



CRIME IMPACT STATEMENT

Great Ancoats Street
Offices, Retail and Restaurant/Café

For: **Soller Nine Limited**

Version A: **22/03/24**

Ref: **2024/0061/CIS/01**

Greater Manchester Police
designforsecurity

Great Ancoats Street

2024/0061/CIS/01

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Development supported with minor security additions required.

This development has been assessed against the principles of 'Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design' (CPTED), in order to reduce the opportunities for crime and the fear of crime.

The layout of the proposed scheme is considered acceptable, as long as the issues discussed in more detail within Section 3.3 of this report are addressed, namely:

- Robust control of access in/and around the buildings.
- Include access controls to cycle store/changing rooms.

If these issues can be addressed as described within the report and the other physical security measures are incorporated, I would be happy to support the development.

Please note: At the planning application stage, Greater Manchester Police Design for Security will make representations to Manchester Planning to require the inclusion of a condition requiring the completed development to achieve Secured by Design (SBD), accreditation. Should the recommendations as listed within Section 4 of this report be adopted, I have every confidence that the scheme will achieve the award and the condition met.

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1 Visual Audit

The development site is indicated by the red outline on the plan adjacent and is supported with existing site context photographs taken around the site.

The site is bounded by Great Ancoats Street (north), Lever St (west), Little Lever St (east), and Houldsworth St (south) within M/cr city centre. The site is located adjacent to the New Islington & Northern Quarter areas and is approx. 700m from Piccadilly train station.

The site is located between Ancoats and the Northern Quarter districts of the City centre.

Great Ancoats Street and neighbouring developments either side define the outer edges of the site.


There is a significant amount of building development taking place within the local area.

There are many similar 'back' streets within the city centre, which can leave adjacent buildings potentially vulnerable to unauthorised access or damage unseen, as well as to nuisance and anti-social behaviour issues, and can leave pedestrians using them somewhat remote/isolated.


The area is served well with public transport, bus, train and metrolink services. A large number of buildings incorporate retro-fitted security measures. Retro-fitted features; CCTV, security lighting, fencing & barbed wire create a feeling of a hostile environment, particularly along some of the smaller back streets.



1 – View towards development site on Houldsworth St.




2 – Graffiti to residential windows on Newton St.



3 – Existing site on Houldsworth St and Lever St.




7 – View along Little Lever St.



6 – View east along Little Ancoats St.



5 – Existing buildings on Lever St.



4 – Existing site on Great Ancoats St.

2 Crime Statistics & Analysis

All data below is based on crimes recorded between 1st March 2023 to 29th February 2024.

2.1 Crime Summary

Figure 1: Recorded Crime within 500m of Site

Domestic Burglary	Non-Domestic Burglary	Criminal Damage	Less Serious Wounding	Theft	Robbery	Serious Wounding	Theft from Motor Vehicle	Theft of Motor Vehicle	Bicycle Theft
51	139	395	1,679	583	205	50	473	48	62

- 2.1.1 The overall rate of crime over the past 12 months has been high, with less serious wounding, theft and vehicle crime having been the most reported offences taking place. These types of crime are typical of those experienced in or within close proximity of district, town or city centres where there is a high concentration of retail, commercial and licensed premises, leading to a higher number of crime and disorder issues. These offences have occurred throughout the local area, with a higher concentration to the west of the proposed site closer to the city centre.
- 2.1.2 Less serious woundings have taken place throughout the local area, particularly to the southwest towards the city centre. Offences have mostly occurred over the weekend period (Friday – Sunday) during the late evening and early hours of the morning when most premises in the area are closing. Assaults and public order offences have been the highest recorded less serious woundings taking place, with the majority of incidents involving disputes between known associates and alcohol often being a factor.
- 2.1.3 Thefts have also taken place throughout the area, with offenders most commonly using pickpocketing and distraction techniques in order to obtain items stored on the person such as mobile phones, purses and wallets. Offenders have also targeted insecure items (mostly mobile phones and bags) left on or under tables in bars and restaurants or benches in public spaces.
- 2.1.4 Vehicle crime in the local area has mostly taken place in private car parks and vehicles using on street parking facilities. Theft from a motor vehicle has been the highest recorded vehicle crime whereby offenders have used implements and objects in order to smash glazing and access the interior of the vehicle before removing items from within. Offenders have also targeted vehicle registration plates, using tools to remove them.

2.2 Common Use-Specific M.O.s (Modus Operandi)

- 2.2.1 Secure windows and doors have been forced open using body pressure, implements and tools to gain access to the building.

Possible Solution – All external doors should be certified to recognised security standards (see Section 4.1), which are independently proven to reduce the risk of forced entry and thus increase the chances of detection. Security-certified door-sets have resisted a series of professional attacks (using a variety of tools) including to the door itself, the frame, the locks and the fittings. They are the best long-term measure to address this risk and can be obtained to suit virtually all operational requirements. Good use of perimeter boundaries, lighting and CCTV can also deter criminals by preventing access to vulnerable areas and increasing the chances of them being seen by staff, security personnel or passers-by. Consideration should also be given to security-certified shutters (see Section 4) to protect particularly vulnerable door.s

- 2.2.2 Organised burglars targeting expensive I.T. equipment.

Possible Solution - Secure store rooms, where such items can be kept, should be incorporated into the design of the building. These rooms should have solid blockwork walls or be reinforced with expanded metal mesh and certified door sets (to BS PAS 24). Valuable items should not be easy to remove, and should be uniquely identified using an appropriate property marking system. Equipment should not be positioned in communal areas where there may be regular community access. Effective access controls within the building should assist in restricting entry of visitors and potential intruders.

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- 2.2.3 Offenders posing as legitimate customers, visitors or employees have gained unauthorised access to staff only areas to steal property.

Possible Solution - Monitoring of people entering and leaving the building helps to discourage intruders. Additionally, CCTV and regular staff patrols will deter potential offenders from attempting to steal personal property. Doors for emergency egress should be alarmed so that building managers are alerted if they are used, and staff discouraged from using them informally, e.g. for smoking breaks and robust access controls to separate visitor/staff only areas.

- 2.2.4 Glazing within windows and doors has been smashed to gain unauthorised access.

Possible Solution - All external doors should be certified to recognised security standards (see Sections 5.1), which are independently proven to reduce the risk of forced entry and thus increase the chances of detection. Security-certified doors are the best long-term measure to address this risk and can be obtained to suit virtually all operational requirements. Good use of perimeter boundaries, lighting and CCTV can also deter criminals by preventing access to vulnerable areas and increasing the chances of them being seen by security personnel or passers-by.

- 2.2.5 Shutters have been prised open to target doors/windows behind them

Possible Solution – Roller shutters can appear secure in that they are difficult to penetrate, however physical security products are only as strong as their weakest component. A security-certified shutter (see Section 5.2) has an independently proven level of resistance, and ensures that all aspects of the shutter (locks, rails, laths etc) have been scrutinised by professionals. Avoid locating shutters in concealed areas where a concerted attack from an offender is unlikely to be witnessed. Ensure that parked vehicles and stored materials do not obscure sight lines.

2.3 General Risk Factors - Offices

The typical security risks for a development of this nature are:

- Burglary
- Violence towards staff
- Theft of personal belongings at work
- Criminal damage to property and vehicles
- Unauthorised access to buildings/private space
- Arson
- Cycle theft
- Employee theft
- Theft of/from parked vehicles
- Theft and criminal damage during the construction period

2.4 Risk Factors - Restaurants

The typical security risks for a development of this nature are:

- Burglary
- Robbery to business
- Criminal damage to property
- Alcohol-fuelled violence
- Miscellaneous theft to customers
- Rowdy and inconsiderate behaviour
- Violence towards staff
- Safety of staff personal belongings
- Robbery / wounding of patrons leaving premises
- Theft and criminal damage during the construction period



2.5 Risk Factors - Retail

The typical security risks for a development of this nature are:


- Commercial burglary
- Cash robbery
- Unauthorised access to private spaces/Tailgating
- Shoplifting
- Employee theft
- Theft of customer / staff property
- Criminal damage to property

2.6 Non-Domestic Burglary (Offices): Risk Analysis

The data below relates to non-domestic burglary offences within/against offices, recorded in the Manchester area.





- 2.6.1 **Day/Time Range:** During the week, the risk of burglary at office premises in Manchester is greatest on Tuesday, Thursday and Sunday.
- 2.6.2 **Time Range:** During the day, the risk of burglary at Manchester office premises rises into the evening/late at night. Such premises are often targeted at these times when they are closed and unoccupied, meaning offenders can attempt to gain unauthorised access without fear of being disturbed or identified.



- 2.6.3 **Point of Entry:** The majority of burglaries at offices in Manchester have been committed through doors. Burglaries against office buildings in this area do not appear to be opportunistic, with offenders often bringing tools with them that can be used to force open doors and cut locks. Offenders have also smashed glazed panels in doors and windows to gain entry. A large proportion of burglaries have been committed through 'unknown' and 'legitimate' points of entry, which are likely to have been where offenders (posing as legitimate customers, visitors or employees) have gained unauthorised access to staff only areas (i.e. through insecure doors, tailgating etc.) to steal property.

2.7 Theft (Offices): Risk Analysis


The data below relates to thefts within/against offices, recorded in the Manchester area.



- 2.7.1 **Day Range:** During the week, the risk of theft at Manchester offices is greatest on Monday and Tuesday and is generally lower over the weekend (when many are shut).
- 2.7.2 **Time Range:** During the day, the risk of theft is concentrated during normal working hours – peaking around midday. During these times, many office workers will take their lunch breaks, leaving unattended property at desks or in insecure areas. Thefts can also often happen at the end of the working day, when members of staff are finishing work and premises is likely to be less secure, such as while cleaning operations are carried out.

2.8 Non-Domestic Burglary (Restaurant/Cafe): Risk Analysis



The data below relates to non-domestic burglary offences within/against restaurants and cafés, recorded in the Manchester area during 2018 - 2019.



- 2.8.1 **Day Range:** The risk of burglary at restaurants/cafes in Manchester fluctuates throughout the week, peaking on Monday, Thursday, and Sunday.
- 2.8.2 **Time Range:** The risk of burglary peaks during the early hours of the morning, when premises are usually closed.
- 2.8.3 **Point of Entry:** In the majority of cases where entry points are known, offenders have entered Manchester restaurants/cafes through external doors. Doors have been forced open with bodily pressure and tools/implements and glazing within doors/windows has been smashed to gain entry. Offenders have also posed as legitimate customers before targeting insecure doors, tailgating, or using force to open internal doors to restricted areas when premises are open to the public.

2.9 Theft (Offices): Risk Analysis




The data below relates to thefts within/against restaurants and cafés, recorded in the Manchester area during 2018 - 2019.



- 2.9.1 **Day Range:** During the week, the risk of theft at Manchester restaurants/cafes peaks over the weekend. Many premises experience higher levels of attendance at the weekend than during the week. Premises are also usually open for longer at the weekend and so the opportunities for offenders to commit theft is greater.
- 2.9.2 **Time Range:** The risk of theft peaks in the afternoon and into the evening. This reflects the times when restaurants/cafes are typically at their busiest and, therefore, the opportunities to commit theft are greater. Handbags, purses/wallets and mobile phones belonging to customers are the most routinely stolen items. Offenders have also targeted I.T equipment within premises, particularly tablets and laptops, as well as alcohol from storage rooms.

2.10 Non-Domestic Burglary (Retail): Risk Analysis

The data below relates to non-domestic burglary offences within / against retail facilities, recorded in the Manchester area during 2018 - 2019.





2.10.1 **Day / Time Range:** The risk of burglary at retail premises in Manchester is consistently high throughout the week, peaking on a Wednesday. During the day the risk of burglary at retail premises increases in the early hours of the morning (12am – 6am). Burglaries at commercial premises frequently take place during the night, when they are closed, and the streets are quiet. Offenders perceive the risk of being witnessed or apprehended at its lowest.

2.10.2 **Point of Entry:** In the local area the following entry points and MO's have been the occurred most frequently:

- Smashed glazing in windows and doors to gain entry to premises.
- Posing as a legitimate customer and tailgating / exploitation insecure doors to gain access to staff only areas.
- Forcing open shutters using bodily force and implements to gain entry.
- Opening secure doors using bodily pressure and implements to gain entry.

2.11 Theft (Retail): Risk Analysis



The data below relates to thefts within / against retail facilities, recorded in the Manchester area during 2018 - 2019.



Day / Time Range: The risk of theft from retail premises in Manchester is consistently high throughout the week, peaking on a Friday and Saturday. During the day the risk of theft at retail premises peaks in the late morning and into the evening (10:30am – 8pm). Small, personal items are being targeted, mostly mobile phones, purses, and bags.

2.12 Vehicle Crime: Risk Analysis

The data below relates to vehicle crime committed within 500m of the site.



2.12.1 **Day/Time Range:** The risk of vehicle crime peaks on Saturday in the evening (20:00-22:00) and just after midnight (00:00-01:00). Offenders tend to target vehicles at this time when they are often left unattended and out of sight of the owners for long periods of time, creating a perceived low risk opportunity for offenders.

3 Layout Appraisal

3.1 Proposed development

- 3.1.1 The project is located in Northern Quarter, Manchester. Opposite the Express building and the boundary runs along Houldsworth street, Little Lever Street, Great Ancoats Street and Lever Street.
- 3.1.2 The proposal is for a full planning application consisting of the partial demolition of existing dilapidated buildings and erection of a 19-storey office building. Retaining the current Bem Brasil building and façade retention at 56-58 Lever Street. The total Gross External Area of the development is 19,376 sqm.

3.2 Positive Aspects of the Proposal

The following proposed features would make a positive contribution to the prevention of crime and fear of crime.

- 3.2.1 Building footprint. The building footprint at ground floor level is relatively simple and contains no areas of potential concealment. All doors and shutters appear to be flush with the external elevations of the buildings, removing areas of potential concealment that could be subject to abuse.
- 3.2.2 The main pedestrian entrances to the buildings are located in prominent locations, which are readily apparent on approaching from the surrounding public realm.
- 3.2.3 Glazed elevations surrounding the new build at ground floor level will help to enliven the street scene and enhance natural surveillance of and from the building.
- 3.2.4 Storage and servicing functions, including refuse stores, appear to be contained within secure enclosures within the footprint of the building.
- 3.2.5 The proposals for the redevelopment and new-build elements clearly define the different uses of the building and all entrances can be easily located and navigated.
- 3.2.6 The foyer/reception zones provide the opportunity for good levels of security at a central control point for the commercial/office spaces.
- 3.2.7 The internal layout of the building appears capable of being divided into identifiable zones, allowing separation of accessible and restricted areas.
- 3.2.8 The large expanse of glazing allows staff to monitor customer and public behaviour in reception and the adjacent public realm.
- 3.2.9 Security measures carefully incorporated into the building design can ensure the building is reasonably secure, without visibly announcing that the design was concerned about crime. The proposed development provides the opportunity to include security features built into the design and construction of the building and avoid the need for obtrusive retrofitted security measures that can increase the fear of crime.

3.3 Changes Needed and Recommendations

The following points have been identified for further consideration and would need to be addressed for Design for Security to support the proposed scheme.

3.4 Recommendations

The following points have been identified for further consideration and would need to be addressed for Design for Security to support the proposed scheme.

- 3.4.1 Reception Lobby. The reception lobby should be laid out to allow staff at the desk to effectively monitor personnel entering or leaving the building through the main pedestrian entrances. Reception staff must also have a good view of the area immediately in front of the building allowing activity in this area to be easily supervised. Measures must be included to prevent visitors / intruders from progressing beyond the entrance lobby without authorisation. Access to the stair core and lifts from the entrance lobby should require passage through access-controlled turnstiles or doors.

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- 3.4.2 The access-control strategy adopted for the development should be capable of confining movement into and through the building, thus allowing staff and visitors to only enter parts of the site to which they have legitimate reason to be present. Access permissions should be fully auditable and regularly reviewed.
- 3.4.3 Access controls and flexibility of use within the building. When accommodating customer requirements for increased flexibility of space within the building, the security of these areas must not be compromised nor impact on other parts of the building. Space shared by a variety of users at varying times means that an intruder is less likely to be identified – it is therefore essential that accommodation is provided for the secure storage of personal items, for instance while staff are away from their work space. Facilities intended for use by external visitors (e.g. cafes / conference and meeting rooms), must be designed so that further access to the building is rigorously controlled. It should not be possible for the staff/visitors of one office floor / suite to access another. All individual office levels or suites should be fitted with self-closing, access-controlled doors, operated by staff swipe cards / fobs or by intercoms linked to individual receptions and all rooms within office suites should be capable of being deadlocked when unoccupied. Where the upper floor office areas are subdivided into smaller individual units, each suite of offices should be capable of separation with their own individual access controls. Access to plant / service/storage areas should also be fitted with auditable access controls (authorised personnel only).
- 3.4.4 Post. Reception and distribution of post within the building should be considered. Incoming post and deliveries should be processed at one single point, in an area that can be easily isolated. Post rooms should not be located close to main exit routes as this could affect prompt evacuation.
- 3.4.5 Current drawings show cycle parking for building users is contained in a dedicated room within the basement. Entry into this space should be strictly limited via the access controlled system under the building management system ensuring only genuine cyclists can gain access. Racks within the cycle stores should allow bikes to be locked by the frame and both wheels and should be obtained from a Secured by Design approved supplier (see www.securedbydesign.com).
- 3.4.6 The refuse store arrangement should allow bins to be collected without the need to leave bins out on the street for long periods of time; and operated so that the building can be secured while collections are taking place.
- 3.4.7 Staff should be given flexibility over permitting access into the building at different times of the day and night. The main entrance doors should be capable of being controlled remotely by reception staff if required, to prevent unauthorised access or nuisance/anti-social behaviour in/around the entrance lobby. If the building is to be open at any time without a concierge or security presence in the lobby area, the doors should be secured and a single-leaf entrance door should be controlled by means of a video access control system linked to each individual office suite (allowing staff to vet callers before allowing them access).
- 3.4.8 It is essential that all of the physical security measures listed below are incorporated into the scheme. Integrated, risk-commensurate security measures aim to place secure physical barriers or surveillance in the path of the criminal – making crime harder to commit and raising the risk of detection and possible capture, as well as promoting a feeling of safety in users.

4 Physical Security

The following checklist forms the physical security requirements for this scheme to achieve Secured by Design accreditation.

4.1 Doors

- ☐ All external doors must be compliant with and certified to BS PAS 24, STS202, or LPS 1175 SR2.
- ☐ Sliding doors should be tested and certified to BS PAS 24, ENV 1627-30 (WK2+). If circumstances could prevent this, please consult with Design for Security.
- ☐ External escape-only doors (as with external doors in general) should be certified to BS PAS 24, or LPS 1175 SR2. It is crucial that the door ironmongery is permitted for use on these doors under the security certification of the product.
- ☐ If the building is to be occupied by multiple tenants, all individual office levels or suites should be fitted with self-closing access-controlled solid-core doors (minimum 44mm thick), operated by staff swipe cards/fobs or by intercoms linked to individual receptions and any rooms within office suites should be capable of being deadlocked when unoccupied. The doors into the emergency escape cores at each level should be fitted with electromagnetic locks, connected to the fire alarm, so that people at one level cannot access other levels. Once an emergency escape core is accessed, the only means of egress should be at ground floor level.
- ☐ Internal doors to storage rooms should be solid core, minimum 44mm thick with a multi-point locking mechanism.

4.2 Shutters

- ☐ Where grilles or shutters are required for additional protection the minimum certification required is:
 - LPS 1175: Issue 7 Security Rating 1
 - STS 202: Issue 3, Burglary Rating 1

4.3 Windows

- ☐ Windows must be compliant with and certified to BS PAS 24 or BS 7950.
- ☐ Ground floor and easily accessible opening lights (escape requirements permitting) must be key-lockable, and have fixed/lockable opening restrictors (not releasable from the outside) limited to 100mm.
- ☐ Security ratings higher than those listed above may be required dependant on:
 - type of risk,
 - level of crime risk,
 - location of building *or*
 - security level of the door or window to be protected.

4.4 Glazing

- ☐ Glazing to a height of 2400mm (or if otherwise accessible) must incorporate at least one pane of glass with a 1.5mm PVB interlayer (e.g. 7.5mm laminated glass), or a glass rated as P1A under EN 356. The remaining pane in a double glazed unit may be toughened glass. It is recommended that glazing to elevations adjoining public areas or evacuation routes should also be laminated.

4.5 Wall Construction

Glazed curtain walling and window walls

- ☐ Secured by Design recognises four distinct types of glazed wall systems. These are:

- Large glazed units connected by 'spider clamp' system.
- Glazed units directly retained within a framing system (usually aluminium)
- Framed windows installed within a separate framing system.
- Framed windows connected to other framed windows to create a window wall.

☐ Glazed curtain walling must be installed using a secure glazing retention system. The method of retaining glass must include one or more of the following:

- Security glazing tape
- Dedicated security sealant or gasket
- A secure mechanical fixing system (Evidence will be required to prove the system is secure. This may be achieved by utilising the specific glazing retention test within PAS 24:2012 or by indicative test on the retention system to LPS 1175: Issue 7, SR1 or STS 202: Issue 3, BR1)

☐ Framed windows (3 and 4 above) used within the construction of a window wall must be certified to one of the following requirements:

- BS PAS 24:2016
- STS 204 Issue 3: 2012
- LPS 1175 Issue 7:2010 Security Rating 1
- LPS 2081 Issue 1:2014 Security Rating A

4.6 Alarms

☐ A monitored alarm system should be installed to cover all building on the site, linked to contacts on all external doors/shutters and PIR detectors covering all ground floor areas with windows, with a signal terminating at a recognized Alarm Receiving Centre (ARC) or security control room.

4.7 Access Control

☐ Access control systems should be operable by swipe card or fob, and not numeric key pads. The following doors should operate on access control:

- Main Entrance Doors
- Turnstiles / doors off reception lobby
- Doors to each individual level / suite
- Refuse / service areas
- Doors into cycle store
- Conference / meeting rooms

☐ The electric locking system to be used throughout the building should be fully auditable (i.e. allows the retention of data, such as who accessed where and when), to allow for a better investigation into any incidents. Staff cards/fobs should be capable of being easily and quickly activated / disabled to ensure that misuse is prevented.

4.8 Lighting

External lighting

☐ Dusk 'til dawn lights, operated by photoelectric cell/daylight sensor, should be installed to all external doors.

☐ Fittings should produce 'white' light, as opposed to yellow/orange light. Metal halide (or bulbs with a comparable output) should be used, as these offer superior colour rendition over alternatives such as high and low pressure sodium bulbs.

☐ Lighting fixtures must not be positioned to provide climbing aids over boundary treatments. Electrical and architectural layouts should be developed together to avoid this.

Internal Lighting

- ☐ Internal lighting should be operated by detection devices which will automatically switch lights on with movement activity in each room.

4.9 CCTV

- ☐ Any CCTV system that may be used within this proposal will require certain specifications and intelligent placement of cameras to compliment the design of the development. Designers should consider the following points when planning a CCTV strategy:
- ☐ CCTV systems (and lighting that support them) require regular cleaning and maintenance to remain effective.
- ☐ Where necessary cameras that are vulnerable to damage should be protected from attack either by relocation to a higher level and using a bigger lens to achieve the view required or through the fitting of a vandal resistant housing.
- ☐ With regards to the retention of footage, the police prefer quality over quantity. The overall retention period should be dictated by what the system is designed to achieve, though it would be better to have good quality images over a 14-day period than poor ones over a 30-day period.
- ☐ Procedures for recovery of recordings are recommended to be established (e.g. trained staff / the CCTV system instruction manual to be readily available). This is to ensure that the images produced will be of an acceptable standard that will allow for identification of an individual which will stand up to scrutiny in court.
- ☐ Acceptable Standard - this generally requires a resolution of 720x576 pixels at a real time frame rate of 25 frames per second. (N.B. Both the camera and DVR must be capable of this – if the camera will only send low resolution images then it does not matter how high the resolution of the recording unit is).
- ☐ Identification – One of three levels of field of view. To identify an individual, the image must capture no less than 120% of the field of view (at least from the top of the individuals head to their knees). The remaining two levels of field of view are 'Overview' and 'Recognition', which whilst effective for observational purposes, are less likely to result in the identification of a person/offender.
- ☐ The intelligent placement of cameras helps to provide clear facial identification of individuals. Suitable locations would be: Entrances to site, external areas all around the new building and ancillary facilities, external doors including emergency egresses / hatches, access-controlled doors & cycle parking areas.

4.10 Fit out

- ☐ Design for Security understands that the designers and client may not always know who will be occupying their buildings once complete, and therefore the end-users requirements. Typical components which are subject to fit-out are:
 - Internal access control
 - Internal doors in to premises
 - Alarm systems
- ☐ These features can be critical to a secure environment, and we would urge the client to provide would-be tenants with the contact details for Design for Security, who will provide free advice on internal security matters so as not to undermine the security of the building shell.

4.11 Other

- ☐ Reception desk and staff. Reception staff should have a clear view of the approaches to all entrances. Reception desks require restricted access from the public side the desk should be deep enough to afford protection for the receptionist. Access beyond a public reception area should be controlled by the receptionist or fob.
- ☐ Effective signage is important to help customers / visitors navigate around the area, so they can easily find the various facilities and locate exit points.

5 Management & Maintenance

- ☐ The designer must ensure that this report is included within the BIM management model so that all parties are aware of the requirements for construction and management.
- ☐ A comprehensive security regime for the management of the development must be prepared and remain in place for the day-to-day running of the site. There should be regular reviews/exercises to ensure that it remains accurate, workable and up-to-date. All staff and residents should understand and accept the need for security measures and it should be made easy for people to raise concerns or report observations.
- ☐ The upkeep of a development over its lifetime can be crucial to the level of security and safety within. Aspects of a development, which are left to deteriorate, have the potential to attract further crime. A maintenance plan should be drawn up to address issues such as:
 - Litter and graffiti removal to ensure that the site remains in good repair.
 - Regular inspection, service and repair to communal security features (lighting, signage, access controls, CCTV, alarms, fencing & gates)
 - Trimming and pruning to shrubs and trees to ensure that sight lines are maintained and coverage of lighting and CCTV is not impaired.
- ☐ Ensure that the site management is for which the building / site was designed able to cope with the remains in place, such as 24 hour concierge / security patrols.
- ☐ Information regarding security features (such as specifications of windows / doors and systems performance) should be conveyed to the ultimate owners or managers of the site to ensure that any future replacements continue to provide the same level of security and maintain any security accreditation for the development.
- ☐ All communal or amenity areas should be subject to an effective maintenance contract. This should ensure that all damage is rectified in a timely manner, and that any such space is not detrimental to its surroundings.

6 Construction

- ☐ Untidy sites and their surroundings can be littered with debris accessible to vandals who often use loose materials as missiles to commit crime. The client should take measures appropriate to secure their site during construction, and control pedestrian and vehicular access in to and out of the site curtilage. It is also recommended that the contractor on this scheme is a member of the 'Considerate Constructors Scheme', who has committed to be a considerate and good neighbour, as well as clean, respectful, safe, environmentally conscious, responsible and accountable.
- ☐ Site security contractors should be SIA (Security Industry Authority) approved to ensure professional standards are adhered to (please see <http://www.sia.homeoffice.gov.uk/pages/acs-intro.aspx> for more details).

7 Useful References

7.1 Secured by Design (SBD)

- ☐ Secured by Design focuses on crime prevention at the design, layout and construction stages of homes and commercial premises and promotes the use of security standards for a wide range of applications and products. To apply for Secured by Design certification for your development, visit our online application form at: <http://www.designforsecurity.org/secured-by-design/sbd-accreditation/>

A Contact register

Date	Contact With	Summary of Contact
27/02/2024	Howells	CIS instruction received
28/02/2024	Howells	Fee agreed / commission confirmed
04/03/2024	DfS	Invoice issued
25/03/2024	DfS	Site visit
19/04/2024	DfS	CIS version A issued

B Associated Documents

This report is based on the following drawings and supplementary information submitted by the applicant.

Drawing No.	Drawing Title	Date	Rev
2510-x.x-230221- LSM-	Full Set GA drawings Combined	27/02/24	

PLEASE NOTE - In the event of any subsequent material changes to the scheme, it will be necessary for Design for Security to reassess the comments made within this report.

C CIS Version History

Version	Revisions Made	Date
A		

D Glossary

Burglary Resistance Standards

BS PAS 23-1, 1999

General performance requirements for door/window assemblies.

A performance standard for door sets and windows, which certifies that a particular door set is fit for purpose. Door products must also have BS PAS 24 certification.

BS PAS 24-1, 2012

General security performance requirements for door/window assemblies.

An attack test standard for door sets and windows. This is the minimum police requirement for Secured by Design dwellings, and is also applicable to French/double doors, and sliding doors.

ENV 1627-30 (Security Ratings WK1 to WK6)

Windows, doors, shutters - Burglar resistance Requirements and classification

The classification system used in ENV 1627-30 is aimed at the commercial market and is based on five elements:

- a) Resistance of glazing*
- b) Performance of hardware*
- c) Resistance to static loading*
- d) Resistance to dynamic loading*
- e) Burglary resistance by manual intervention*

LPS 1175 (Security Ratings 1 to 6)

Specification for testing and classifying the burglary resistance of building components

This includes doors, shutters, garage doors and grilles typically for commercial premises and higher risk domestic premises and is acceptable to the ABI and the Police. The standard has 6 levels, 6 being the highest, with levels 1 and 2 equivalent in many respects to BS PAS 24 and BS 7950.

STS201 Issue 4: 2012

Enhanced security requirements for door-sets and door assemblies for dwellings to satisfy the requirements of PAS23 and PAS24

STS202 Issue 3: 2011

Requirements for burglary resistance of construction products including hinged, pivoted, folding or sliding door-sets, windows, curtain walling, security grilles, garage doors and shutters.

This specifies a broadly similar range of attack tools and times to those specified at the lower levels of LPS1175.

EN 356, 2000 (Ratings P1A to P8A)

Glass in building. Security glazing. Testing and classification of resistance against manual attack.

A performance standard for manual attacks on glazing. P2A is comparable to the performance of a 6.8mm laminated glass, and P4A to that of a 9.5mm laminated glass.

Commonly Used Acronyms

CIT

Cash in transit (refers to vehicles, personnel and routines).

CPTED

Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design

CRS

Crime Reduction Specialist. Sometimes known as CPO (Crime Prevention Officer)

INPT

Integrated Neighbourhood Policing Team.

PVB / PolyVinyl Butyral (Glazing interlayer)

A commonly used interlayer used in the production of laminated glass.

LPCB (Loss Prevention Certification Board)

A brand of the BRE Global (Building Research Establishment) family. The LPCB work with insurers, Government, police, designers, manufacturers, contractors and end users to develop methods of assessing performance and reliability of security products to ensure their fitness for purpose.

UKAS (United Kingdom Accreditation Service)

The sole national accreditation body recognised by government to assess, against internationally agreed standards, organisations that provide certification, testing, inspections and calibration services.

Useful Websites

Design for Security

www.designforsecurity.org

Secured by Design

www.securedbydesign.com

RIBA Product Selector

www.ribaproductselector.com

LPCB – Red Book Live

www.redbooklive.com

Crime Reduction (Home Office)

www.crimereduction.homeoffice.gov.uk

DAC (Design Against Crime) Solution Centre

www.designagainstcrime.org

Building for Life

www.buildingforlife.org

CLG (Communities and Local Government)

www.communities.gov.uk