



CRIME IMPACT STATEMENT

RENSHAW HOUSE, 99 PLYMOUTH GROVE, MANCHESTER

PURPOSE BUILT STUDENT ACCOMODATION (3 no. STUDIO BEDROOMS & 14 no. CLUSTER FLATS, WITH A TOTAL OF 92 no. STUDENT BEDROOMS)

Greater Manchester Police

designforsecurity

FOR: Mia James Construction

VERSION B: 07/05/2024

REFERENCE: 2024/0058/CIS/01

Renshaw House, 99 Plymouth Grove, Manchester

URN: 2024/0058/CIS/01

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Minor security additions/improvements required

This development has been assessed against the principles of 'Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design' (CPTED), in order to reduce the opportunities for crime and the fear of crime.

The layout of the proposed scheme is considered acceptable, as long as the issues discussed in more detail within Section 3.3 of this report are addressed, namely:

- The control of access into/around the scheme is fundamental to its security, ideally including a 24/7 staffed reception/entrance lobby to oversee, control and direct all visitor access/egress to/from the building. If not, the main entrance should be single-leaf and controlled remotely via a robust access control system. There should also be a secure system for the delivery of post/parcels that does not require access to all floors of the building.
- The sides and rear of the building should be securely enclosed to prevent unauthorised access, including vehicular gates to the service access off Hyde Grove and defensive planting to further deter unauthorised access from the publicly accessible open space to the north of the site.
- The ground floor residential windows along Hyde Grove should be protected by some defined defensible space to protect them from unauthorised access, nuisance and damage.
- The proposed external cycle store must be robustly constructed and gated to prevent unauthorised access and theft. The internal cycle stores should also be adequately secured to prevent unauthorised access.

If these issues can be addressed as described within the report and the other physical security measures are incorporated, we would be happy to support the development.

Please note: Greater Manchester Police Design for Security will recommend to the local planning authority that a planning condition is added that reflects the physical security specification listed within Section 4 of this report.



Bradley Hart MTCP

Design for Security Consultant

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1 Visual Audit



The site lies at the junction of Plymouth Grove and Hyde Grove, in the Victoria Park area to the south-east of Manchester city centre.

It is currently occupied Renshaw House – a two storey, 10 bed house for student rental. There is a hard surface parking area to the west (enclosed with railings/gates to Hyde Grove) and a grassed garden area to the east (enclosed with mature trees/scrub vegetation and chain link fencing).

To the immediate west is the Old Church, which also provides student accommodation, and there are student residential blocks to the south on the opposite side of Hyde Grove. The land to the north of the site is partially occupied by a parking area serving the adjacent Manchester Central Ambulance Station/Manchester Donor Centre site (enclosed with Palisade and timber fencing) and an area of grassed open space along Plymouth Grove (which currently has a tent pitched on it).

At the end of the short cul-de-sac of Hyde Grove is a gated parking/servicing area serving the Blood Donor site and a gated car park serving the Travelodge hotel fronting onto Upper Brook Street. Hyde Grove itself has no parking permit restrictions along it (as many other streets within the vicinity do), meaning it is very busy with on-street parking at all times. These are likely to be the vehicles of residents, students and patients/visitors/staff of the nearby hospital and university buildings. Vehicles parked on-street for long periods of time, where they cannot be directly overlooked by their owners, can often be vulnerable to theft of and from, as well as damage (both malicious and accidental).

The site is surrounded by residential, medical and university uses and there is a large amount of student accommodation in the wider area. Students tend to be more vulnerable to crime due to a number of factors including their age, lifestyle, income, tenure, employment status, occupancy and accommodation type.



2 Crime Statistics & Analysis

All data below is based on crimes recorded between 1st February 2018 to 31st January 2019.





2.1 Crime Summary

Recorded Crime within 500m of Site									
Domestic Burglary	Non-Domestic Burglary	Criminal Damage	Less Serious Wounding	Theft	Robbery	Serious Wounding	Theft from Motor Vehicle	Theft of Motor Vehicle	Bicycle Theft
18	18	85	608	143	25	14	34	8	37

- 2.1.1 In the local area, the volume of crime is high – particularly less serious wounding, theft, criminal damage and vehicle crime. These are typical of the crimes often associated with hospital and university sites, as well as student areas. Residents, students, patients, visitors and staff often park their vehicles on streets in the vicinity of such uses, where offenders know that vehicles will be left unattended for long periods, leaving them potentially vulnerable.
- 2.1.2 As this Crime Impact Statement relates to a proposed student accommodation scheme, the more detailed analysis below will look at residential burglary and vehicle crime.

2.2 Local Crime Rate Comparison


The rates below relate to crimes committed within 500m of the site. England & Wales data was last recorded for January – December 2021.



- 2.2.1 The rate of domestic burglaries (i.e. incidents per 1,000 dwellings) in the local area is **44% lower** than the rate for Manchester as a whole, **28% lower** than the rate for Greater Manchester and **27% lower** than the rate for England & Wales.
- 2.2.2 The rate of woundings (i.e. incidents per 1,000 dwellings) in the local area is **76% higher** than the rate for Manchester as a whole, **140% higher** than the rate for Greater Manchester and **358% higher** than the rate for England & Wales.
- 2.2.3 The rate of incidents of criminal damage (i.e. incidents per 1,000 dwellings) in the local area is **35% higher** than the rate for Manchester as a whole, **77% higher** than the rate for Greater Manchester and **116% higher** than the rate for England & Wales.
- 2.2.4 The rate of incidents of vehicle crime (i.e. incidents per 1,000 dwellings) in the local area is **20% lower** than the rate for Manchester as a whole, **31% higher** than the rate for Greater Manchester and **60% higher** than the rate for England & Wales.

2.3 Domestic Burglary: Risk Analysis

The data below relates to domestic burglaries committed within 500m of the site.





- 2.3.1 **Day Range:** During the week, the risk of domestic burglary in the local area peaks on Tuesday and Wednesday to Saturday. The wider local area includes residential properties occupied by students and, during the weekend, many will either travel home or will go out during the evenings – providing opportunities for offenders to exploit.

2.3.2 **Time Range:** In the local area, the risk of burglary peaks late at night and during the early hours of the morning – when it is dark, streets tend to be quieter than during the day and offenders perceive a lower risk of being detected or identified.

- 2.3.3 **Point of Entry:** In the local area, the following entry points and MOs have been utilised most frequently:
- In cases where the entry point is unknown, offenders are likely to have exploited insecure windows and doors, have posed legitimate visitors or have tailgated residents to gain unauthorised access without being noticed. Students generally tend to be less security conscious and can leave windows and door insecure – particularly when properties are in multiple occupation.
 - Doors have also been forced open by offenders to gain access.
 - Windows have been prised open using bodily pressure/implements.
 - Glazing with windows and doors has been smashed to gain entry.

2.4 Vehicle Crime: Risk Analysis

The data below relates to vehicle crime committed within 500m of the site.



2.4.1 **Day Range:** During the week, the risk of vehicle crime in the local area peaks on Wednesday, but remains relatively consistent throughout the week.

2.4.2 **Time Range:** During the day, the risk of vehicle crime in the local area rises in the afternoon. University staff/students and hospital staff/patients/visitors often park their vehicles in the local area during the day, where offenders know that vehicles will be left unattended for long periods, leaving them potentially vulnerable.

2.4.3 Vehicles parked on streets or within open, communal areas/car parks - where they are easily accessible and cannot be easily overlooked by their owners - are often more vulnerable to attack than those parked on the driveways of individual properties or within secure parking facilities. Theft from a motor vehicle and criminal damage to a vehicle are the most prevalent types of vehicle crime, with offenders smashing windows or picking locks to steal items, removing vehicle parts/reg plates and smashing windows/scratching paint to cause damage.

2.5 General Risk Factors

2.5.1 The typical security risks for a development of this nature are:

- Domestic burglary
- Bogus callers and distraction burglary
- Criminal damage to property and vehicles
- Anti-social behaviour
- Theft of/from parked vehicles
- Unauthorised access to buildings/private space
- Tailgating (pedestrian and vehicular)

- Neighbour disputes
- Poor maintenance of access control systems
- Theft and criminal damage during the construction period

2.6 Common Use-Specific M.O.s (Modus Operandi)

2.6.1 Having looked at the crime data for the site and the surrounding area, the most frequent MOs (modus operandi) used by offenders when targeting residential properties are listed below, along with suggested measures to reduce the risk of them being utilised at the proposed development:

- In cases where the entry point is unknown/legitimate, offenders are likely to have exploited insecure windows and doors, have posed legitimate visitors or have tailgated residents to gain unauthorised access without being noticed.

Possible Solution - All external doors should be certified to recognised security standards (see Section 4.1), which are independently proven to reduce the risk of forced entry and thus increase the chances of detection. A robust access control system should be in place to allow the concierge/residents to vet visitors before allowing them access to the development. Consideration could also be given to 'airlock' lobby system, which features a secondary entrance door that only releases when the external door has closed, reducing the opportunities for tailgating unnoticed. The main communal entrance/s should also be located in a highly visible position and should be well-lit to deter offenders from trying to gain unauthorised access.

All individual apartments should also be secured with a security-certified entrance doorset (also Section 4.1), to ensure that any offender who may have gained access to the building (e.g. by tailgating, posing as a legitimate visitor etc.) cannot gain further access without drawing the attention of other residents. Doors off internal corridors should not be located in deep recesses, where an offender could operate without fear of detection.

All ground floor/accessible windows should also be certified to recognised security standards (see Section 4.2), with key operated locks and opening restrictors. Windows to accessible elevations should be protected by some defensible space, to define them as entirely separate from the street and offer them some protection from unauthorised access as well as nuisance/anti-social behaviour.

All private spaces to the sides/rear of the buildings should be robustly enclosed, particularly where adjacent to publicly accessible space, to deter unauthorised access (see Section 4.5). Open pedestrian routes/accessible land to the rear of the properties should be avoided. Lighting to the front and rear of dwellings can also deter and reveal potential intruders, as well as reduce the fear of crime (see Section 4.6).

- Doors have also been forced open by offenders to gain access.
Possible Solution - See above.
- Windows have been prised open using bodily pressure/implements.
Possible Solution - See above.
- Glazing with windows and doors has been smashed to gain entry.

Possible Solution - All ground floor/accessible glazing should include a laminated pane, which forms a much more robust barrier against shattering and penetration (see Section 4.3). Where possible, the size of any glazed elements within/directly adjacent to doors should be reduced and set well-away from locking points.

- Vehicles have been target for theft from and criminal damage, predominately when parked on-street/in public car parks

Possible Solution - It is essential that developments are designed so that any residents vehicles are secured and overlooked. Any communal parking areas serving blocks of apartments or groups of houses should be located directly in front of the dwellings they serve, clearly separated from the street or any areas of adjacent open space/pedestrian routes. Any side/rear or undercroft communal parking areas must be secured to prevent unauthorised access to where hidden doors, windows and parked vehicles could be attacked unseen.

3 Layout Appraisal

3.1 Proposed Development

- 3.1.1 The proposal is to erect a part 3/4/5/6 storey block to form student accommodation (3 no. studio bedrooms and 14 no. clusters flats, with a total of 92 no. student bedrooms) with associated communal space and landscaping.
- 3.1.2 The proposed building will front onto Hyde Grove, with the main entrance off the street leading to a reception/social space (incorporating study areas, lounge seating, 3 no. quiet study rooms, a social laundry and a gym/fitness suite). The remainder of the ground floor of the building will incorporate 2 no. secure cycle stores (for 68 no. cycles), a bin store, plant and hot/cold water rooms and 3 no. studio bedrooms. The landscaped gardens to the sides and rear of the building will house a service access area, substation, 6 no. visitor cycle stands, a further 14 no. cycle store enclosure, pergola and seating/BBQ areas. The upper floors of the building will be formed by 4/5/6/8/9 bedroom cluster flats, with maintenance access to flat green roof areas and PV panels on the roof.

3.2 Positive Aspects of the Proposal

The following proposed features would make a positive contribution to the prevention of crime and fear of crime.

- 3.2.1 The proposed development will bring additional activity, overlooking and surveillance to the area at all times of the day and night.
- 3.2.2 The scheme is likely to have a staff presence on-site to manage access and address any issues that might arise.
- 3.2.3 The building will present an active frontage to Hyde Grove, enlivening the street scene and helping to provide useful natural surveillance over the route.
- 3.2.4 The principal entrance to the scheme is located in a prominent position and will be capable of being clearly seen from the public realm.
- 3.2.5 The footprint of the building has been kept relatively simple, with no doors/windows hidden within deep recesses or behind building lines (where they would be vulnerable to attack).
- 3.2.6 The majority of the proposed student bedrooms will be provided well-above street level, meaning that residents' possessions cannot be easily observed and unauthorised entry is more effectively prevented. This also reduces the potential impacts of excessive noise, nuisance and anti-social behaviour (particularly at night).
- 3.2.7 The private courtyard/landscaped areas to the sides and rear of the building will be capable of being securely enclosed to deter unauthorised access to where hidden doors/windows could be vulnerable to unauthorised access unseen.
- 3.2.8 The scheme includes internal and external cycle stores within private space, capable of being secured to prevent damage and theft.
- 3.2.9 The proposed development provides the opportunity to include security features built into the design/construction of the scheme. Security measures carefully incorporated into the design/specification of the development can ensure the building is reasonably secure, without visibly announcing that the design was concerned about crime.

3.3 Points for Further Consideration

The following points have been identified for further consideration and would need to be addressed for Design for Security to support the proposed scheme.

- 3.3.1 It is highly recommended that the reception desk within the entrance lobby is staffed by a 24-hour concierge, who should oversee, control and direct all visitor access/egress to/from the building (see Section 4.1), as well as provide formal surveillance over the Hyde Grove frontage. Ideally, the concierge should greet visitors, contact the students to inform them they have a visitor at reception and the student should come to meet them in the entrance lobby to escort them to their studio/cluster flat. If the main entrance lobby is not to be staffed at any point, the main entrance doorset should be single-

leaf (which is easier to secure and operate remotely) and there should be a secure lobby created (with an access-controlled secondary doorset within the entrance lobby) to minimise the risk of offenders 'tailgating' legitimate residents/visitors. Visitor access should be controlled by means of a video entry phone system linked to each cluster flat, so that residents can confirm the identity of visitors before allowing them access into the entrance lobby. Visitors should then be met by students in the entrance lobby, from which point they can be met and escorted. There should also be a secure system for the delivery of post and parcels that does not require access to all floors of the building (again, see Section 4.1).

- 3.3.2 The sides and rear of the building must be enclosed and defined as private space for the use/access of staff and residents only by railings and gates to a minimum height of 2100mm (see Section 4.5 for more information). In addition to a robust boundary definition, it is highly recommended that the rear boundary of the site along the publicly open space to the north is protected by mature defensive planting along the public side of the fenceline to discourage access, damage and scaling. If this is unachievable, there should at least be dense vegetation/hedging along the private side of the fenceline to discourage unauthorised access over/through it. Care should also be taken to ensure that any changes in ground levels or adjacent trees do not inadvertently form climbing aids over the boundaries to private space. Vehicular gates should secure the service access area off Hyde Grove, which should remain secured and only utilised when required for service/maintenance purposes.
- 3.3.3 The ground floor residential windows along Hyde Grove must be protected by some defined defensible space (defined by low level railings and planting - see Section 4.5 for more information), in order to funnel pedestrian movement away from them and protect them from unauthorised access, nuisance and damage.
- 3.3.4 Given the levels of cycle theft in the local area, the proposed external cycle store must be securely enclosed/gated to prevent unauthorised access and theft (see Section 4.9 for more information). The internal cycle stores should also be adequately secured to prevent unauthorised access (see Section 4.1). All cycle stores should also include stands that allow staff/residents to adequately secure their cycles (again, see Section 4.9).
- 3.3.5 It is essential that all of the physical security measures listed below are incorporated into the scheme. Integrated, risk-commensurate security measures aim to place secure physical barriers or surveillance in the path of the criminal – making crime harder to commit and raising the risk of detection and possible capture, as well as promoting a feeling of safety in residents and visitors.

4 Physical Security

In addition to the layout issues highlighted in Section 3, the following checklist forms the physical security requirements for this scheme to achieve Secured by Design accreditation if required.

4.1 Doors & Access Controls

- ☐ All external doorsets should be compliant with and certified to BS PAS 24, STS 201 or LPS 1175 SR2. It is crucial that the door ironmongery to any external escape-only doors is permitted under the security certification of the product. All escape-only doors should be alarmed (audible upon opening) and designed without visible external ironmongery. Security-certified louvred doorsets are also available if required to plant rooms or refuse stores (see <https://www.securedbydesign.com/member-companies/accredited-product-search> for SBD approved suppliers).

- ☐ The main communal entrance to the building should be formed by a security-certified, self-closing/locking doorset (ideally single-leaf – see below) secured with a multi-point electronic lock permitted as part of the certification, capable of being operated by staff/student key-fob or via an electronic access control system. The following access control/postal delivery strategies should be adopted:

If the Main Reception Desk is staffed 24/7

- Ideally, the main reception should be staffed by a 24 hour concierge, who should oversee, control and direct all visitor access/egress to/from the building at all times. The main entrance doorset should be controlled by resident key-fob or remotely by the concierge, who should greet visitors, contact the residents (via an audio access control system) to inform them they have a visitor at reception and the resident should come to meet them in the entrance lobby, from which point they can be escorted to their studio/cluster flat.
- Postal deliveries should be made directly to the concierge (for distribution to students later) or to TS 009 postboxes within the entrance lobby (see below), under the supervision of reception staff.

If the Main Reception Desk is left unattended at any point

- The main entrance should be single-leaf, which is easier to secure and operate remotely. In order to minimise the risk of tailgating, there should be a secure lobby arrangement within the building – with a secondary internal door to the entrance lobby to the same specification as the outer door, including an electronic lock operated by resident key-card/fob. Visitor access should be controlled by means of an audio-visual entry phone system (with the picture viewable on the phone unit, rather than on a television set), so that residents can confirm the identity of visitors before allowing them access into the entrance lobby. Visitors should then be met by residents in the entrance lobby and escorted to their studio/cluster flat.
- There should be a secure system for the delivery of post without needing to provide access to all floors of the building. Where possible, postal delivery arrangements should allow for external deposits and internal withdrawals by residents. Where this is not practical, postal deliveries should be made to postboxes within the secure entrance lobby described above, without providing access to all floors of the building. The postboxes themselves should be certified to Door & Hardware Federation Technical Specification 009 (TS 009), with letter box apertures to a maximum size of 260mm x 40mm (incorporating anti-fishing measures). There should also be a secure system for depositing parcels within the secure postal lobby, such as the smart parcel boxes used by the major internet shopping companies. All other deliveries should be made directly to residents via the access control system.

- ☐ Any rear communal entrances to the building (off the rear landscaped courtyard) should be formed by a security-certified, self-closing/locking doorset secured with a multi-point electronic lock permitted as part of the certification, operated by staff/student key-fob only. The external entrance doors to the cycle stores and bin store should also be security-certified and operated in the same way.

- ☐ All internal entrance doorsets to studio flats and cluster flats must be compliant with and certified to BS PAS 24, SPS 201 or LPS 1175 SR2. It is advised that these doors do not have fixed sidelights, and are provided with door viewers instead. Chain limiters are recommended, but not generally essential.

- ☐ All internal doors/frames to individual student bedrooms within cluster flats should be of robust construction (FD30 or higher), with hinge-bolts and a lock certified to BS 8621 or PAS 8621, to allow each student to secure their own bedroom/possessions.
- ☐ The rear escape doors to cluster flats 1a, 2a & 3a should also be compliant with and certified to BS PAS 24, STS 201 or LPS 1175 SR2. It is crucial that the door ironmongery to any external escape-only door is permitted under the security certification of the product. These escape-only doors should be alarmed (audible upon opening) and signed as such to prevent casual use. All fire doors to the escape stair core itself (on each level) should be fitted with electromagnetic locks connected to the fire alarm. Once the escape stairwell is accessed, the only means of egress should be at ground floor level.
- ☐ Any internal doors/frames to staff rooms, the laundry, the podcast study/quiet study rooms, gym/fitness suite, cycle/bin stores and plant rooms should be solid-core (FD30 or higher), with 3 hinges and an electrically operated lock controlled by staff/resident key-fob. Maintenance doors/hatches onto flat roof areas should be similarly secured to prevent unauthorised use.

4.2 Windows

- ☐ All ground floor and any potentially accessible upper floor windows, where possible, should be certificated to BS PAS 24. All other window designs/dimensions should take account of the requirements of the above standards, as certified products can carry dimensional restrictions. Any curtain walling panels should include laminated glazing (see below) and should be fixed with a secure glazing retention system (e.g. with security glazing tape, with a dedicated security sealant/gasket or a secure mechanical fixing system from the glazing retention tests within the BS PAS 24 or LPS 1175 standards).
- ☐ Any ground floor/easily accessible opening lights, escape requirements permitting, must be key-lockable and have fixed/lockable opening restrictors not releasable from the outside, limited to 100mm.

4.3 Glazing & Building Fabric

- ☐ All glazing up to a height of 2400mm (or if otherwise accessible) must incorporate at least one pane of glass rated as P1A under EN 356. The remaining pane in a double glazed unit may be toughened glass.
- ☐ There should be a block work wall (or material of similar strength e.g. welded-steel mesh) behind any cladding to the building, to a minimum height of 2000mm from external ground level, to ensure that the fabric of the building itself is not vulnerable to attack.
- ☐ Any external louvres to refuse stores or plant areas should be robustly constructed and fixed, to ensure they cannot be easily removed, and designed to ensure that they cannot be used as a climbing aid to reach upper floor windows.
- ☐ There should be no other features of the building (such as projecting window cills, projecting brickwork/cladding features, exposed rainwater down pipes etc.) or nearby hard/soft landscaping features (such as nearby trees, lighting columns, handrails, street furniture etc.) that may provide climbing aids up to upper floor windows or over boundaries.

4.4 Alarms

- ☐ Ideally, each studio flat and cluster flat (particularly at ground level) should have an intruder alarm fitted to comply with BS EN 50131. Alarms should be linked to contacts on studio/cluster flat entrances and PIR detectors covering all accessible rooms with windows. Any such alarms should be monitored by the on-site management staff, who can respond to any activations.
- ☐ All ground floor external doors to communal areas should be fitted with alarm contacts, linked to the building intruder alarm system, to alert staff if anyone attempts to gain unauthorised access. Any escape only doors should be alarmed 24/7 and should be signed as such to deter casual use.

4.5 Boundaries

- ☐ The sides and rear of the building should be enclosed and defined as private space by railings and gates to a minimum height of 2100mm (please see <https://www.securedbydesign.com/member-companies/accredited-product-search> for a list of Police approved perimeter security suppliers). Care should be taken to ensure that any boundaries formed by a combination of walls and railings should have panels that are fixed flush with the outer skin of the brickwork below, leaving no steps/gaps that would provide a climbing aid.
- ☐ Any branches or vegetation growing through or directly over the boundary to the site should be removed or pruned to ensure they do not form climbing aids over the boundary or cause damage to the fencing itself. Where possible, low-level defensive planting (i.e. low-level, densely branched, thorny shrubs/hedging) should be provided on the public side of the northern boundary (along the publicly accessible area of open space) to deter access and scaling. If this is not possible, at least dense vegetation/hedging should be provided along the private side of the fenceline to discourage unauthorised access over/through it.
- ☐ Any pedestrian gates to private space should be to a minimum height of 2100mm and should be single-leaf, self-closing/locking and secured with a multi-point lock operated by staff/resident key fob. The vehicular gates to the service access area off Hyde Grove should be securely locked at all times, other than when access is required for servicing/maintenance. They should not be left insecure and attended at any time.
- ☐ All gates to private space should have no centrally located horizontal bars to aid climbing and should be located away from other climbing aids, such as low walls, street lights, trees etc. Exposed hinges and large sliding bolt apertures/locking points should be avoided, or fitted with shrouding/protective plates to avoid the creation of footholds (see opposite for example). Any release mechanisms on the internal side of any pedestrian gates required for emergency egress purposes should not be capable of being reached/operated from the external face of the gates. The gap at the bottom of any gates should be small enough to stop anyone crawling through.
- ☐ The ground floor residential windows along the Hyde Grove frontage of the building should be protected by some defensible space defined by low-level railings and planting, to an approximate height of 1200mm, in order to provide some protection and funnel passing pedestrian movement away from them. The railings should be designed to discourage comfortably sitting on or leaning against them, which could potentially cause nuisance and intimidation to residents.
- ☐ Any low boundaries that adjoin high boundaries should have transition panels/sections to prevent the low boundary being used as a climbing aid over the higher.



4.6 Lighting

- ☐ Dusk 'til dawn lights, operated by photoelectric cell/daylight sensor, should be installed to all external doors.
- ☐ Fittings should produce 'white' light, as opposed to yellow/orange light. LED or bulbs with a comparable output should be used, as these offer superior colour rendition over alternatives such as high and low pressure sodium bulbs.
- ☐ Lighting fixtures must not be positioned to provide climbing aids over boundaries or up to high level windows. Electrical and architectural layouts should be developed together to avoid this.

4.7 Landscaping

- ☐ In vulnerable locations, such as around building entrances/frontages, low planting should not exceed 1000mm in height and tree canopies should fall no lower than 2000mm from the ground. This is in order to allow people to see their surroundings better and eliminate hiding places, as well as allow lighting and any CCTV to operate unimpeded. A maintenance agreement should stipulate that these planting dimensions would be adhered to.

- ☐ Loose surface materials in the accessible landscaped areas of the scheme should be avoided. Small fragments of ground covering can be used as missiles against people and premises (both to gain entry and to commit criminal damage).
- ☐ Planting must be avoided that will aid climbing over boundary treatments. The security of fences can be compromised if trees or street furniture are placed close by.
- ☐ There should be no hard landscaping that could inadvertently create seating or loitering spots (except within secure designated or otherwise-controlled areas). These features can encourage anti-social behaviour and raise the fear of crime.

4.8 CCTV

Any CCTV system that may be used within this proposal will require certain specifications and intelligent placement of cameras to compliment the design of the development. Designers should consider the following points when planning a CCTV strategy:

- ☐ CCTV systems (and lighting that support them) require regular cleaning and maintenance to remain effective.
- ☐ Where necessary cameras that are vulnerable to damage should be protected from attack either by relocation to a higher level and using a bigger lens to achieve the view required or through the fitting of a vandal resistant housing.
- ☐ With regards to the retention of footage, the police prefer quality over quantity. The overall retention period should be dictated by what the system is designed to achieve, though it would be better to have good quality images over a 14-day period than poor ones over a 30-day period.
- ☐ Procedures for recovery of recordings are recommended to be established (e.g. trained staff / the CCTV system instruction manual to be readily available). This is to ensure that the images produced will be of an [acceptable standard](#) that will allow for [identification](#) of an individual which will stand up to scrutiny in court.

Acceptable Standard - this generally requires a resolution of 720x576 pixels at a real time frame rate of 25 frames per second. (N.B. Both the camera and DVR must be capable of this – if the camera will only send low resolution images then it does not matter how high the resolution of the recording unit is).

Identification – One of three levels of field of view. To identify an individual, the image must capture no less than 120% of the field of view (at least from the top of the individuals head to their knees). The remaining two levels of field of view are [overview](#) and [recognition](#), which whilst effective for observational purposes, are less likely to result in the identification of a person/offender.

- ☐ The intelligent placement of cameras helps to provide clear facial identification of individuals. If a CCTV system is to be utilised, suitable locations for camera coverage would be: [all facades of the building, the main entrance reception/lobby space and all cycle parking areas](#).

4.9 Other

- ☐ It is highly recommended that external cycle stores or lockers are sourced from an SBD supplier - please see [Accredited Product Search \(securedbydesign.com\)](#). If not, they should ideally be of steel-framed construction, with welded-wire mesh panels/roofs and lockable gates (with no exposed hinges or large sliding bolt apertures that could form a climbing aid). If the proposed cycle stores are to be of timber construction, they must have a concrete foundation, minimum 38x50mm planed timber frame; floor and roof constructed from minimum 11mm boards; and minimum 11x125mm tongue & grooved board walls and door. The doors should have coach-bolted hinges and hasp and stables/padlocks to meet Sold Secure Silver standard. The external and internal cycle stores should include 'Sheffield' style racks, or similar, that allow residents to lock both wheels and the crossbar to a stand, rather than just the crossbar (wheel slots and butterfly racks are not suitable). For further information, please refer to our cycle storage guidance document: www.designforsecurity.org/all-downloads/.
- ☐ A strategy should be defined to ensure waste collection can take place whilst retaining a secure development.



Signage to indicate the name and address of the development, contact details of the management company and informing staff, residents and visitors that CCTV is in operation should be erected at the entrance to the site/building. Signage should also be erect to direct visitors, but also to deter unauthorised access to back-of-house/staff-only areas.

5 Management & Maintenance

- 5.1.1 A comprehensive security regime for the management of the student scheme must be prepared and remain in place for the day-to-day running of the site. There should be regular reviews/exercises to ensure that it remains accurate, workable and up-to-date. All staff and residents should understand and accept the need for security measures and it should be made easy for people to raise concerns or report observations to the facilities management team.
- 5.1.2 The upkeep of a residential development over its lifetime can be crucial to the level of security and safety within. Aspects of a development, which are left to deteriorate, have the potential to attract further crime – a process known as ‘the broken window theory’. A maintenance plan should be drawn up to address issues such as:
- Litter/graffiti removal
 - Repair to communal areas (e.g. boundary treatments, access controls, lighting, signage etc.)
 - Trimming and pruning to shrubs and trees
- 5.1.3 Any open space or amenity areas should be subject to an effective maintenance contract, to ensure that all damage is rectified in a timely manner and that any such space will not be detrimental to its surroundings. Low-level defensive planting beds can be used to great effect to funnel pedestrians away from vulnerable areas (such as ground floor windows, boundaries or hidden corners/recesses).
- 5.1.4 Tenant key-cards should be capable of being easily and quickly activated/disabled by staff to ensure that mis-use is prevented.
- 5.1.1 Any high value equipment to communal areas (e.g. computers, flat screen monitors/televisions, tools etc.) should be property marked and securely fixed or stored to deter damage/theft. An accurate record should be maintained which logs all such items.

6 Construction

- 6.1.1 Untidy sites and their surroundings can be littered with debris accessible to vandals who often use loose materials as missiles to commit crime. The client should take measures appropriate to secure their site during construction, and control pedestrian and vehicular access in to and out of the site curtilage. It is also recommended that the contractor on this scheme is a member of the ‘Considerate Constructors Scheme’, who has committed to be a considerate and good neighbour, as well as clean, respectful, safe, environmentally conscious, responsible and accountable.
- 6.1.2 Site security contractors should be SIA (Security Industry Authority) approved to ensure professional standards are adhered to (please see <http://www.sia.homeoffice.gov.uk/pages/acs-intro.aspx> for more details).

7 Useful References

7.1 Secured by Design (SBD)

- 7.1.1 Secured by Design focuses on crime prevention at the design, layout and construction stages of homes and commercial premises and promotes the use of security standards for a wide range of applications and products. To apply for Secured by Design certification for your development, visit our online application form at: <http://www.designforsecurity.org/secured-by-design/sbd-accreditation/>

A Contact Register

Date	Contact With	Summary of Contact
21 st February 2024	Iceni Projects	Receipt of CIS instruction form & plans
23 rd February & 6 th March 2024	Iceni Projects	Quote issued & request for additional plans/info
14 th to 15 th March 2024	Iceni Projects	Email correspondence re: amendments to scheme & revised quote
18 th March 2024	Iceni Projects	Receipt of revised instruction form & plans
19 th March 2024	Iceni Projects	Revised quote issued & request for additional plans/info
19 th March 2024	Mia James Construction	Confirmation of instruction & fee
20 th March 2024	GMP Finance Dept	Confirmation of payment
16 th April 2024	Iceni Projects	Email sent requesting additional plans/info
19 th April 2024	Iceni Projects	Version A of CIS issued
3 rd May 2024	Iceni Projects	Revised plans received following pre-app discussions with LPA. Request to update CIS

B Associated Documents

This report is based on the following drawings and supplementary information submitted by the applicant.

Drawing No.	Drawing Title	Date	Rev
FO2384-GWP-01-00-D-A-(PA)-0001	Site Location Plan (SUPERSEDED)	12.09.23	Draft/S
FO2384-GWP-01-00-D-A-(PA)-0001	Site Location Plan	28.03.24	P01
(544)2337-GWP-01-00-D-A-(PA)-0002	Topographical Survey	28.03.24	P01
(544)2337-GWP-01-00-D-A-(PA)-0003	Existing Ground Floor Plan	28.03.24	P01
(544)2337-GWP-01-00-D-A-(PA)-0004	Existing First Floor Plan	28.03.24	P01
(544)2337-GWP-01-00-D-A-(PA)-0005	Existing Elevations	28.03.24	P01
(544)2337-GWP-01-00-D-A-(PA)-0006	Demolition Ground Floor Plan	02.05.24	P02
(544)2337-GWP-01-00-D-A-(PA)-0007	Demolition First Floor Plan	02.05.24	P02
(544)2337-GWP-01-GF-D-A-(PA)-0007	Proposed Ground Floor Plan (SUPERSEDED)	15.02.24	P01
(544)2337-GWP-01-GF-D-A-(SK)-0031	Proposed Ground Floor Plan (SUPERSEDED)	13.03.24	P03
(544)2337-GWP-01-01-D-A-(SK)-0032	Proposed First Floor Plan (SUPERSEDED)	29.02.24	P02
(544)2337-GWP-01-02-D-A-(SK)-0033	Proposed Second Floor Plan (SUPERSEDED)	29.02.24	P02
(544)2337-GWP-01-03-D-A-(SK)-0034	Proposed Third Floor Plan (SUPERSEDED)	29.02.24	P02
(544)2337-GWP-01-04-D-A-(SK)-0035	Proposed Fourth Floor Plan (SUPERSEDED)	29.02.24	P02
(544)2337-GWP-01-05-D-A-(SK)-0036	Proposed Fifth Floor Plan (SUPERSEDED)	29.02.24	P02
(544)2337-GWP-01-RL-D-A-(SK)-0037	Proposed Roof Plan (SUPERSEDED)	14.03.24	P01
(544)2337-GWP-01-00-D-A-(PA)-0008	Proposed Site Plan	02.05.24	P02
(544)2337-GWP-01-00-D-A-(PA)-0009	Proposed Ground Floor Plan	02.05.24	P05
(544)2337-GWP-01-00-D-A-(PA)-0010	Proposed First Floor Plan	02.05.24	P03
(544)2337-GWP-01-00-D-A-(PA)-0011	Proposed Second Floor Plan	02.05.24	P03

(544)2337-GWP-01-00-D-A-(PA)-0012	Proposed Third Floor Plan	02.05.24	P03
(544)2337-GWP-01-00-D-A-(PA)-0013	Proposed Fourth Floor Plan	02.05.24	P03
(544)2337-GWP-01-00-D-A-(PA)-0014	Proposed Fifth Floor Plan	02.05.24	P04
(544)2337-GWP-01-00-D-A-(PA)-0015	Proposed Roof Plan	02.05.24	P04

PLEASE NOTE - In the event of any subsequent material changes to the scheme, it will be necessary for Design for Security to reassess the comments made within this report.

C CIS Version History

Version	Revisions Made	Date
A		
B	Changes to layout, reduction in student bedrooms & increase in GF communal amenity following pre-app discussions with LPA	08/05/24

D Glossary

Burglary Resistance Standards

BS PAS 24

General security performance requirements for door/window assemblies.

An attack test standard for doorsets and windows. This is the minimum police requirement for Secured by Design dwellings, and is also applicable to French/double doors, and sliding doors.

BS EN 1627 (Security Ratings RC1 to RC6)

Windows, doors, shutters - Burglar resistance Requirements and classification

The classification system used in BS EN 1627 is aimed at the commercial market and is based on five elements:

- a) Resistance of glazing*
- b) Performance of hardware*
- c) Resistance to static loading*
- d) Resistance to dynamic loading*
- e) Burglary resistance by manual intervention*

LPS 1175 (Security Ratings 1 to 6)

Specification for testing and classifying the burglary resistance of building components

This includes doors, shutters, garage doors and grilles typically for commercial premises and higher risk domestic premises and is acceptable to the ABI and the Police. The standard has 6 levels, 6 being the highest, with levels 1 and 2 equivalent in many respects to BS PAS 24 and BS 7950.

STS 201

Enhanced security requirements for doorsets and door assemblies for dwellings to satisfy the requirements of PAS 24

STS 202

Requirements for burglary resistance of construction products including hinged, pivoted, folding or sliding doorsets, windows, curtain walling, security grilles, garage doors and shutters.

This specifies a broadly similar range of attack tools and times to those specified at the lower levels of LPS 1175.

BS EN 356 (Ratings P1A to P8A)

Glass in building. Security glazing. Testing and classification of resistance against manual attack.

A performance standard for manual attacks on glazing. P2A is comparable to the performance of a 6.8mm laminated glass, and P4A to that of a 9.5mm laminated glass.

Commonly Used Acronyms

CIT

Cash in transit (refers to vehicles, personnel and routines).

CPTED

Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design

CRS

Crime Reduction Specialist. Sometimes known as CPO (Crime Prevention Officer)

INPT

Integrated Neighbourhood Policing Team.

PVB/PolyVinyl Butyral (Glazing interlayer)

A commonly used interlayer used in the production of laminated glass.

LPCB (Loss Prevention Certification Board)

A brand of the BRE Global (Building Research Establishment) family. The LPCB work with insurers, Government, police, designers, manufacturers, contractors and end users to develop methods of assessing performance and reliability of security products to ensure their fitness for purpose.

UKAS (United Kingdom Accreditation Service)

The sole national accreditation body recognised by government to assess, against internationally agreed standards, organisations that provide certification, testing, inspections and calibration services.

Useful Websites

Design for Security

www.designforsecurity.org

Secured by Design

www.securedbydesign.com

RIBA Product Selector

www.ribaproductselector.com

LPCB – Red Book Live

www.redbooklive.com

Crime Reduction (Home Office)

www.crimereduction.homeoffice.gov.uk

DAC (Design Against Crime) Solution Centre

www.designagainstcrime.org

Building for Life

www.buildingforlife.org

CLG (Communities and Local Government)

www.communities.gov.uk