



CRIME IMPACT STATEMENT

24 Dutton Street, Manchester

Indoor Padel Tennis Courts

FOR: Pure Padel Clubs Ltd

VERSION A: 5th April 2024

REFERENCE: 2024/0072/CIS/01

Greater Manchester Police

designforsecurity



24 Dutton Street

2024/0072/CIS/01

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Development supported

This development has been assessed against the principles of 'Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design' (CPTED - <http://designforsecurity.org/about/crime-prevention-through-environmental-design/>), in order to reduce the opportunities for crime and the fear of crime. The proposed scheme has been found acceptable and if submitted to the local planning department in its current form we will support the application.



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Contents

1	Visual Audit.....	4
2	Crime Statistics & Analysis.....	5
	2.1 Crime Summary	
	2.2 Common Use-Specific M.O.s (Modus Operandi)	
	2.3 Risk Factors	
	2.4 Burglary Risk Analysis	
	2.5 Theft Risk Analysis	
	2.6 Vehicle Crime: Risk Analysis	
3	Layout Appraisal.....	9
	3.1 Proposed development	
	3.2 Positive Aspects of the Proposal	
	3.3 Changes Needed and Recommendations	
4	Physical Security	9
	4.1 Doors	
	4.2 Windows, Curtain Walling, Cladding & Shutters	
	4.3 Glazing	
	4.4 Alarms	
	4.5 Access Control	
	4.6 CCTV	
	4.7 Other	
5	Management & Maintenance	11
6	Construction	11
7	Useful References	12
	7.1 Secured by Design (SBD)	

Appendix

A	Contact register	13
B	Associated Documents.....	13
C	CIS Version History	13

1 Visual Audit

The proposed development site can be seen on the adjacent map, edged in red. The site is located in the Cheetham Hill area of Manchester, on the periphery of the Manchester city centre area.

The site boundaries are defined by Robert Street to the East and Dutton Street to the South-West. The other site boundaries are defined by neighbouring properties.

The site is currently developed with a large steel portal framed building with a small car parking area. The car parking area is defined with a steel palisade boundary. On the day of visiting the site there were no obvious signs of criminal or antisocial behaviour, but this building and other in the area have had retrospective security measure installed such as metal bars, roller shutters, and barbed wire.

The local area is a mix of commercial and residential uses, and the site is in close proximity to HMP Manchester. Opposite the site on Dutton Street work has commenced on a large apartment development.



2 Crime Statistics & Analysis

All data below is based on crimes recorded between 1st February 2018 to 31st January 2019.

2.1 Crime Summary

Recorded Crime within 500m of Site									
Domestic Burglary	Non-Domestic Burglary	Criminal Damage	Less Serious Wounding	Theft	Robbery	Serious Wounding	Theft from Motor Vehicle	Theft of Motor Vehicle	Bicycle Theft
42	68	111	495	170	26	46	244	40	11

- 2.1.1 The volume of crime over the past 12 months in the local area is high, with the most prevalent types of recorded crime being less serious wounding, vehicle crime and theft. These types of crime are typical of those experienced in, or within, close proximity of city centres where there is a higher concentration of retail, commercial and licensed premises, leading to larger number of crime and disorder issues.
- 2.1.2 Less serious woundings have taken place throughout the local area, with a hotspot of offences occurring around Victoria Station and at locations on/around Cheetham Hill Road. Assaults and public order offences have been the highest recorded less serious woundings taking place, often occurring late at night/over the weekend with alcohol consumption being a contributing factor.
- 2.1.3 Theft from motor vehicle has been the most common type of vehicle crime offence, with a large hotspot of offences occurring in the streets and car parks near to Victoria Station and the AO Arena. It is likely that offenders target vehicles here as they tend to be left unattended for long periods of time whilst the owners are working or attending nearby events/attractions. Vehicles parked on streets or within open car parks (particularly when they are not staffed, have poor lighting levels and poor surface/boundary treatments), where they are easily accessible and cannot be easily overlooked by their owners, are often more vulnerable to attack than those parked within secure parking facilities.
- 2.1.4 Theft offences have also taken place throughout the local area, with a hotspot of offences around/off Lord Street to the east and Victoria Station/AO Arena to the south. Theft of parcels/bags left unattended from doorsteps, tables and communal areas of flats have accounted for most of the recorded offences, as well as incidents of personal thefts (with offenders using pickpocketing and distraction techniques to obtain items such as mobile phones or wallets/purses). There have also been cases of clamps placed by the Council being removed and stolen from parked vehicles in the local area.

2.2 Common Use-Specific M.O.s (Modus Operandi)

- 2.2.1 Sports Facilities: Offenders have forced open doors using bodily pressure and implements/tools, smashed glazed panels within doors or targeted them when left insecure by staff.
Possible Solution - All external doors should be certified to the relevant security standards (see section 4).
- 2.2.2 Sports Facilities: Windows have also been targeted, with offenders prised them open, removing the beading/glazing or smashing the glazing to gain unauthorised access.
Possible Solution - All ground floor/accessible windows should be certified to a burglary resistant standard and glazing should include a laminated pane, which forms a much more robust barrier against shattering and penetration (see section 4 for more details).
- 2.2.3 Sports Facilities: Offenders have gained access to insecure rooms/areas unnoticed, before targeting school equipment.
Possible Solution – There should be a secure area for staff to leave their belongings while at work and access to all staff areas should be restricted with auditable access controls.
- 2.2.4 Sports Facilities: Shutters have been forced upwards to gain unauthorised access or to access doors/windows behind them.
Possible Solution – All shutters should be certified to a burglary resistant standard.


2.3 Risk Factors

The typical security risks for a development of this nature are:

- Burglary
- Theft of user / staff belongings
- Other theft from premises
- Theft of / from parked cars
- Uncontrolled access
- Criminal damage to property and vehicles
- Arson
- Violence towards staff and other users
- Cycle security
- Cash robbery / attacks on vending machines
- Anti-social behaviour
- Loitering groups
- Theft and criminal damage during the construction period

2.4 Burglary Risk Analysis

The data below relates to non-domestic burglary offences within / against leisure facilities (including leisure centres, sports centres and gyms), recorded in the Greater Manchester area.





2.4.1 Day/Time Range: During the week, the risk of burglary at leisure facilities in the Greater Manchester area peaks on Thursday/Friday and is slightly lower on Saturday. During the day, the risk of burglary peaks during the late afternoon/early evening and during the early hours of the morning. During the late afternoon / early evening, leisure facilities are often at their busiest, meaning offenders can take advantage of busy staff and anonymity among higher numbers of legitimate customers. Offenders often target commercial properties at night, when they are often closed (or operate with a reduced number of on-site staff), it is dark and the streets/areas in which they are typically located are quieter than during the day – meaning offenders perceive a lower risk of being observed or detected.

2.4.2 Point of Entry: The following entry points and MO's have been utilised most frequently by offenders targeting leisure facilities:

- Doors and windows have been forced open by offenders using bodily pressure and implements.
- The glazing within doors and windows has been smashed to gain entry.
- Where the point of entry is 'legitimate' or 'unknown', this is likely to have been where offenders have posed as legitimate customers to gain access to premises when they are open, before targeting insecure doors, tailgating or using force to open internal doors to restricted areas without being noticed.

2.5 Theft Risk Analysis



The data below relates to thefts within / against leisure facilities (including leisure centres, sports centres and gyms), recorded in the Greater Manchester area.



- 2.5.1 **Day/Time Range:** During the week, the risk of theft at leisure facilities within the Greater Manchester area peaks on Tuesday but remains consistently high throughout the week. During the day, the risk of theft rises in the afternoon and peaks in the evening. This is when leisure facilities are typically at their busiest and the opportunities to offend are greater. Personal property belonging to staff and customers, such as mobile phones and cash, are the most routinely targeted items – taking place most often in changing / locker rooms and staff-only areas.

2.6 Vehicle Crime: Risk Analysis

The data below relates to vehicle crime committed within 500m of the site.



- 2.6.1 **Day/Time Range:** The risk of vehicle crime in the local area is relatively consistently high through the week, with the lowest risk experienced on Wednesday, and during the day the risk is highest in the evening. Offenders tend to target vehicles in the evening when they are often left unattended and out of sight of the owners for long periods of time, creating a perceived low risk opportunity for offenders.

3 Layout Appraisal

3.1 Proposed development

- 3.1.1 The proposed development is a change of use of the existing building and installation of 6no. new padel tennis courts complete with ancillary services inclusive of changing rooms, WC's, reception, and small retail area.

3.2 Positive Aspects of the Proposal

The following proposed features would make a positive contribution to the prevention of crime and fear of crime.

- 3.2.1 There are similar indoor sports/leisure uses in the local area (i.e. Kick Air and Rock Over Climbing) which do not suffer disproportionately from crime or antisocial behaviour.
- 3.2.2 The existing building footprint is relatively simple and only the Robert Street elevation is exposed to the public. The Dutton Street elevation is set back from the pavement and protected by the site boundary.
- 3.2.3 The car parking area is defined with secure ~2400mm palisade fence boundary and vehicular gates which can be secured when the building is closed.
- 3.2.4 The main glazed entrance into the building can be secured with a roller shutter when the building is closed.
- 3.2.5 The main entrance is positioned in full view of the main entrance, allowing staff to vet those entering the building.
- 3.2.6 The proposed opening hours (i.e. from 7am to 10pm) are in keeping with similar uses in the local area.

3.3 Changes Needed and Recommendations

The following points have been identified for further consideration and would need to be addressed for Design for Security to support the proposed scheme.

- 3.3.1 Lockers should be provided so that users of the padel courts can store their personal belongings securely and reduce the potential for theft.
- 3.3.2 The proposed offices and back-of-house areas should be restricted to staff to prevent unauthorised access into these spaces.
- 3.3.3 The building should be covered with a monitored intruder alarm. The intruder alarm should be capable of being zoned so that the office areas can be alarmed when not in use but the padel courts are (or the other way round).
- 3.3.4 The development should have a comprehensive CCTV system covering both the external and internal areas of the building.
- 3.3.5 Any new external fittings (i.e. doors, windows, glazing, roller shutters) should be certified to a burglary resistant standard (see section 4).

4 Physical Security

Any new external fittings should be certified to the following standards.

4.1 Doors

- ☐ External doors must be compliant with and certified to BS PAS 24, STS201, LPS 1175 SR2, LPS 2081 SR B, or STS 222.
- ☐ External escape-only doors (as with external doors in general) should be certified to BS PAS 24, STS201, LPS 1175 SR2, LPS 2081 SR B, or STS 222. It is crucial that the door ironmongery is permitted for use on these doors under the security certification of the product.
- ☐ Letterboxes within doors must be located a minimum of 400mm away from internal handle and locking hardware.
- ☐ Garage or sectional overhead doors must be tested and certified to RC2, LPS 1175 SR2 or STS202.

4.2 Windows, Curtain Walling, Cladding & Shutters

- ☐ Windows must be compliant with and certified BS PAS 24, LPS 1175 SR2, LPS 2081 SR A, STS 204, or STS 222.
- ☐ Ground floor and easily accessible opening lights (escape requirements permitting) must be key-lockable and have fixed/lockable opening restrictors (not releasable from the outside) limited to 100mm.
- ☐ Shutters must be tested and certified to STS 202 or LPS 1175 SR2 (or SR1 if perforated laths are required) and installed in accordance with manufacturer's instructions.

4.3 Glazing

- ☐ Glazing to a height of 2400mm (or if otherwise accessible) must incorporate at least one pane of glass with a 1.5mm PVB interlayer (e.g. 7.5mm laminated glass), or a glass rated as P4A under EN 356. The remaining pane in a double glazed unit may be toughened glass.

4.4 Alarms

- ☐ A monitored alarm system should be installed to cover each building, linked to contacts on all external doors and PIR detectors covering all ground floor areas with windows, with a signal terminating at a recognized Alarm Receiving Centre (ARC) or security control room.
- ☐ If an alarm isn't installed, then the infrastructure should be provided for one to be easily installed.

4.5 Access Control

- ☐ Access control systems should be operable by swipe card or fob, and not numeric keypads. The following areas/doors should operate on access control:
 - External doors
 - Office spaces

4.6 CCTV

- ☐ The proposed development should be covered by a comprehensive CCTV system. Individual industrial units should have the infrastructure for the easy installation of a CCTV system if required by a tenant.
- ☐ It is important that an operational requirement for CCTV is drawn up for commercial premises in accordance with their specific use and that the objectives for the CCTV system are clearly established before a tendering process is started. A useful reference to help achieve this goal is the CCTV Operational Requirements Manual 2009 ISBN 978-1-84726-902-7 Published April 2009 by the Home Office Scientific Development Branch.
- ☐ The CCTV system must have a recording format that is acceptable to the police with images of evidential quality. Staff should be sufficiently trained to operate the system and be able to make recordings available to police on request and an operational requirement must take account of this fact.
- ☐ Whilst the location of cameras is a site-specific matter it would be normal practice for the system to observe all vehicular and pedestrian entrances. Early discussions with an independent expert and potential installers can resolve a number of matters including:
 - monitoring and recording requirements
 - activation in association with the intruder alarm
 - requirements for observation and facial recognition/identification
 - areas to be monitored and field of view
 - activities to be monitored
 - the use of recorded images
 - maintenance of equipment and the management of recording

- subsequent ongoing training of operatives

- ☐ TV systems must be installed to BS EN 50132-7: CCTV surveillance systems for use in security applications.
- ☐ The CCTV system should be compatible with the existing or planned lighting system.
- ☐ CCTV systems should be registered with the Information Commissioner's Office (ICO) and be compliant with guidelines in respect to Data Protection and Human Rights legislation. Further information is available at this website: www.ico.org.uk
- ☐ For guidance on the use of CCTV images as legal evidence see BS 7958: 215 Closed circuit television (CCTV). Management and operation. Code of practice. This document provides guidance and recommendations for the operation and management of CCTV within a controlled environment where data that may be offered as evidence is received, stored, reviewed or analysed. It assists owners of CCTV systems to follow best practice when gathering information of evidential quality. Remotely monitored detector activated CCTV systems must be installed in accordance with BS 8418: 2015 Installation and remote monitoring of detector operated CCTV systems - Code of practice.

4.7 Other

- ☐ Staff lockers should be provided so that staff can safely store personal items during the working day.

5 Management & Maintenance

5.1.1 A comprehensive security and maintenance regime for the management of the units must be prepared and remain in place for the day-to-day running of the building. There should be regular reviews/exercises to ensure that it remains accurate, workable and up to date. The operating/maintenance plan should focus on issues such as:

- Opening and closing the units, including staff arrival and departure (including any lone-worker policies).
- Securing the site when not in use.
- Management of deliveries (servicing activities should not require any service doors to remain open unattended for prolonged periods).
- Details of staff security training.
- Location and management of any smoking areas.
- Repairing damaged external and internal fittings, particularly security features e.g. access control systems, alarm systems, CCTV cameras, lighting etc.
- Cleaning and prompt removal of graffiti, litter etc.
- Regular boundary checks
- Refuse collection arrangements.

5.1.2 All high value equipment within communal areas (e.g. computers, televisions, tools etc.) should be property marked and securely fixed or stored to deter damage/theft. An accurate record should be maintained which logs all such items.

6 Construction

6.1.1 Untidy sites and their surroundings can be littered with debris accessible to vandals who often use loose materials as missiles to commit crime. The client should take measures appropriate to secure their site during construction, and control pedestrian and vehicular access in to and out of the site curtilage. It is also recommended that the contractor on this scheme is a member of the 'Considerate Constructors Scheme', who has committed to be a considerate and good neighbour, as well as clean, respectful, safe, environmentally conscious, responsible and accountable.

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- 6.1.2 Site security contractors should be SIA (Security Industry Authority) approved to ensure professional standards are adhered to (please see <http://www.sia.homeoffice.gov.uk/pages/acs-intro.aspx> for more details).

7 Useful References

7.1 Secured by Design (SBD)

- 7.1.1 Secured by Design focuses on crime prevention at the design, layout and construction stages of homes and commercial premises and promotes the use of security standards for a wide range of applications and products. To apply for Secured by Design certification for your development, visit our online application form at: <http://www.designforsecurity.org/secured-by-design/sbd-accreditation/>

A Contact register

Date	Contact With	Summary of Contact
26/03/2024	Ray Waite	CIS confirmed

B Associated Documents

This report is based on the following drawings and supplementary information submitted by the applicant.

Drawing No.	Drawing Title	Date	Rev

PLEASE NOTE - In the event of any subsequent material changes to the scheme, it will be necessary for Design for Security to reassess the comments made within this report.

C CIS Version History

Version	Revisions Made	Date
A		