CRIME IMPACT STATEMENT

Virgil Street, Old Trafford

4 No. Houses & Change of Use to Offices

FOR: Generation 300 Ltd

VERSION B: 6th March 2024

REFERENCE: 2022/0632/CIS/01

Greater Manchester Police

designforsecurity

CPT
CRIME PREVENTION TEAM

Virgil Street

2022/0632/CIS/01

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Recommendations Made

This development has been assessed against the principles of 'Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design' (CPTED), in order to reduce the opportunities for crime and the fear of crime. The development is broadly acceptable, in terms of designing out crime, and we are supportive of the proposals. There a number of points raised in section 3.3 which should be followed where possible, and it is recommended that the houses and office building should be built to Secured by Design standards. If the recommendations contained within section 3.3 are implemented, we would be generally supportive of the planning application.

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1 Visual Audit

The proposed development site can be seen on the adjacent map, edged in red. The site is located in the Old Trafford area within the borough of Trafford.

The site is roughly rectangular and is presently developed, with a single two storey building occupying the site, with associated car parking area. The building presently has planning permission for industrial use. The car parking area is well defined with a fence/gate. The building fronts on to the pavement and ground floor windows have been fitted with external security bars.

Adjacent the development on Virgil Street is a large apartment development, and the majority of developments in the local area are residential.

There was evidence of fly-tipping on Virgil Street on the day of visiting the site and there was littering too in the vicinity of building.

On-street parking in the local area appeared to be in high demand, which is likely due to the number of residential uses in the locale lack of car parking facilities.



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2 Crime Statistics & Analysis

All data below is based on crimes recorded between 1st January 2022 to 31st December 2022.

2.1 Crime Summary

Figure 1: Recorded Crime within 500m of Site

Domestic Burglary	Non-Domestic Burglary	Criminal Damage	Less Serious Wounding	Theft	Robbery	Serious Wounding	Theft from Motor Vehicle	Theft of Motor Vehicle	Bicycle Theft
52	24	77	369	49	29	9	54	22	13

2.1.1 The most frequently occurring offences over the last 12 months in the local area have been less serious wounding, criminal damage, and vehicle crime. With a hotspot of offences situated at the junction of Chester Road and Bridgewater Way.

2.1.2 Less serious woundings have taken place throughout the local area, particularly at the junction of Chester Road and Bridgewater Way to the north of the site, and at Cornbrook tram stop. Assaults and harassment have been the highest recorded offence types occurring in the area, and incidents have typically occurred between known associates.

2.1.3 Criminal damage offences have also taken place throughout the local area. There has been a hotspot of offences around EZ Supermarket on Erskine Street. Offenders have mainly targeted glazing in windows and doors of properties and vehicles left unattended on streets in the surrounding residential areas. There have also been many cases of implements being used to scratch the paint and tyres on vehicles

2.1.4 Theft from a motor vehicle has been the highest recorded vehicle crime occurring. Offenders have targeted vehicles throughout the area by using tools and objects to gain access to the vehicles by smashing glazing or lockpicking and then removing items from within.

2.2 Common Use-Specific M.O.s (Modus Operandi)

Residential

2.2.1 Forcing open secure windows and doors (mostly located to the front of the property) using bodily pressure and implements in order to gain entry to the property.

Possible Solution - All external door sets should be certified to a burglary resistant standard (see section 4.1). Rear doors should be positioned within the secure rear boundary to restrict access to residents. Ground floor and easily accessible windows should be certified to a burglary resistant standard (i.e. BS PAS 24)

2.2.2 Exploitation of insecure windows and doors, mostly to the rear of the property.

Possible Solution - Front doors should have split spindles or a fixed external handle so then cannot be opened from outside without a key. Rear doors should be positioned in secure rear gardens with appropriate boundary treatments. Ground floor windows should have restrictors installed so that they cannot be opened from the outside if left insecure.

2.2.3 Breaking glazing in windows and doors (mostly to the rear of the property), using implements.

Possible Solution – All ground floor glazing should include a pane of laminate glazing to prevent it from being easily smashed or shattered to gain entry (see section 4.3)

Offices

2.2.4 Opening secure doors and windows (mostly front doors) using bodily pressure and implements to gain access to the property.

Possible Solution – All external doors and ground floor windows should be certified to a burglary resistant standard (see section 4.2) which are designed to withstand a prolonged attempt to gain entry.

2.2.5 Forcing open secure shutters using bodily pressure and implements (mostly hammers and metal bars) to gain access to doors and windows situated behind the shutters.

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Possible Solution - Any shutters should be certified to a recognised security standard (i.e. LPS 1175 SR2). Shutters certified to a burglary resistant standard are able to withstand prolonged, opportunist, attacks by criminals.

2.2.6 Posing as a legitimate employee and exploiting insecure doors and tailgating staff into staff only areas.

Possible Solution –The entrance to the building should operate on an access control system so that only members of staff and genuine visitors can enter.

2.3 Risk Factors - Residential

The typical security risks for a development of this nature are:

- Domestic burglary
- Theft from gardens, sheds, or garages
- Criminal damage to dwellings and vehicles
- Theft of, or from, vehicles
- Bogus callers and distraction burglary
- Anti-social behaviour
- Neighbour disputes
- Theft and criminal damage during the construction period
- Unauthorised access to private spaces
- Poor maintenance of access control systems

2.4 Risk Factors - Office

The typical security risks for a development of this nature are:

- Burglary
- Theft of customer and staff property
- Criminal damage to property and parked vehicles
- Cycle security
- Tailgating and uncontrolled access
- Theft and criminal damage during the construction period

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2.5 Crime Rate Comparison

The rates below relate to crime committed within 500m of the site. England & Wales data was last recorded for January – December 2017.

Comparison of Burglary Dwelling Rates at Site (Km), Trafford, and Greater Manchester



Comparison of Wounding Rates at Site (Km), Trafford, and Greater Manchester



Comparison of Criminal Damage Rates at Site (Km), Trafford, and Greater Manchester



Comparison of Vehicle Crime Rates at Site (Km), Trafford, and Greater Manchester



2.5.1 The rate of domestic burglaries per 1000 dwellings is **28% higher** than Trafford as a whole, **13% higher** than Greater Manchester and **16% higher** than England & Wales.

2.5.2 The rate of woundings per 1000 dwellings is **18% higher** than Trafford as a whole, **20% lower** than Greater Manchester and **52% higher** than England & Wales.

2.5.3 The rate of incidents of criminal damage per 1000 dwellings is **38% higher** than Trafford as a whole, **12% lower** than Greater Manchester and **7% higher** than England & Wales.

2.5.4 The rate of incidents of vehicle crime per 1000 dwellings is **97% higher** than Trafford as a whole, **27% higher** than Greater Manchester and **54% higher** than England & Wales.

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2.6 Domestic Burglary: Risk Analysis

The data below relates to domestic burglaries committed within 500m of the site.

Burglary dwelling – Day Range



Burglary dwelling – Time Range



Burglary Dwelling – Point of Entry



2.6.1 Day/Time Range: The risk of domestic burglary peaks on a Friday during the evening. Offenders often target properties during the evening when it is dark and there is less footfall in the area, giving offenders the perception that they are less likely to be caught or identified. Offenders are also likely to target properties during the working week when they are left unoccupied for long periods of time creating a perceived low risk opportunity.

2.6.2 Point of Entry: In the local area the following entry points and MO's have been utilised most frequently:

- Smashed glazing in windows and doors using implements.
- Exploitation of insecure windows and doors.
- Forcing open secure windows and doors using bodily pressure and implements in order to gain access.
- Entering and apartment building by means of insecure doors and tailgating legitimate residents, accessing communal areas.

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2.7 Vehicle Crime: Risk Analysis

The data below relates to vehicle crime committed within 500m of the site.

Vehicle Crime – Day Range



Vehicle Crime – Time Range



2.7.1 Day/Time Range: The risk of vehicle crime peaks on Tuesday, during the early hours of the morning. Offenders often target vehicles in the early hours of the morning when as they are likely to be left unattended and out of sight of the owner for long periods of time, creating a perceived low risk opportunity.

2.8 Offices: Burglary Risk Analysis

The data below relates to non-domestic burglary offences within / against offices, recorded in the Trafford area.

2.8.1

Office Burglary – Day Range



Office Burglary – Time Range



Office Burglary – Point of Entry



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2.8.2 Day / Time Range: The risk of office burglary in the Trafford area peaks on a Sunday during the evening (6:30pm – 11:59pm.) Offenders often target premises at night when it is dark, neighbouring streets are quiet and footfall in the area is low. Also offices are targeted during the weekends as they are less likely to be occupied.

2.8.3 Point of Entry: In the local area the following entry points and MO's have been the occurred most frequently:

- Opening secure doors (mostly front doors) using bodily pressure and implements to access the premises.
- Entering premises as legitimate customer and tailgating staff/ exploiting insecure doors to access staff only areas.
- Exploitation of insecure windows to gain access to the property.
- Forcing open shutters using implements and bodily force to gain access.

2.9 Offices: Theft Risk Analysis

The data below relates to thefts within / against offices, recorded in the Trafford area.





2.9.1 Day / Time Range: Levels of theft are fairly low throughout the week, peaking on a Wednesday and a Friday. The risk of theft at office premises is spread throughout the day, spiking during the morning (9:30am – 12pm) and in the late afternoon (3:30pm -6pm.) Personal property such as cash, credit cards and mobile phones were the most frequently targeted property.

3 Layout Appraisal

3.1 Proposed development

3.1.1 The proposed development is the erection of 4 no. terraced houses and the change of use of the existing building to offices, with a new car parking area.

3.2 Positive Aspects of the Proposal

The following proposed features would make a positive contribution to the prevention of crime and fear of crime.

3.2.1 All dwellings will have garage parking. Vehicles parked in garages and on driveways are less likely to be targeted by offenders than when parked on the road or in communal parking courts.

3.2.2 Front doors are positioned in prominent locations where they can be overlooked from the street allowing residents to view any potential threats on approaching their property. Houses in the development typically overlook other houses.

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3.2.3 The front elevations of the building abut the footway but do not have any windows at ground floor level that could be targeted by offenders or those antisocially minded.

3.2.4 Access to rear gardens will be restricted with a gate installed flush with the front elevation of the dwellings. The passageway between plots 2 & 3 will be gated at the front elevation with a communal gate. This will prevent offenders from easily accessing the rear gardens.

3.2.5 Adjacent developments are residential in nature, with a high level of residential activity in the area, which will allow for passive surveillance opportunities.

3.2.6 The proposed office use will generate activity during the day when residents are typically at work.

3.2.7 Rear gardens will be provided for residents to securely store bins reducing the potential for misuse.

3.2.8 Access to the sides and rear of the offices will be restricted and inaccessible to members of the public and would be offenders.

3.2.9 The office car parking area will be secured with a sliding gate.

3.2.10 A secure bin store will be provided for the offices which will prevent the potential for misuse.

3.3 Changes Needed and Recommendations

The following points have been identified for further consideration and would need to be addressed for Design for Security to support the proposed scheme.

Houses

3.3.1 Exposed gable ends can often attract antisocial/criminal behaviour such as ballgames, congregation, and graffiti. It is recommended that the exposed gable of the house adjacent the turning head is protected with a low boundary or shrubby.

3.3.2 Due to the higher than average domestic burglary rate in the area it is highly recommended that the houses have an intruder alarm installed.

3.3.3 Garage doors should be certified to LPS 1175 SR1 or STS202 BR1 to prevent an offender from being able to easily damage the garage door to gain entry.

3.3.4 Doors from the garage into the dwelling should be certified to BS PAS 24, to restrict access into the dwelling if an offender damages the garage door to gain entry.

3.3.5 The communal gate providing access to the rear of plots no. 2 & 3 should be of robust construction and lockable from both sides, ideally it should also be self-closing and self-locking.

3.3.6 Rear boundaries should have a masonry (or other hardwearing) base, with timber fence above to a total height of 2100mm. It is recommended that the top 300mm consist of trellis structure, any boundaries adjacent publicly accessible open space should have a strip of defensible planting should protect rear boundaries.

Offices

3.3.7 Existing secure site boundaries should be inspected for damage and repaired or replaced where necessary. It is highly recommended that any new boundary treatments are 2400mm high and of robust construction. The proposed sliding vehicular gates to the car parking area should be to the same height and construction.

3.3.8 The office should be appropriately secured so that only staff and genuine visitors can gain entry. Ideally, the office reception should be staffed during standard office hours (i.e.9am-5pm) to allow visitors to be vetted before being permitted access into the building; alternatively, the main entrance into the building can operate on an access control system so that access is restricted to staff.

3.3.9 There should be a video/audio intercom on the main entrance to allow staff to vet visitors to the building when the main reception is not staffed and to allow visitors access into the building. If the reception area is staffed, then measures must be included to prevent members of the public from progressing beyond the entrance lobby without authorisation (i.e. turnstiles).

3.3.10 Individual office suites should be capable of being secured when not in use, to prevent unauthorised access. It is highly recommended that the office suites operate on an auditable access control system. If the building is to be occupied by multiple tenants, it is recommended that all individual office suites should be fitted with self-closing doors, certified to BS PAS 24.

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3.3.11 Publicly accessible elevations of the building elevations should be illuminated (at ground floor level) to deter loitering/congregation.

3.3.12 The building should be covered with an alarm system that can be monitored either by security staff on site or at an alarm receiving centre. Individual offices should have the infrastructure to allow for the easy installation of an alarm.

3.3.13 Where possible, given the listed status of the building, any new external doors, windows, and glazing should conform to burglary resistant standards (see section 4 for more details).

3.3.14 A large number of thefts in office developments are of personal items from desks/workspaces. Lockers should be provided so that staff can securely store personal items when working.

4 Physical Security (Residential)

In addition to the layout issues highlighted in section 3, the following checklist (sections 4-7) forms the physical security requirements for this scheme to achieve Secured by Design accreditation if required.

4.1 Doors

- ☐ Front and rear doors to dwellings must be compliant with and certified to BS PAS 24, STS201, LPS 1175 SR2, LPS 2081 SR B, or STS 222.
- ☐ Any external French/double doors or sliding doors must be compliant with and certified to BS PAS 24.
- ☐ Front doors to properties should have fixed external handles or split spindles, meaning access is only possible with a key.
- ☐ Front doors should have either fixed sidelights or door viewers.
- ☐ Chain limiters are recommended but not generally essential.
- ☐ Letterboxes within doors must be located a minimum of 400mm away from internal handle and locking hardware.
- ☐ Doors in to houses, from garages, should be certified to BS PAS 24, alternatively the garage door should be certified to LPS 1175 SR1, STS202 BR1.

4.2 Windows

- ☐ Windows must be compliant with and certified to BS PAS 24, LPS 1175 SR2, LPS 2081 SR A, STS 204, or STS 222.
- ☐ Ground floor and easily accessible opening lights (escape requirements permitting) must be key-lockable and have fixed/lockable opening restrictors (not releasable from the outside) limited to 100mm.

4.3 Glazing

- ☐ Glazing to a height of 2400mm (or if otherwise accessible) must incorporate at least one pane of glass rated as P1A under EN 356. The remaining pane in a double-glazed unit may be toughened glass.

4.4 Alarms

- ☐ If an alarm is installed, it should comply with either:
  - BS EN 50131 and PD 6662 for wired systems
  - BS 6799 for wireless systems
- ☐ If an alarm is installed, it should be linked to contacts on all external doors, (including internal doors in to garages and, PIR detectors should cover all ground floor rooms with windows.
- ☐ If an alarm is not to be provided, there should be a 13amp, non-switched fuse spur to allow future residents to connect an alarm.

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4.5 Boundaries

- ☐ Rear boundaries should have a masonry (or other hardwearing) base, with timber fence above to a total height of 2100mm. It is recommended that the top 300mm consist of trellis structure.
- ☐ Rear boundaries adjacent publicly accessible open space should have a strip of defensible planting should protect rear boundaries.
- ☐ Sub-divisional rear boundaries may be as low as 1500mm.
- ☐ The fronts of properties should be demarcated by low boundaries such as planting and/or railings to an approximate height of 1000mm.
- ☐ Any low boundaries that adjoin high boundaries should have transition panels/sections to prevent the low boundary being used as a climbing aid over the higher.
- ☐ Gates into the rear curtilage of dwellings should be in keeping with the height of adjacent boundary treatments and incorporate either:
  - A pad lockable bolt to the midpoint of the internal face, or
  - A key operable deadlock

4.6 Landscaping

- ☐ In vulnerable locations such as entrances, parking areas and footpaths, low planting should not exceed 1000mm in height, and tree canopies should fall no lower than 2m from the ground. This is in order to allow people to see their surroundings better, make a rational choice of routes and eliminate hiding places. A maintenance agreement should stipulate that these planting dimensions would be adhered to.
- ☐ Loose surface materials in the publicly accessible areas of the scheme should be avoided. Small fragments of ground covering can be used as missiles against people and premises (both to gain entry and to commit criminal damage).

4.7 Lighting

- ☐ External lighting must be provided to the front and rear of dwellings, operated by photoelectric cell/daylight sensor (manual override is also permissible). PIR security lighting is not recommended for these locations and should not be employed unless advised.
- ☐ Garage doors should be illuminated with dusk-til-dawn lighting.
- ☐ Fittings should produce ‘white’ light, as opposed to yellow/orange light. Metal halide (or bulbs with a comparable output) should be used, as these offer superior colour rendition over alternatives such as high- and low-pressure sodium bulbs.
- ☐ Lighting fixtures must not be positioned to provide climbing aids over boundary treatments. Electrical and architectural layouts should be developed together to avoid this.
- ☐ The proposed access road should be illuminated to adoptable standards.

4.8 Other

- ☐ Meter cupboards should be located to the fronts of properties only, not in the private areas.
- ☐ Any rainwater pipes should be square in profile and fixed back to the building fabric to prevent climbing to upper floor windows.

5 Physical Security (Non-residential)

The below standards should be adhered to in the installation of any new external fittings.

5.1 Doors

- ☐ External doors must be compliant with and certified to BS PAS 24:2012, STS202, or LPS 1175 SR2.

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- ☐ Sliding doors should be tested and certified to ENV 1627-30 (WK2+). If circumstances could prevent this, please consult with Design for Security.
- ☐ Any revolving doors should be tested and certified to ENV 1627-30 (WK2+). If circumstances could prevent this, please consult with Design for Security.
- ☐ External escape-only doors (as with external doors in general) should be certified to BS PAS 24:2012, or LPS 1175 SR2+. It is crucial that the door ironmongery is permitted for use on these doors under the security certification of the product. All escape-only doors should be alarmed (audible upon opening) and designed without visible external ironmongery.
- ☐ If the building is to be occupied by multiple tenants, it is recommended that all individual office suites should be fitted with self-closing access-controlled doors, certified to BS PAS 24.
- ☐ Letterboxes within doors must be located a minimum of 400mm away from internal handle and locking hardware.

5.2 Windows and Shutters

- ☐ All windows, where possible, should be certificated to BS 7950 or BS PAS 24:2012. All other window designs/dimensions should take account of the requirements of these standards, as certified products can carry dimensional restrictions.
- ☐ Ground floor and easily accessible opening lights (escape requirements permitting) must be key-lockable and have fixed/lockable opening restrictors (not releasable from the outside) limited to 100mm.
- ☐ Any curtain walling panels should include laminated glazing (see below) and should be securely fixed directly to the floor slabs where possible, rather than to perimeter columns.
- ☐ Shutters must be tested and certified to LPS 1175 SR2 (or SR1 if perforated laths are required) and installed in accordance with manufacturer's instructions.

5.3 Glazing

- ☐ Glazing to a height of 2400mm (or if otherwise accessible) must incorporate at least one pane of glass with a 1.5mm PVB interlayer (e.g. 7.5mm laminated glass), or a glass rated as P4A under EN 356. The remaining pane in a double glazed unit may be toughened glass.
- ☐ Any ground floor glazed elevations of the building should be protected by anti-ram bollards (to LPS 1246 or BS PAS 68) or re-enforced steel risers, or other vehicle mitigation such as planters and street furniture, to deter against ram-raid type attacks.

5.4 Alarms

- ☐ Alarms should be installed to cover the entire building and each individual office suite, linked to contacts on all external doors and PIR detectors. It is strongly recommended that any alarm system is monitored, with a response facility - be that an alert to the key holder, or to a security patrol team.

5.5 Access Control

- ☐ Access control systems should be operable by swipe card or fob, and not numeric keypads. The following doors should operate on access control:
  - The main office entrance doors (out-of-hours and if reception is not staffed).
  - Access from the reception lobby into the offices
  - Individual offices

6 Management & Maintenance

6.1.1 The upkeep of a development over its lifetime can be crucial to the level of security and safety within. Aspects of a development, which are left to deteriorate, have the potential to attract further crime – a

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process known as 'the broken window theory'. A maintenance plan should be drawn up to address issues such as:

- Litter removal
- Repair to communal areas (lighting, signage, access controls)
- Trimming and pruning to shrubs and trees

6.1.2 Any public open space or amenity areas not under the ownership of residents should be subject to an effective maintenance contract. This should ensure that all damage is rectified in a timely manner, and that any such space will not be detrimental to its surroundings.

7 Construction

7.1.1 Untidy sites and their surroundings can be littered with debris accessible to vandals who often use loose materials as missiles to commit crime. The client should take measures appropriate to secure their site during construction, and control pedestrian and vehicular access in to and out of the site curtilage. It is also recommended that the contractor on this scheme is a member of the 'Considerate Constructors Scheme', who has committed to be a considerate and good neighbour, as well as clean, respectful, safe, environmentally conscious, responsible, and accountable.

7.1.2 Site security contractors should be SIA (Security Industry Authority) approved to ensure professional standards are adhered to (please see http://www.sia.homeoffice.gov.uk/pages/acs-intro.aspx for more details).

8 Useful References

8.1 Secured by Design (SBD)

8.1.1 Secured by Design focuses on crime prevention at the design, layout and construction stages of homes and commercial premises and promotes the use of security standards for a wide range of applications and products. To apply for Secured by Design certification for your development, visit our online application form at: http://www.designforsecurity.org/secured-by-design/sbd-accreditation/

A Contact register

Date	Contact With	Summary of Contact
04/01/2023	Patrick Ross	CIS instruction confirmed
31/01/2023	Patrick Ross	Revised plans
15/02/2023	Patrick Ross	Progress update
05/03/2024	Patrick Ross	Revised drawings
06/03/2024	Patrick Ross	Version B issued

B Associated Documents

This report is based on the following drawings and supplementary information submitted by the applicant.

Drawing No.	Drawing Title	Date	Rev
AL(05)105	Proposed site plan		P4
AL(05)120	Proposed GF plan		P4
AL(05)140	Proposed elevations		P4
AL(05)131	Proposed rear elevation		P4

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PLEASE NOTE - In the event of any subsequent material changes to the scheme, it will be necessary for Design for Security to reassess the comments made within this report.

C CIS Version History

Version	Revisions Made	Date
A		

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