



CRIME IMPACT STATEMENT

LAND OFF JURBY AVENUE, BLACKLEY, MANCHESTER
13 no. DEMENTIA CARE SUPPORTED LIVING APARTMENTS,
WITH ATTACHED COMMUNITY HUB

Greater Manchester Police

designforsecurity

FOR: Irwell Valley Homes

VERSION A: 14/02/2023

REFERENCE: 2009/0928/CIS/02

Land off Jurby Avenue, Blackley, Manchester

URN: 2009/0928/CIS/02

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Minor security additions/improvements required

This development has been assessed against the principles of 'Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design' (CPTED), in order to reduce the opportunities for crime and the fear of crime.

The layout of the proposed scheme is considered acceptable, as long as the issues discussed in more detail within Section 3.3 of this report are addressed, namely:

- Secure enclosure of landscaped gardens to the sides/rear of the building, including particularly robust definition/protection where exposed to the existing open space to the south, east and west of the site, in order to prevent damage, penetration and scaling.
- Secure access controls into/around the building, including the prevention of unauthorised access between any publicly accessible communal hub facilities and residential portions of the building.
- The hidden recessed secondary entrance to the community hub, located to the east of the main communal entrance, should be brought forward to remove the hidden/sheltered space and maximise surveillance opportunities from Jurby Avenue.
- Definition to car park and street frontage of site to clearly define car park as in ownership/control of the building and to discourage unauthorised access/mis-use.

If these issues can be addressed as described within the report and the other physical security measures are incorporated, we would be happy to support the development.

Please note: Greater Manchester Police Design for Security will recommend to the local planning authority that a planning condition is added that reflects the physical security specification listed within Section 4 of this report.



Bradley Hart MTCP

Design for Security Consultant

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1 Visual Audit


The site lies at the end of Jurby Avenue – a short cul-de-sac in the Blackley area of north Manchester.

The site is currently formed by non-allocated green space, with some wooden bollards between the grassland and the turning circle at the end of Jurby Avenue. The southern boundary of the site is partially defined by a low-level chain link fence. The north-eastern portion of the site is currently in use as a temporary compound for contractors, enclosed with herras fencing.

To the immediate north of the site are residential dwellings fronting onto Jurby Avenue, including a number of bungalows for the elderly, beyond which is Co-op Academy Manchester fronting onto Plant Hill Road. Although it is located at the end of a residential cul-de-sac, the site benefits from little direct overlooking from the dwellings themselves.

To the west, east and south of the site is more open space, some of which is densely vegetated. The ground levels of the surrounding open land fall away from the ground level of the site and Jurby Avenue. Plant Hill Park lies to the east of the site, French Barn Lane Allotments lie to the south and to the east is a sheltered housing scheme fronting towards Plant Hill Road.

When open land or routes exist to the rear of sites and dwellings, they can often leave them vulnerable to unauthorised access (particularly when they benefit from little/no natural surveillance) – as they can provide easy access/escape routes for offenders to utilise unseen. Routes and open land to the rear of dwellings can also experience nuisance and anti-social behaviour issues and can leave legitimate users intimidated/vulnerable, particularly after dark.



2 Crime Statistics & Analysis

All data below is based on crimes recorded between 1st January 2022 to 31st December 2022.



2.1 Crime Summary

Recorded Crime within 500m of Site									
Domestic Burglary	Non-Domestic Burglary	Criminal Damage	Less Serious Wounding	Theft	Robbery	Serious Wounding	Theft from Motor Vehicle	Theft of Motor Vehicle	Bicycle Theft
20	<5	35	205	19	14	<5	9	14	<5

- 2.1.1 The volume of recorded crime in the local area is relatively high when it is considered that much of the study area is formed by open space, which lowers the density of development in the area and typically attracts fewer crime and disorder incidents. The most prevalent types of crime have been less serious wounding, criminal damage and vehicle crime. Recorded crimes have been concentrated around/off Plant Hill Road/French Barn Lane (including Co-op Academy) to the north and west and around/off Ashdown Avenue/Hill Lane to the north-east and south-east of the site
- 2.1.2 Less serious woundings have mostly consisted of assaults, harassment and public order offences, with the majority of offences occurring during domestic disputes or between students and/or teachers. Criminal damage offences have mostly targeted vehicles and dwellings, with the body work of parked vehicles damaged, public transport windows smashed and windows of properties smashed. Offenders have forced entry to vehicles to steal items within them or to make off with them – particularly vans, minibuses and mopeds.
- 2.1.3 As this CIS report related to a support living residential scheme, the more detailed analysis below will look at local residential burglary and vehicle crime, as well as crimes at Greater Manchester sheltered schemes.


2.2 Crime Rate Comparison (Local Area)

The rates below relates to crime committed within 500m of the site. England & Wales data was last recorded for January – December 2021.




- 2.2.1 The rate of domestic burglaries (i.e. incidents per 1,000 dwellings) in the local area is **1% higher** than the rate for Manchester as a whole, **30% higher** than the rate for Greater Manchester and **33% higher** than the rate for England & Wales.
- 2.2.2 The rate of woundings (i.e. incidents per 1,000 dwellings) in the local area is **4% lower** than the rate for Manchester as a whole, **31% higher** than the rate for Greater Manchester and **150% higher** the rate for England & Wales.

Comparison of Criminal Damage Rates at Site (km), Manchester and Greater Manchester



Comparison of Vehicle Crime Rates at Site (km), Manchester and Greater Manchester




- 2.2.3 The rate of incidents of criminal damage (i.e. incidents per 1,000 dwellings) in the local area is **9% lower** than the rate for Manchester as a whole, **20% higher** than the rate for Greater Manchester and **45% higher** than the rate for England & Wales.
- 2.2.4 The rate of incidents of vehicle crime (i.e. incidents per 1,000 dwellings) in the local area is **32% lower** than the rate for Manchester as a whole, **12% higher** than the rate for Greater Manchester and **36% higher** than the rate for England & Wales.


2.3 Local Domestic Burglary: Risk Analysis

The data below relates to domestic burglaries committed within 500m of the site.


Domestic Burglary – Day Range



Domestic Burglary – Time Range





Burglary Dwelling – Point of Entry



- 2.3.1 **Day Range:** During the week, the risk of domestic burglary fluctuates – peaks on Tuesday, Friday and Sunday.
- 2.3.2 **Time Range:** During the day, the risk peaks during the early hours of the morning – when it is dark streets are typically quieter than during the day and offenders perceive a lower risk of being observed or detached.
- 2.3.3 **Point of Entry:** In the local area, the following entry points and MOs have been utilised most frequently:
- Doors and windows have been forced open or targeted when left insecure.
 - The glazing within doors (particularly patio doors) and windows has been smashed to gain entry.
 - Where the point of entry is 'unknown', this is likely to have been where offenders have exploited insecure doors/windows without being noticed or have posed as legitimate visitors to gain access to apartment buildings, before targeting insecure doors, tailgating or using force to open internal doors without being noticed.

2.4 Local Vehicle Crime: Risk Analysis

The data below relates to vehicle crime committed within 500m of the site.



- 2.4.1 **Day Range:** During the week, the risk of vehicle crime in the local area peaks on Tuesday, Wednesday and Friday.
- 2.4.2 **Time Range:** During the day, the risk peaks during the early hours of the morning and around midday.
- 2.4.3 Vehicles parked on-street or in open communal parking area, where they are easily accessible and often cannot be easily overlooked by their owners, are usually more vulnerable to attack than those parked on the driveways of individual properties or within secure garages/parking facilities.

2.5 Greater Manchester Care Home/Sheltered Scheme Burglary, Theft & Criminal Damage: Risk Analysis

The information below relates to burglary, theft and criminal damage offences within/against care homes/sheltered schemes, recorded across the Greater Manchester area

- 2.5.1 In terms of care homes/sheltered schemes across Greater Manchester, the risk of burglary is concentrated in the late evening and the early hours of the morning. At these times, residents are likely to be asleep or in their rooms and staffing levels are likely to be lower, allowing criminals to operate without being detected. The majority of burglaries at Greater Manchester care homes/sheltered schemes have occurred through doors to the front and the rear of premises and through rear windows. In a number of burglaries, force has not been required to gain entry - offenders have often exploited freely accessible areas and open bedroom windows/doors to steal property. Most thefts occur during the afternoon and the evening, when residents are likely to be out of their rooms for longer periods of time - leaving insecure rooms, items of personal property and cash vulnerable to theft unseen/unnoticed. Care homes/sheltered schemes have also suffered from incidents of criminal damage – particularly the smashing of external glazing in the evening.

2.6 General Risk Factors

2.6.1 The typical security risks for a development of this nature are:

- Domestic burglary
- Bogus callers and distraction burglary
- Criminal damage to property and vehicles
- Anti-social behaviour
- Theft of/from parked vehicles
- Unauthorised access to buildings/private space
- Tailgating (pedestrian and vehicular)
- Neighbour disputes
- Poor maintenance of access control systems
- Theft and criminal damage during the construction period

2.7 Common Local M.O.s (Modus Operandi)

2.7.1 Having looked at the crime data for the site and the surrounding area, the most frequent M.O.s used by offenders when targeting residential properties/vehicles in the local area and Greater Manchester care homes/sheltered schemes are listed below, along with suggested measures to reduce the risk of them being utilised at the proposed development:

- **Local Residential:** Doors and windows have been forced open or targeted when left insecure.

Possible Solution - All external doors should be certified to recognised security standards (see Section 4.1), which are independently proven to reduce the risk of forced entry and thus increase the chances of detection. There should be no

All ground floor/accessible windows should also be certified to recognised security standards (see Section 4.2), with key operated locks and opening restrictors.

- **Local Residential:** The glazing within doors (particularly patio doors) and windows has been smashed to gain entry.

Possible Solution - All ground floor/accessible glazing should include a laminated pane, which forms a much more robust barrier against shattering and penetration (see Section 4.3). Where possible, the size of any glazed elements within/directly adjacent to doors should be reduced and set well-away from locking points.

All private spaces to the sides/rear of the building should be robustly enclosed (see Section 4.5), particularly where adjacent to publicly accessible space, to deter unauthorised access. Open pedestrian routes/accessible land to the rear of the properties should be avoided. Lighting to the front and rear of the building can also deter and reveal potential intruders, as well as reduce the fear of crime (see Section 4.7).

- **Local Residential:** Where the point of entry is 'unknown', this is likely to have been where offenders have exploited insecure doors/windows without being noticed or have posed as legitimate visitors to gain access to apartment buildings, before targeting insecure doors, tailgating or using force to open internal doors without being noticed.

Possible Solution – A robust access control system should be in place to allow residents to vet visitors to the apartment block before allowing them access (see Section 4.1). The main communal entrance to the block should be located in a highly visible position and should be well-lit to deter offenders from trying to gain unauthorised access. Consideration could also be given to 'airlock' lobby system, which features a secondary entrance door that only releases when the external door has closed, reducing the opportunities for tailgating unnoticed.

All individual apartments should also be secured with a security-certified entrance doorset (see Section 4.1), to ensure that any offender who may have gained access to the building (e.g. by tailgating, posing as a legitimate visitor etc.) cannot gain further access without drawing the

attention of other residents. Doors off internal corridors should not be located in deep recesses, where an offender could operate without fear of detection.

All ground floor/accessible windows should also be certified to recognised security standards (see Section 4.2), with key operated locks and opening restrictors. Clearly defined defensible space between dwelling frontages and the 'street' can provide a degree of separation between public and semi-private space and act as a psychological barrier to some offenders, who are more likely to feel under observation/scrutiny from the street or overlooking properties (see Section 4.5). Such boundary definitions can also reduce the risk of criminal damage and nuisance/anti-social behaviour.

- **Local Vehicle Crime:** Vehicles have been targeted when parked on the street or within publicly accessible communal parking areas

Possible Solution - It is essential that the development is designed so that residents and staff vehicles are secured and overlooked. Ideally, any surface communal parking areas serving apartment buildings should be located directly in front of the building, clearly separated from the street or any areas of adjacent open space/pedestrian routes. Any side, rear, undercroft or basement communal parking areas must be secured to prevent unauthorised access to where hidden doors, windows and parked vehicles could be attacked unseen.

- **Greater Manchester Care Homes/Sheltered Schemes:** Offenders with legitimate access, or appearing to be legitimate, stealing property from residents

Possible Solution - All external doors should be security-certified and there should be a secure access control system in place to vet legitimate visitors and prevent unauthorised access (see Section 4.1). All staff should understand and accept the need for security measures and should be trained to be vigilant and to report any suspicious behaviour, as well as encourage residents to store their personal valuables securely. Procedures should also be in place to control/manage access to those other than everyday visitors e.g. tradesmen, deliveries etc.

- **Greater Manchester Care Homes/Sheltered Schemes:** Theft of insecure property through open ground floor windows and burglary where access is gained through insecure windows/doors

Possible solution - All ground floor/accessible windows should be security-certified with key operated locks and opening restrictors (see Section 4.2). Any external patio doors to ground floor apartments/living spaces fronting onto the street/publicly accessible areas may be vulnerable to unauthorised access - either from bogus callers, being forced open or being left insecure - and it is recommended they are not incorporated into such schemes. Staff should try and encourage residents to be vigilant and to close and lock windows and doors to rooms which are not being used.

- **Greater Manchester Care Homes/Sheltered Schemes:** Incidents of criminal damage, where external glazing has been smashed.

Possible solution - All ground floor/accessible glazing should include a laminated pane, which forms a much more robust barrier against shattering and penetration (see Section 4.3). Any accessible residential windows at ground floor level should be protected by some defensible space, to define them as entirely separate from the street and protect them from unauthorised access, as well as damage, nuisance and anti-social behaviour.

3 Layout Appraisal

3.1 Proposed Development

- 3.1.1 The proposal is to erect a two-storey apartment building for dementia care supported living comprising 13 no. self-contained apartments, with communal facilities (including ground and first floor kitchenettes, an assisted bathroom and laundry). The ground floor of the building will also include a community hub, including a communal room, kitchenette and ancillary spaces. 2 no. staff offices are proposed at ground level, with a staff room at first floor level.
- 3.1.2 The building will front onto communal landscaped areas and a car park accessed off Jurby Road, with secure landscaped gardens to the sides/rear of the building including a refuse enclosure and a buggy store.

3.2 Positive Aspects of the Proposal


The following proposed features would make a positive contribution to the prevention of crime and fear of crime.

- 3.2.1 The proposed development will provide additional activity, surveillance and overlooking to the area at all times of the day and night.
- 3.2.2 The private communal gardens to the sides/rear of the building will be enclosed, preventing unauthorised access to where criminals could attack the building/exploit opportunities.
- 3.2.3 The proposed building will be staffed on a 24 hour basis and will have a clearly identifiable main entrance, which is capable of being robustly managed to control access. People arriving or leaving via the main entrance should be easily viewed by reception/office staff.
- 3.2.4 Many of the proposed apartments will be provided above street level, meaning that residents' possessions cannot be easily observed and unauthorised entry is more effectively prevented. This also reduces the potential impacts of excessive noise, nuisance and anti-social behaviour (particularly at night).
- 3.2.5 The internal layout of the building is generally uncluttered with few obstacles to surveillance.
- 3.2.6 The proposed development provides the opportunity to include security features built into the design and construction of the building, avoiding the need for obtrusive retro-fitted security measures that can increase the fear of crime. Security measures carefully incorporated into the design can ensure the developments are reasonably secure, without visibly announcing that the design was concerned about crime.

3.3 Points for Further Consideration

The following points have been identified for further consideration and would need to be addressed for Design for Security to support the proposed scheme.

- 3.3.1 The landscaped areas to the sides and rear of the building should be securely enclosed as private space to prevent unauthorised access to hidden elevations of the building, where doors and windows may be vulnerable to unauthorised access unseen. Much of the rear boundary of the site will directly abut the existing open space to the south, east and west of the site. As such, the rear boundary of the site could be vulnerable to damage and unauthorised access unseen and must be particularly robustly defined to prevent damage, penetration and scaling (see illustration opposite and Section 4.5 for more information). If at all possible, it is highly recommended that low-level defensive planting (i.e.



low-level, densely branched, thorny shrubs) is provided on the public side of the perimeter fencing, to further deter access and scaling. Where this is absolutely unachievable, it could be provided on the private side of the boundary - although this is likely to be less effective. There should also be no publicly accessible trees/branches adjacent to the fencing, which could form a climbing aid.

- 3.3.2 Access into/around the building must be robustly controlled to prevent unauthorised access. The office adjacent to the main entrance should be staffed (at least during the day/peak visiting times) to ensure visitors are greeted and vetted before being allowed further access into the building. A high and wide reception desk will allow staff to have full surveillance of everyone entering and exiting the building and across publicly accessible external areas. If the entrance lobby is not to be staffed at any time of the day or night, the main entrance should be secured and should be capable of being controlled remotely by means of a video entry phone system linked to a staffed base/office, so that staff can vet callers to the building before allowing them access. If the community hub at ground floor level is to be accessible to/for the use of non-residents, it could provide anonymity to would-be criminals to access the rest of the building. It is therefore essential that if these communal facilities are intended for non-resident use, access between the community hub and the residential portions of the building must also be robustly controlled, to ensure that casual/unauthorised access between them is prevented. All internal back-of-house areas/staff facilities should be accessible to authorised staff only (see Section 4.1 for more information relating to access controls).
- 3.3.3 The secondary entrance to the community hub, located to the east of the main communal entrance, is recessed within a sheltered area underneath the first floor of the building, where it is partially hidden from the street and could potentially be attacked unseen. It is highly recommended that this entrance, if required, is brought forward to remove the hidden/sheltered space and maximise surveillance opportunities from Jurby Avenue.
- 3.3.4 The frontage of the site and the car park should be defined as entirely separate from the street, in ownership/control of the home. There should also be a symbolic barrier at the vehicular entrance to the site (e.g. brick pillars, change of road surface texture/colour etc.) to encourage a feeling of territoriality among the staff and residents, psychologically giving the impression that the area beyond is private and discouraging anyone without a legitimate reason from entering (see illustration above & Section 4.5 for more information). The parking areas should also be clearly signed as for the use of staff/residents/visitors only.
- 3.3.5 It is highly recommended that all of the physical security measures listed below are incorporated into the scheme. Integrated, risk-commensurate security measures aim to place secure physical barriers or surveillance in the path of the criminal – making crime harder to commit and raising the risk of detection and possible capture, as well as promoting a feeling of safety in residents, visitors and staff.

4 Physical Security

The following checklist forms the physical security requirements for this scheme to achieve Secured by Design accreditation.

4.1 Doors & Access Controls

- ☐ All external doors (including all single-leaf, double-leaf and bi-folding doorsets at ground and first floor level) must be compliant with and certified to BS PAS 24, STS 201 or LPS 1175 SR2. It is crucial that the door ironmongery to any escape-only doors is permitted for use under the security certification of the product. Any escape-only doors should be alarmed (audible upon opening) and designed without visible external ironmongery.
- ☐ The main entrance doorset to the building will be formed by double door, which must be compliant with and certified to BS PAS 24, STS 201 or LPS 1175 SR2, including a multi-point electronic lock permitted as part of the certification, capable of being operated via an electronic access control system. The reception/office desk adjacent to the communal entrance should be staffed at all times (at least during the day/peak visiting times) to allow staff to greet visitors, vet them and control access into the building. The main entrance door should be capable of being operated remotely from the reception desk if/when required. It should also be capable of being controlled by means of a video entry phone system linked to an out-of-hours staff base/office, so that staff can vet callers to the building before allowing them access if/when the reception desk is not staffed (e.g. at night).
- ☐ Reception/office staff should manage postal deliveries to ensure that they can be made within the entrance lobby without providing access to all floors of the building. Any postboxes should be certified to Door & Hardware Federation Technical Specification 009 (TS 009), with letter box apertures to a maximum size of 260mm x 40mm (incorporating anti-fishing measures).
- ☐ Any staff-only/service entrance doorsets must be security-certified to one of the above standards, be self-closing/locking and operated by staff key-fob only. The buggy store doors should also be security-certified and operated by resident key-fob.
- ☐ The lift and the internal doors/frames providing access from any publicly accessible communal facilities at ground floor level into the residential portions of the building should be solid-core, self-closing and fitted with access controls (operated by staff/resident key fobs, not keypads), in order to prevent unauthorised access if/when the ground floor facilities are open to non-residents. The reception/office desk adjacent to the main entrance of the building should be staffed at all times when the ground floor communal facilities are open to non-residents, to allow them to remotely control access through the main entrance door and the internal doors/lift off the community hub once legitimate visitors have been greeted and vetted.
- ☐ All individual internal apartment entrance doorsets must also be compliant with and certified to BS PAS 24, STS 201 or LPS 1175 SR2 (capable of being opened by staff in case of an emergency). These doors should have either a door viewer or a fixed sidelight, containing laminated glazing.
- ☐ The internal doors/frames providing access to offices, kitchens, laundries and staff rooms (as well as general stores, plant areas etc.) should be solid-core (min. 44mm thick), have 3 hinges and should be capable of being deadlocked to secure them when unoccupied. Any drug stores or record rooms should be fitted with a security-certified doorset (to BS PAS 24) and auditable access controls.
- ☐ The access control system used throughout the building should be operable by staff or resident key-card and not numeric key pads, which can be observed and are rarely changed. The system should be fully auditable (i.e. allows the retention of data, such as who accessed where and when), to allow for a better investigation into any incidents. Staff key-fobs should be capable of being easily and quickly activated/disabled to ensure that mis-use is prevented.

4.2 Windows

- ☐ All ground floor/potentially accessible upper floor windows (e.g. from single-storey flat roof areas) should be certificated to BS PAS 24 where possible. Any curtain walling panels should include laminated glazing and should be securely fixed.

- ☐ All ground floor/accessible opening lights, escape requirements permitting, must be key-lockable and have fixed/lockable opening restrictors not releasable from the outside, limited to 100mm.

4.3 Glazing & Building Fabric

- ☐ All ground floor/potentially accessible upper floor glazing (e.g. from single-storey flat roof areas) must incorporate at least one pane of glass rated as P1A under EN 356. The remaining pane in a double glazed unit may be toughened glass.
- ☐ There should be no other features of the buildings (such as projecting window cills, projecting brickwork/cladding features, exposed rainwater down pipes etc.) or nearby hard/soft landscaping features (such as nearby trees, lighting columns, handrails, street furniture etc.) that may provide climbing aids up to upper floor windows, onto flat roof areas/balconies or over boundaries.

4.4 Alarm

- ☐ All ground floor external doors to communal areas should be fitted with alarm contacts, linked to the building intruder alarm system, to alert staff if anyone attempts to gain unauthorised access. Escape only doors should be alarmed 24/7 and should be signed as such to deter casual use.

4.5 Boundaries

- ☐ The landscaped gardens to the sides/rear of the building should be enclosed with 2100mm high walls, close-boarded timber fencing (with a masonry or other hardwearing base where publicly accessible) or railings (see Section 3.3 for illustration). Fencing or railing panels must be fixed securely to the posts (preventing tampering/removal) and any level changes should not inadvertently facilitate climbing or leave large gaps underneath the panels/gates. There should be no centrally located horizontal bars to aid climbing and there should be no other adjacent climbing aids such as low walls, street lights, trees or street furniture/junction boxes etc. Care should be taken to ensure that any boundaries to private space formed by a combination of walls and railing/timber fencing should have panels that are fixed flush with the outer skin of the brickwork below, leaving no steps/gaps that would provide a climbing aid.
- ☐ The exposed and potentially vulnerable rear boundaries of the building directly abutting the open land to the south, west and east should be protected by defensive planting (i.e. low-level, densely branched, thorny shrubs) on the public side if possible or on the private side if not (although this will be less effective). Any existing immediately adjacent/overhanging tree branches should also be removed or pruned where possible, to ensure they do not form a climbing aid over the secure boundary.
- ☐ Any pedestrian gates to private space should also be 2100mm high, self-closing and 'slam to lock' (i.e. an automatic deadlocking mortice latch, key operated from both sides), which cannot be left unlocked when shut. There should be no centrally located horizontal bars, which would aid climbing, and they should be located away from other climbing aids (such as low walls, lighting columns etc.). Exposed hinges and large sliding bolt apertures/locking points should be avoided, or fitted with shrouding/protective plates (see opposite) to avoid the creation of footholds. The gap at the bottom of any gates should be small enough to stop anyone crawling through.
- ☐ The car park to the front of the building should be enclosed with 1800-2100mm high walls, close-boarded timber fencing or railings where adjacent to the open space to the east and the existing dwellings fronting onto Juby Avenue. The frontage of the site onto Juby Avenue should be defined by low-level railings and a symbolic barrier at the entrance (formed by brick pillars and a change of road surface texture/colour) to encourage a feeling of territoriality among the residents, psychologically giving the impression that the area beyond is private and discouraging anyone without a legitimate purpose from entering.
- ☐ The landscaping areas to the front of the building should incorporate low-level planting beds or hedging along the elevations of the building to provide some defensible space to the building frontage and funnel pedestrian movement away from ground floor windows.



- ☐ The external communal refuse store serving the building should be enclosed with 2100mm high walls, railings or fire-resistant close-boarded timber fencing and self-closing, 'slam to lock' gates. A strategy should be defined to ensure waste collection can take place while retaining a secure development.
- ☐ Any low boundaries that adjoin high boundaries should have transition panels/sections to prevent the low boundary being used as a climbing aid over the higher.

4.6 CCTV

If a CCTV system is to be installed at the scheme, the following points should be considered when planning a CCTV strategy:

- ☐ CCTV systems (and lighting that support them) require regular cleaning and maintenance to remain effective.
- ☐ Where necessary cameras that are vulnerable to damage should be protected from attack either by relocation to a higher level and using a bigger lens to achieve the view required or through the fitting of a vandal resistant housing.
- ☐ With regards to the retention of footage, the police prefer quality over quantity. The overall retention period should be dictated by what the system is designed to achieve, though it would be better to have good quality images over a 14-day period than poor ones over a 30-day period.
- ☐ Procedures for recovery of recordings are recommended to be established (e.g. trained staff / the CCTV system instruction manual to be readily available). This is to ensure that the images produced will be of an *Acceptable Standard* that will allow for *Identification* of an individual which will stand up to scrutiny in court.

Acceptable Standard - this generally requires a resolution of 720x576 pixels at a real time frame rate of 25 frames per second. (N.B. Both the camera and DVR must be capable of this – if the camera will only send low resolution images then it does not matter how high the resolution of the recording unit is).

Identification – One of three levels of field of view. To identify an individual, the image must capture no less than 120% of the field of view (at least from the top of the individuals head to their knees). The remaining two levels of field of view are *Overview* and *Recognition*, which whilst effective for observational purposes, are less likely to result in the identification of a person/offender.

- ☐ The intelligent placement of cameras helps to provide clear facial identification of individuals. Suitable locations would be: *all parking areas, external facades of the building, the main entrance door and entrance lobby/community hub, any drug stores/vulnerable areas and the buggy store.*

4.7 Lighting

- ☐ External lighting must be provided to all vehicular/pedestrian routes within the site, in accordance with BS 5489. Lighting to communal parking areas should also be in accordance with BS 5489 and display an average lux level of 10, with a uniformity level of no less than 25%.
- ☐ Dusk 'til dawn lights, operated by photoelectric cell/daylight sensor, should be installed to all external doors.
- ☐ Fittings should produce 'white' light, as opposed to yellow/orange light. LED, metal halide or bulbs with a comparable output should be used, as these offer superior colour rendition over alternatives such as high and low pressure sodium bulbs.
- ☐ Lighting fixtures must not be positioned to provide climbing aids over boundary treatments. Electrical and architectural layouts should be developed together to avoid this.

4.8 Landscaping

- ☐ In vulnerable locations such as around entrances, parking areas and footpaths, low planting should not exceed 1000mm in height and tree canopies should fall no lower than 2000mm from the ground. This is in order to allow people to see their surroundings better and eliminate hiding places. A maintenance agreement should stipulate that these planting dimensions would be adhered to.

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- ☐ Loose surface materials in the publicly accessible areas of the scheme should be avoided. Small fragments of ground covering can be used as missiles against people and premises (both to gain entry and to commit criminal damage).
 - ☐ Planting must be avoided that will aid climbing over boundary treatments. The security of fences can be compromised if trees or street furniture are placed close by.
 - ☐ There should be no hard landscaping that could inadvertently create seating or loitering spots (except within secure designated or otherwise-controlled areas). These features can encourage anti-social behaviour and raise the fear of crime.

5 Management & Maintenance

- 5.1.1 A comprehensive security regime for the management of the development must be prepared and remain in place for the day-to-day running of the site. There should be regular reviews/exercises to ensure that it remains accurate, workable and up-to-date. All residents and staff should understand and accept the need for security measures and it should be made easy for people to raise concerns or report observations.
- 5.1.2 The upkeep of a development over its lifetime can be crucial to the level of security and safety within. Aspects of a development, which are left to deteriorate, have the potential to attract further crime – a process known as ‘the broken window theory’. A maintenance plan should be drawn up to address issues such as:
- Litter/graffiti removal
 - Repair to communal areas (access controls, fencelines, lighting, signage etc.)
 - Trimming and pruning to shrubs and trees
- 5.1.3 Any public open space or amenity areas not under the ownership of residents should be subject to an effective maintenance contract. This should ensure that all damage is rectified in a timely manner, and that any such space will not be detrimental to its surroundings. Low-level defensive planting beds can be used to great effect to funnel pedestrians away from vulnerable areas (such as gable walls, boundaries to private space or hidden corners/recesses).
- 5.1.4 All high value equipment to communal areas (e.g. computers, televisions, tools etc.) should be property marked and securely fixed or stored to deter damage/theft. An accurate record should be maintained which logs all such items in each of the buildings.
- 5.1.5 Adequate signage should be deployed in all areas not only to direct people throughout the building, but also to deter unauthorised access to back-of-house/staff-only areas. The car park should be signed for the use of residents, staff and visitors only.

6 Construction

- 6.1.1 Untidy sites and their surroundings can be littered with debris accessible to vandals who often use loose materials as missiles to commit crime. The client should take measures appropriate to secure their site during construction, and control pedestrian and vehicular access in to and out of the site curtilage. It is also recommended that the contractor on this scheme is a member of the ‘Considerate Constructors Scheme’, who has committed to be a considerate and good neighbour, as well as clean, respectful, safe, environmentally conscious, responsible and accountable.
- 6.1.2 Site security contractors should be SIA (Security Industry Authority) approved to ensure professional standards are adhered to (please see <http://www.sia.homeoffice.gov.uk/pages/acs-intro.aspx> for more details).

7 Useful References

7.1 Secured by Design (SBD)

- 7.1.1 Secured by Design focuses on crime prevention at the design, layout and construction stages of homes and commercial premises and promotes the use of security standards for a wide range of applications and products. To apply for Secured by Design certification for your development, visit our online application form at: <http://www.designforsecurity.org/secured-by-design/sbd-accreditation/>

A Contact Register

Date	Contact With	Summary of Contact
19 th December 2022	JDA	Receipt of CIS instruction form & plans
21 st December 2022	JDA	Quote issued & request for additional info
10 th January 2023	Irwell Valley Devt Ltd	Confirmation of instruction/fee
2 nd February 2023	JDA	Email correspondence re: timescales
14 th February 2023	JDA	Email sent re: report completion & payment
12 th to 13 th June 2023	JDA	Email correspondence re: invoice
12 th July 2023	Irwell Valley Devt Ltd	Email correspondence re: report release & payment
5 th September 2023	JDA & Irwell Valley Devt Ltd	Email correspondence re: report release & payment
19 th September 2023	Irwell Valley Homes	Email received requesting copy of invoice
5 th October 2023	GMP Finance Dept	Confirmation of payment

B Associated Documents

This report is based on the following drawings and supplementary information submitted by the applicant.

Drawing No.	Drawing Title	Date	Rev
1226 JDA Z1 00 A DR 0001	Location Plan	07/01/22	-
1226 JDA Z1 00 A DR 0002	Existing Site Plan	07/01/22	-
1226 JDA Z1 00 A DR 0003	Proposed Site Plan	28/08/22	P03
1226 JDA Z1 00 A DR 0004	Proposed Ground Floor Plan	28/08/22	P03
1226 JDA Z1 00 A DR 0005	Proposed First Floor Plan	28/08/22	P03
1226 JDA Z1 XX A DR 0006	Proposed Elevations	28/08/22	P02

PLEASE NOTE - In the event of any subsequent material changes to the scheme, it will be necessary for Design for Security to reassess the comments made within this report.

C CIS Version History

Version	Revisions Made	Date
A		

D Glossary

Burglary Resistance Standards

BS PAS 24

General security performance requirements for door/window assemblies.

An attack test standard for doorsets and windows. This is the minimum police requirement for Secured by Design dwellings, and is also applicable to French/double doors, and sliding doors.

BS EN 1627 (Security Ratings RC1 to RC6)

Windows, doors, shutters - Burglar resistance Requirements and classification

The classification system used in BS EN 1627 is aimed at the commercial market and is based on five elements:

- a) Resistance of glazing*
- b) Performance of hardware*
- c) Resistance to static loading*
- d) Resistance to dynamic loading*
- e) Burglary resistance by manual intervention*

LPS 1175 (Security Ratings 1 to 6)

Specification for testing and classifying the burglary resistance of building components

This includes doors, shutters, garage doors and grilles typically for commercial premises and higher risk domestic premises and is acceptable to the ABI and the Police. The standard has 6 levels, 6 being the highest, with levels 1 and 2 equivalent in many respects to BS PAS 24 and BS 7950.

STS 201

Enhanced security requirements for doorsets and door assemblies for dwellings to satisfy the requirements of PAS 24

STS 202

Requirements for burglary resistance of construction products including hinged, pivoted, folding or sliding doorsets, windows, curtain walling, security grilles, garage doors and shutters.

This specifies a broadly similar range of attack tools and times to those specified at the lower levels of LPS 1175.

BS EN 356 (Ratings P1A to P8A)

Glass in building. Security glazing. Testing and classification of resistance against manual attack.

A performance standard for manual attacks on glazing. P2A is comparable to the performance of a 6.8mm laminated glass, and P4A to that of a 9.5mm laminated glass.

Commonly Used Acronyms

CIT

Cash in transit (refers to vehicles, personnel and routines).

CPTED

Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design

CRS

Crime Reduction Specialist. Sometimes known as CPO (Crime Prevention Officer)

INPT

Integrated Neighbourhood Policing Team.

PVB/PolyVinyl Butyral (Glazing interlayer)

A commonly used interlayer used in the production of laminated glass.

LPCB (Loss Prevention Certification Board)

A brand of the BRE Global (Building Research Establishment) family. The LPCB work with insurers, Government, police, designers, manufacturers, contractors and end users to develop methods of assessing performance and reliability of security products to ensure their fitness for purpose.

UKAS (United Kingdom Accreditation Service)

The sole national accreditation body recognised by government to assess, against internationally agreed standards, organisations that provide certification, testing, inspections and calibration services.

Useful Websites

Design for Security

www.designforsecurity.org

Secured by Design

www.securedbydesign.com

RIBA Product Selector

www.ribaproductselector.com

LPCB – Red Book Live

www.redbooklive.com

Crime Reduction (Home Office)

www.crimereduction.homeoffice.gov.uk

DAC (Design Against Crime) Solution Centre

www.designagainstcrime.org

Building for Life

www.buildingforlife.org

CLG (Communities and Local Government)

www.communities.gov.uk