



CRIME IMPACT STATEMENT

Hotspur Press, 2 Gloucester Street

Student residential scheme

For: **MANNER**

Version D: **04/03/24**

Ref: **2018/0397/CIS/02**

Greater Manchester Police

design**for**security

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Development supported with minor security additions required.

This development has been assessed against the principles of 'Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design' (CPTED), in order to reduce the opportunities for crime and the fear of crime.

The layout of the proposed scheme is considered acceptable, as long as the issues discussed in more detail within Section 3.3 of this report are addressed, namely:

- Robust control of access to back-of-house areas.
- Access controls through the building
- install security certified doors, glazing and windows
- Secure lockers for staff

If these issues can be addressed as described within the report and the other physical security measures are incorporated, I would be happy to support the development.

Please note: At the planning application stage, Greater Manchester Police Design for Security will make representations to Manchester Planning to require the inclusion of a condition requiring the completed development to achieve Secured by Design (SBD), accreditation. Should the recommendations as listed within Section 4 of this report be adopted, I have every confidence that the scheme will achieve the award and the condition met.

David Maher *Dip Arch*
Consultant

e: david.maher@gmp.police.uk

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1 Visual Audit

The development site is indicated by the red outline on the plan adjacent and is supported with existing site context photographs taken around the site.

The site is situated on Cambridge St, M/cr. located adjacent to the M/cr to Liverpool railway line and the River Medlock. The site has been derelict for some time but is currently empty and secured externally.


The opposite end of Cambridge St. connects to the Mancunian Way. The site is located near Whitworth St. a busy road crossing the southern aspect of the city. Whitworth St. combines a mix of commercial/retail/leisure/residential uses which provide high levels of activity throughout the day & evening. Whitworth St. is heavily used for bus services for the city centre.

There are a number of well-established residential buildings within the vicinity, developed over the last 15 years.

To the rear of the site is the First Street development district; providing a mix of cultural, commercial, car park and student residential uses. The area is heavily pedestrianized and in parts, traffic free. A number of ground floor uses offer external seating areas on the pedestrianized streets supporting the area as a cultural & vibrant destination.

Parking is in high demand within the area due to the proximity to the city centre.


There was visual evidence of graffiti in and around the site and recesses in neighbouring buildings were being used as outdoor toilets.



7 – View of proposed site.




6 – The adjacent River Medlock.




5 – View towards the rear of the existing Hotspur Press building.




1 – View of site along Cambridge St.



2 – View along Whitworth St & Cambridge St.



3 – View across Whitworth St towards First St.



4 – View north along Cambridge St.

2 Crime Statistics & Analysis

All data below is based on crimes recorded between 1st October 2022 to 30th September 2023.

2.1 Crime Summary

Recorded Crime within 500m of Site									
Domestic Burglary	Non-Domestic Burglary	Criminal Damage	Less Serious Wounding	Theft	Robbery	Serious Wounding	Theft from Motor Vehicle	Theft of Motor Vehicle	Bicycle Theft
60	80	257	1,064	461	133	22	574	60	82

- 2.1.1 The overall rate of crime over the past 12 months has been high for the Manchester division, with less serious wounding, vehicle crime and theft having been the highest recorded offences taking place. These types of crime are typical of those experienced in or within close proximity of district, town or city centres, where there is often a higher concentration of retail, commercial and licensed premises, leading to a higher number of crime and disorder issues. Whilst the offences have been occurring all throughout the local area, there is a higher concentration occurring to the east of the proposed site at locations along Oxford Street, as well as around Deansgate to the west.
- 2.1.2 Less serious wounding has predominantly occurred in the public spaces and at commercial outlets situated along Oxford Street and around Deansgate. Assaults, harassment, and public order offences have been the highest recorded less serious woundings taking place, with the majority of incidents involving disputes between customers or unknown associates, and alcohol often being a factor.
- 2.1.3 Theft from motor vehicle has been the most common vehicle crime offence taking place, whereby offenders have smashed the glazing in windows before removing items from within. Offenders have targeted vehicles parked in streets and the various car parks situated throughout the local area. As the location is within close proximity to the city centre vehicles are usually left unsupervised for long periods of time, creating many low-risk opportunities for offenders.
- 2.1.4 Thefts have occurred throughout the local area, with two main hotspots occurring at Deansgate Metrolink stop to the west and around the junction of Oxford Road with New Wakefield Street to the east. Offenders have mainly used pickpocketing in order to obtain items stored on the person, as well as targeting items in insecure bags or coats left unattended at tables in restaurants and bars. There have also been some cases of parcel theft from communal areas in apartment blocks.

2.2 Common Local M.O.s (Modus Operandi)

- 2.2.1 Posing as a legitimate resident/ visitor and entering communal areas (mostly corridors and bike storage rooms) by means of insecure doors or tailgating residents.

Possible Solution - Monitoring of people entering and leaving the building helps to discourage intruders. Additionally, CCTV and regular staff patrols will deter potential offenders from attempting to steal personal property. Doors for emergency egress should be alarmed so that building managers are alerted if they are used, and staff discouraged from using them informally, e.g. for smoking breaks and robust access controls to separate visitor/staff only areas.

- 2.2.2 Exploitation of insecure doors and windows (mostly front doors).

Possible Solution - All individual cluster flats/apartments should also be secured with a security-certified entrance door-set (see appendix 2), to ensure that any offender who may have gained access to the building (e.g. by tailgating, posing as a legitimate visitor etc.) cannot gain further access without drawing the attention of other residents. Doors off internal corridors should not be located in deep recesses, where an offender could operate without fear of detection.

- 2.2.3 Forcing open secure windows and doors using bodily pressure and implements in order to gain access to the property.

Possible Solution - All external doors should be certified to recognised security standards (see section 4.1), which are independently proven to reduce the risk of forced entry and thus increase the chances of detection. A robust access control system should be in place to allow residents to vet visitors to the building before allowing them access. The main communal entrance should be located in a highly

visible position and should be well-lit to deter offenders from trying to gain unauthorised access. Lighting to the front and rear of properties can also deter and reveal potential intruders, as well as reduce the fear of crime.

2.2.4 Smashed glazing in windows and doors using implements.

Possible Solution - All ground floor/accessible windows should be certified to recognised security standards (see Section 4.2), with key operated locks and opening restrictors. All ground floor/accessible glazing should also include a laminated pane, which forms a much more robust barrier against shattering penetration (see Section 4.3). Any glazed panels in or around doors should be small and set well-away from locking points. Windows to accessible elevations should be protected by some defensible space, to define them as entirely separate from the street and protect them from attack and nuisance/anti-social behaviour.

2.2.5 Offenders targeted entrance apartment doors by 'tailgating' or posing as legitimate visitors, before forcing open individual apartment doors or targeting those left insecure by residents.

Possible Solution - All individual apartments should be secured with a security-certified entrance doorset (see Section 4.1), to ensure that any offender who may have gained access to the building (e.g. by tailgating, posing as a legitimate visitor etc.), cannot gain further access without drawing the attention of other residents. Doors off internal corridors should not be located in deep recesses, where an offender could operate without fear of detection. A staffed 24/7 concierge desk will support the management and security of the entrance lobby.





2.3 Risk Factors

The typical security risks for a development of this nature are:

- Domestic burglary
- Theft from gardens, sheds or garages
- Criminal damage to dwellings and vehicles
- Theft of, or from, vehicles
- Bogus callers and distraction burglary
- Anti-social behaviour
- Neighbour disputes
- Theft and criminal damage during the construction period
- Unauthorised access to private spaces
- Poor maintenance of access control systems

2.4 Comparing crime rates in the neighbourhood around the site to those in Manchester and Greater Manchester




The rates below relates to crime committed within 500m of the site. England & Wales data was last recorded for January – December 2017.



- 2.4.1 The rate of domestic burglaries per 1000 dwellings is **75% lower** than Manchester as a whole, **68% lower** than Greater Manchester and **67% lower** than England & Wales.
- 2.4.2 The rate of woundings per 1000 dwellings is **53% lower** than Manchester as a whole, **36% lower** than Greater Manchester and **23% higher** than England & Wales.
- 2.4.3 The rate of incidents of criminal damage per 1000 dwellings is **37% lower** than Manchester as a whole, **18% lower** than Greater Manchester and **0% higher** than England & Wales.
- 2.4.4 The rate of incidents of vehicle crime per 1000 dwellings is **140% higher** than Manchester as a whole, **296% higher** than Greater Manchester and **381% higher** than England & Wales.

2.5 Domestic Burglary: Risk Analysis

The data below relates to domestic burglaries committed within 500m of the site.





2.5.1 **Day/Time Range:** The risk of domestic burglary is highest on a Friday, and peaks at numerous times throughout the day. It most commonly occurs at midday (12:00-13:00), the afternoon (16:00-17:00), the evening (20:00-21:00) and at midnight (00:00-01:00). Offenders tend to target properties at midday and in the afternoon during the working week when they are likely to be left unattended for long periods of time whilst the owners are out at work. Offenders also are more likely to target properties in the evening and late at night when it is dark and there is less footfall in the area, giving them the perception that they are less likely to be caught or identified.

2.5.2 **Point of Entry:** In the local area the following entry points and MO's have been utilised most frequently:

- In cases where the entry point has been recorded as "unknown", it is likely that the offenders has exploited insecure windows and doors.
- Forcing open secure windows and doors.
- Smashed glazing in windows and doors.
- Gaining access to communal areas of apartments by exploiting insecure doors and tailgating residents.

2.6 Vehicle Crime: Risk Analysis

The data below relates to vehicle crime committed within 500m of the site.



- 2.6.1 **Day/Time Range:** The risk of vehicle crime is high throughout the week, peaking on Saturday in the evening (19:00-22:00). Offenders tend to target vehicles at this time when they are often left unattended and out of sight of the owner for long periods of time in the streets and car parks throughout the local area, creating a perceived low risk opportunity.

3 Layout Appraisal

3.1 Proposed development

- 3.1.1 Partial demolition and redevelopment of the former Hotspur Press Complex (Medlock Mill) and redevelopment of the site to provide 595 units of Purpose Built Student Accommodation (Sui Generis Use Class) within a part 4-storey (existing) and part 36-storey (new build) building with ground floor commercial or community uses (Use Classes F(e), F2(a)(b) and E(b)), associated ancillary internal and external amenity space, public realm (including a new public square), hard and soft landscaping and associated highway works.
- 3.1.2 A controlled reception space serves the ground floor entrance. The ground floor also contains student amenity lounge spaces and a mezzanine.
- 3.1.3 A resident cycle store and amenity spaces are located in the basement with access via a lobbied entrance from Gloucester Street.
- 3.1.4 The scheme will provide a new public square linking through to the First Street development, bridging over the River Medlock. Façade retention of the building fronting Cambridge St will form part of the gateway to the public square & First St.

3.2 Positive Aspects of the Proposal

The following proposed features would make a positive contribution to the prevention of crime and fear of crime.

- 3.2.1 The proposed development will bring vitality to a site which has remained disused for a number of years. The building will present an active frontage to the public elevations around the site, which will help to improve natural surveillance of the surrounding public realm and animate the street scene. Occupation of the ground floor reception spaces is essential in order to provide the much-needed natural surveillance at street level and enliven the surrounding public realm as intended, which will help to discourage antisocial activity and more serious disorder around the development.
- 3.2.2 The building proposes a number of ground floor activities increase the levels of pedestrian and public uses. In-turn these offer the advantage of good levels of activity and natural surveillance of the courtyard communal space and surrounding public realm.
- 3.2.3 The communal thoroughfare is overlooked by the ground floor reception and café/bar uses. All of which provide good levels of natural surveillance for the courtyard.
- 3.2.4 The proposed building clearly defines the different uses of the building and all entrances can be easily located and navigated.
- 3.2.5 The foyer/reception zone provides the opportunity for good levels of security at a central control point for the residential space.
- 3.2.6 The building plot provides ground floor activity in the form of student amenity spaces, meeting rooms and reception space uses. In-turn these uses offer good levels of activity and natural surveillance of the adjacent streets, hotel car park and public realm.
- 3.2.7 The footprint of the building facing onto the public realm is relatively simple and free from deeply recessed concealed areas. Where ground floor amenity spaces have been located, consideration appears to have been taken through the use of external facing materials; glazing, providing good levels of activity.
- 3.2.8 Student amenity spaces provide opportunities for residents to meet and foster community relations within the development. Schemes which have good social communities are less likely to tolerate inappropriate behaviour and are more willing to challenge unfamiliar faces in the development.
- 3.2.9 The main entrance will be accessed via an electronic access control fob system for residents and staff. The arrangement of the lobby space is greeted and potentially controlled via a concierge.
- 3.2.10 Security measures carefully incorporated into the building design can ensure the building is reasonably secure, without visibly announcing that the design was concerned about crime. The proposed development provides the opportunity to include security features built into the design and construction

of the building and avoid the need for obtrusive retro-fitted security measures that can increase the fear of crime.

3.3 Changes Needed and Recommendations

The following points have been identified for further consideration and would need to be addressed for Design for Security to support the proposed scheme.

- 3.3.1 External lighting and CCTV should be incorporated into the design of the new Public Square and public thoroughfare. A considered lighting scheme will create the sense of a safe space which the public will be encouraged to use throughout the day and evening. A retrospective inclusion of CCTV within the public realm can create the appearance that people are entering through a possible crime hotspot.
- 3.3.2 Access into the building will be managed and controlled by a concierge at reception. An intercom will be provided from the entrance door to the reception desk. Visitors need to sign in at reception from where residents will collect them.
- 3.3.3 Residential post/parcel room. Arrangements for the delivery of post should not allow postal delivery staff access to internal areas of the residential areas beyond the reception space. Mail boxes for residents should be located either within a secure lobby area or use a 'through-the-wall' post box arrangement. Due to the significant increase in on-line postal ordering, considerations should be given to appropriate post room area; avoiding parcels/post being left in an unsecure location. Further design details of these ancillary spaces are to be developed.
- 3.3.4 Given the prolific high levels of graffiti within and around the site, it is important that external cladding materials at ground floor are sealed, protected and supports the removal of graffiti.
- 3.3.5 All elevations of the new building should be monitored by CCTV with a complementary lighting system to illuminate it throughout the hours of darkness.
- 3.3.6 Consideration to be given to the location of external visitor cycle hoops. Currently there appears to be no allocation for the position of cycle hoops. Bicycles left at the hoop location for long periods of time will become targets for theft and/or damage. Therefore, Cycle hoops should be located in a position where they can viewed by users and/or staff. Safe cycle storage will encourage and promote greener transport methods to the development and help to reduce crime levels.
- 3.3.7 Communal / amenity space. The robust management of such spaces is essential to encourage active use and enjoyment, whilst making abuse less likely to occur. Poor management and maintenance can lead to a downward spiral of neglect and loss of environmental quality, encouraging nuisance, vandalism and other anti-social or criminal behaviour
- 3.3.8 **F&B Premises:** Staff should be provided with a secure area to store personal belongings (i.e. lockers) within a secure area of the school building which is restricted to staff, such as the staff room.
- 3.3.9 **F&B Premises:** The most frequently occurring crime in restaurants, and licensed premises, is the theft of personal property (i.e. handbags, purses, mobile phones) placed on tables/chairs, or the floor, for this reason it is highly recommended that tables and chairs are designed to facilitate secure storage of belongings or adapted with 'Chelsea Clips' to reduce the opportunities to steal bags/coats.
- 3.3.10 **F&B Premises:** Casual access to the rear of the bars/service counters should be restricted (e.g. with a lockable hatch that cannot be easily scaled) to prevent unauthorised access.
- 3.3.11 **F&B Premises:** Licensed premises are often the scene of violent disorder. A comprehensive CCTV system should be installed so that any incidents will be recorded. The intelligent placement of cameras helps to provide clear facial identification of individuals. Suitable locations would be: the main entrances in to the premises, all bar/service areas, toilet lobbies and customer circulation/seating areas.
- 3.3.12 **F&B Premises:** Restaurants and bars in the area have frequently been targeted by burglars. It is highly recommended that the premises should be covered with a monitored alarm (with response).
- 3.3.13 It is highly recommended that all of the physical security measures listed below are incorporated into the scheme. Integrated, risk-commensurate security measures aim to place secure physical barriers or surveillance in the path of the criminal – making crime harder to commit and raising the risk of detection and possible capture, as well as promoting a feeling of safety in residents and visitors.

4 Physical Security (Residential)

The following checklist forms the physical security requirements for this scheme to achieve Secured by Design accreditation.

4.1 Doors

- ☐ External communal access doors must be compliant with and certified to STS202 BR2 or LPS 1175 SR2. The communal entrance doors should be self-closing and secured with a multi-point electronic lock and capable of being operated via an electronic access control system, these features should be permitted under the scope of the certification.
- ☐ Arrangements for residents to admit visitors. Communal entrance and inner lobby / zone doors should be capable of being controlled by means of a video entry phone system (with the picture viewable on a phone unit, rather than on a television set) so that residents can confirm the identity of visitors before allowing them access themselves.
- ☐ Where secure lobbies are to be created, the secondary communal door must be to the same specification as the outer door - certified to BS PAS 24, STS 201 or LPS 1175 SR2, including a lock capable of being operated via an electronic access control system. The post boxes themselves should be of robust construction, with letter box apertures to a maximum size of 260mm x 40mm (incorporating anti-fishing measures). All other deliveries should be made directly to residents via the access-controlled main entrance.
- ☐ Apartment entrance doors must be compliant with and certified to BS PAS 24, STS 201 or LPS 1175 SR2. It is advised that these doors do not have fixed sidelights, and are provided with door viewers instead.
- ☐ Any letterboxes within doors must be located a minimum of 400mm away from internal handle and locking hardware.
- ☐ Doors to storage / meter rooms should have 44mm solid core doors, 3 hinges, with a mortised sash lock to BS3621/8621 to allow the rooms to be secured when not in use.
- ☐ External escape-only doors (as with external doors in general) should be certified to BS PAS 24, STS 201 or LPS 1175 SR2. It is crucial that the door ironmongery is permitted for use on these doors under the security certification of the product.
- ☐ The doors to the cycle store should be compliant with and certified to BS PAS 24 or LPS 1175 SR2, or be steel gates within steel frames. These doors/gates should both be self-closing and lock securely upon closure and be accessible by a programmable fob allowing secure entry and exit.

4.2 Windows

- ☐ Windows must be compliant with and certified to BS PAS 24.
- ☐ Ground floor and easily-accessible opening lights (escape requirements permitting) must be key-lockable, and have fixed/lockable opening restrictors (not releasable from the outside) limited to 100mm.

4.3 Glazing

- ☐ Glazing to a height of 2400mm (or if otherwise accessible) must incorporate at least one pane of laminated glass rated as P1A under EN 356. The remaining pane in a double glazed unit may be toughened glass.

4.4 Alarms

- ☐ If an alarm is installed then it should comply with either:
 - BS EN 50131 and PD 6662 for wired systems
 - BS 6799 for wireless systems

-
- ☐ If an alarm is installed, it should be linked to contacts on all external doors, and PIR detectors should cover all ground floor rooms with windows.

4.5 Access Control

- ☐ Access control systems should be operable by swipe card or fob, and not numeric key pads. The following doors should operate on access control:
- All external doors where regular staff access is required.
 - Doors separating internal zones / lobbies
 - Any internal doors to obvious high risk or controlled areas (e.g. storage / server / locker rooms)
 - Cycle store

4.6 Boundaries

- ☐ Secure boundaries should be formed at the extent of the new thoroughfare between the proposed external retail space and the ground floor public landscaped amenity space. Care should be taken to ensure that any boundaries formed by a combination of walls and railings should have railing panels that are fixed flush with the outer skin of the brickwork below, leaving no steps/gaps that would provide a climbing aid.
- ☐ Inward opening automatic gates to provide access to the courtyard area must be certified to one of the following standards:
- LPS 1175: Issue 7, SR2
 - STS 202: Issue 3, BR2
 - Sold Secure Gold
- ☐ PAS 68: 2013

4.7 Landscaping

- ☐ In vulnerable locations such as entrances, parking areas and footpaths, low planting should not exceed 1000mm in height, and tree canopies should fall no lower than 2m from the ground. This is in order to allow people to see their surroundings better, make a rational choice of routes and eliminate hiding places. A maintenance agreement should stipulate that these planting dimensions would be adhered to.
- ☐ Loose surface materials in the publicly accessible areas of the scheme should be avoided. Small fragments of ground covering can be used as missiles against people and premises (both to gain entry and to commit criminal damage).
- ☐ Planting must be avoided that will aid climbing over boundary treatments. The security of fences can be compromised if trees or street furniture are placed close by

4.8 Lighting

- ☐ External lighting must be provided to pedestrian routes within the site in accordance with BS 5489.
- ☐ Dusk 'til dawn lights, operated by photoelectric cell/daylight sensor, should be installed to all external doors (manual override is also permissible).
- ☐ Fittings should produce 'white' light, as opposed to yellow/orange light. Metal halide (or bulbs with a comparable output) should be used, as these offer superior colour rendition over alternatives such as high and low pressure sodium bulbs.

4.9 Other

- ☐ Meter cupboards to apartments should be located to the fronts of properties only or within a secure cupboard / room inside the block but not inside individual apartments. Smart meters are acceptable.

- ☐ Any externally-mounted rainwater pipes should be square in profile and fixed back to the building fabric to prevent climbing to upper floor windows.
- ☐ Partition walls between flats and corridors should be of masonry construction or include reinforcement such as a layer of expanded metal mesh.
- ☐ Consideration should be given to use of alternatives to lead in construction, and minimise the amount of metal on visible elevations of the buildings. Inspection covers should be capable of securing to reduce potential access to cabling.

5 Physical Security (Non-residential)

5.1 Doors

- ☐ External doors must be compliant with and certified to BS PAS 24, STS02, or LPS 1175 SR2.
- ☐ Sliding doors should be tested and certified to ENV 1627-30 (WK2+). If circumstances could prevent this, please consult with Design for Security.
- ☐ External escape-only doors (as with external doors in general) should be certified to BS PAS 24:2012, or LPS 1175 SR2. It is crucial that the door ironmongery is permitted for use on these doors under the security certification of the product.
- ☐ Internal doors to storage rooms should be solid core, minimum 44mm thick with a multi-point locking mechanism.
- ☐ Garage or sectional overhead doors must be tested and certified to LPS 1175 SR2. If circumstances could prevent this, please consult with Design for Security.

5.2 Shutters

- ☐ Where grilles or shutters are required for additional protection the minimum certification required is:
 - LPS 1175: Issue 7 Security Rating 1
 - STS 202: Issue 3, Burglary Rating 1

5.3 Windows

- ☐ Windows must be compliant with and certified to BS PAS 24 or BS 7950.
- ☐ Ground floor and easily accessible opening lights (escape requirements permitting) must be key-lockable, and have fixed/lockable opening restrictors (not releasable from the outside) limited to 100mm.

5.4 Glazing

- ☐ All glazing up to a height of 2400mm (or if otherwise accessible) should incorporate at least one pane of glass with a 1.5mm PVB interlayer (e.g. 7.5mm laminated glass), or a glass rated as P4A under EN 356. The remaining pane in a double glazed unit may be toughened glass.

5.5 Alarms

- ☐ A monitored alarm system should be installed to cover all building on the site, linked to contacts on all external doors/shutters and PIR detectors covering all ground floor areas with windows, with a signal terminating at a recognized Alarm Receiving Centre (ARC) or security control room.

5.6 Access Control

- ☐ Access control systems should be operable by swipe card or fob, and not numeric key pads. The following doors should operate on access control:
 - All external doors where regular staff access is required.

- Doors separating internal zones / lobbies
- Any internal doors to obvious high risk or controlled areas (e.g. storage / server / locker rooms)

5.7 Lighting

- ☐ External lighting must be provided to pedestrian routes within the site in accordance with BS 5489.
- ☐ Lighting to vehicle circulation areas, service yards should be in accordance with BS 5489, and display an average lux level of 20 with a uniformity level of no less than 25%. These figures should be evidenced by a lighting layout/lux plan.
- ☐ Dusk 'til dawn lights, operated by photoelectric cell/daylight sensor, should be installed to all external doors.
- ☐ Fittings should produce 'white' light, as opposed to yellow/orange light. Metal halide (or bulbs with a comparable output) should be used, as these offer superior colour rendition over alternatives such as high and low pressure sodium bulbs.
- ☐ Lighting fixtures must not be positioned to provide climbing aids over boundary treatments. Electrical and architectural layouts should be developed together to avoid this.
- ☐ Internal lighting should be operated by detection devices which will automatically switch lights on with movement activity in each room.

5.8 CCTV

- ☐ Any CCTV system that may be used within this proposal will require certain specifications and intelligent placement of cameras to compliment the design of the development. Designers should consider the following points when planning a CCTV strategy:
- ☐ CCTV systems (and lighting that support them) require regular cleaning and maintenance to remain effective.
- ☐ Where necessary cameras that are vulnerable to damage should be protected from attack either by relocation to a higher level and using a bigger lens to achieve the view required or through the fitting of a vandal resistant housing.
- ☐ With regards to the retention of footage, the police prefer quality over quantity. The overall retention period should be dictated by what the system is designed to achieve, though it would be better to have good quality images over a 14-day period than poor ones over a 30-day period.
- ☐ Procedures for recovery of recordings are recommended to be established (e.g. trained staff / the CCTV system instruction manual to be readily available). This is to ensure that the images produced will be of an acceptable standard that will allow for identification of an individual which will stand up to scrutiny in court.
- ☐ **Acceptable Standard** - this generally requires a resolution of 720x576 pixels at a real time frame rate of 25 frames per second. (N.B. Both the camera and DVR must be capable of this – if the camera will only send low resolution images then it does not matter how high the resolution of the recording unit is).
- ☐ **Identification** – One of three levels of field of view. To identify an individual, the image must capture no less than 120% of the field of view (at least from the top of the individuals head to their knees). The remaining two levels of field of view are 'Overview' and 'Recognition', which whilst effective for observational purposes, are less likely to result in the identification of a person/offender.
- ☐ The intelligent placement of cameras helps to provide clear facial identification of individuals. Suitable locations would be: Entrances to site, external areas all around the new building and ancillary facilities, external doors including emergency egresses / hatches, access-controlled doors & cycle parking areas

6 Management & Maintenance

- 6.1.1 The upkeep of a development over its lifetime can be crucial to the level of security and safety within. Aspects of a development, which are left to deteriorate, have the potential to attract further crime – a

process known as 'the broken window theory'. A maintenance plan should be drawn up to address issues such as:

- Litter removal
- Repair to communal areas (lighting, signage, access controls)
- Trimming and pruning to shrubs and trees

- 6.1.2 Any public open space or amenity areas not under the ownership of residents should be subject to an effective maintenance contract. This should ensure that all damage is rectified in a timely manner, and that any such space will not be detrimental to its surroundings.

7 Construction

- 7.1.1 Untidy sites and their surroundings can be littered with debris accessible to vandals who often use loose materials as missiles to commit crime. The client should take measures appropriate to secure their site during construction, and control pedestrian and vehicular access in to and out of the site curtilage. It is also recommended that the contractor on this scheme is a member of the 'Considerate Constructors Scheme', who has committed to be a considerate and good neighbour, as well as clean, respectful, safe, environmentally conscious, responsible and accountable.

- 7.1.2 Site security contractors should be SIA (Security Industry Authority) approved to ensure professional standards are adhered to (please see <http://www.sia.homeoffice.gov.uk/pages/acs-intro.aspx> for more details).

8 Useful References

8.1 Secured by Design (SBD)

- 8.1.1 Secured by Design focuses on crime prevention at the design, layout and construction stages of homes and commercial premises and promotes the use of security standards for a wide range of applications and products. To apply for Secured by Design certification for your development, visit our online application form at: <http://www.designforsecurity.org/secured-by-design/sbd-accreditation/>

A Contact register

Date	Contact With	Summary of Contact
27/09/2023	Turley	CIS application
10/10/2023	Turley	CIS instruction received
11/10/2023	DfS	Site visit
09/10/2023	Turley	Drawings received
19/10/2023	DfS	Invoice issued
20/10/2023	DfS	CIS completed
22/11/2023	DfS	CIS updated & issued
24/11/2023	DfS	Section 3.1.1 Updated to reflect unit numbers
04/03/2024	DfS	Section 3.1.1 Updated to reflect unit numbers

B Associated Documents

This report is based on the following drawings and supplementary information submitted by the applicant.

Drawing No.	Drawing Title	Date	Rev
Figure 1.1	Location Plan - Existing - With EIA Boundary		
Figure 1.2	Location Plan - Proposed - With EIA Boundary		
Figure 4.1	Existing Plan		
Figure 4.2	Demolition Plans (Brochure)		
Figure 4.3	Proposed Site Plan		
Figure 4.4	Basement Plan		
Figure 4.5	Ground Floor Plan		
Figure 4.6	Ground Floor Mezzanine		
Figure 4.7	Level 01 and Level 02 Plan		
Figure 4.8	Level 03 Plan		
Figure 4.9	Typical Floor Plan (Levels 04-15) 6-bed		
Figure 4.10	Typical Floor Plan (Levels 16-23) 4-bed		
Figure 4.11	Typical Floor Plan (Levels 24-33) Studios		
Figure 4.15	Level 34 Plan		
Figure 4.16	Roof Plan		
Figure 4.17	East & West Elevation		
Figure 4.18	North & South Elevation		
Figure 4.19	Sections		
Figure 4.20	Proposed Landscape (DRAFT TBC by MacGregor Smith)		
Figure 5.1	Schedule of Accommodation		
Figure 5.2	Unit Schedule		
Figure 6.1	Landscape Proposal (DRAFT MacGregor) Smith to send		
Figure 7.1	Brown Roof Plan		
Figure 8.1	Survey Elevations		
Figure 9.1	Site Wide Masterplan		

PLEASE NOTE - In the event of any subsequent material changes to the scheme, it will be necessary for Design for Security to reassess the comments made within this report.

C CIS Version History

Version	Revisions Made	Date
A		

B	Section 3.1 updated	22/11/23
C	Section 3.1.1 updated to reflect unit numbers	24/11/23
D	Section 3.1.1 updated to reflect unit numbers	04/03/24

D Glossary

Burglary Resistance Standards

BS PAS 23-1, 1999

General performance requirements for door/window assemblies.

A performance standard for doorsets and windows, which certifies that a particular doorset is fit for purpose. Door products must also have BS PAS 24 certification.

BS PAS 24-1, 2012

General security performance requirements for door/window assemblies.

An attack test standard for doorsets and windows. This is the minimum police requirement for Secured by Design dwellings, and is also applicable to French/double doors, and sliding doors.

ENV 1627-30 (Security Ratings WK1 to WK6)

Windows, doors, shutters - Burglar resistance Requirements and classification

The classification system used in ENV 1627-30 is aimed at the commercial market and is based on five elements:

- a) Resistance of glazing*
- b) Performance of hardware*
- c) Resistance to static loading*
- d) Resistance to dynamic loading*
- e) Burglary resistance by manual intervention*

LPS 1175 (Security Ratings 1 to 6)

Specification for testing and classifying the burglary resistance of building components

This includes doors, shutters, garage doors and grilles typically for commercial premises and higher risk domestic premises and is acceptable to the ABI and the Police. The standard has 6 levels, 6 being the highest, with levels 1 and 2 equivalent in many respects to BS PAS 24 and BS 7950.

STS201 Issue 4: 2012

Enhanced security requirements for doorsets and door assemblies for dwellings to satisfy the requirements of PAS23 and PAS24

STS202 Issue 3: 2011

Requirements for burglary resistance of construction products including hinged, pivoted, folding or sliding doorsets, windows, curtain walling, security grilles, garage doors and shutters.

This specifies a broadly similar range of attack tools and times to those specified at the lower levels of LPS1175.

EN 356, 2000 (Ratings P1A to P8A)

Glass in building. Security glazing. Testing and classification of resistance against manual attack.

A performance standard for manual attacks on glazing. P2A is comparable to the performance of a 6.8mm laminated glass, and P4A to that of a 9.5mm laminated glass.

Commonly Used Acronyms

CIT

Cash in transit (refers to vehicles, personnel and routines).

CPTED

Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design

CRS

Crime Reduction Specialist. Sometimes known as CPO (Crime Prevention Officer)

INPT

Integrated Neighbourhood Policing Team.

PVB/PolyVinyl Butyral (Glazing interlayer)

A commonly used interlayer used in the production of laminated glass.

LPCB (Loss Prevention Certification Board)

A brand of the BRE Global (Building Research Establishment) family. The LPCB work with insurers, Government, police, designers, manufacturers, contractors and end users to develop methods of assessing performance and reliability of security products to ensure their fitness for purpose.

UKAS (United Kingdom Accreditation Service)

The sole national accreditation body recognised by government to assess, against internationally agreed standards, organisations that provide certification, testing, inspections and calibration services.

Useful Websites

Design for Security

www.designforsecurity.org

Secured by Design

www.securedbydesign.com

RIBA Product Selector

www.ribaproductselector.com

LPCB – Red Book Live

www.redbooklive.com

Crime Reduction (Home Office)

www.crimereduction.homeoffice.gov.uk

DAC (Design Against Crime) Solution Centre

www.designagainstcrime.org

Building for Life

www.buildingforlife.org

CLG (Communities and Local Government)

www.communities.gov.uk