



CRIME IMPACT STATEMENT

Spear Street

5 Apartments and Office (121sqm)

For: **Zidane Projects**

Version A: **13/04/23**

Ref: **2017/1014/CIS/01**

Greater Manchester Police

designforsecurity

Spear Street, Manchester.

2017/1014/CIS/01

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Development Supported

This development has been assessed against the principles of 'Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design' (CPTED), in order to reduce the opportunities for crime and the fear of crime.

The layout of the proposed scheme is considered acceptable, as long as the issues discussed in more detail within Section 3.3 of this report are addressed, namely:

- Robust control of access into the residential apartment block, including a secure system for the delivery of post.
- External gates to a height of 2.5m

If these issues can be addressed as described within the report and the other physical security measures are incorporated, we would be happy to support the development.

Please note: Greater Manchester Police Design for Security will recommend to the local planning authority that a Secured by Design planning condition is added that reflects the physical security specification listed within Sections 4 & 5 of this report.

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1 Visual Audit


The site lies on the north-west side of Spear Street in the Northern Quarter area of Manchester city centre, which houses a concentration of independent retail units, bars, cafés/restaurants and office premises, as well as some residential units and budget hotels.

The site itself is currently vacant and is secured with timber hoardings along Spear Street. It is enclosed on three sides.


In contrast, Spear Street is a much narrower street with more limited levels of activity, pedestrian footfall and vehicular movement. Many of the properties along Spear Street to the south-west back onto the route itself, leaving numerous blank facades or window and door openings that have either been secured (with grilles, bars or shutters) or have been bricked up. Many have also been There are many similar 'back' streets within the city centre, which can leave adjacent buildings potentially vulnerable to unauthorised access or damage unseen, as well as to nuisance and anti-social behaviour issues, and can leave pedestrians using them somewhat remote/isolated.

The immediate area around the site on blank and shuttered street frontages of the buildings (to Spear Street and Faraday Street) have been heavily graffitied. If such signs of disorder are not repaired/removed immediately, they can often attract further abuse, giving the impression that buildings are not owned or cared for by anybody and that crime and disorder is tolerated.


The site is close to Stephenson Square a wide space which has been temporarily part pedestrianised, a popular and busy destination – as a result, it benefits from good levels of natural surveillance and overlooking.



7 – Evidence of criminal damage on Spear St.




6 – Bar/restaurant in the Hive Building & pedestrian route through.



5 – View towards site from Faraday St.




1 – Proposed development site on Spear St.



2 – View northeast along Spear St.



3 – View Southeast along Faraday St.



4 – New addition to Spear St, office & apartment development.

2 Crime Statistics & Analysis

All data below is based on crimes recorded between 1st March 2022 to 28th February 2023.

Crime Summary

Figure 1: Recorded Crime within 500m of Site

Domestic Burglary	Non-Domestic Burglary	Criminal Damage	Less Serious Wounding	Theft	Robbery	Serious Wounding	Theft from Motor Vehicle	Theft of Motor Vehicle	Bicycle Theft
108	213	354	2,438	821	251	65	456	51	101

- 2.1.1 The overall crime rate in the local area is high for Manchester, with less serious wounding, theft and vehicle crime having been the highest recorded crimes taking place. Offences have taken place throughout the area surrounding the site, with a trend of more offences occurring closer to the city centre.
- 2.1.2 Less serious woundings offences have taken place all throughout the local area, with the volume of offences increasing towards the city centre. Public order offences have been the most common offence, with assaults and harassment also occurring. Most violent offences have been carried out during disputes between unknown associates.
- 2.1.3 Thefts in the local area have mostly been taking place within/around the licenced premises, restaurants and retail premises situated within the Northern Quarter, with a hotspot of offences taking place at locations along Hilton Street. Offenders have primarily targeted mobile phones, wallets/purses and cash by using pickpocketing and distraction methods to obtain the personal belongings, as well as targeting parcels and bags left unattended.
- 2.1.4 Theft from motor vehicles has been the highest recorded vehicle crime taking place. Offenders have targeted securely parked vehicles by using implements to bypass the locking mechanism and tools to remove vehicle parts and vehicle registration plates. In cases of criminal damage to vehicles offenders have mostly used implements to smash the glazing in windows and sharp implements to cause damage to vehicle tyres.

2.2 Common Use-Specific M.O.s (Modus Operandi)

- 2.2.1 Offenders have exploited insecure communal entrances or have tailgated into apartment buildings behind genuine visitors/residents to gain access unnoticed.

Possible Solution – A robust access control system should be in place to allow residents to vet visitors to apartment blocks before allowing them access (see Section 4.1). The main communal entrance to the block should be located in a highly visible position and should be well-lit to deter offenders from trying to gain unauthorised access. Consideration could also be given to ‘airlock’ lobby system, which features a secondary entrance door that only releases when the external door has closed, reducing the opportunities for tailgating unnoticed

- 2.2.2 Doors have been targeted (a common M.O. when apartments are burgled) and have been forced open with bodily pressure/implements or have been targeted when left insecure.

Possible Solution - All external doors should be certified to recognised security standards (see Sections 4.1), which are independently proven to reduce the risk of forced entry and thus increase the chances of detection.

All individual apartments should also be secured with a security-certified entrance doorset (also see Section 4.1), to ensure that any offender who may have gained access to the building (e.g. by tailgating, posing as a legitimate visitor etc.) cannot gain further access without drawing the attention of other residents. Doors off internal corridors should not be located in deep recesses, where an offender could operate without fear of detection. There should be no balconies that would be publicly accessible from street level.

- 2.2.3 Glazing within doors and windows has been smashed to gain entry.

Possible Solution – All ground floor/accessible glazing (including in and around doors) should include a laminated pane (see Section 4.3), which forms a much more robust barrier against shattering and penetration. The strength of the laminated glass should be relative to the strength of the door or

window system in which it is fitted. Where possible, the size of any glazed elements within/directly adjacent to doors should be reduced and set well away from locking points.

- 2.2.4 Smashed glazing in windows and doors (mostly to the front of the property with concrete and bricks) to gain entry.

Possible Solution –

- 2.2.5 Posing as a legitimate resident and gaining access to apartment buildings by means of insecure doors or tailgating residents.

Possible Solution –

2.3 Risk Factors – Residential

The typical security risks for a development of this nature are:

- Domestic burglary
- Theft from gardens, sheds or garages
- Criminal damage to dwellings and vehicles
- Theft of, or from, vehicles
- Bogus callers and distraction burglary
- Anti-social behaviour
- Neighbour disputes
- Theft and criminal damage during the construction period
- Unauthorised access to private spaces
- Poor maintenance of access control systems





2.4 Risk Factors - Retail

The typical security risks for a development of this nature are:

- Commercial burglary
- Cash robbery
- Unauthorised access to private spaces/Tailgating
- Shoplifting
- Employee theft
- Theft of customer / staff property
- Criminal damage to property

2.5 Comparing crime rates in the neighbourhood around the site to those in Manchester and Greater Manchester




The rates below relates to crime committed within 500m of the site. England & Wales data was last recorded for January – December 2021.



- 2.5.1 The rate of domestic burglaries per 1000 dwellings is **43% lower** than Manchester as a whole, **26% lower** than Greater Manchester and **25% lower** than England & Wales.
- 2.5.2 The rate of woundings per 1000 dwellings is **4% lower** than Manchester as a whole, **31% higher** than Greater Manchester and **149% higher** than England & Wales.
- 2.5.3 The rate of incidents of criminal damage per 1000 dwellings is **17% lower** than Manchester as a whole, **8% higher** than Greater Manchester and **32% higher** than England & Wales.
- 2.5.4 The rate of incidents of vehicle crime per 1000 dwellings is **140% higher** than Manchester as a whole, **295% higher** than Greater Manchester and **380% higher** than England & Wales.

2.6 Domestic Burglary: Risk Analysis

The data below relates to domestic burglaries committed within 500m of the site.





2.6.1 **Day/Time Range:** The risk of domestic burglary peaks on a Sunday during the evening. Offenders often target properties during evening when it is dark and there is less footfall in the area, giving offenders the perception that they are less likely to be caught or identified.

2.6.2 **Point of Entry:** In the local area the following entry points and MO's have been utilised most frequently:

- Forcing open secure windows and doors using bodily pressure and implements in order to gain access to the property.
- In crimes in which the entry point has been recorded as "unknown" it is likely that offenders have targeted insecure windows and doors.
- Smashed glazing in windows and doors.
- Posing as a legitimate resident and gaining access to apartment buildings by means of insecure doors or tailgating residents.

2.7 Vehicle Crime: Risk Analysis



The data below relates to vehicle crime committed within 500m of the site.



- 2.7.1 **Day/Time Range:** The risk of vehicle is consistently high throughout the week, peaking on a Saturday during the afternoon. Offenders often target vehicles during the afternoon particularly around the city centre where vehicles are often left unattended and out of sight of the owner for long periods of time.

2.8 Non-Domestic Burglary (Manchester Offices): Risk Analysis


The data below relates to non-domestic burglary offences within/against offices, recorded in the Manchester area 2018-2019.



2.8.1 **Day Range:** During the week, the risk of burglary at office premises in Manchester is greatest on Tuesday, Thursday and Sunday.

2.8.2 **Time Range:** During the day, the risk of burglary at Manchester office premises rises into the evening/late at night. Such premises are often targeted at these times when they are closed and unoccupied, meaning offenders can attempt to gain unauthorised access without fear of being disturbed or identified.



2.8.3



2.8.4 **Point of Entry:** The majority of burglaries at offices in Manchester have been committed through doors. Burglaries against office buildings in this area do not appear to be opportunistic, with offenders often bringing tools with them that can be used to force open doors and cut locks. Offenders have also smashed glazed panels in doors and windows to gain entry. A large proportion of burglaries have been committed through 'unknown' and 'legitimate' points of entry, which are likely to have been where offenders (posing as legitimate customers, visitors or employees) have gained unauthorised access to staff only areas (i.e. through insecure doors, tailgating etc.) to steal property.

2.9 Theft (Manchester Offices): Risk Analysis

The data below relates to thefts within/against offices, recorded in the Manchester area 2018-2019.



- 2.9.1 **Day Range:** During the week, the risk of theft at Manchester offices is greatest on Monday and Tuesday and is generally lower over the weekend (when many are shut).
- 2.9.2 **Time Range:** During the day, the risk of theft is concentrated during normal working hours – peaking around midday. During these times, many office workers will take their lunch breaks, leaving unattended property at desks or in insecure areas. Thefts can also often happen at the end of the working day, when members of staff are finishing work and premises is likely to be less secure, such as while cleaning operations are carried out..

3 Layout Appraisal

3.1 Proposed development

- 3.1.1 The proposal is to erect a five storey building comprising of a ground floor use-class E commercial unit (121sqm.) and 5 no. 2 bed apartments at upper floor levels.
- 3.1.2 The building will front onto Spear Street and will feature a commercial unit at ground level (with w/c and store), along with a residential communal entrance, a plant room and a bin store (with an external gated entrance also off Spear Street). The upper floors of the building will house the apartments.

3.2 Positive Aspects of the Proposal

The following proposed features would make a positive contribution to the prevention of crime and fear of crime.

- 3.2.1 The proposal will bring legitimate activity to what appears to be a currently vacant site that is vulnerable to criminal damage and other abuse. Redevelopment with housing and repopulation of the site should help to create a sense of ownership and responsibility and improve informal policing of the area.
- 3.2.2 The layout of upper floor corridors is relatively free of projections or recesses that could impede sight lines. Doors within communal corridors should contain a glazed element to improve informal surveillance. Individual apartment entrance doors are positioned flush with the corridor walls removing the potential for concealment.
- 3.2.3 Cycle stores for residents' use are provided at basement within the building. Entry to the stores must be restricted to genuine cyclists only, on application to the managers of the building. Racks within the enclosures should allow cyclists to lock the frame and both wheels and should be obtained from a Secured by Design-approved supplier (see www.securedbydesign.com for details). An additional cycle store has been located at the rear of the building within the site boundary. The external store should have access control for residents.
- 3.2.4 All of the apartments will have routinely occupied living spaces overlooking the adjacent public realm, which will help to increase natural surveillance in the public realm around the site.
- 3.2.5 The residents' entrances to the building have scope to be laid out with a double door entry system, creating a lobby area and inner access-controlled doors to allow further entry to the inner hall and stair well. This helps to discourage tailgating into the blocks, which is the most common method of entry for intruders.
- 3.2.6 The proposed apartments will be provided above street level, meaning that residents' possessions cannot be easily observed and unauthorised entry is more effectively prevented. This also reduces the potential impacts of excessive noise, nuisance and anti-social behaviour (particularly at night).
- 3.2.7 The proposed development provides the opportunity to include security features built into the design and construction of the building and avoid the need for obtrusive retrofitted security measures that can appear hostile and increase the fear of crime. Security measures carefully incorporated into the design can ensure the building is reasonably secure, without visibly announcing that the design was concerned about crime.

3.3 Changes Needed and Recommendations

The following points have been identified for further consideration and would need to be addressed for Design for Security to support the proposed scheme.

- 3.3.1 Access into the buildings should be controlled by a video entry phone system (with the picture viewable on the phone unit, rather than on a television set) so that residents can vet visitors before allowing them access into the building. There should be no unrestricted trade access into the building.
- 3.3.2 Postal workers should not be allowed unfettered access throughout the development. Postal workers should be granted access only to the lobby space where the post-box is located.
- 3.3.3 The development should be covered with a comprehensive CCTV system covering the main entrances, elevations of the buildings and entrance to the cycle store.

-
- 3.3.4 The proposed commercial unit should have the infrastructure for the easily installation of an alarm, CCTV system, and access control, to allow a future tenant to install these during the fitout of these units.
 - 3.3.5 The gates to the external bin store area should be to a height of 2.5m. The area should also be covered by the building CCTV system.
 - 3.3.6 It is highly recommended that all of the physical security measures listed below are incorporated into the scheme. Integrated, risk-commensurate security measures aim to place secure physical barriers or surveillance in the path of the criminal – making crime harder to commit and raising the risk of detection and possible capture, as well as promoting a feeling of safety in residents and visitors, as well as staff and customers.

4 Physical Security (Residential)

In addition to the layout issues highlighted in section 3, the following checklist (sections 4-7) forms the physical security requirements for this scheme to achieve Secured by Design accreditation if required.

4.1 Doors

- ☐ External communal access doors must be compliant with and certified to BS PAS 24, STS201, or LPS 1175 SR2, including a lock capable of being operated via an electronic access control system. The communal entrance doors should be self-closing and secured with a multi-point electronic lock and capable of being operated via an electronic access control system, these features should be permitted under the scope of the certification. Access into the build should be controlled by a video entry phone system (with the picture viewable on the phone unit, rather than on a television set) so that residents can vet visitors before allowing them access into the building. There should be no unrestricted trade access into the building.
- ☐ Where secure postal lobbies are to be created, the secondary communal door must be to the same specification as the outer door - certified to BS PAS 24, STS201, or LPS 1175 SR2, including a lock capable of being operated via an electronic access control system.
- ☐ Apartment entrance doors must be compliant with and certified to BS PAS 24, STS201, or LPS 1175 SR2. Apartment entrance doors must have a door viewer.
- ☐ Construction of internal walls surrounding internal apartment entrance doors (600mm either side of the door set) should incorporate a resilient layer to reduce the risk of anyone breaking through the wall to access the locking mechanism. The resilient layer should be timber (minimum thickness of 9mm) or expanded metal.
- ☐ External escape-only doors (as with external doors in general) should be certified to BS PAS 24, or LPS 1175 SR2. It is crucial that the door ironmongery is permitted for use on these doors under the security certification of the product.

4.2 Windows

- ☐ Ground floor and easily accessible windows must be compliant with and certified to BS PAS 24.
- ☐ Ground floor and easily accessible opening lights (escape requirements permitting) must be key-lockable and have fixed/lockable opening restrictors (not releasable from the outside) limited to 100mm.

4.3 Glazing & Building Fabric

- ☐ Glazing to a height of 2400mm (or if otherwise accessible) must incorporate at least one pane of glass with a 1.5mm PVB interlayer (e.g. 7.5mm laminated glass), or a glass rated as P4A under EN 356. The remaining pane in a double-glazed unit may be toughened glass.
- ☐ There should be a block work wall or material of similar strength (e.g. welded-steel mesh) behind or within any new cladding/insulated panels to the building, to a minimum height of 2000mm from ground level, to ensure that the fabric of the building itself is not vulnerable to attack.

4.4 Alarms

- ☐ If an alarm is installed, then it should comply with either:
 - BS EN 50131 and PD 6662 for wired systems
 - BS 6799 for wireless systems
- ☐ If an alarm is not to be provided, there should be a 13amp, non-switched fuse spur to allow future residents to connect an alarm.

4.5 Access Control

- ☐ Access control systems should be operable by swipe card or fob, and not numeric keypads. The following areas/doors should operate on access control:
 - Communal entrances
 - Communal areas
 - Basement Parking
 - Bicycle stores
 - Circulation cores
 - Courtyard areas
 - Staff only areas
 - Parcel rooms

4.6 Basement Bicycle store

- ☐ Doors into the cycle parking area(s) must be certified to BS PAS 24, STS202, or LPS 1175 SR2, including a lock capable of being operated via an electronic access control system, with access restricted to registered residents (i.e. genuine bicycle owners).
- ☐ Cycle stands should either be U-profile or Sheffield style stands. If rack storage is used it should be possible for both wheels and the frame to be secured.
- ☐ Externally positioned cycle stands should be illuminated to a high standard.

4.7 Lighting

- ☐ External lighting must be provided to pedestrian routes within the development in accordance with BS 5489. Lighting should be taken from a variety of sources and levels (i.e. columns, up lighting) to provide a greater level of coverage and avoid shadows/pooling.
- ☐ Fittings should produce 'white' light, as opposed to yellow/orange light. Metal halide (or bulbs with a comparable output) should be used, as these offer superior colour rendition over alternatives such as high- and low-pressure sodium bulbs.
- ☐ Dusk 'til dawn lights, operated by photoelectric cell/daylight sensor, should be installed to all external doors.
- ☐ Elevations of the buildings should be illuminated, particularly the commercial units and the clubhouse.

4.8 CCTV

- ☐ Any CCTV system that may be used within this proposal will require certain specifications and intelligent placement of cameras to compliment the design of the development. Designers should consider the following points when planning a CCTV strategy:
- ☐ CCTV systems (and lighting that support them) require regular cleaning and maintenance to remain effective.
- ☐ Where necessary cameras that are vulnerable to damage should be protected from attack either by relocation to a higher level and using a bigger lens to achieve the view required or through the fitting of a vandal resistant housing.
- ☐ With regards to the retention of footage, the police prefer quality over quantity. The overall retention period should be dictated by what the system is designed to achieve, though it would be better to have good quality images over a 14-day period than poor ones over a 30-day period.
- ☐ Procedures for recovery of recordings are recommended to be established (e.g. trained staff / the CCTV system instruction manual to be readily available). This is to ensure that the images produced will be of

an acceptable standard that will allow for identification of an individual which will stand up to scrutiny in court.

- ☐ **Acceptable Standard** - this generally requires a resolution of 720x576 pixels at a real time frame rate of 25 frames per second. (N.B. Both the camera and DVR must be capable of this – if the camera will only send low resolution images, then it does not matter how high the resolution of the recording unit is).
- ☐ **Identification** – One of three levels of field of view. To identify an individual, the image must capture no less than 120% of the field of view (at least from the top of the individuals head to their knees). The remaining two levels of field of view are 'Overview' and 'Recognition', which whilst effective for observational purposes, are less likely to result in the identification of a person/offender.
- ☐ The intelligent placement of cameras helps to provide clear facial identification of individuals.
- ☐ Any public open space or amenity areas not under the ownership of residents should be subject to an effective maintenance contract. This should ensure that all damage is rectified in a timely manner, and that any such space will not be detrimental to its surroundings.

5 Physical Security (Non-Residential)

5.1 Doors

- ☐ The main entrance doorset must be compliant with and certified to BS PAS 24, STS 202 or LPS 1175 SR2. Any letterbox within the doorset must be located a minimum of 400mm away from internal handle and locking hardware.
- ☐ The internal doorset/frame to the store should be solid-core (min. 44mm thick), self-closing, with 3 hinges and deadlock so that it can be secured when not in use.

5.2 Windows & Shutters

- ☐ All windows should be security-certified to BS PAS 24 where possible and should be non-opening. All other window designs/dimensions should take account of the requirements of the above standards, as certified products can carry dimensional restrictions. Any curtain walling panels should include laminated glazing (see below) and should be securely fixed.
- ☐ Any shutters should be certified to LPS 1175 SR2 (or SR1 if perforated laths are required) and installed in accordance with manufacturer's instructions. If shutters are to be installed they should either be provided internally or, if they are to be externally mounted, shutter boxes and guides built into the fabric of the building (where they would be less visually intrusive and less vulnerable to damage).

5.3 Glazing & Building Fabric

- ☐ All glazing must incorporate at least one pane of glass with a 1.5mm PVB interlayer (e.g. 7.5mm laminated glass), or a glass rated as P4A under EN 356. The remaining pane in a double glazed unit may be toughened glass.
- ☐ There should be a block work wall (or material of similar strength e.g. welded-steel mesh) behind any cladding to the building, to a minimum height of 2000mm from external ground level, to ensure that the fabric of the building itself is not vulnerable to attack. Internal walls between the residential portion of the building and the ground floor commercial premises should either be of robust masonry construction or should incorporate timber sheathing (minimum 9mm thick) or expanded metal, in order to ensure that the building fabric is not vulnerable to attack/penetration.

5.4 Internal Security

- ☐ All back-of-house/staff areas should not be publicly accessible. Internal doors to storage rooms, staff rooms or offices should be solid-core (minimum 44mm thick) and self-closing - fitted with auditable access controls (i.e. proximity readers or swipe cards) or secured with keys. Staff should only be allowed access to areas required for their work. Keys/passes should only be carried if required for duties and should be accounted for at all times.

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- ☐ The office premises should have a staffed reception desk adjacent to the main entrance and all visitors should report to the reception for vetting by staff before gaining access. The main entrance door should be capable of being controlled remotely by reception staff if required (e.g. into the evening/at night) to prevent unauthorised access. Any internal doors/frames to individual offices should be solid core (minimum 44mm thick) and key-lockable so that they can be secured when unoccupied.
 - ☐ Any electric locking system to be used throughout the premises should be fully auditable (i.e. allows the retention of data, such as who accessed where and when), to allow for a better investigation into any incidents. Any staff cards/fobs should be capable of being easily and quickly activated/disabled to ensure that mis-use is prevented.

5.5 Alarm

- ☐ A comprehensive intruder alarm system should be installed to cover the premises, linked to contacts on all external doors and PIR detectors. It is strongly recommended that any alarm system is monitored, with a response facility (i.e. linked to an Alarm Receiving Centre, who will alert the key holder or a security patrol team).

5.6 Lighting

- ☐ External lighting must be provided to the exterior of the unit and the surrounding public realm, in accordance with BS 5489. Dusk 'til dawn lights, operated by photoelectric cell/daylight sensor, should be installed to all external doors.
- ☐ Fittings should produce 'white' light (which offer superior colour rendition), as opposed to yellow/orange light, and fixtures must not be positioned where they may provide climbing aids up to high level windows. Electrical and architectural layouts should be developed together to avoid this.

5.7 CCTV

Any CCTV system that may be used within this proposal will require certain specifications and intelligent placement of cameras to compliment the design of the development. Designers should consider the following points when planning a CCTV strategy:

- ☐ CCTV systems (and lighting that support them) require regular cleaning and maintenance to remain effective.
- ☐ Where necessary cameras that are vulnerable to damage should be protected from attack either by relocation to a higher level and using a bigger lens to achieve the view required or through the fitting of a vandal resistant housing.
- ☐ With regards to the retention of footage, the police prefer quality over quantity. The overall retention period should be dictated by what the system is designed to achieve, though it would be better to have good quality images over a 14-day period than poor ones over a 30-day period.
- ☐ Procedures for recovery of recordings are recommended to be established (e.g. trained staff / the CCTV system instruction manual to be readily available). This is to ensure that the images produced will be of an *acceptable standard* that will allow for *identification* of an individual which will stand up to scrutiny in court.

Acceptable Standard - this generally requires a resolution of 720x576 pixels at a real time frame rate of 25 frames per second. (N.B. Both the camera and DVR must be capable of this – if the camera will only send low resolution images then it does not matter how high the resolution of the recording unit is).

Identification – One of three levels of field of view. To identify an individual, the image must capture no less than 120% of the field of view (at least from the top of the individuals head to their knees). The remaining two levels of field of view are *overview* and *recognition*, which whilst effective for observational purposes, are less likely to result in the identification of a person/offender.

- The intelligent placement of cameras helps to provide clear facial identification of individuals. Suitable locations would be: *the commercial unit frontage, the main entrance to the unit, internal circulation areas, all sales counters/till positions and any customer seating areas.*

6 Management & Maintenance

- 6.1.1 The upkeep of a development over its lifetime can be crucial to the level of security and safety within. Aspects of a development, which are left to deteriorate, have the potential to attract further crime – a process known as ‘the broken window theory’. A maintenance plan should be drawn up to address issues such as:
- Litter removal
 - Repair to communal areas (lighting, signage, access controls)
- 6.1.2 Any public open space or amenity areas not under the ownership of residents should be subject to an effective maintenance contract. This should ensure that all damage is rectified in a timely manner, and that any such space will not be detrimental to its surroundings.
- 6.1.3 A comprehensive security regime for the individual commercial unit must be prepared and remain in place for the day-to-day running of the site. There should be regular reviews/exercises to ensure that it remains accurate, workable, and up to date. All staff should understand and accept the need for security measures, and it should be made easy for people to raise concerns or report observations. The operating/maintenance plan should focus on issues such as:
- Opening and closing the building, including staff arrival and departure.
 - Management of deliveries (servicing activities should not require any service doors to remain open unattended for prolonged periods).
 - Repairing damaged external and internal fittings, particularly security features e.g. access control systems, alarm systems, CCTV cameras, and lighting.
 - Cleaning and prompt removal of graffiti and litter; and
 - Refuse collection arrangements.
- 6.1.4 All high value equipment within publicly accessible areas (e.g. computers, televisions, tools etc.) should be properly marked and securely fixed or stored to deter damage/theft. An accurate record should be maintained which logs all such items.
- 6.1.5 Refuse collection arrangements should not require bins to be left in the street for extended periods/overnight. Servicing activities should not require any service doors to remain open unattended for prolonged periods.
- 6.1.6 Adequate signage should be deployed in all areas not only to direct people throughout the building, but also to deter unauthorised access to staff-only/back-of-house areas.

7 Management & Maintenance

- 7.1.1 The upkeep of a development over its lifetime can be crucial to the level of security and safety within. Aspects of a development, which are left to deteriorate, have the potential to attract further crime – a process known as ‘the broken window theory’. A maintenance plan should be drawn up to address issues such as:
- Litter removal
 - Repair to communal areas (lighting, signage, access controls)
 - Trimming and pruning to shrubs and trees
- 7.1.2 Any public open space or amenity areas not under the ownership of residents should be subject to an effective maintenance contract. This should ensure that all damage is rectified in a timely manner, and that any such space will not be detrimental to its surroundings.

8 Construction

- 8.1.1 Untidy sites and their surroundings can be littered with debris accessible to vandals who often use loose materials as missiles to commit crime. The client should take measures appropriate to secure their site

during construction, and control pedestrian and vehicular access in to and out of the site curtilage. It is also recommended that the contractor on this scheme is a member of the 'Considerate Constructors Scheme', who has committed to be a considerate and good neighbour, as well as clean, respectful, safe, environmentally conscious, responsible and accountable.

- 8.1.2 Site security contractors should be SIA (Security Industry Authority) approved to ensure professional standards are adhered to (please see <http://www.sia.homeoffice.gov.uk/pages/acs-intro.aspx> for more details).

9 Useful References

9.1 Secured by Design (SBD)

- 9.1.1 Secured by Design focuses on crime prevention at the design, layout and construction stages of homes and commercial premises and promotes the use of security standards for a wide range of applications and products. To apply for Secured by Design certification for your development, visit our online application form at: <http://www.designforsecurity.org/secured-by-design/sbd-accreditation/>

A Contact register

Date	Contact With	Summary of Contact
27/02/2023	Material Studio Architects	CIS application received
14/03/2023	Material Studio Architects	CIS confirmed
23/03/2023	GMP	Invoice issued
11/04/2023	DfS	Site visit
18/04/2023	DfS	CIS completed
XX/04/2023	DfS	CIS Issued

B Associated Documents

This report is based on the following drawings and supplementary information submitted by the applicant.

Drawing No.	Drawing Title	Date	Rev
LP2110_3_001	Location Plan	12/12/22	
LP2110_3_002	Existing Block Site Plan	12/12/22	
LP2110_3_003	Proposed Block Site Plan	12/12/22	
LP2110_3_004	Existing Topographical Plan	12/12/22	
LP2110_3_005	Proposed Topographical Plan	12/12/22	
LP2110_3_199	Proposed Basement Plan	12/12/22	
LP2110_3_200	Proposed Ground Floor Plan	12/12/22	
LP2110_3_201	Proposed First Floor Plan	12/12/22	
LP2110_3_202	Proposed Second Floor Plan	12/12/22	
LP2110_3_203	Proposed Third Floor Plan	12/12/22	
LP2110_3_204	Proposed Fourth Floor Plan	12/12/22	
LP2110_3_205	Proposed Fifth Floor Plan	12/12/22	
LP2110_3_206	Proposed Roof Plan	12/12/22	
LP2110_3_300	Proposed Front Elevation	12/12/22	
LP2110_3_301	Proposed Side Elevation	12/12/22	
LP2110_3_302	Proposed rear party wall Elevation	12/12/22	
LP2110_3_303	Proposed long party wall Elevation	26/10/21	

PLEASE NOTE - In the event of any subsequent material changes to the scheme, it will be necessary for Design for Security to reassess the comments made within this report.

C CIS Version History

Version	Revisions Made	Date
A		

D Glossary

Burglary Resistance Standards

BS PAS 23-1, 1999

General performance requirements for door / window assemblies.

A performance standard for door-sets and windows, which certifies that a particular door-set is fit for purpose. Door products must also have BS PAS 24 certification.

BS PAS 24-1, 2012

General security performance requirements for door/window assemblies.

An attack test standard for door-sets and windows. This is the minimum police requirement for Secured by Design dwellings, and is also applicable to French/double doors, and sliding doors.

ENV 1627-30 (Security Ratings WK1 to WK6)

Windows, doors, shutters - Burglar resistance Requirements and classification

The classification system used in ENV 1627-30 is aimed at the commercial market and is based on five elements:

- a) Resistance of glazing*
- b) Performance of hardware*
- c) Resistance to static loading*
- d) Resistance to dynamic loading*
- e) Burglary resistance by manual intervention*

LPS 1175 (Security Ratings 1 to 6)

Specification for testing and classifying the burglary resistance of building components

This includes doors, shutters, garage doors and grilles typically for commercial premises and higher risk domestic premises and is acceptable to the ABI and the Police. The standard has 6 levels, 6 being the highest, with levels 1 and 2 equivalent in many respects to BS PAS 24 and BS 7950.

STS201 Issue 4: 2012

Enhanced security requirements for door-sets and door assemblies for dwellings to satisfy the requirements of PAS23 and PAS24

STS202 Issue 3: 2011

Requirements for burglary resistance of construction products including hinged, pivoted, folding or sliding door-sets, windows, curtain walling, security grilles, garage doors and shutters.

This specifies a broadly similar range of attack tools and times to those specified at the lower levels of LPS1175.

EN 356, 2000 (Ratings P1A to P8A)

Glass in building. Security glazing. Testing and classification of resistance against manual attack.

A performance standard for manual attacks on glazing. P2A is comparable to the performance of a

6.8mm laminated glass, and P4A to that of a 9.5mm laminated glass.

Commonly Used Acronyms

CIT

Cash in transit (refers to vehicles, personnel and routines).

CPTED

Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design

CRS

Crime Reduction Specialist. Sometimes known as CPO (Crime Prevention Officer)

INPT

Integrated Neighbourhood Policing Team.

PVB / PolyVinyl Butyral (Glazing interlayer)

A commonly used interlayer used in the production of laminated glass.

LPCB (Loss Prevention Certification Board)

A brand of the BRE Global (Building Research Establishment) family. The LPCB work with insurers, Government, police, designers, manufacturers, contractors and end users to develop methods of assessing performance and reliability of security products to ensure their fitness for purpose.

UKAS (United Kingdom Accreditation Service)

The sole national accreditation body recognised by government to assess, against internationally agreed standards, organisations that provide certification, testing, inspections and calibration services.

Useful Websites

Design for Security

www.designforsecurity.org

Secured by Design

www.securedbydesign.com

RIBA Product Selector

www.ribaproductselector.com

LPCB – Red Book Live

www.redbooklive.com

Crime Reduction (Home Office)

www.crimereduction.homeoffice.gov.uk

DAC (Design Against Crime) Solution Centre

www.designagainstcrime.org

Building for Life

www.buildingforlife.org

CLG (Communities and Local Government)

www.communities.gov.uk