



CRIME IMPACT STATEMENT

The erection of a new Lidl food store (Class E) and 2no. retail units (sui generis) with associated car parking and landscaping

AT Fallowfield Retail Park, Birchfields Road, Manchester

FOR: **RAPLEYS LLP**

VERSION A: **16.01.24**

2020/0499/CIS/02

Greater Manchester Police

design**for**security

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

We welcome the investment in this part of Manchester and support the construction of a retail development on the site. The development of a supermarket, in particular, will inevitably attract criminals leading to an increase in crime - shoplifting, theft use of threats or violence, and criminal damage, for example, but with appropriate design interventions the risk and effects of crime can be minimised.

Several recommendations to improve security within the scheme are included in section 3.3 of the report. The principal recommendations are summarised as follows:

- install appropriate fencing and gates to define the edge of the development, secure the service bay and secure the pathway on the eastern side of the building
- ensure the external walls of the building are appropriately robust
- install security-rated doors, windows, shutters, and glazing
- fit intruder alarms and a comprehensive CCTV system
- consider employing a security guard within the supermarket to deter offenders
- install access controls to the doors connecting the supermarkets shop floor to the warehouse and back-of house
- include motorcycle parking provision within the car park.

Greater Manchester Police support the application and, should the Manchester Planning be minded to approve the application, recommend the inclusion conditions requiring the development to a) be built in accordance with the security recommendations and physical security specification set out in sections 3.3 and 4 of this report, and/or b) to achieve Secured by Design accreditation.

Adrian Murphy *MRTPI*

Consultant

e: adrian.murphy@designforsecurity.org

Contents

1	Visual Audit.....	4
2	Crime Statistics & Analysis.....	5
	2.1 Crime in the neighbourhood around the site	
	2.2 Crime at retail premises across the Manchester Division	
	2.3 Modus operandi used in burglary and theft at retail premises in Manchester and measures to reduce risk	
	2.4 Environmental features that can influence crime patterns	
3	Development Appraisal	9
	3.1 The proposed development	
	3.2 Positive aspects of the proposal	
	3.3 Recommendations to improve the security of the development	
4	Physical Security	12
	4.1 Building fabric	
	4.2 Doors	
	4.3 Security shutters	
	4.4 Window frames	
	4.5 Glazing	
	4.6 Alarms	
	4.7 CCTV	
	4.8 Boundaries	
	4.9 Car park	
	4.10 Lighting	
	4.11 Landscaping	
	4.12 Other	
5	Construction	13
6	Secured by Design (SBD)	13

Appendix

A	Contact Register	14
B	Associated Documents.....	14
C	CIS Version History	14

1 Visual Audit

The broadly, triangular-shaped, application site and its surroundings are shown on the plan and photographs below. The 0.9-hectare site, edged in red on the plan, is located on the east side of Birchfields Road (A34), at the junction with Moseley Road (B5093), in Fallowfield, south Manchester. Birchfields Road is a heavily trafficked, radial route that connects the city centre with the southern suburbs. Moseley Road is also a busy route and connects the centre of Fallowfield with Levenshulme district centre about half a mile to the east. The neighbourhood around the site includes a mix of family housing and student accommodation, commercial premises, schools, sports grounds. Elevated on an embankment, the Manchester-to-Manchester Airport railway line is situated immediately east of the site. Steel palisade, security fencing and a timber fence restrict access onto the embankment from the application site. A roundabout marks the junction of Moseley Road and Birchfields Road and it adjoins the southern tip of the site. There is a kitchen showroom, a tyre and exhaust centre, and a car sales pitch facing the roundabout. Numbers 132-178 Birchfields Road, a series semi-detached, family houses, overlook the site from the western side of the road. The three units that make up the remainder of the Fallowfield Retail Park, which are occupied by a charity store, a food retailer and a household goods store lie immediately south of the site.


Looking north along the A34, Birchfields Road, with housing on the left and the Fallowfield Retail Park on the right



A view of the light-controlled, vehicle access into the site from Birchfields Road




The commercial units on the application site at the southern end of the Fallowfield Retail Park



The vandalised former Burger King restaurant and drive-thru located at the north-western corner of the application site



The commercial units north of the application site at the northern end of the Fallowfield Retail Park



The service area & outbuildings at the rear of the application site, with the tree-lined railway embankment beyond



The application site comprises a series of vacant buildings that include retail and restaurant/fast-food outlets, a medical practice, outbuildings, along with car parking, service area, sub-station and a service road. The buildings are all relatively modern, single-storey and, with the exception of the former drive-thru restaurant, which is located at the north-western corner of the site, are located towards the site's eastern and southern boundaries; the remainder of the central and western parts of the site are used for customer parking. The service yard is located on the eastern edge of the site and is accessed from the central service road that serves both the vacant and trading elements of the Retail Park. The service yard has, latterly, been secured with welded-wire mesh fencing and gates. The service road forms a, light-controlled, junction with Birchfields Road. The Birchfields Road and Moseley Road boundaries are defined with a knee-rail fence. As well as the main access into the Retail Park, there are formal pedestrian paths onto Moseley Road and Birchfields Road. CCTV cameras monitor activity across the whole of the retail park whilst the buildings and car park are appropriately illuminated.

2 Crime Statistics & Analysis

2.1 Crime in the neighbourhood around the site

The data below relates to crime committed within 500m of the site recorded between 1st October 2022 to 30th September 2023.

All crime

Domestic Burglary	Non-Domestic Burglary	Criminal Damage	Less Serious Wounding	Theft	Robbery	Serious Wounding	Theft from Motor Vehicle	Theft of Motor Vehicle	Bicycle Theft
37	5	48	205	26	9	6	23	11	<5

2.1.1 There were 514 recorded crimes in the neighbourhood around the development site during the period analysed. This volume of crime is a little above the average for a typical neighbourhood within Manchester.

2.1.2 The most common crimes recorded (5% or more of the total) were:

- the use, or threat, of violence - 54%
- theft - 14%
- criminal damage - 9%
- burglary – 8%
- vehicle crime, i.e., damage to, theft of & theft from a vehicle - 7%

2.1.3 The streets/places where 30 or more crimes were recorded were:



- Birchfields Road - 75 crimes
- Slade Lane – 48 crimes
- Kingsway - 36 crimes
- Lytham Road – 31 crimes

2.1.4 Crime hotspots in the neighbourhood include the Fallowfield Retail Park, the terraced streets east of Kingsway and south of Moseley Road, education establishments on Lytham Road, and the area immediately around the junction of Slade Lane and Kingsway.

Crime at retail premises

2.1.5 As well as Fallowfield Retail Park, there are retail/commercial premises at Slade Lane and Kingsway. However, all crime (53 offences) at retail premises reported in the area analysed was concentrated at Fallowfield Retail Park. The most commonly occurring crimes were theft/shoplifting (30 offences), followed by crimes involving the use or threat of violence (15 offences) The remaining 8 crimes included criminal damage, robbery, burglary, theft from a vehicle and drug possession.

Vehicle crime



2.1.6 The risk of vehicle crime is moderate. Offences are committed on all days of the week, particularly on Tuesday and Friday. Most offences are carried out in the afternoon and evening.



2.2 Crime at retail premises across the Manchester Division

The data below relates to burglary offences carried out at retail premises in Manchester.


There were 6,173 offences carried out at retail premises across the City of Manchester. These included:

- 3,637 incidents of theft and shoplifting
- 1,747 incidents where violence was used or threatened
- 397 burglaries
- 210 incidents of criminal damage
- 182 robberies

Burglary





- 2.2.1 The risk of burglary at retail premises in Manchester is consistently high throughout the week and is most commonly committed in the late evening and at night after premises have closed for business and members of staff have left.



- 2.2.2 In around half of the incidents of burglary at retail premises, offenders forced open the front or rear doors. Forcing shutters open was also a common method of gaining entry. Offenders also gained entry by smashing glazing in doors and windows or forced their way through the walls or roof of a building. On a number of occasions, the offender entered by legitimate means, suggesting entry was not forced.

Theft (excluding shoplifting)



- 2.2.3 The risk of theft is consistently high throughout the week and is most common during the afternoon. Offenders have mostly targeted customer's personal belongings (mobile phones, bags, and purses) as well as items belonging to staff and to the business.

2.3 Modus operandi used in burglary and theft at retail premises in Manchester and measures to reduce risk

2.3.1 Ram-raiding walls, gates and shutters and penetrating walls and the roof

To minimise the risk of offenders forcing walls, roofs shutters and gates:

- security-certified fencing/gates (to LPS 1175) and should be used to secure service areas - sliding gates tend to be more secure than hinged gates;
- steel frame buildings, faced with a proprietary cladding system, should include a 2000mm high brick or blockwork base or a suitably robust inner layer of attack resistant material, e.g., expanded metal panels;
- roofs should be high enough that they are not easily accessible, comprise of a security-rated roofing system or include a sandwich of materials which makes them difficult to penetrate;
- secluded public passageways to the sides and rear of building should be avoided wherever possible; and,
- all external doors should be illuminated by dusk-to-dawn lights.

2.3.2 Shutters have been forced upwards by offenders

To minimise the risk of offenders forcing shutters:

- security-certified roller shutters (to LPS 1175) should be used wherever possible;
- where size limits the availability of certified shutters, intruder alarms, CCTV and lighting should be deployed to increase the security of these larger openings; and,
- anti-ram bollards or barriers should be deployed to help secure the most vulnerable shutters.

2.3.3 Doors have been forced open with tools and locks have been smashed to gain entry

To minimise the risk of offenders forcing doors:

- all external doors should be certified to PAS 24, STS 202 or LPS 1175 sr2 standard; and,
- external doors should be placed where they can be readily observed by staff or monitored by CCTV and fitted with alarm contacts.

2.3.4 Entering a building via unsecured doors and windows.

To minimise the risk of offenders committing rime by entering via unsecured windows or doors

- other than customer entrance doors, external doors should be self-closing and lock upon closure; and,
- windows should have opening restrictors and key operated locks fitted:

2.3.5 Glazing in windows and doors has been smashed

To minimise the risk of breaking and entering via windows:

- windows should be avoided on secluded elevations;
- window and glazed doors should be fitted with laminate glass, which, because of its structural properties, is extremely difficult to break and penetrate sufficiently to reach in and open locks or climb through; and,
- security shutters or grilles, certified to the LPS 1175 sr2 standard, should be fitted to vulnerable windows.

2.3.6 Shoplifting and theft of employee property

To minimise the risk of offenders stealing personal property from retail premises:

- deploy a security guard at the entrance to the store

- install a one-way system to control movement through and in and out of the store;
- create a secure 'back of house' to the store, with fob or keypad-controlled doors;
- overt signage should be used to warn against entry to staff-only areas, referring visitors to appropriately located, visible reception areas; and,
- include space for employees to store personal/valuable items securely e.g., lockers or lockable drawers.

2.4 Environmental features that can influence crime patterns

2.4.1 Features of the physical environment can influence patterns criminal and anti-social behaviour. They affect potential offenders' perceptions about a possible crime site, their evaluations of the circumstances surrounding a potential crime site, and the availability and visibility of one or more witnesses, who might intervene, at or near a site. Offenders may decide whether or not to commit a crime in a location after they determine the following:

- How easy will it be to enter the area?
- How visible, attractive, or vulnerable do targets appear?
- What are the chances of being seen?
- If seen, will the people in the area do something about it?
- Is there a quick, direct route for leaving the location after the crime is committed?

2.4.2 Aspects of the local environment that might help to reduce the risk of crime and disorder at the site are as follows:

- the remaining part of the Retail Park is busy seven days a week, including into the evening. The passive surveillance of staff and customers coming and going as they use the Park is likely to deter some criminal activity;
- the visible activity and passive surveillance of residents of the houses on the western side of Birchfields Road, facing the site, may deter some criminals from carrying out crime at the Retail Park;
- being adjacent to Birchfields Road and Moseley Road, the constant flow of vehicle and to a lesser degree pedestrian traffic, the site benefits from regular passive surveillance. Sites that benefit from day-long passive surveillance are likely to deter certain types of offence or offenders who may feel that their actions are likely to be witnessed with a greater risk of being apprehended;
- there is ample car parking on the site;
- the site is well-illuminated and includes CCTV coverage; and,
- the railway line provides a very secure boundary at the eastern side of the site.

2.4.3 There are also some features that might facilitate crime and disorder, and these include:

- Fallowfield Retail Park attracts offenders engaged in theft, shoplifting and violent crime;
- the site is very visible from Birchfield Road. Offenders are likely to observe the site as it develops and be aware of, and potentially exploit, any criminal opportunities;
- the accessibility of the street-facing site boundaries, permeability of the site, and formal and informal pedestrian routes leaves it vulnerable to criminal activity;
- notwithstanding the addition of security fencing, the accessibility and seclusion of the service yard may encourage offenders to seek out opportunities to commit crime; and,
- the decaying drive-thru restaurant has attracted offenders engaged in criminal damage. The decline of this building detracts from the appearance of the Retail Park and the neighbourhood generally;

3 Development Appraisal

3.1 The proposed development

- 3.1.1 Following demolition of the existing buildings, this application seeks approval for the following elements:
- erection of a single-storey, 2,227m², supermarket (Use Class E);
 - erection of two small retail units (sui generis use) at the northern end of the supermarket;
 - maintaining the existing access to the site at the junction with Birchfields Road;
 - creation of pedestrian route into the site from Birchfields Road;
 - laying out car and cycle parking; and,
 - retention of peripheral landscaping.
- 3.1.2 The proposed building will have a largely, rectangular footprint and will be positioned on the eastern part of the site, roughly on the site of the existing buildings. It will occupy around 40% of the site have a gross floorspace of 2,417m².
- 3.1.3 The customer entrance and exit doors will be at the south-western corner of the building.
- 3.1.4 Servicing will take place at the north-eastern corner of the site where a HGV, reverse-delivery bay will be located. The plans are not clear, but it assumed HGV's will unload onto a raised dock with service shutter and a personnel door, on the northern elevation.
- 3.1.5 Included in the store, there will be an entrance lobby, large sales floor with till points at the southern end, a modest warehouse space, chiller, utility room, bakery and associated freezer, and deposit return scheme. The staff accommodation includes a cash office, canteen, cloak/changing room, meeting room, IT room and cash room.
- 3.1.6 Other than the customer entrance and exit doors, and the service bay access door and shutter, there will be two means of escape doors on the eastern elevation, allowing staff and customers to leave the shopfloor, and two on the western elevation, allowing staff to leave the warehouse or the staff accommodation. The only external door is the utility room, which is a self-contained with no means of accessing the store itself.
- 3.1.7 The small retail units, each with a floorspace of 95m², will have shopfronts on their western elevation facing the proposed car park.
- 3.1.8 Externally, there will be 94-space, customer car park, laid out between the front of the store and Birchfields Road and Moseley Road. The car park includes, appropriately located, electric vehicle charging bays, disabled bays and parent and child spaces. Parking for 10 bicycles will be provided at the south-eastern corner of the store.
- 3.1.9 Customer access into the car park from Birchfields Road will remain unchanged.
- 3.1.10 There will be direct access for pedestrians and cyclist from Birchfields Road to the store entrance.
- 3.1.11 Gated at the northern and the southern end, a means of escape pathway will be laid out alongside the eastern elevation of the supermarket.
- 3.1.12 Peripheral landscaping will be retained and enhanced.

3.2 Positive aspects of the proposal

- 3.2.1 The proposals result in the redevelopment of a site and buildings which, if not put to appropriate use, may otherwise attract further crimes and anti-social behaviour.
- 3.2.2 The food store will have a relatively simple, broadly rectangular, footprint.
- 3.2.3 The likely design and height of the proposed store is such that the risk of offenders accessing the roof and exploiting any weaknesses in the construction to gain entry is minimal.
- 3.2.4 The customer entrance and exit doors will be very visible to customers arriving on foot or by car at the south-western corner.

-
- 3.2.5 The development will generate activity and passive surveillance over the wider area to the benefit of Retail Park customers and tenants.
 - 3.2.6 The proposed, glazed entrance and glazed southern elevation of the store facilitates supervision of the car and cycle parking by staff and customers. All parts of the car park are visible to passing traffic and pedestrians within the site.
 - 3.2.7 With separate customer entrance and exit doors, and a layout requiring customers to pass through a till point) enhances the security of the store, deterring shoplifters and those intent of committing robbery.
 - 3.2.8 Back of house areas can easily be made secure with the installation of appropriate controls on doors connecting both the warehouse and the staff facilities to the shop floor.
 - 3.2.9 The cash office is located within a secure area of the store, some distance from the store entrance.
 - 3.2.10 Bicycle parking is provided on the site.
 - 3.2.11 Access to the supermarket shopfront and doors on the car park-facing, western elevation, will be protected with bollards.
 - 3.2.12 The maintenance/means of escape pathway that adjoins eastern side of the store will be secured at either end with 2400mm high gates.
 - 3.2.13 The service bay is appropriately sited.

3.3 Recommendations to improve the security of the development

Defining the edge of the car park

- 3.3.1 Rather than a knee-rail, which has, previously, not always been successful in deterring pedestrians from creating 'desire lines' from Birchfields Road through the car park, the southern and western edges of the car park should be defined with a suitably high (around 1000mm) railing. Informal pathways can result in an increase of damage (accidental or malicious) to cars as pedestrians pass between them. Restricting access onto the site to just two points reduces the opportunity for offenders to target cars and easily make their escape.

Security of the service bay

- 3.3.2 Because the service entrance door and shutter are on a secluded elevation of the building, a place an offender may target in attempts at breaking and entering or targeting staff leaving the premises in advance of a robbery, I recommend that the service area should be enclosed with 2400mm high, welded-wire mesh fencing and gates. This additional layer of security will also reduce the risk of the loading area attracting anti-social behaviour, criminal damage, or of an arson attack on, for example, a refuse store.
- 3.3.3 Armco™ barriers should be installed around the periphery of the service area to protect perimeter fencing, retaining wall and the building itself.
- 3.3.4 Low intensity, dusk-to-dawn lighting and CCTV should be used to illuminate, monitor and record activity in this area.

Access along the eastern elevation of the building

- 3.3.5 The panic hardware fitted to the gates that will secure the pathway on the eastern side of the building should be shrouded to ensure the gates cannot be opened from the 'public' side.

Bicycle parking

- 3.3.6 The security of bicycles would be enhanced if the cycle hoops were relocated towards the customer entrance door.

Motorcycle parking

- 3.3.7 Motorcycle parking places should be identified, with ground anchors or hoops located within a highly visible part of the car park.

Pedestrian safety

- 3.3.8 Given the layout of the car park, and likely mix of pedestrians - often pushing shopping trolleys, and vehicles, measures should be installed that will calm traffic speeds and direct pedestrians to safe routes across the car park. Poor behaviour by both motorists and pedestrians within a busy car park can

sometimes lead to conflict. Designing the car park so that traffic speeds are moderated– using rumble strips or raised thresholds - and safe, convenient routes are included to cater for pedestrians – using distinctly different surfacing to denote pedestrian routes - will reduce the risk of disputes arising.

- 3.3.9 Additional bollards should be introduced to prevent vehicles encroaching on the paved area in front of Units 4 and 4a.

The building

- 3.3.10 The lower 2000mm of the external walls should include a brick or blockwork to minimise the risk of intruders entering by force.
- 3.3.11 All external doors, window frames, glazing and the shutters to the supermarket, and Unit 4 and 4a, should carry a security certification.
- 3.3.12 In order to prevent breaking and entering, and criminal damage, security-rated shutters or grilles should be fitted to any windows to staff rooms, Unit 4 and 4a shopfronts, and to all customer entrance and exit doors.
- 3.3.13 The supermarket's cash office door should be security-rated, include a door viewer (spyhole), be self-closing and lock securely upon closure.
- 3.3.14 An access control system should be installed within the supermarket, which controls entry to the warehouse and from the shop floor and staff welfare area. A fob activated system is preferred.
- 3.3.15 To facilitate passive surveillance into and out of the supermarket and Units 4 and 4a, the glazed elements of the southern elevation of the supermarket and the small unit shopfronts should be kept largely free of advertising materials.

Cash handling

- 3.3.16 A safe which meets the LPS 1163 standard should be installed in the cash office of the supermarket and, ideally within the small units.
- 3.3.17 Chute deposit safes should be considered for use at each till point of the supermarket
- 3.3.18 A dedicated parking bay should be marked out very close to the supermarket entrance for the use of cash-in-transit vehicles only.

CCTV and alarms

- 3.3.19 A CCTV system should be installed at the supermarket, with cameras capable of monitoring activity within the store, the store entrance and exit doors, the warehouse and back of house, the service area, all elevations of the building, the car park and cycle parking. Monitoring equipment should be located within the management office whilst recording equipment should be located within a very secure place within the store, or images should be recorded off-site by a suitable management company. A more modest system that monitors entrances and till points should be installed in each of the small units.
- 3.3.20 The supermarket and small units should be fitted with an intruder alarm that includes sensors on all doors as well as PIR detectors on the shop floor.
- 3.3.21 A panic alarm should also be considered for the supermarket, with panic buttons fitted at till points and in the cash office.

Security guard

- 3.3.22 Consider employing a security guard within the supermarket, one that is, visible on the shop floor during shopping hours.

Refuse storage

- 3.3.23 A secure refuse store should be provided within the secure service yard.

Signage

- 3.3.24 Signs should be erected to inform the public of the name of the development; direct customers to the appropriate store entrance; deter customers from entering restricted areas, inform customers of the use of CCTV on the site; and, clearly state the regulations for use of the car park (and sanctions for misuse).

Landscaping

- 3.3.25 High quality, well-maintained landscaping within the site will help improve the appearance of the development, define the edges of the site, prevent parking in inappropriate places and protect boundary

fencing from irregular vehicle movements. Tree and shrub planting should respect the need to maintain lines of sight across the development by staff and customers as well as by CCTV cameras and lighting.

4 Physical Security

The following checklist forms the physical security requirements for this scheme to achieve Secured by Design accreditation.

4.1 Building fabric

- ☐ There should be a brick or blockwork wall (or material of similar strength e.g., welded-steel mesh) behind any low-level cladding to the building (to a minimum height of 2000mm from external ground level), to ensure that the building itself is adequately secure.
- ☐ The supermarket cash room, in which the safe will be located, should have solid walls and a secure, rather than a false, ceiling.

4.2 Doors

- ☐ Sliding entrance and exit doors should be tested and certified to ENV 1627-30 (RC2+) or a similar security standard.
- ☐ Hinged entrance, service doors, and all escape doors should be compliant with, and certified to LPS 1175 SR2. All of these doors should be self-closing and be capable of locking automatically upon closure.
- ☐ The to the supermarket cash office should be compliant with, and certified to, BS PAS 24, STS202 or LPS 1175 SR2, self-closing and be capable of locking automatically upon closure.
- ☐ The doors to the welfare area of the supermarket should be FD30-rated, fitted with fob-activated, electronic locks, be self-closing and capable of locking automatically upon closure.

4.3 Security shutters

- ☐ Roller shutters securing loading dock, and shutters installed to enhance security to entrance, shopfronts and means of escape doors or windows should meet LPS 1175 SR2 standard.

4.4 Window frames

- ☐ Any opening windows should be certificated to BS PAS 24 or LPS 1175, include locks operated with a key, and have restrictors that limit opening to 100mm.

4.5 Glazing

- ☐ All external glazing should incorporate at least one pane of glass with a 1.5mm PVB interlayer (e.g., 7.5mm laminated glass), or a glass rated as P4A under EN 356. The remaining pane in a double-glazed unit may be toughened.
- ☐ External glazing should be kept largely free of any advertising materials.

4.6 Alarms

- ☐ A monitored intruder alarm system should be installed to the supermarket and small units. Each should be linked to contacts on all external doors, windows and shutters, and PIR detectors should monitor all internal floor areas, with a signal terminating at a recognised Alarm Receiving Centre (ARC) or security control room. The alarm should have two secure signalling paths (one being GSM radio back-up).
- ☐ A panic alarm should be installed in the supermarket. Panic buttons should be fitted under the till points and in the management office so that staff can alert other staff members that assistance is required.

4.7 CCTV

- ☐ A CCTV system should be installed. Externally, the system should be capable of monitoring all facades of the building, the service bay, the car, motorcycle and bicycle parking, the vehicle and pedestrian

entrances. Internally, the system should be capable of monitoring the entrance and exit doors, all other external doors, till points, circulation aisles, and the warehouse.

4.8 Boundaries

- ☐ The perimeter of the car park should be defined with a 1000mm high railing.
- ☐ The service bay should be enclosed with a 2400mm high, welded wire mesh fence and matching vehicle gates.
- ☐ Exposed hinges and large, sliding bolt apertures/locking points on the gates securing the service bay, and those of the gates securing the service pathway on the eastern side of the building, should be avoided. Alternatively locking points should be fitted with shrouding/protective plates to avoid the creation of footholds.

4.9 Car park

- ☐ Bays and directional markings should be clearly demarcated to avoid confusion or conflict, with pedestrian routes/directions clearly signed.
- ☐ Traffic calming measures should be incorporated to limit the speed of vehicles within the site.

4.10 Lighting

- ☐ Lighting to the car park should be in accordance with BS 5489, with an average lux level 20 and a uniformity level of no less than 25%.
- ☐ Dusk-to-dawn, low-intensity lighting, operated by photoelectric cell/daylight sensor, should be installed to all external doors, shutters and gates, and to all elevations of the building.
- ☐ Fittings should produce 'white' light.
- ☐ Lighting fixtures must not be positioned to provide climbing aids over fencing or gates.

4.11 Landscaping

- ☐ Traffic calming should be introduced to reduce vehicle speeds at appropriate places along the service road.
- ☐ In order to promote natural and electronic surveillance of the site, low planting should not exceed 1000mm in height and tree canopies should fall no lower than 2000mm from the ground.

4.12 Other

- ☐ Shopping trolleys should be secured at night/when the store is closed to prevent theft/abuse.

5 Construction

- ☐ The developer should take appropriate measures to secure their site during construction, and control pedestrian and vehicular access in and out. The contractor on this scheme should be a member of the 'Considerate Constructors Scheme' and Site security contractors should be Security Industry Authority, SIA, approved (see <http://www.sia.homeoffice.gov.uk/pages/acs-intro.aspx> for more details).

6 Secured by Design (SBD)

- ☐ Secured by Design focuses on crime prevention at the design, layout and construction stages of commercial premises and promotes the use of security standards for a wide range of applications and products. To apply for Secured by Design certification for your development, visit our online application form at: <http://www.designforsecurity.org/secured-by-design/sbd-accreditation/>

A Contact Register

Date	Contact	Summary of Contact
04.10.23	Joshua Ambrus, Rapleys LLP.	Request for Crime Impact Statement
07.11.23		Site visited
16.01.24	Joshua Ambrus, Rapleys LLP.	Report issued

B Associated Documents

This report is based on the following:

Drawing No.	Drawing Title	Date	Rev
7397-SMR-00-XX-DR-A-2003-A3-C3	Proposed Site Plan		
7397-SMR-00-XX-DR-A-2004-A3-C3	Proposed External Works		
7397-SMR-00-XX-DR-A-8021-S2-P3	Preliminary Levels Strategy		
Type 15	Fallowfield - trolley bay in car park		

In the event of any changes to the scheme, it may be necessary for Design for Security to review the recommendations made within this report.

C CIS Version History

Version	Revisions	Date
A		16.01.24