



CRIME IMPACT STATEMENT

Land off Enterprise Way, Manchester Airport

154 Bed Hotel

FOR: EVANS DAKOTA HOTELS LTD

VERSION A: 19th April 2024

REFERENCE: 2024/0103/CIS/01

Greater Manchester Police

designforsecurity

Land off Enterprise Way

2024/0103/CIS/01

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Recommendations made

The proposed development has been assessed using the principles of 'Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design' (CPTED - <http://designforsecurity.org/about/crime-prevention-through-environmental-design/>), in order to reduce the opportunities for crime, the fear of crime, and anti-social behaviour. The location and the proposed development is generally acceptable; however, hotels can attract criminal and antisocial behaviour. There are a number of recommendations made in section 3.3, including but not limited to:

- Access control into and around the hotel
- Comprehensive CCTV system, particularly covering the restaurant/bar
- Measures to reduce the potential for flyparking

These measures will improve the security of the buildings, deter criminals, and alert staff to unwanted/suspicious behaviour. These measures, and those detailed in section 3.3 of this report should be implemented where possible.



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1 Visual Audit

The proposed development site can be seen on the adjacent map, edged in red. The site is located in the area to the North of Manchester Airport.

The site boundaries are defined by Bailey Lane to the North-East and to the South the site is bound by Enterprise Way to the South, with the North-West of the site defined by a small watercourse.

The site has previously been developed and a large hardstanding remains on site, with other areas of the site are seeded or overgrown with shrubbery. The site boundaries are defined with a mix of chain link fence and temporary herras fencing. The proposed vehicular access will be taken off a new roundabout on Enterprise Way, with the existing entrance on Bailey Lane retained.



2 Crime Statistics & Analysis

All data below is based on crimes recorded between 1st February 2018 to 31st January 2019.

Crime Summary

Figure 1: Recorded Crime within 500m of Site

Domestic Burglary	Non-Domestic Burglary	Criminal Damage	Less Serious Wounding	Theft	Robbery	Serious Wounding	Theft from Motor Vehicle	Theft of Motor Vehicle	Bicycle Theft
15	<5	27	133	22	6	<5	10	6	<5

- 2.1.1 The overall rate of crime in the local area is low for the South Manchester district, with less serious wounding, theft and criminal damage being the most commonly reported crimes occurring in the area. Offences have mostly occurred to the north of the proposed site in which Woodhouse Park residential estate is located. To the south of the proposed site Manchester Airport is located, therefore a lower rate of crime has occurred.
- 2.1.2 Less serious woundings have occurred throughout the local area, particularly to the north and north east of the site. Assaults, public order offences and harassment offences have most commonly been reported, with offences often occurring during a domestic dispute and between known associates. Offences occurring to the south of the site have mostly involved road rage incidents.
- 2.1.3 Theft offences have occurred throughout the local area with offences involving theft of money, bank cards and mobile phones. Offences in which mobile phones have been targeted have mostly occurred at local businesses in the area and private hire taxis. Offences in which bank cards and money have been targeted have mostly occurred between known associates in a domestic setting.
- 2.1.4 Criminal damage offences to the north around Portway with dwellings and vehicles most commonly targeted. Offences have involved objects being thrown at glazing, causing it to smash. Other criminal damage offences have occurred against property within dwellings during domestic disputes and vehicles paint work being scratched by unknown offenders.

2.2 Common Use-Specific M.O.s (Modus Operandi)

- Offenders, posing as guests or legitimate customers, accessing staff-only/restricted areas to steal property

Possible Solution - There should be a robust access control system in place (see section 4.4) to ensure that callers to the building are vetted and/or met and escorted before being allowed entry into the building. All individual rooms should be capable of being secured when unoccupied and there should be a secure area for staff to store their belongings while at work.

- Offenders entering rooms using forged or stolen electronic key-cards/fobs or by exploiting insecure doors.

Possible Solution - Hotel bedroom doors/frames should be robust/solid core (minimum 44mm thick) and fitted with auditable access controls (i.e. VingCard or similar). Doors should have a door closer to ensure that doors cannot be left ajar accidentally by residents when they leave their room.

- Doors have been forced open with bodily pressure and tool/implements to gain entry

Possible Solution - All external doors should be certified to recognised security standards (see section 4.1), which are independently proven to reduce the risk of forced entry and thus increase the chances of detection. Security-certified doors are the best long-term measure to address this risk and can be obtained to suit virtually all operational requirements.

- Theft of personal property from table tops or from bags hung on chairs or stored under tables

Possible Solution – Consideration should be given to tables and chairs designed to facilitate secure storage of belongings or adapted with ‘Chelsea Clips’ (see below) to reduce the opportunities to steal bags/coats. The internal layout of the premises can also increase surveillance opportunities and help deter offenders. It should be generally uncluttered, allowing clear views of all spaces and avoiding any pinch points or areas of concealment. The precise arrangement of internal furnishings should aid circulation and aim to achieve a balance between intimacy and visibility.

2.3 Risk Factors - Hotels

The typical security risks for a development of this nature are:

- Burglary of hotel rooms
- Robbery to business
- Theft of personal belongings at work
- Criminal damage to property and vehicles
- Unauthorised access to buildings/private space
- Arson
- Cycle theft
- Employee theft
- Theft of/from parked vehicles
- Violence towards staff
- Theft and criminal damage during the construction period


2.4 Risk Factors – Restaurants

The typical security risks for a development of this nature are:

- Burglary
- Robbery to business
- Criminal damage to property
- Alcohol-fuelled violence/conflict
- Miscellaneous theft to customers
- Rowdy and inconsiderate behaviour
- Conflict of use with neighbouring venues
- Violence towards staff
- Safety of staff personal belongings
- Robbery/wounding of patrons leaving premises
- Theft and criminal damage during the construction period

2.5 Burglary Risk Analysis

The data below relates to non-domestic burglary offences within/against hotels, recorded in the Manchester area during 2018 - 2019.





2.5.1 **Day/Time Range:** The risk of burglary at Manchester hotels fluctuates throughout the week, peaking on Tuesday. During the day, the risk of burglary peaks during the early hours of the morning. It is likely that offenders target hotels at these times when guests are likely to be out of their rooms or when staffing levels are likely to be lower – allowing offender's time to attempt to gain unauthorised access without being detected.

2.5.2 **Point of Entry:** In the local area the following entry points and MO's have been utilised most frequently:

- Offenders posing as legitimate customers to gain entry before targeting insecure doors/ restricted areas.
- Opening secured doors using bodily pressure and implements to gain access.
- Exploitation of insecure doors to gain entry to hotel room.
- In cases of unknown point of entry offenders have often gained possession of the hotel room key card and accessed the room, removing personal and business property.

2.6 Theft Risk Analysis



The data below relates to thefts within/against hotels, recorded in the Manchester area during 2018 - 2019.



- 2.6.1 **Day/ Time Range:** The risk of theft at Manchester hotels generally increases over the weekend. It is possible that the risk increases at these times when hotels typically have more guests and the opportunity to carry out such offences is greater. However, offenders do also target hotels between Monday and Friday, when they are typically less busy and they perceive a lower risk of being caught/challenged. The risk of theft is greatest around lunchtime and in the evening/early hours of the morning. This is when hotel restaurants, bars and gyms are likely to be at their busiest and, therefore, the opportunities to commit theft are greater. Thefts of personal property (such as mobile phones, bags and purses/wallets) are the most routinely stolen items.

2.7 Vehicle Crime: Risk Analysis

The data below relates to vehicle crime committed within 500m of the site.



- 2.7.1 **Day/Time Range:** The risk of vehicle crime peaks on a Monday during the late evening and early hours of the morning. Offenders often target vehicles during these times as vehicles are likely to be left unattended and out of sight of the vehicle owner for long periods of time, creating a perceived low risk opportunity.

3 Layout Appraisal

3.1 Proposed development

- 3.1.1 The proposed development is a 154 bedroom hotel with ancillary ground floor bar/restaurant, and 130 parking spaces.

3.2 Positive Aspects of the Proposal

The following proposed features would make a positive contribution to the prevention of crime and fear of crime.

- 3.2.1 The location of the reception desk will allow staff to view those entering the building and those entering the circulation core of the hotel, allowing them to vet those entering the hotel and those going to the hotel floors.
- 3.2.2 Hotel corridors are linear offering good sightlines for guests, allowing them to survey any potential threats.
- 3.2.3 There are no deeply recessed areas of the building or other opportunities for an offender, or those antisocially minded concealing themselves.
- 3.2.4 Pedestrian and vehicular access from Enterprise Way will be clearly defined.
- 3.2.5 There is a large car parking area which is well overlooked by the hotel building, allowing residents and staff to view parked vehicles.
- 3.2.6 The level of crime in the local area is generally low, the risk of the hotel being targeted by criminals should be low if the correct security measures are installed.

3.3 Changes Needed and Recommendations

The following points have been identified for further consideration and would need to be addressed for Design for Security to support the proposed scheme.

- 3.3.1 Staff should be given flexibility over permitting access into the building at different times of the day and night. The main entrance doors should be capable of being controlled by reception staff if required (e.g. at night) to prevent unauthorised access or nuisance/antisocial behaviour in/around the entrance lobby.
- 3.3.2 Doors into hotel room corridors should only be accessible/operable by guest key card, ensuring that access can only be gained by guests of that specific area of the hotel.
- 3.3.3 Safes should be provided in all rooms. Safes should be of robust construction and fixed to a solid floor or wall. It is highly recommended that safes are operated by a personal identification number (PIN) selected by each new guest, or by the guest key card system.
- 3.3.4 Access into staff only areas should be restricted to staff. Signage should be provided so that it is clear which areas are restricted to staff, to prevent confusion being used as a legitimate excuse for accessing staff only areas.
- 3.3.5 The pedestrian route from Enterprise Way should be illuminated so that it can be used safely when it is dark.
- 3.3.6 All elevations of the building should be illuminated to a high standard to deter criminals and those antisocially minded.
- 3.3.7 The car parking area should be illuminated to a high standard to foster safe use when it is dark and to deter criminals from targeting parked cars.
- 3.3.8 There should be an appropriate system in place to prevent fly-parking due to the close proximity of the airport.
- 3.3.9 Due to the prevalence of violent crime in restaurant/bars the proposed restaurant/bars should be covered with a comprehensive CCTV system.

4 Physical Security

4.1 Doors

- ☐ External doors must be compliant with and certified to BS PAS 24, STS201, LPS 1175 SR2, LPS 2081 SR B, or STS 222.
- ☐ Sliding/revolving doors should be tested and certified to LPS 1175 SR2.
- ☐ Hotel bedroom doors/frames should be robust/solid core (minimum 44mm thick) and fitted with auditable access controls (i.e. VingCard or similar).
- ☐ Each bedroom should have a small wall or floor safe, operated by a personal identification number (PIN) selected by each new guest.
- ☐ External escape-only doors (as with external doors in general) should be certified to BS PAS 24, or LPS 1175 SR2. It is crucial that the door ironmongery is permitted for use on these doors under the security certification of the product.
- ☐ All doors/frames to staff areas/stores/offices should be robust/solid core (minimum 44mm thick) and fitted with auditable access controls. Staff should only be allowed access to areas required for their work. Keys/passes should only be carried if required for duties and should be accounted for at all times.

4.2 Windows & Building Fabric

- ☐ Ground floor windows must be compliant with and certified to BS PAS 24, LPS 1175 SR2, LPS 2081 SR A, STS 204, or STS 222.
- ☐ Ground floor and easily accessible opening lights (escape requirements permitting) must be key-lockable, and have fixed/lockable opening restrictors (not releasable from the outside) limited to 100mm.
- ☐ Any curtain walling panels should include laminated glazing (see below) and should be securely fixed directly to the floor slabs where possible, rather than to perimeter columns.

4.3 Glazing

- ☐ In double glazed units the inner pane should not be less than 7.5mm laminated glass (2 x 3mm glass plies with an approx. 1.5mm PVB interlayer) and the outer pane should be a minimum of 6mm toughened or 6.8mm laminated glass (2 x 3mm glass plies with an approx. 0.8mm PVB interlayer).

4.4 Access Control

- ☐ Access to first floor, and above, should be restricted to hotel residents and staff. Hotel guests should only be able to access the specific floor that they are staying on.
- ☐ Access control systems should be operable by swipe card or fob, and not numeric key pads. The following areas/doors should operate on access control:
 - Main entrances
 - External doors
 - Stairs/lifts
 - Offices
 - Staff only areas

4.5 Cash Office

- ☐ Storage of cash and other high value items should be within a secure room. The room should have solid walls, rather than stud partitions/similar and the ceiling should be reinforced with expanded metal mesh. The door in to this room should be certified to BS PAS 24 or LPS 1175 SR2 and there should be a safe certified under LPS 1183 (the correct size and category of safe should be determined by an assessment of prospective takings and to meet insurance need) and consideration should be given to having the safe on a time delay (with appropriate signage to deter would-be offenders).

4.6 Landscaping

- ☐ In vulnerable locations such as entrances, parking areas and footpaths, low planting should not exceed 1000mm in height, and tree canopies should fall no lower than 2m from the ground. This is in order to allow people to see their surroundings better, make a rational choice of routes and eliminate hiding places. A maintenance agreement should stipulate that these planting dimensions would be adhered to.
- ☐ There should be no hard landscaping that could inadvertently create seating or loitering spots (except within secure designated or otherwise-controlled areas). These features can encourage anti-social behaviour and raise the fear of crime.

4.7 Lighting

- ☐ External lighting must be provided to pedestrian routes within the site in accordance with BS 5489.
- ☐ Fittings should produce 'white' light, as opposed to yellow/orange light. Metal halide (or bulbs with a comparable output) should be used, as these offer superior colour rendition over alternatives such as high and low pressure sodium bulbs.
- ☐ Dusk 'til dawn lights, operated by photoelectric cell/daylight sensor, should be installed to all external doors.

4.8 CCTV

- ☐ The proposed development should be covered by a comprehensive CCTV system. Individual industrial units should have the infrastructure for the easy installation of a CCTV system if required by a tenant.
- ☐ It is important that an operational requirement for CCTV is drawn up for commercial premises in accordance with their specific use and that the objectives for the CCTV system are clearly established before a tendering process is started. A useful reference to help achieve this goal is the CCTV Operational Requirements Manual 2009 ISBN 978-1-84726-902-7 Published April 2009 by the Home Office Scientific Development Branch.
- ☐ The CCTV system must have a recording format that is acceptable to the police with images of evidential quality. Staff should be sufficiently trained to operate the system and be able to make recordings available to police on request and an operational requirement must take account of this fact.
- ☐ Whilst the location of cameras is a site-specific matter it would be normal practice for the system to observe all vehicular and pedestrian entrances. Early discussions with an independent expert and potential installers can resolve a number of matters including:
 - monitoring and recording requirements
 - activation in association with the intruder alarm
 - requirements for observation and facial recognition/identification
 - areas to be monitored and field of view
 - activities to be monitored
 - the use of recorded images
 - maintenance of equipment and the management of recording
 - subsequent ongoing training of operatives
- ☐ TV systems must be installed to BS EN 50132-7: CCTV surveillance systems for use in security applications.
- ☐ The CCTV system should be compatible with the existing or planned lighting system.
- ☐ CCTV systems should be registered with the Information Commissioner's Office (ICO) and be compliant with guidelines in respect to Data Protection and Human Rights legislation. Further information is available at this website: www.ico.org.uk
- ☐ For guidance on the use of CCTV images as legal evidence see BS 7958: 215 Closed circuit television (CCTV). Management and operation. Code of practice. This document provides guidance and recommendations for the operation and management of CCTV within a controlled environment where

data that may be offered as evidence is received, stored, reviewed or analysed. It assists owners of CCTV systems to follow best practice when gathering information of evidential quality. Remotely monitored detector activated CCTV systems must be installed in accordance with BS 8418: 2015 Installation and remote monitoring of detector operated CCTV systems - Code of practice.

4.9 Car Park

- ☐ The car parking area should be illuminated in accordance with BS 5489.
- ☐ All bays and directional arrows should be clearly marked.
- ☐ Signage should be displayed clearly with the following information:
 - a) Car park operator and contact details
 - b) Details of car parking charges
 - c) Restrictions that apply to the car park and fines.

4.10 Other

- ☐ There must be no features of the building envelope which create sheltered/hiding places or ledges, which could endanger passers-by or encourage loitering.
- ☐ Any bin stores should be secure, lockable, and fire resistant enclosures. A strategy should be defined to ensure waste collection can take place whilst retaining a secure development.

5 Management & Maintenance

- 5.1.1 The upkeep of a development over its lifetime can be crucial to the level of security and safety within. Aspects of a development, which are left to deteriorate, have the potential to attract further crime – a process known as ‘the broken window theory’. A maintenance plan should be drawn up to address issues such as:
- Litter removal
 - Repair to communal areas (lighting, signage, access controls)
 - Trimming and pruning to shrubs and trees
- 5.1.2 Any public open space or amenity areas not under the ownership of residents should be subject to an effective maintenance contract. This should ensure that all damage is rectified in a timely manner, and that any such space will not be detrimental to its surroundings.

6 Construction

- 6.1.1 Untidy sites and their surroundings can be littered with debris accessible to vandals who often use loose materials as missiles to commit crime. The client should take measures appropriate to secure their site during construction, and control pedestrian and vehicular access in to and out of the site curtilage. It is also recommended that the contractor on this scheme is a member of the ‘Considerate Constructors Scheme’, who has committed to be a considerate and good neighbour, as well as clean, respectful, safe, environmentally conscious, responsible and accountable.
- 6.1.2 Site security contractors should be SIA (Security Industry Authority) approved to ensure professional standards are adhered to (please see <http://www.sia.homeoffice.gov.uk/pages/acs-intro.aspx> for more details).

7 Useful References

7.1 Secured by Design (SBD)

- 7.1.1 Secured by Design focuses on crime prevention at the design, layout and construction stages of homes and commercial premises and promotes the use of security standards for a wide range of applications

and products. To apply for Secured by Design certification for your development, visit our online application form at: <http://www.designforsecurity.org/secured-by-design/sbd-accreditation/>

A **Contact register**

Date	Contact With	Summary of Contact
25/03/2024	Carole Handley	CIS application received

B **Associated Documents**

This report is based on the following drawings and supplementary information submitted by the applicant.

Drawing No.	Drawing Title	Date	Rev
1011	PROPOSED GROUND FLOOR PLAN - BAR OPTION 1		
1013	PROPOSED FIRST FLOOR PLAN		
1014	PROPOSED TYPICAL UPPER FLOOR PLAN		
1015	PROPOSED TOP FLOOR PLAN		
1028	PROPOSED SITE LAYOUT MAR'24		

PLEASE NOTE - In the event of any subsequent material changes to the scheme, it will be necessary for Design for Security to reassess the comments made within this report.

C **CIS Version History**

Version	Revisions Made	Date
A		