N.B. Both the camera and DVR must be capable of this – if the camera will only send low resolution images then it does not matter how high the resolution of the recording unit is).
- ☐ **Identification** – One of three levels of field of view. To identify an individual, the image must capture no less than 120% of the field of view (at least from the top of the individuals head to their knees). The remaining two levels of field of view are 'Overview' and 'Recognition', which whilst effective for observational purposes, are less likely to result in the identification of a person/offender.
- ☐ The intelligent placement of cameras helps to provide clear facial identification of individuals. Suitable locations would be: **Entrances to site, external areas all around the new building and ancillary facilities, external doors including emergency egresses / hatches, access-controlled doors & cycle parking areas.**

4.4 Other

- ☐ Any cycle stores should be secure, lockable enclosures.
- ☐ Any bin stores should be secure, lockable, and fire resistant enclosures. A strategy should be defined to ensure waste collection can take place whilst retaining a secure development.
- ☐ Directions and signage. Visitors to the site should be clearly directed to appropriate entrances and exits. Adequate signage should be deployed in all areas not only to direct people to and through the buildings, but also to deter unauthorised access to restricted areas. Lack of orientation can provide legitimacy to an intruder.
- ☐ Staff lockers should be provided, and in a location where there is a high level of activity and surveillance, so that staff can safely store personal items during the working day.

5 Management & Maintenance

- 5.1.1 The upkeep of a development over its lifetime can be crucial to the level of security and safety within. Aspects of a development, which are left to deteriorate, have the potential to attract further crime – a process known as 'the broken window theory'. A maintenance plan should be drawn up to address issues such as:
 - Litter removal
 - Repair to communal areas (lighting, signage, access controls)
 - Trimming and pruning to shrubs and trees

6 Construction

- 6.1.1 Untidy sites and their surroundings can be littered with debris accessible to vandals who often use loose materials as missiles to commit crime. The client should take measures appropriate to secure their site during construction, and control pedestrian and vehicular access in to and out of the site curtilage. It is also recommended that the contractor on this scheme is a member of the 'Considerate Constructors Scheme', who has committed to be a considerate and good neighbour, as well as clean, respectful, safe, environmentally conscious, responsible and accountable.
- 6.1.2 Site security contractors should be SIA (Security Industry Authority) approved to ensure professional standards are adhered to (please see <http://www.sia.homeoffice.gov.uk/pages/acs-intro.aspx> for more details).

7 Useful References

7.1 Secured by Design (SBD)

- 7.1.1 Secured by Design focuses on crime prevention at the design, layout and construction stages of homes and commercial premises and promotes the use of security standards for a wide range of applications and products. To apply for Secured by Design certification for your development, visit our online application form at: <http://www.designforsecurity.org/secured-by-design/sbd-accreditation/>

A Contact register

Date	Contact With	Summary of Contact
08/12/23	Client	Application submitted
18/12/23	Client	Client confirmed CIS report
04/01/24	DfS	Invoice issued
30/01/24	DfS	Site visit
31/01/24	DfS	CIS complete

B Associated Documents

This report is based on the following drawings and supplementary information submitted by the applicant.

Drawing No.	Drawing Title	Date	Rev
MA11767 / 1010	Proposed Site Layout		
MA11767 - 6000A	External Levels		
MA11767 - 6010A	Pavement Plan		
MA11767 - 6020A	Kerbing Arrangement		
MA11767 - 6030	Construction Detail		

PLEASE NOTE - In the event of any subsequent material changes to the scheme, it will be necessary for Design for Security to reassess the comments made within this report.

C CIS Version History

Version	Revisions Made	Date
A		

D Glossary

Burglary Resistance Standards

BS PAS 23-1, 1999

General performance requirements for door/window assemblies.

A performance standard for door sets and windows, which certifies that a particular door set is fit for purpose. Door products must also have BS PAS 24 certification.

BS PAS 24-1, 2012

General security performance requirements for door/window assemblies.

An attack test standard for door sets and windows. This is the minimum police requirement for Secured by Design dwellings, and is also applicable to French/double doors, and sliding doors.

ENV 1627-30 (Security Ratings WK1 to WK6)

Windows, doors, shutters - Burglar resistance Requirements and classification

The classification system used in ENV 1627-30 is aimed at the commercial market and is based on five elements:

- a) Resistance of glazing*
- b) Performance of hardware*
- c) Resistance to static loading*
- d) Resistance to dynamic loading*
- e) Burglary resistance by manual intervention*

LPS 1175 (Security Ratings 1 to 6)

Specification for testing and classifying the burglary resistance of building components

This includes doors, shutters, garage doors and grilles typically for commercial premises and higher risk domestic premises and is acceptable to the ABI and the Police. The standard has 6 levels, 6 being the highest, with levels 1 and 2 equivalent in many respects to BS PAS 24 and BS 7950.

STS201 Issue 4: 2012

Enhanced security requirements for door-sets and door assemblies for dwellings to satisfy the requirements of PAS23 and PAS24

STS202 Issue 3: 2011

Requirements for burglary resistance of construction products including hinged, pivoted, folding or sliding door-sets, windows, curtain walling, security grilles, garage doors and shutters.

This specifies a broadly similar range of attack tools and times to those specified at the lower levels of LPS1175.

EN 356, 2000 (Ratings P1A to P8A)

Glass in building. Security glazing. Testing and classification of resistance against manual attack.

A performance standard for manual attacks on glazing. P2A is comparable to the performance of a 6.8mm laminated glass, and P4A to that of a 9.5mm laminated glass.

Commonly Used Acronyms

CIT

Cash in transit (refers to vehicles, personnel and routines).

CPTED

Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design

CRS

Crime Reduction Specialist. Sometimes known as CPO (Crime Prevention Officer)

INPT

Integrated Neighbourhood Policing Team.

PVB/PolyVinyl Butyral (Glazing interlayer)

A commonly used interlayer used in the production of laminated glass.

LPCB (Loss Prevention Certification Board)

A brand of the BRE Global (Building Research Establishment) family. The LPCB work with insurers, Government, police, designers, manufacturers, contractors and end users to develop methods of assessing performance and reliability of security products to ensure their fitness for purpose.

UKAS (United Kingdom Accreditation Service)

The sole national accreditation body recognised by government to assess, against internationally agreed standards, organisations that provide certification, testing, inspections and calibration services.

Useful Websites

Design for Security

www.designforsecurity.org

Secured by Design

www.securedbydesign.com

RIBA Product Selector

www.ribaproductselector.com

LPCB – Red Book Live

www.redbooklive.com

Crime Reduction (Home Office)

www.crimereduction.homeoffice.gov.uk

DAC (Design Against Crime) Solution Centre

www.designagainstcrime.org

Building for Life

www.buildingforlife.org

CLG (Communities and Local Government)

www.communities.gov.uk