

Conway Architectural Design
6 Conway Close
Middleton
Manchester
M24 1EW

Your Ref: 137857/FO/2023
Our Ref: 2012/0996/SBD/01

F.A.O. David Trudgeon

Date: 28th March 2024

Dear Sir,

Re: SECURED BY DESIGN (SBD) – Grosvenor Arms, 2 Eldridge Drive, Manchester

Thank you for the SBD application you have submitted in relation to the scheme at the above site.

Unfortunately, the scheme is not eligible for full SBD accreditation (i.e. the SBD Gold Award) given the vulnerabilities of the layout of the scheme, namely:

- The partially hidden ground floor windows and emergency exit door along the north-west elevation of the building will directly abut the existing narrow alleyway and cannot be protected by any defined defensible space or enclosed within private space – leaving them exposed and vulnerable to unauthorised access, damage and nuisance/anti-social behaviour (i.e. people banging on windows as they walk by within close proximity).
- The ground floor windows fronting directly onto Eldridge Drive are similarly exposed and potentially vulnerable.

However, the attached checklist of physical security measures forms the requirements for the scheme to achieve the SBD Silver Award, which should be enough to discharge your planning condition. I have also included some highly recommended additional measures (over and above the SBD Silver Award) to improve the security of the scheme.

A final inspection of the scheme will be required (which I advise is carried out 1-2 weeks before handover), upon which the checklist items can be verified. Please contact me as this time approaches to organise the inspection. Other items which relate to technical information (e.g. door and window specifications) must be satisfied through the production of product test certificates, or SBD supplier certificates (if the supplier is an SBD-registered company), before the inspection is carried out.

Should you have any queries regarding the contents of this letter, or any other issues relating to this SBD scheme, please do not hesitate to contact me.

Yours faithfully

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to be 'Bradley Hart', with a stylized, cursive script.

Bradley Hart MTCP
Consultant


e: bradley.hart@designforsecurity.org



Measures required for SBD Silver Award

1.0 Doors & Access Controls

- ☐ The wall and fencing to the private parking area/communal garden to the side of the building should be returned to the front corner of the property (as shown opposite), allowing visitors to come to/from the main communal entrance of the building without having to enter the private/resident-only space.
- ☐ The main communal entrance to the building itself should be single-leaf, which is which are easier to secure and operate remotely via an access control system. Double-leaf communal entrance doorsets are only appropriate where entrance lobbies are staffed by a concierge, who can oversee, control and direct all visitor access and egress to/from the building. The entrance itself should be compliant with and certified to BS PAS 24, STS 201 or LPS 1175 SR2, self-closing/locking and capable of being controlled by means of an video or audio entry phone system, so that residents can vet callers to the building before allowing them access.
- ☐ There should be a secure system for the delivery of post without needing to provide access to all areas/floors of the building. Ideally, postal delivery arrangements should allow for external deposits and internal withdrawals by residents. If not, there should be a 'secure lobby' arrangement with a secondary communal door to the same security specification as the outer door, to allow for deliveries to postboxes within a secure postal lobby. Postboxes should be certified to Door & Hardware Federation Technical Specification 009 (TS 009), with letter box apertures to a maximum size of 260mm x 40mm (incorporating anti-fishing measures). All other deliveries should be made directly to residents via the access control system.
- ☐ The emergency exit door should be compliant with and certified to BS PAS 24, STS 201 or LPS 1175 SR2. It is crucial that the door ironmongery to any external escape-only door is permitted under the security certification of the product. The escape-only door should be alarmed (audible upon opening), with no glazing and no visible external ironmongery.
- ☐ All individual internal apartment entrance doorsets must also be compliant with and certified to BS PAS 24, STS 201 or LPS 1175 SR2. It is advised that these doors do not have fixed sidelights, and are provided with door viewers instead. Chain limiters to apartment entrance doors are recommended, but not generally essential.



2.0 Windows

- ☐ All ground and first floor windows (including any rooflights) must be compliant with and certified to BS PAS 24.
- ☐ All ground and upper floor opening lights (escape requirements permitting) must be key-lockable, and have fixed/lockable opening restrictors (not releasable from the outside) limited to 100mm. It is recommended that the particularly vulnerable windows fronting directly onto the street and the alleyway to the side of the property are non-opening.

3.0 Glazing

- ☐ All glazing (at all levels) must incorporate at least one pane of glass rated as P1A under EN 356. The remaining pane in a double glazed unit may be toughened glass.
- ☐ As much as possible, there should be no features of the building (such as projecting window cills, exposed rainwater down pipes, projecting brickwork/cladding features etc.) or nearby hard/soft landscaping features (such as nearby lighting columns etc.) that may provide climbing aids onto the roof of the single storey elements of the building.

4.0 Alarms

- ☐ Each apartment should have an intruder alarm installed to comply with BS EN 50131 (wired or wire free systems). They should be linked to contacts on all doors and PIR detectors should cover all ground floor/potentially accessible rooms with windows.

5.0 Lighting

- ☐ External lighting must be provided to all external doors and the resident's parking area, operated by photoelectric cell/daylight sensor (manual override is also permissible). PIR security lighting is not recommended.
- ☐ Fittings should produce 'white' light, as opposed to yellow/orange light. LED or bulbs with a comparable output should be used, as these offer superior colour rendition over alternatives such as high and low pressure sodium bulbs.
- ☐ Lighting fixtures must not be positioned where they could provide climbing aids over boundary treatments or up to high level windows. Electrical and architectural layouts should be developed together to avoid this.

Recommended Additional Measures to Improve Security of the Scheme

- ☐ The ground floor residential windows fronting directly onto the street and the alleyway to the side of the property will not be protected by any enclosed defensible space – leaving them exposed and vulnerable to nuisance, damage, being left insecure or being forced open, as well as a lack of privacy for residents. Given these are existing building elements, they cannot be protected by any enclosed defensible space, to clearly define them as separate from the public realm, deter unauthorised access/nuisance/anti-social behaviour and funnel any pedestrian movement away from them. It is therefore highly recommended that at least the lower half of these windows should also be protected by a perforated steel balustrade or ornate bars/planters (see below for examples), to provide a visual deterrent and deter criminal damage and nuisance, as well as provide a degree of privacy for residents. It is preferable for any such balustrades to be fixed to the face of the building or as far forward within the window reveal as possible (leaving as little a gap underneath them as possible) to avoid the creation of a climbing aid.



- ☐ The resident's parking area and amenity spaces to the side and rear of the building should be enclosed with walls/railings and gates to a minimum height of 2100mm. Any boundaries formed by a combination of walls and railings should have railing panels that are fixed flush with the outer skin of the brickwork below, leaving no steps/gaps that would provide a climbing aid. There should be no centrally located horizontal bars to aid climbing and exposed hinges or large sliding bolt apertures/locking points should be avoided, or fitted with shrouding/protective plates (see opposite) to avoid the creation of footholds. The gap at the bottom of the gates should be small enough to stop anyone crawling through.
- ☐ It is highly recommended that a cycle store or cycle lockers are sourced from an SBD supplier - please see [Accredited Product Search \(securedbydesign.com\)](https://securedbydesign.com). If not, at least the cycle store should be of steel-framed construction, with welded-wire mesh panels/roof and a lockable gate (with no exposed hinges or large sliding bolt apertures that could form a climbing aid). The cycle store should include 'Sheffield' style racks, or similar, that allow residents to lock both wheels and the crossbar to a stand, rather than just the crossbar (wheel slots and butterfly racks are not suitable). For further information, please refer to our cycle storage guidance document: www.designforsecurity.org/all-downloads/. The proposed bin store should be enclosed with 1800-2100mm high close-boarded timber fencing and a lockable gate.



Please inform us of any alterations to the scheme following receipt of this letter, as the criteria within may be affected.