



CRIME IMPACT STATEMENT

Unit 1 Millow Street

A snooker centre includes elevation alterations.

For: **MUSE ARCHITECTS**

Version A: **15/02/24**

Ref: **2024/0020/CIS/01**

Greater Manchester Police

design**for**security

Unit 1 Millow Street

2024/0020/CIS/01

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Development Supported with further security requirements

This development has been assessed against the principles of 'Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design', in order to reduce the opportunities for crime and the fear of crime. The proposed scheme has been found acceptable and if submitted to the local planning department in its current form we will support the application.

The layout of the proposed scheme is considered acceptable, as long as the issues discussed in more detail within Section 3.3 of this report are addressed, namely:

- Robust control of access in/and around the buildings
- External Lighting
- External & internal CCTV coverage

If these issues can be addressed as described within the report and the other physical security measures are incorporated, I would be happy to support the development.

Please note: Greater Manchester Police Design for Security will recommend to the local planning authority that a planning condition for Secured by Design certification is added that reflects the physical security specification listed within Appendix 2 of this report.

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1 Visual Audit

The development site is indicated by the red outline on the plan adjacent and is supported with existing site context photographs taken around the site.

The site contains a commercial unit within the railway arches off Millow St.



The archways Millow Street have historically been synonymous with light industrial uses, however more recently they are being used for leisure and gym activities. Surface grade car parking fronts onto the units which is accessed via a vehicle gate, at the time of the visit the gate had been damaged.

To the immediate south of the proposed site is the rear of the Parkers Hotel building and Corporation St apartments.

To the east of the site is Red Bank road which provides access to Cheetham Hill area and the nearby Green Quarter residential development.

Given the close proximity to the City the car parks are popular for city centre commuters and event goers. However, there is limited on-site presence at the car parks and cars parked for a particular length of time out of sight are easy and attractive targets for criminal activities. At the time of the site visit it was not clear if there are any control measures / restrictions on the car park.

The immediate area and landscaping is in a state of disrepair and are targets for anti-social behaviour and fly-tipping.



2 Crime Statistics & Analysis

All data below is based on crimes recorded between 1st February 2023 to 31st January 2024.

2.1 Crime Summary

Figure 1: Recorded Crime within 500m of Site

Domestic Burglary	Non-Domestic Burglary	Criminal Damage	Less Serious Wounding	Theft	Robbery	Serious Wounding	Theft from Motor Vehicle	Theft of Motor Vehicle	Bicycle Theft
41	79	194	929	362	63	19	378	42	37

- 2.1.1 The overall crime rate in the local area over the last 12 months has been high, which is to be expected given the site's location in the city centre. The highest recorded crimes have been less serious wounding, theft and vehicle crime. These types of crime are typical of those experienced in or within close proximity of district, town or city centres – where there is often a concentration of retail, commercial and licensed premises, leading to a concentration of crime and disorder issues. While these offences have occurred throughout the local area, there is a high concentration of offences occurring to the south and southwest of the proposed site where the northern quarter of the city centre is located. This area has a high volume of licenced premises, restaurants and retail units.
- 2.1.2 Physical assaults, harassment and public order offences have been the highest recorded less serious woundings, with the majority of offences having taken place in the evening and during the early hours of the morning. A higher volume of incidents is typically experienced between Friday and Sunday – when more people visit the city and attend licensed premises.
- 2.1.3 The proposed site is located within a short walking distance to the northern quarter where the majority of thefts have taken place. Offenders have used pick pocketing and distraction techniques to obtain mobile phones, purses / wallets and bags, as well as targeting insecure items on benches and tabletops within restaurants, licenced premises and on the streets.
- 2.1.4 Theft from motor vehicle has been the highest recorded vehicle crime taking place. Offenders have in most targeted vehicles in private car parks and on street parking. Broken glazing has been the most common entry point, with personal items removed from vehicles, as well as offenders using tools in order to remove vehicle registration plates.

2.2 Common Use-Specific M.O.s (Modus Operandi)

- 2.2.1 Vehicles parked on the street were targeted for theft and criminal damage.
Possible Solution - Any arrangement for off-site car parking should utilise sites approved under the 'Park Mark' safer parking scheme.
- 2.2.2 Implements were used to force locks on doors and force shutters upwards.
Possible Solution - All external doors should be certified to recognised security standards, which are independently proven to reduce the risk of forced entry and thus increase the chances of detection. Security-certified doors are the best long-term measure to address this risk and can be obtained to suit virtually all operational requirements. Good use of perimeter boundaries, lighting and CCTV can deter criminals from attempting this, by discouraging access to private or concealed areas
- 2.2.3 Walls and roofs were penetrated using tools / implements or bodily pressure.
Possible Solution – The design of buildings should not include features that would allow them to be easily climbed and, in this respect, careful consideration of adjacent boundaries, rainwater downpipes, canopies, trees, lighting columns, pallets, bins etc. is essential. Avoid locating stored materials adjacent to buildings where they may provide a step up. Roofing and wall construction should use a system approved by Secured by Design or incorporate reinforcement such as expanded metal mesh.
- 2.2.4 Theft of materials and tools from storage and service yards.
Possible Solution – The site boundaries should be formed of robust fencing with the number of gates / entry points kept to a minimum. Overhanging tree branches and other vegetation should be removed or trimmed back. The location of stored materials and equipment within the service yard can create blind

spots that are difficult to survey and obscure the coverage of cameras. Good management practises will be essential and consider providing ground markings to designate where storage is and is not acceptable. The condition of fencing along the perimeter should be regularly inspected for damage/attack.

- 2.2.5 Offenders posing as legitimate customers, visitors or employees have gained unauthorised access to staff only areas to steal property.

Possible Solution – There should be a secure area for staff to store their belongings while at work and all staff-only, back-of-house areas should be secured to prevent unauthorised public access (see Section 4.4).

- 2.2.6 Shutters have been prised open to target doors/windows behind them.

Possible Solution - To minimise the risk of offenders forcing shutters:

- *security-certified roller shutters (to LPS 1175) should be used wherever possible;*
- *where the size limits the availability of certified shutters, CCTV and lighting should be deployed to increase the security of these larger openings.*

- 2.2.7 Forcing open secure windows and doors (mostly front doors and fire exit doors) using bodily pressure and implements in order to gain entry to the premises.




Possible Solution - All external doors should be certified to recognised security standards (see Section 4.1), which are independently proven to reduce the risk of forced entry and thus increase the chances of detection. Security-certified doors are the best long-term measure to address this risk and can be obtained to suit virtually all operational requirements.

2.3 Risk Factors – Leisure Centres

- Burglary
- Theft of user/staff belongings
- Other theft from premises
- Theft of/from parked cars
- Uncontrolled access
- Criminal damage to property and vehicles
- Arson
- Violence towards staff and other users
- Cycle security
- Cash robbery/attacks on vending machines
- Anti-social behaviour
- Loitering groups
- Theft and criminal damage during the construction period

2.4 Non-Domestic Burglary Retail Facilities: Risk Analysis

The data below relates to non-domestic burglary offences within / against retail facilities, recorded in the Manchester area.





2.4.1 **Day / Time Range:** The risk of burglary at retail premises in Manchester is consistently high throughout the week, peaking on a Wednesday. During the day the risk of burglary at retail premises increases in the early hours of the morning (12am – 6am). Burglaries at commercial premises frequently take place during the night, when they are closed and the streets are quiet. Offenders perceive the risk of being witnessed or apprehended at its lowest.

2.4.2 **Point of Entry:** In the local area the following entry points and MO's have been the occurred most frequently:

- Smashed glazing in windows and doors to gain entry to premises.
- Posing as a legitimate customer and tailgating / exploitation insecure doors to gain access to staff only areas.
- Forcing open shutters using bodily force and implements to gain entry.
- Opening secure doors using bodily pressure and implements to gain entry.

2.5 Theft Retail Facilities: Risk Analysis


The data below relates to thefts within / against retail facilities, recorded in the Manchester area.



- 2.5.1 **Day / Time Range:** The risk of theft from retail premises in Manchester is consistently high throughout the week, peaking on a Friday and Saturday. During the day the risk of theft at retail premises peaks in the late morning and into the evening (10:30am – 8pm). Small, personal items are being targeted, mostly mobile phones, purses and bags.

2.6 Non-Domestic Burglary Leisure Facilities: Risk Analysis

The data below relates to non-domestic burglary offences within/against leisure facilities (including leisure centres, sports centres and gyms), recorded in the Greater Manchester area.





2.6.1 **Day/ Time Range:** During the week, the risk of burglary at Greater Manchester leisure facilities peaks on Thursday/Friday and is slightly lower on Saturday. During the day, the risk of burglary peaks during the late afternoon/early evening and during the early hours of the morning. During the late afternoon/early evening, leisure facilities are often at their busiest, meaning offenders can take advantage of busy staff and anonymity among higher numbers of legitimate customers. Offenders often target commercial properties at night, when they are often closed (or operate with a reduced number of on-site staff), it is dark and the streets/areas in which they are typically located are quieter than during the day – meaning offenders perceive a lower risk of being observed or detected.

2.6.2 **Point of Entry:** The following entry points and MO's have been utilised most frequently by offenders targeting Greater Manchester leisure facilities:

- Doors and windows have been forced open by offenders using bodily pressure and implements.
- The glazing within doors and windows has been smashed to gain entry.
- Where the point of entry is 'legitimate' or 'unknown', this is likely to have been where offenders have posed as legitimate customers to gain access to premises when they are open, before targeting insecure doors, tailgating or using force to open internal doors to restricted areas without being noticed.

2.7 Theft Leisure Facilities: Risk Analysis



The data below relates to thefts within/against leisure facilities (including leisure centres, sports centres and gyms), recorded in the Greater Manchester area.



- 2.7.1 **Day/ Time Range:** During the week, the risk of theft at Greater Manchester leisure facilities peaks on Tuesday, but remains consistently high throughout the week. During the day, the risk of theft rises in the afternoon and peaks in the evening. This is when leisure facilities are typically at their busiest and the opportunities to offend are greater. Personal property belonging to staff and customers, such as mobile phones and cash, are the most routinely targeted items – taking place most often in changing/locker rooms and staff-only areas.

2.8 Vehicle Crime: Risk Analysis

The data below relates to vehicle crime committed within 500m of the site.



- 2.8.1 **Day/Time Range:** The risk of vehicle crime peaks on Saturday in the evening (20:00-22:00). Offenders tend to target vehicles in the evening when they tend to be left unattended and out of sight of the owners for long periods of time, creating a perceived low risk opportunity.

3 Layout Appraisal

3.1 Proposed development

- 3.1.1 Change of Use intending to establish a Snooker Centre (Sui Generis), includes elevation alterations to remove shutters and introduce a new shop front. Site has one main gated entrance via car park, visitors then make their way to the unit with no other public entrances.

3.2 Positive Aspects of the Proposal

The following proposed features would make a positive contribution to the prevention of crime and fear of crime.

- 3.2.1 The proposal will offer a new use within the area and help foster new business relationships within the area between different working groups.
- 3.2.2 The proposal will create a new leisure destination point for the area bringing in a new diverse range of people to the area, thus helping to continue to repopulate this part of the city and generate activity throughout the day and at weekends. Additional activity associated with the site will help support informal policing and natural surveillance.
- 3.2.3 The arch will present active frontages to the street, helping to enliven the street scene and provide useful natural surveillance over the surrounding public realm.
- 3.2.4 The proposed development provides the opportunity to include security features built into the design and construction of the premises and avoid the need for obtrusive retrofitted security measures that can increase the fear of crime. Security measures carefully incorporated into the design can ensure the buildings are reasonably secure, without visibly announcing that the design was concerned about crime.

3.3 Changes Needed and Recommendations

The following points have been identified for further consideration and would need to be addressed for Design for Security to support the proposed scheme.

- 3.3.1 **Essential:** Lighting should provide good visual guidance and orientation, and support visibility for pedestrians and for motorists. The proposals are to incorporate a lighting scheme that will distribute illumination evenly around the external entrance area and car park without areas of shadowing or pooling and work coherently with the wider security requirements of the site such as CCTV.
- 3.3.2 **Essential:** A CCTV system should be incorporated into the proposals which pick up external and internal areas: Car park / External entrance / Entrance lobby / All games rooms.
- 3.3.3 Areas restricted to staff should be clearly signed to ensure that patrons cannot use the excuse of getting lost for accessing areas restricted to staff.
- 3.3.4 Replacements made to the external fittings of the building (i.e., doors, windows, glazing, shutters) it is highly recommended that they are certified to the standards in the following section (4 -Physical Security).
- 3.3.5 Staff lockers should be provided so that staff can safely store personal items during the working day.
- 3.3.6 The cash management strategy at the end of a trading day should be robust and remove the opportunity for crime and theft of cash. Consideration should be given to using a Cash & Valuables in Transit company to collect takings at the end of the day, reducing the risk to staff carrying this out presently and reducing the opportunities for theft.
- 3.3.7 Signage should be provided communicating that no cash is stored in the venue overnight.
- 3.3.8 It is essential that all the physical security measures listed below are incorporated into the scheme as a whole. Integrated, risk-commensurate security measures aim to place secure physical barriers or surveillance in the path of the criminal – making crime harder to commit and raising the risk of detection and possible capture, as well as promoting a feeling of safety in users.

3.4 Internal Layout & Security – Further recommendations

- 3.4.1 Restaurants/cafes/bars can, if poorly managed, generate crime for the following reasons:

- **Opportunities** - Large numbers of people congregating in premises, generating opportunities for crime. Unlike on-street populations, patrons are stationary for long periods of time, making them easier to target.
- **Lack of attention** - The movement of people, noise, social interaction and other factors mean patrons can be easily distracted.
- **Cohesion** – Particularly during busy periods, the large numbers and wide variety of groups of people that tend to frequent premises means that such a venue would lack 'community territoriality' (i.e. regular customers displaying an awareness of and care for the environment around them). This can limit any self-policing that might otherwise occur.
- **Customer turnover** – High turnover with high levels of customer movement within an establishment, are more likely to allow offenders to go unnoticed.
- **Valuable goods** – Often available and possibly on show, a particular problem in seating areas. Patrons are likely to carry small, valuable, concealable goods – such as mobile phones, purses/wallets, keys etc.
- **Stealth** - Busy venues provide the anonymity necessary to commit offences.

3.4.2 The internal security and layout of the premises should be carefully considered, so as to maximise surveillance over customers and reduce the opportunities for criminals to exploit. It is highly recommended that the following good practice principles are adopted where applicable, in order to minimise the issues highlighted above:

3.4.3 The entrance to the premises must be effectively managed at busy periods to control numbers, ensure safe access/egress and avoid potential conflicts arising. Customers entering/leaving the premises should be easily observed by staff.

3.4.4 The correct size and category of safe should be determined by an assessment of prospective takings and to meet insurance needs. Consideration should also be given to a chute deposit safe (certified to LPS 1183) behind the counter area.


3.4.5 Internal access doors/frames to all other storage/cellar rooms etc. should also be solid-core (min. 44mm thick) and fitted with either auditable access controls (i.e. proximity readers or swipe cards) or secured with key operated locks (carried by staff only if required for duties and accounted for at all times) to secure them when unoccupied. All staff should understand and accept the need for security measures and should be trained to be vigilant and to report any suspicious behaviour.

3.4.6 It should not be possible for patrons of the premises to gain unauthorised access to the adjacent office reception/lobby area or the upper floors of the building, or vice versa. Any doors between unit and the office reception/lobby area should be certified to BS PAS 24 or LPS 1175 SR2 and should be self-closing with a multi-point electronic lock permitted as part of the certification, capable of being operated via staff key-fob during normal working hours and be securely locked and alarmed at all other times.

3.4.7 Consideration should be given to a high and wide service counter, which increases the distance between staff and any potentially aggressive patrons and aids surveillance of all parts of the premises. Tills should be positioned away from customers' reach, but preferably fronting towards customers. Casual access to the rear of the service counter should be prevented (e.g. with a lockable hatch that cannot be easily scaled). Sufficient levels of service staff should be provided at busy periods to reduce waiting times and the potential for frustration, aggression and conflict.

3.4.8 Staff should have clear views of the W/Cs to monitor their use. The internal layout the premises should be generally uncluttered with few places for concealment, allowing staff to monitor customer behaviour. The precise arrangement of internal furnishings should aid circulation and aim to achieve a balance between intimacy and visibility.

3.4.9 It is highly recommended that customer tables are fitted with Chelsea Clips, to reduce the opportunities for theft (see below).



Operating policy

3.4.10 An 'operating policy' should be drawn up, which includes:

- Location and management of the smoking area.
- A procedure for making the premises secure after customers have left so that counting and securing the takings can be carried out in a secure environment.
- A procedure for staff leaving and securing the premises so that staff safety is not compromised.
- Security (door policy; door staff; staff training; CCTV cameras - monitoring and recording facilities, and their locations; intruder alarm; and cash storage/management);
- Fire safety, including clearing designated escape routes of all obstacles;
- Noise management; and,
- Servicing and waste management (in a secure location) arrangements, avoiding the disposal of glass late at night which might disturb residents at nearby accommodation.

3.4.11 It is essential that all of the physical security measures listed below are incorporated into the scheme. Integrated, risk-commensurate security measures aim to place secure physical barriers or surveillance in the path of the criminal – making crime harder to commit and raising the risk of detection and possible capture, as well as promoting a feeling of safety in customers and staff.

3.5 Internal Layout & Security – Further recommendations

3.5.1 Leisure & Sports uses can, if poorly managed, generate crime for the following reasons:

- **Opportunities** - Large numbers of people congregating in premises, generating opportunities for crime. Unlike on-street populations, patrons are stationary for long periods of time, making them easier to target.
- **Lack of attention** - The movement of people, noise, social interaction and other factors mean patrons can be easily distracted.
- **Cohesion** – Particularly during busy periods, the large numbers and wide variety of groups of people that tend to frequent premises means that such a venue would lack 'community territoriality' (i.e. regular customers displaying an awareness of and care for the environment around them). This can limit any self-policing that might otherwise occur.
- **Customer turnover** – High turnover with high levels of customer movement within an establishment, are more likely to allow offenders to go unnoticed.
- **Valuable goods** – Often available and possibly on show, a particular problem in seating areas. Patrons are likely to carry small, valuable, concealable goods – such as mobile phones, purses/wallets, keys etc.
- **Stealth** - Busy venues provide the anonymity necessary to commit offences.

3.5.2 The internal security and layout of the premises should be carefully considered, so as to maximise surveillance over customers and reduce the opportunities for criminals to exploit. It is highly recommended that the following good practice principles are adopted where applicable, in order to minimise the issues highlighted above:

3.5.3 The entrance to the premises must be effectively managed at busy periods to control numbers, ensure safe access/egress and avoid potential conflicts arising. Customers entering/leaving the premises should be easily observed by staff.

3.5.4 The correct size and category of safe should be determined by an assessment of prospective takings and to meet insurance needs. Consideration should also be given to a chute deposit safe (certified to LPS 1183) behind the counter area.

3.5.5 Internal access doors/frames to all other storage/cellar rooms etc. should also be solid-core (min. 44mm thick) and fitted with either auditable access controls (i.e. proximity readers or swipe cards) or secured with key operated locks (carried by staff only if required for duties and accounted for at all times) to secure them when unoccupied. All staff should understand and accept the need for security measures and should be trained to be vigilant and to report any suspicious behaviour.

3.5.6 It should not be possible for patrons of the premises to gain unauthorised access to the adjacent office reception/lobby area or the upper floors of the building, or vice versa. Any doors between unit and the

office reception/lobby area should be certified to BS PAS 24 or LPS 1175 SR2 and should be self-closing with a multi-point electronic lock permitted as part of the certification, capable of being operated via staff key-fob during normal working hours and be securely locked and alarmed at all other times.

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- 3.5.8 Staff should have clear views of the W/Cs to monitor their use. The internal layout the premises should be generally uncluttered with few places for concealment, allowing staff to monitor customer behaviour. The precise arrangement of internal furnishings should aid circulation and aim to achieve a balance between intimacy and visibility.

Operating policy

- 3.5.9 An 'operating policy' should be drawn up, which includes:
- Location and management of the smoking area.
 - A procedure for making the premises secure after customers have left so that counting and securing the takings can be carried out in a secure environment.
 - A procedure for staff leaving and securing the premises so that staff safety is not compromised.
 - Security (door policy; door staff; staff training; CCTV cameras - monitoring and recording facilities, and their locations; intruder alarm; and cash storage/management);
 - Fire safety, including clearing designated escape routes of all obstacles;
 - Noise management; and,
 - Servicing and waste management (in a secure location) arrangements, avoiding the disposal of glass late at night which might disturb residents at nearby accommodation.

4 Physical Security

The following checklist forms the physical security requirements for this scheme to achieve Secured by Design accreditation.

4.1 Doors

- ☐ Any new external doors should be compliant with and certified to BS PAS 24, STS 202 or LPS 1175 SR2.
- ☐ Generally, internal doors should be solid core (minimum 44mm thick) with 3 hinges and a 5 lever mortise deadlock or similar, so that they can be secured when unoccupied.
- ☐ It is crucial that the door ironmongery to any external escape-only doors is permitted under the security certification of the product. Escape-only doors should be alarmed (audible upon opening) and designed without visible external ironmongery.

4.2 Windows & Shutters

- ☐ All new windows, where possible, should be certificated to BS PAS 24. All other window designs/dimensions should take account of the requirements of the above standards, as certified products can carry dimensional restrictions. Any curtain walling panels should include laminated glazing and should be securely fixed.
- ☐ The glazed frontages of the arches should be secured with shutters certified to LPS 1175 SR2 (or SR1 if perforated laths are required), which should be installed in accordance with the manufacturer's instructions. Any external shutters should have shutter boxes and guides built into the fabric of the building, where they would be less visually intrusive and less vulnerable to damage or being forced open.

4.3 Glazing & Building Fabric

- ☐ All new glazing must incorporate at least one pane of glass with a 1.5mm PVB interlayer (e.g. 7.5mm laminated glass), or a glass rated as P4A under EN 356. The remaining pane in a double-glazed unit may be toughened glass.
- ☐ Any external louvered panels should be robustly constructed and fixed, to ensure they cannot be easily removed, and designed to ensure that they cannot be used as a climbing aid. Security-certified louvered doorsets are also available if required (e.g. <http://www.securedbydesign.com/members/premier-ss-ltd/>).

4.4 Internal Layout & Security

4.4.1 Leisure & Sports facilities can, if poorly managed, generate crime for the following reasons:

- **Opportunities** - Large numbers of people congregating in premises, generating opportunities for crime. Unlike on-street populations, patrons are stationary for long periods of time, making them easier to target.
- **Lack of attention** - The movement of people, noise, social interaction and other factors mean patrons can be easily distracted.
- **Cohesion** – Particularly during busy periods, the large numbers and wide variety of groups of people that tend to frequent such premises means that such a venue would lack 'community territoriality' (i.e. regular customers displaying an awareness of and care for the environment around them). This can limit any self-policing that might otherwise occur.
- **Customer turnover** – High turnover with high levels of customer movement within an establishment, are more likely to allow offenders to go unnoticed.
- **Valuable goods** – Often available and possibly on show, a particular problem in external seating areas. Patrons are likely to carry small, valuable, concealable goods – such as mobile phones, purses, wallets, keys etc.
- **Stealth** - Busy venues provide the anonymity necessary to commit offences.

4.4.2 The internal security and layout of the premises should be carefully considered, so as to maximise surveillance over customers and reduce the opportunities for criminals to exploit. It is highly recommended that the following good practice principles are adopted where applicable, in order to minimise the issues highlighted above:

- ☐ The main entrance to the premises must be effectively managed at busy periods to control numbers, ensure safe access/egress and avoid potential conflicts arising. Customers entering/leaving the premises should be easily observed by staff.
- ☐ All/any door staff employed at the premises should be provided by an SIA ACS approved door security company and should wear easily identifiable clothing, both when inside and outside the premises.
- ☐ A smoking area should be defined and clearly demarcated and a procedure for allowing smokers to re-enter the premises should be set out in the operating procedures for the venue.
- ☐ If cash is taken at the premises, there should be a secure cash office – which should have solid masonry walls (with no adjacent false/suspended ceilings), a doorset certified to BS PAS 24 and a safe providing adequate capacity and overnight cover. The correct size and category of safe should be determined by an assessment of prospective takings and to meet insurance needs. Consideration should also be given to chute deposit safes (certified to LPS 1183) behind the bar areas, or an alternative management practice, which would reduce the amount of cash held in tills during busy periods.
- ☐ Internal access doors/frames to all other offices, cellar/storerooms, kitchens, staff facilities etc. should also be solid-core (min. 44mm thick) and fitted with auditable access controls (i.e. proximity readers or swipe cards) or secured with key operated locks (carried by staff only if required for duties and accounted for at all times) to secure them when unoccupied. All staff should understand and accept the need for security measures and should be trained to be vigilant and to report any suspicious behaviour.
- ☐ Consideration should be given to high bars/service counters, which increases the distance between staff and any potentially aggressive patrons and aids surveillance of all parts of the premises. Any tills should be positioned away from customers' reach, but preferably fronting towards customers. Casual access to the rear of the bars/service counters should be prevented (e.g. with a lockable hatch that cannot be easily scaled). Sufficient levels of service staff should be provided at busy periods to reduce waiting times and the potential for frustration, aggression and conflict.
- ☐ Staff should have clear views of the W/Cs to monitor their use. The internal layout the premises should be generally uncluttered with few places for concealment, allowing staff to monitor customer behaviour. The precise arrangement of internal furnishings should aid circulation and aim to achieve a balance between intimacy and visibility.

4.5 Lighting

- ☐ Dusk 'til dawn lights, operated by photoelectric cell/daylight sensor, should be installed to all external doors/shutters. Fittings should produce 'white' light, as opposed to yellow/orange light.
- ☐ Internal lighting should be controlled from behind the reception desk or in a security/management room, away from public access. Zoned dimmers should be used to increase control of areas from the reception / management office. An override is recommended, within easy reach of security staff, so that if an incident occurs the lighting level can be raised. High-level house lighting is an important element of control. This will also help at the end of an event so that staff can see to clear up, and patrons have no doubt that it is closing time and they should make their way out of the premises.

4.6 Alarm

- ☐ An alarm should be installed to cover the premises, linked to contacts on all external doors/shutters and PIR detectors. It is strongly recommended that any alarm system is monitored, with a response facility (e.g. linked to an Alarm Receiving Centre, who will alert the key holder).
- ☐ It is also recommended that the alarm system should incorporate personal attack buttons for the use of staff in identified locations, such as behind the bars or in any cash office (which should also contain a telephone and a mobile phone with a clear signal).

4.7 CCTV

4.7.1 Any CCTV system that may be used within this proposal will require certain specifications and intelligent placement of cameras to compliment the design of the development. Designers should consider the following points when planning a CCTV strategy:

- ☐ CCTV systems (and lighting that support them) require regular cleaning and maintenance to remain effective.
- ☐ Where necessary cameras that are vulnerable to damage should be protected from attack either by relocation to a higher level and using a bigger lens to achieve the view required or through the fitting of a vandal resistant housing.
- ☐ With regards to the retention of footage, the police prefer quality over quantity. The overall retention period should be dictated by what the system is designed to achieve, though it would be better to have good quality images over a 14-day period than poor ones over a 30-day period.
- ☐ Procedures for recovery of recordings are recommended to be established (e.g. trained staff / the CCTV system instruction manual to be readily available). This is to ensure that the images produced will be of an [acceptable standard](#) that will allow for [identification](#) of an individual which will stand up to scrutiny in court.

Acceptable Standard - this generally requires a resolution of 720x576 pixels at a real time frame rate of 25 frames per second. (N.B. Both the camera and DVR must be capable of this – if the camera will only send low resolution images then it does not matter how high the resolution of the recording unit is).

Identification – One of three levels of field of view. To identify an individual, the image must capture no less than 120% of the field of view (at least from the top of the individuals head to their knees). The remaining two levels of field of view are '[Overview](#)' and '[Recognition](#)', which whilst effective for observational purposes, are less likely to result in the identification of a person/offender.

- ☐ The intelligent placement of cameras helps to provide clear facial identification of individuals. Suitable locations would be: [the external entrances to the premises, all bars and alcohol storage areas, any cash office and customer circulation/seating areas.](#)

5 Management & Maintenance

5.1.1 Active continuous management and maintenance of the premises can reduce the likelihood of crime and disorder occurring. An operating/maintenance plan should be created to promote good management of the premises, this plan should focus on issues such as:

- Opening and closing of premises, including staff arrival and departure;
- Any cash management within the premises;
- Any cash-in-transit collections/deliveries and banking practices (which should take place in a secure room with a certified safe to meet insurance needs);
- Management of stock deliveries (servicing activities should not require any service doors to remain open unattended for prolonged periods);
- Details of staff security training.
- Location and management of any smoking areas.
- Repairing damaged external and internal fittings, particularly security features e.g. alarm system, CCTV cameras etc;
- Cleaning and prompt removal of graffiti, litter etc; and
- Refuse collection arrangements.

5.1.2 There should be regular reviews/exercises to ensure that it remains accurate, workable and up to date. All staff should understand and accept the need for security measures, and it should be made easy for people to raise concerns or report observations.

5.1.3 The opening hours of the premises should be consistent with other such premises in the locale and should not unduly conflict with other nearby uses. Service of drinks should end approximately 30 minutes before the premises closes, in order to aid effective dispersal of customers.

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- 5.1.4 All high value equipment (e.g. computers, flat screen monitors/televisions etc.) should be property marked and securely fixed or stored to deter damage/theft. An accurate record should be maintained which logs all such items.
- 5.1.5 Toilets can give rise to problems and the following issues should be considered:
- Fittings should be flush to avoid tampering and concealed cisterns, pipe work etc. should be used.
 - Graffiti and vandal resistant materials, such as stainless steel, laminates and plastics should be considered.
 - Consider hanging cubicle doors as outward opening as this will aid gaining access in an emergency. An alternative measure is to reduce toilet doors in size by a minimum of 200mm from the floor and to reduce the top height.
 - Provide 'Chelsea Clip'/karibina style hooks on the back of cubicle doors or partitions for bags and coats.
 - Consider the safety of vending machines. Cash boxes can be tampered with, consider fitting them with alarms.
 - Consider setting out a rota and putting notices in toilet facilities that make users aware that regular checks will be carried out. A built in visited/checked chart should be provided.
 - Adequate signage should be deployed in all areas not only to direct people throughout the premises, but also to deter unauthorised access to back-of-house/staff-only areas.

6 Construction

- 6.1.1 Untidy sites and their surroundings can be littered with debris accessible to vandals who often use loose materials as missiles to commit crime. The client should take measures appropriate to secure their site during construction, and control pedestrian and vehicular access in to and out of the site curtilage. It is also recommended that the contractor on this scheme is a member of the 'Considerate Constructors Scheme', who has committed to be a considerate and good neighbour, as well as clean, respectful, safe, environmentally conscious, responsible and accountable.
- 6.1.2 Site security contractors should be SIA (Security Industry Authority) approved to ensure professional standards are adhered to (please see <http://www.sia.homeoffice.gov.uk/pages/acs-intro.aspx> for more details).

7 Useful References

7.1 Secured by Design (SBD)

- 7.1.1 Secured by Design focuses on crime prevention at the design, layout and construction stages of homes and commercial premises and promotes the use of security standards for a wide range of applications and products. To apply for Secured by Design certification for your development, visit our online application form at: <http://www.designforsecurity.org/secured-by-design/sbd-accreditation/>

A Contact register

Date	Contact With	Summary of Contact

B Associated Documents

This report is based on the following drawings and supplementary information submitted by the applicant.

Drawing No.	Drawing Title	Date	Rev
000_002	1-500-Site Plan		
000_001	1-1250-Site Plan		
111_201	Elevations		
111_101	Ground Floor Plan.pdf		
000_002	1-500-Site Plan		
000_001	1-1250-Site Plan		
111_201	Elevations		
111_101	Ground Floor Plan		

PLEASE NOTE - In the event of any subsequent material changes to the scheme, it will be necessary for Design for Security to reassess the comments made within this report.

C CIS Version History

Version	Revisions Made	Date
A		

D Glossary

Burglary Resistance Standards

BS 7950, 1997

Specification for enhanced security performance of casement and tilt/turn windows.

BS 4873, 2005: Specification for aluminium windows.

BS 7412, 2007: Specification for plastic windows made from PVC-U extruded hollow profiles.

BS 644-1, 2003: Wood windows. Specification for factory assembled windows - various types.

BWF:TWAS: Timber window accreditation scheme.

BS 6510, 2005: Specification for steel windows, sills, window boards & doors.

BS PAS 23-1, 1999

General performance requirements for door assemblies.

A performance standard for door sets, which certifies that a particular door set is fit for purpose. Door products must also have BS PAS 24 certification.

BS PAS 24-1, 2012

General security performance requirements for door assemblies.

An attack test standard for door sets, which certifies that a particular door, frame, lock and hardware set has withstood a series of physical tests. This is the minimum police requirement for Secured by Design dwellings, and is also applicable to French/double doors, and sliding doors.

ENV 1627-30 (Security Ratings WK1 to WK6)

Windows, doors, shutters - Burglar resistance Requirements and classification

The classification system used in ENV 1627-30 is aimed at the commercial market and is based on five elements:

- Resistance of glazing
- Performance of hardware
- Resistance to static loading
- Resistance to dynamic loading
- Burglary resistance by manual intervention

LPS 1175 (Security Ratings 1 to 6)

Specification for testing and classifying the burglary resistance of building components

This includes doors, shutters, garage doors and grilles typically for commercial premises and higher risk domestic premises and is acceptable to the ABI and the Police. The standard has 6 levels, 6 being the highest, with levels 1 and 2 equivalent in many respects to BS PAS 24 and BS 7950.

STS01 Issue 4: 2012

Enhanced security requirements for doorsets and door assemblies for dwellings to satisfy the requirements of PAS23 and PAS24

As the title suggests this is an equivalent test standard to PAS 24, incorporating PAS 23 (fitness for purpose), published by Warrington Certification.

STS02 Issue 3: 2011

Requirements for burglary resistance of construction products including hinged, pivoted, folding or sliding doorsets, windows, curtain walling, security grilles, garage doors and shutters.

This specifies a broadly similar range of attack tools and times to those specified at the lower levels of LPS1175. However, STS02 does not extend to cover the higher levels of risk addressed within LPS1175 and the attack methods used differ.

EN 356, 2000 (Ratings P1A to P8A)

Glass in building. Security glazing. Testing and classification of resistance against manual attack.

A performance standard for manual attacks on glazing. P2A is comparable to the performance of a 6.8mm laminated glass, and P4A to that of a 9.5mm laminated glass.

Commonly Used Acronyms

CIT

Cash in transit (refers to vehicles, personnel and routines).

CPTED

Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design
(Learn more at www.designforsecurity.org/about/cpted)

CRS

Crime Reduction Specialist. Sometimes known as CPO (Crime Prevention Officer)

INPT

Integrated Neighbourhood Policing Team.

PVB/PolyVinyl Butyral (Glazing interlayer)

A commonly used interlayer used in the production of laminated glass.

LPCB (Loss Prevention Certification Board)

A brand of the BRE Global (Building Research Establishment) family. The LPCB work with insurers, Government, police, designers, manufacturers, contractors and end users to develop methods of assessing performance and reliability of security products to ensure their fitness for purpose.

UKAS (United Kingdom Accreditation Service)

The sole national accreditation body recognised by government to assess, against internationally agreed standards, organisations that provide certification, testing, inspections and calibration services.

Useful Websites

Design for Security

www.designforsecurity.org

Secured by Design

www.securedbydesign.com

RIBA Product Selector

www.ribaproductselector.com

LPCB – Red Book Live

www.redbooklive.com

Crime Reduction (Home Office)

www.crimereduction.homeoffice.gov.uk

DAC (Design Against Crime) Solution Centre

www.designagainstcrime.org

Building for Life

www.buildingforlife.org

CLG (Communities and Local Government)

www.communities.gov.uk