CRIME IMPACT STATEMENT

FORMER CLEVER CLOWN NURSERY, GREENBROW ROAD

Three-storey apartment block, 20 units

For: **STOCKPORT DEVELOPMENTS**

Version A: **29/01/24**

Ref: **2011/0612/CIS/01**

Greater Manchester Police

designforsecurity

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FORMER CLEVER CLOWN NURSERY, GREENBROW ROAD

2011/0612/CIS/01

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Development Supported - Minor Design Changes Advised

This development has been assessed using the principles of 'Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design' in order to identify any opportunities for crime and the fear of crime. The proposed scheme has been found acceptable in principle, but further consideration of certain aspects is recommended as stated in section 3.3 of this report, in order to gain our full support for this development at planning stage. These include: -

- *Apartment entrance lobby*
- *Secure cycle store for residents*

Our support for this scheme is subject to the above issues being satisfactorily addressed, as described within the report.

Please note: Greater Manchester Police Design for Security will recommend to the local planning authority that a planning condition is added that reflects the physical security specification listed within Section 4 of this report and require the inclusion of a condition requiring the completed development to achieve Secured by Design (SBD), accreditation.

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1 Visual Audit

The development site is indicated by the red outline on the plan adjacent and is supported with existing site context photographs taken around the site.

The existing site currently contains a building, the former Clever Clowns nursery, now closed and boarded up.

Vehicle entrance to the sites frontage is not controlled, therefore the site has become used by fly-tipping.

Greenbrow Road defines the application site's southern boundary; it is a long, meandering road, one of the main circulation routes that serves the Newall Green area of Wythenshaw.

It is largely residential in character and comprises mainly, post war, family houses set out in a garden-village' style, with grass verges, tree-lined streets and generous public green spaces.

Many of the front gardens are defined with privet hedges, although an increasing number are replacing privet with timber fencing.

Greenbrow Road also includes shopping parades, giving local residents access to a small range of shops and services. Immediately adjacent to the site there is bus stop and next to it, within the grass verge, there is a 5G telecommunications mast and associated electronics cabinets; graffiti is evident on each of these three cabinets. There is also a bus stop and shelter on the eastern side of Greenbrow Road, opposite the site.



1 – The site & existing building on Greenbrow Road.

2 – Neighbouring residential property on Greenbrow Road.

3 – Neighbouring apartment block on Greenbrow Road.

4 – Existing retail/residential block on Greenbrow Road.

5 – Within the site evidence of fly-tipping.

6 – Within the site evidence of fly-tipping..

7 – View towards rear boundary.

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2 Crime Statistics & Analysis

All data below is based on crimes recorded between 1st January 2023 to 31st December 2023.

2.1 Crime Summary

Recorded Crime within 500m of Site									
Domestic Burglary	Non-Domestic Burglary	Criminal Damage	Less Serious Wounding	Theft	Robbery	Serious Wounding	Theft from Motor Vehicle	Theft of Motor Vehicle	Bicycle Theft
11	<5	35	164	17	10	5	7	<5	<5

2.1.1 The overall rate of crime over the past 12 months is low for the Manchester division, with less serious wounding and criminal damage having been most commonly reported. Less serious woundings have occurred throughout the residential neighbourhoods surrounding the site, with assaults, harassment and public order offences having been most commonly reported and the majority of incidents involving disputes between known associates or cases of domestic violence. Criminal damage against dwellings has accounted for the majority of criminal damage offences taking place, whereby offenders have most commonly used objects in order to smash the glazing in windows and damage the external doors of properties.

2.2 Common Local M.O.s (Modus Operandi)

2.2.1 **Forcing open of doors at both the front and rear of the property using implements or bodily force, in particular by kicking doors open**.

Possible Solution - All ground floor/accessible doors & windows should be certified to recognised security standards (see Section 4.1 & 4.2), with key operated locks and opening restrictors. All ground floor/accessible glazing should also include a laminated pane, which forms a much more robust barrier against shattering penetration (see Section 4.3). Any glazed panels in or around doors should be small and set well-away from locking points. Windows to accessible elevations should be protected by some defensible space, to define them as entirely separate from the street and protect them from attack and nuisance/anti-social behaviour.

2.2.2 **Exploitation of insecure windows and doors (mostly to the front of the property)**.

Possible Solution - Front doors should be visible to neighbouring properties and from the 'street' rather than set within recesses or on more secluded elevations. Front doors should include a split spindle mechanism which locks on closure and can only be opened from outside with a key.

2.2.3 **Smashed glazing in windows and doors using implements**.

Possible Solution - All external doors should be certified to BS PAS 24 security standard. PAS 24-rated doors are very difficult to force open. All ground floor or otherwise accessible glazing should include a laminated pane, which forms a much more robust barrier against shattering and penetration (see Section 4.3). Where possible, the size of any glazed elements within or directly adjacent to doors should be reduced and set well away from locking point.

2.2.4 **Offenders have stolen bicycles**.

Possible Solution - To minimise the risk of offenders targeting bicycles:

- *cycle stores should be provided within a secure part of the site.*
- *rear garden gates should be robust, tall, self-closing and self-locking.*
- *CCTV should monitor activity in and around communal cycle stores; and,*
- *PIR lighting should be installed to illuminate cycle stores.*

2.2.5 ***Offenders have damaged boundary fencing***.

Possible Solution - To minimise the risk of offenders targeting fencing:

- *rear garden boundaries should avoid being exposed to the public realm.*

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- communal pathways providing access to rear gardens should be secured with self-closing, self-locking gates; and,
- fencing should be especially robust when unavoidably exposed to the public realm.

2.2.6 **Theft of plant and machinery, and criminal damage during the construction period**.

Possible Solution - To minimise the risk of offenders targeting the construction site:

- *a secure boundary should be erected around the site.*
- *access should be restricted to contractors and authorised visitors.*
- *security staff should patrol during non-working hours.*
- *lighting and CCTV should be installed to illuminate the site and record activity.*
- *at the end of the working day, plant and machinery should be arranged to prevent forced access onto the site; and,*
- *plant and machinery should be fitted with a tracking device.*

2.3 Risk Factors

The typical security risks for a development of this nature are:

- Domestic burglary
- Theft from gardens, sheds or garages
- Criminal damage to dwellings and vehicles
- Theft of, or from, vehicles
- Bogus callers and distraction burglary
- Anti-social behaviour
- Neighbour disputes
- Theft and criminal damage during the construction period
- Unauthorised access to private spaces
- Poor maintenance of access control systems

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2.4 Comparing crime rates in the neighbourhood around the site to those in Manchester and Greater Manchester

The rates below relates to crime committed within 500m of the site. England & Wales data was last recorded for January – December 2017.

Comparison of Domestic Burglary Rates at Site (Km), Manchester, and Greater Manchester



Comparison of Wounding Rates at Site (Km), Manchester, and Greater Manchester



Comparison of Criminal Damage Rates at Site (Km), Manchester, and Greater Manchester



Comparison of Vehicle Crime Rates at Site (Km), Manchester, and Greater Manchester



2.4.1 The rate of domestic burglaries per 1000 dwellings is **53% lower** than Manchester as a whole, **40% lower** than Greater Manchester and **39% lower** than England & Wales.

2.4.2 The rate of woundings per 1000 dwellings is **34% lower** than Manchester as a whole, **11% lower** than Greater Manchester and **70% higher** than England & Wales.

2.4.3 The rate of incidents of criminal damage per 1000 dwellings is **24% lower** than Manchester as a whole, **0% higher** than Greater Manchester and **22% higher** than England & Wales.

2.4.4 The rate of incidents of vehicle crime per 1000 dwellings is **80% lower** than Manchester as a whole, **66% lower** than Greater Manchester and **59% lower** than England & Wales.

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2.5 Domestic Burglary: Risk Analysis

The data below relates to domestic burglaries committed within 500m of the site.

Burglary Dwelling – Day Range



Burglary Dwelling – Time Range



Burglary Dwelling – Point of Entry



2.5.1 Day/Time Range: The risk of domestic burglary peaks just after midnight (00:00-01:00). Offenders often target properties late at night when it is dark and there is less footfall in the area, giving them the perception that they are less likely to be caught or identified.

2.5.2 Point of Entry: In the local area the following entry points and MO's have been utilised most frequently:

- Forcing open secure windows and doors using bodily pressure.
- In cases where the entry point has been recorded as "unknown", it is likely that the offenders have exploited insecure windows or doors.
- Smashed glazing in windows and doors.

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2.6 Vehicle Crime: Risk Analysis

The data below relates to vehicle crime committed within 500m of the site.

Vehicle Crime – Day Range



Vehicle Crime – Time Range



2.6.1 Day/Time Range: The risk of vehicle crime peaks on Saturday around midday (12:00-13:00). Offenders tend to target vehicles at this time during the weekend when they are often left parked and unattended in the residential neighbourhoods throughout the local area for long periods of time, creating a perceived low risk opportunity for offenders.

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3 Layout Appraisal

3.1 Proposed development

3.1.1 Demolition of the existing building, and erection of a three-storey apartment block comprising 20 affordable units, supported by 13 parking bays and all other associated works.

3.2 Positive Aspects of the Proposal

The following proposed features would make a positive contribution to the prevention of crime and fear of crime.

3.2.1 The proposal will bring additional legitimate activity to a closed building and vacant site. Redevelopment with housing and repopulation of the site should help to generate a sense of ownership and responsibility and improve informal policing of the area.

3.2.2 The elevation of the building facing the public realm is generally free of recesses or projections that could provide cover for criminal or antisocial activity.

3.2.3 The main pedestrian entrance to the building is located on the front of the property facing Greenbrow Road and is readily apparent on approaching the building from the public road.

3.2.4 The internal areas of the block appears to be generally free of obstacles, thus an intruder would find difficulty in hiding within the communal parts of the buildings. All communal doors within the corridors should include glazed elements to improve sight lines.

3.2.5 Many of the flats will have routinely occupied rooms overlooking the adjacent communal areas, which will help to increase natural surveillance of accessible areas around the block. Some of the residents' parking spaces can be overlooked from windows of routinely occupied rooms in the apartment blocks.

3.2.6 The proposal has the opportunity to rationalise the boundary treatments across the site.

3.2.7 The development will result in the removal of an undeveloped site which might otherwise become a greater target for vandals and increasingly an eyesore. Such sites can attract further criminal behaviour, which may affect surrounding properties. For pedestrians, passing such places daily, especially at night, can be very disconcerting.

3.2.8 The proposed development provides the opportunity to include security features built into the design and construction of the building and avoid the need for obtrusive retrofitted security measures that can increase the fear of crime. Security measures carefully incorporated into the design can ensure the building is reasonably secure, without visibly announcing that the design was concerned about crime.

3.3 Changes Needed and Recommendations

The following points have been identified for further consideration and would need to be addressed for Design for Security to support the proposed scheme.

3.3.1 The communal entrance must be well lit, be fitted with security-certified doors and fitted with an electrically operated, multi-point lock, activated with a programmable fob. There should also be an audio-visual link to each apartment, so that residents can remotely allow *bona fide* visitors.

3.3.2 Access into the building should be controlled by a video entry phone system (with the picture viewable on the phone unit, rather than on a television set), so that residents can vet visitors before allowing them access in to the reception area only prior to providing access further into the building.

3.3.3 Effective lighting should be included to allow users to feel secure in the hours of darkness. Location of lamp columns for the parking court should take account of obstructions to vision such as any proposed or existing vegetation and parking arrangements for vehicles.

3.3.4 The car parking area and pedestrian routes should be illuminated to a high level and in accordance with BS 5489 which should be considered as the minimum standard. A variety of lighting sources should be used to illuminate the environment rather than reliance on one type of lighting which can lead to pooling/shadowing.

3.3.5 To minimise the risk of offender's tail-gating legitimate residents/visitors, the secondary doors into lobby entrance, residents' parking courtyard should also include access controls. Access controls will need to

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be used at the communal entrance to restrict entry into the development to residents and their authorised visitors.

3.3.6 Residential post - Arrangements for the delivery of post should not allow postal staff to have access to internal areas of the residential area beyond the 'reception' space. Mailboxes for residents should be located either within a secure lobby area or use a 'through-the-wall' post box arrangement. Further design details of these ancillary spaces are to be developed.

3.3.7 A secure cycle store for residents should be provided. Entry to the stores must be restricted to genuine cyclists only, on application to the managers of the building. Racks within the enclosures should allow cyclists to lock the frame and both wheels and should be obtained from a Secured by Design-approved supplier (see www.securedbydesign.com for details).

3.3.8 Bin storage – A purpose-built storage space should be identified within the enclosed boundary to accommodate waste bins, avoiding the need for free-standing bin stores in front of the apartment building where they could provide potential hiding places and targets for criminal damage.

3.3.9 The boundary treatments to the proposed rear parking court are vitally important to secure it and to preventing unauthorised access to private spaces. The sides and rear of the site, including the amenity areas, should be defined as private space and adequately secured to prevent unauthorised access (Refer to 4.5). Care should be taken to ensure ground level changes do not inadvertently facilitate scaling boundaries or leave large gaps underneath the panels/gates.

3.3.10 Communal facilities, amenity and rear parking court. The robust management of such areas is essential to encourage active use and enjoyment, whilst making abuse less likely to occur. Poor management and maintenance can lead to a downward spiral of neglect and loss of environmental quality, encouraging nuisance, vandalism and other anti-social or criminal behaviour.

3.3.11 Security measures carefully incorporated into the building design can ensure the building is reasonably secure, without visibly announcing that the design was concerned about crime. The proposed development provides the opportunity to include security features built into the design and construction of the building and avoid the need for obtrusive retrofitted security measures that can increase the fear of crime.

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4 Physical Security

The following checklist forms the physical security requirements for this scheme to achieve Secured by Design accreditation.

4.1 Doors

- ☐ External communal access doors must be compliant with and certified to STS202 BR2 or LPS 1175 SR2. The communal entrance doors should be self-closing and secured with a multi-point electronic lock and capable of being operated via an electronic access control system, these features should be permitted under the scope of the certification.
- ☐ All individual apartment entrance doorsets must also be compliant with and certified to BS PAS 24, STS 201 or LPS 1175 SR2. It is advised that these doors do not have fixed sidelights and are provided with door viewers instead. Chain limiters to apartment entrance doors are recommended, but not generally essential.
- ☐ Arrangements for residents to admit visitors. Communal entrance and inner lobby / zone doors should be capable of being controlled by means of a video entry phone system (with the picture viewable on a phone unit, rather than on a television set) so that residents can confirm the identity of visitors before allowing them access themselves.
- ☐ Where secure postal lobbies are to be created, the secondary communal door must be to the same specification as the outer door - certified to BS PAS 24, STS 201 or LPS 1175 SR2, including a lock capable of being operated via an electronic access control system. The post boxes themselves should be of robust construction, with letter box apertures to a maximum size of 260mm x 40mm (incorporating anti-fishing measures). All other deliveries should be made directly to residents via the access-controlled main entrance.
- ☐ Apartment entrance doors must be compliant with and certified to BS PAS 24, STS 201 or LPS 1175 SR2. It is advised that these doors do not have fixed sidelights, and are provided with door viewers instead.
- ☐ Any letterboxes within doors must be located a minimum of 400mm away from internal handle and locking hardware.
- ☐ Doors to storage / meter rooms should have 44mm solid core doors, 3 hinges, with a mortised sash lock to BS3621/8621 to allow the rooms to be secured when not in use.
- ☐ External escape-only doors (as with external doors in general) should be certified to BS PAS 24, STS 201 or LPS 1175 SR2. It is crucial that the door ironmongery is permitted for use on these doors under the security certification of the product.
- ☐ Any external french/double doors or sliding doors to easily accessible balconies or terraces should also be certified to BS PAS 24, SPS 201 or LPS 1175 SR2 and should include laminated glazing (see below).
- ☐ The doors to the cycle store should be compliant with and certified to BS PAS 24 or LPS 1175 SR2, or be steel gates within steel frames. These doors/gates should both be self-closing and lock securely upon closure and be accessible by a programmable fob.

4.2 Windows

- ☐ Windows must be compliant with and certified to BS PAS 24.
- ☐ Ground floor and easily accessible opening lights (escape requirements permitting) must be key-lockable, and have fixed/lockable opening restrictors (not releasable from the outside) limited to 100mm. Ground floor windows facing George Leigh Street should not include accessible opening lights.

4.3 Glazing

- ☐ Glazing to a height of 2400mm (or if otherwise accessible) must incorporate at least one pane of laminated glass rated as P1A under EN 356. The remaining pane in a double glazed unit may be toughened glass.

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4.4 Alarms

☐ If an alarm is installed then it should comply with either:

- BS EN 50131 and PD 6662 for wired systems
- BS 6799 for wireless systems

☐ If an alarm is installed, it should be linked to contacts on all external doors, and PIR detectors should cover all ground floor rooms with windows.

4.5 Access Control

☐ Access control systems should be operable by swipe card or fob, and not numeric keypads. The following areas/doors should operate on access control:

- Residential communal entrance doors off Greenbrow Road
- Lift core
- Bin stores
- Cycle stores
- Car park entrance gates

4.6 Boundaries

☐ Secure boundaries should be formed around the car park and residential boundaries. Care should be taken to ensure that any boundaries formed by a combination of walls and railings should have railing panels that are fixed flush with the outer skin of the brickwork below, leaving no steps/gaps that would provide a climbing aid.

☐ The car parks serving the apartment block must be secured and accessed through 1800mm high automatic gates, to prevent unauthorised access. The vehicular gates should be operated using a key fob/proximity reader system with no automatic egress (i.e. access control both 'in' and 'out'), so that criminals cannot gain access to the area, attack the vehicles or dwellings and escape. There should be no centrally located horizontal bars to aid climbing and the gates should be located away from other climbing aids, such as low walls, lighting columns etc. If double gates are used, they should overlap when closed and should not be capable of being forced open. The hinges should also not provide footholds and the gap at the bottom of the gates should be small enough to stop anyone crawling through. Any pedestrian gates should be self-closing and 'slam to lock' (i.e. an automatic deadlocking mortice latch, key or fob operated from both sides), which cannot be left unlocked when shut.

☐ Inward opening automatic gates to provide access to the courtyard area must be certified to one of the following standards:

- LPS 1175: Issue 7, SR2
- STS 202: Issue 3, BR2
- Sold Secure Gold

4.7 Car Parks

☐ The parking areas to the apartment blocks should be enclosed as described above (see Section 4.6), with access-controlled pedestrian and vehicular gates. Any communal entrance doorsets off such parking areas should be security-certified and fob-controlled on access and egress, preventing any visitors accessing the residential parking area through the buildings and ensuring that if a criminal does gain access to the car park, further access is prevented into the buildings (see Section 4.1).

☐ Lighting within surface car parks should be in accordance with BS 5489 and display an average lux level of 20 with a uniformity level of no less than 25%.

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- [ ] Bays and directional markings should be clearly demarcated, with pedestrian routes/directions clearly signed. The surface of the car park should be even tarmac, and the integrity of the surface treatment should be maintained, to ensure that there is no loose material that can be used to commit crime.

4.8 Landscaping

- [ ] In vulnerable locations such as entrances, parking areas and footpaths, low planting should not exceed 1000mm in height, and tree canopies should fall no lower than 2m from the ground. This is in order to allow people to see their surroundings better, make a rational choice of routes and eliminate hiding places. A maintenance agreement should stipulate that these planting dimensions would be adhered to.
- [ ] Loose surface materials in the publicly accessible areas of the scheme should be avoided. Small fragments of ground covering can be used as missiles against people and premises (both to gain entry and to commit criminal damage).
- [ ] Planting must be avoided that will aid climbing over boundary treatments. The security of fences can be compromised if trees or street furniture are placed close by.

4.9 Lighting

- [ ] External lighting must be provided to pedestrian routes within the site in accordance with BS 5489.
- [ ] Dusk 'til dawn lights, operated by photoelectric cell/daylight sensor, should be installed to all external doors (manual override is also permissible).
- [ ] Lighting in the car park should be in accordance with BS 5489, and display an average lux level 20 with a uniformity level of no less than 25%. These figures should be evidenced by a lighting layout/lux plan.
- [ ] Fittings should produce 'white' light, as opposed to yellow/orange light. Metal halide (or bulbs with a comparable output) should be used, as these offer superior colour rendition over alternatives such as high- and low-pressure sodium bulbs.

4.10 CCTV

- [ ] Any CCTV system that may be used within this proposal will require certain specifications and intelligent placement of cameras to compliment the design of the development. Designers should consider the following points when planning a CCTV strategy:
- [ ] CCTV systems (and lighting that support them) require regular cleaning and maintenance to remain effective.
- [ ] Where necessary cameras that are vulnerable to damage should be protected from attack either by relocation to a higher level and using a bigger lens to achieve the view required or through the fitting of a vandal resistant housing.
- [ ] With regards to the retention of footage, the police prefer quality over quantity. The overall retention period should be dictated by what the system is designed to achieve, though it would be better to have good quality images over a 14-day period than poor ones over a 30-day period.
- [ ] Procedures for recovery of recordings are recommended to be established (e.g. trained staff / the CCTV system instruction manual to be readily available). This is to ensure that the images produced will be of an acceptable standard that will allow for identification of an individual which will stand up to scrutiny in court.
- [ ] **Acceptable Standard** - this generally requires a resolution of 720x576 pixels at a real time frame rate of 25 frames per second. (N.B. Both the camera and DVR must be capable of this – if the camera will only send low resolution images then it does not matter how high the resolution of the recording unit is).
- [ ] **Identification** – One of three levels of field of view. To identify an individual, the image must capture no less than 120% of the field of view (at least from the top of the individuals head to their knees). The remaining two levels of field of view are 'Overview' and 'Recognition', which whilst effective for observational purposes, are less likely to result in the identification of a person/offender.
- [ ] The intelligent placement of cameras helps to provide clear facial identification of individuals. Suitable locations would be: Main entrances, foyer, stairs, lift lobbies, landings, cycle stores, bin store entrances.

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4.11 Other

- ☐ Meter cupboards to apartments should be located to the fronts of properties only or within a secure cupboard / room inside the block but not inside individual apartments. Smart meters are acceptable.
- ☐ Any externally mounted rainwater pipes should be square in profile and fixed back to the building fabric to prevent climbing to upper floor windows.
- ☐ Partition walls between flats and corridors should be of masonry construction or include reinforcement such as a layer of expanded metal mesh.
- ☐ Consideration should be given to use of alternatives to lead in construction and minimise the amount of metal on visible elevations of the buildings. Inspection covers should be capable of securing to reduce potential access to cabling.

5 Management & Maintenance

5.1.1 The upkeep of a development over its lifetime can be crucial to the level of security and safety within. Aspects of a development, which are left to deteriorate, have the potential to attract further crime – a process known as 'the broken window theory'. A maintenance plan should be drawn up to address issues such as:

- Litter removal
- Repair to communal areas (lighting, signage, access controls)
- Trimming and pruning to shrubs and trees

5.1.2 Any public open space or amenity areas not under the ownership of residents should be subject to an effective maintenance contract. This should ensure that all damage is rectified in a timely manner, and that any such space will not be detrimental to its surroundings.

6 Construction

6.1.1 Untidy sites and their surroundings can be littered with debris accessible to vandals who often use loose materials as missiles to commit crime. The client should take measures appropriate to secure their site during construction, and control pedestrian and vehicular access in to and out of the site curtilage. It is also recommended that the contractor on this scheme is a member of the 'Considerate Constructors Scheme', who has committed to be a considerate and good neighbour, as well as clean, respectful, safe, environmentally conscious, responsible and accountable.

6.1.2 Site security contractors should be SIA (Security Industry Authority) approved to ensure professional standards are adhered to (please see http://www.sia.homeoffice.gov.uk/pages/acs-intro.aspx for more details).

7 Useful References

7.1 Secured by Design (SBD)

7.1.1 Secured by Design focuses on crime prevention at the design, layout and construction stages of homes and commercial premises and promotes the use of security standards for a wide range of applications and products. To apply for Secured by Design certification for your development, visit our online application form at: http://www.designforsecurity.org/secured-by-design/sbd-accreditation/

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A Contact register

Date	Contact With	Summary of Contact
22/11/23	Eden planning & Development Ltd	Application received
05/01/24	Eden planning & Development Ltd	Client confirmation
08/01/24	GMP	Invoice issued
30/01/24	DfS	Site visit
31/01/24	DfS	CIS completed
31/01/24	DfS	CIS issued

B Associated Documents

This report is based on the following drawings and supplementary information submitted by the applicant.

Drawing No.	Drawing Title	Date	Rev
PL01	Proposed Site Plan		
PL02	Proposed Plans		
PL03	Proposed Elevations		
PL04	Images		
DS01	Drawing Issue Sheet		
EX02	Existing Topographical Survey		
PL05	Images		
PL06	Images		
PL07	Images		
PL08	Images		
PL09	Massing Overview		

PLEASE NOTE - In the event of any subsequent material changes to the scheme, it will be necessary for Design for Security to reassess the comments made within this report.

C CIS Version History

Version	Revisions Made	Date
A		

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D Glossary

Burglary Resistance Standards

BS PAS 23-1, 1999
General performance requirements for door/window assemblies.

A performance standard for doorsets and windows, which certifies that a particular doorset is fit for purpose. Door products must also have BS PAS 24 certification.

BS PAS 24-1, 2012
General security performance requirements for door/window assemblies.

An attack test standard for doorsets and windows. This is the minimum police requirement for Secured by Design dwellings, and is also applicable to French/double doors, and sliding doors.

ENV 1627-30 (Security Ratings WK1 to WK6)
Windows, doors, shutters - Burglar resistance Requirements and classification

The classification system used in ENV 1627-30 is aimed at the commercial market and is based on five elements:

a) Resistance of glazing

b) Performance of hardware

c) Resistance to static loading

d) Resistance to dynamic loading

e) Burglary resistance by manual intervention

LPS 1175 (Security Ratings 1 to 6)
Specification for testing and classifying the burglary resistance of building components

This includes doors, shutters, garage doors and grilles typically for commercial premises and higher risk domestic premises and is acceptable to the ABI and the Police. The standard has 6 levels, 6 being the highest, with levels 1 and 2 equivalent in many respects to BS PAS 24 and BS 7950.

STS201 Issue 4: 2012
Enhanced security requirements for doorsets and door assemblies for dwellings to satisfy the requirements of PAS23 and PAS24

STS202 Issue 3: 2011
Requirements for burglary resistance of construction products including hinged, pivoted, folding or sliding doorsets, windows, curtain walling, security grilles, garage doors and shutters.

This specifies a broadly similar range of attack tools and times to those specified at the lower levels of LPS1175.

EN 356, 2000 (Ratings P1A to P8A)

Glass in building. Security glazing. Testing and classification of resistance against manual attack.

A performance standard for manual attacks on glazing. P2A is comparable to the performance of a 6.8mm laminated glass, and P4A to that of a 9.5mm laminated glass.

Commonly Used Acronyms

CIT
Cash in transit (refers to vehicles, personnel and routines).

CPTED
Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design

CRS
Crime Reduction Specialist. Sometimes known as CPO (Crime Prevention Officer)

INPT
Integrated Neighbourhood Policing Team.

PVB/PolyVinyl Butyral (Glazing interlayer)
A commonly used interlayer used in the production of laminated glass.

LPCB (Loss Prevention Certification Board)
A brand of the BRE Global (Building Research Establishment) family. The LPCB work with insurers, Government, police, designers, manufacturers, contractors and end users to develop methods of assessing performance and reliability of security products to ensure their fitness for purpose.

UKAS (United Kingdom Accreditation Service)
The sole national accreditation body recognised by government to assess, against internationally agreed standards, organisations that provide certification, testing, inspections and calibration services.

Useful Websites

Design for Security
www.designforsecurity.org

Secured by Design
www.securedbydesign.com

RIBA Product Selector
www.ribaproductselector.com

LPCB – Red Book Live
www.redbooklive.com

Crime Reduction (Home Office)
www.crimereduction.homeoffice.gov.uk

DAC (Design Against Crime) Solution Centre
www.designagainstcrime.org

Building for Life
www.buildingforlife.org
CLG (Communities and Local Government)
www.communities.gov.uk

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