



CRIME IMPACT STATEMENT

Holt Town

Public Realm

For: **Eastlands Arena Ltd**

Version A: **20/03/24**

Ref: **2024/0059/CIS/01**

Greater Manchester Police

design**for**security

Holt Town

2024/0059/CIS/01

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Development Supported with minor design & management recommendations.

This development has been assessed against the principles of 'Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design' (CPTED), in order to reduce the opportunities for crime and the fear of crime.

It is not considered to be a development that will generate significant levels of crime but in order to minimise the risk, the design team should take into account the recommendations contained within this report when preparing the detailed plans. Clearly, with a development of this nature, there needs to be a balance between creating a safe area without detracting from the ambience of the place.

Several recommendations to improve security within the scheme are included in section 3.3 of the report. The principal recommendations are summarised as follows:

- Replace legacy street furniture, signage and information points.
- Robust landscape materials & furniture
- Using way-marking posts
- Lighting to be incorporated at access points & to work with local ecology.
- prepare and execute a management and maintenance plan for the repair and upkeep of the routes and facilities along it.

The success of this proposal will largely be dependent on implementation of efficient management and maintenance procedures, together with other crime-prevention initiatives over the long term.

If these issues can be addressed as described within the report and the other physical security measures are incorporated, I would be happy to support the development.

Please note: Greater Manchester Police support the application and where feasible, the development is built in accordance with the security recommendations and physical security specifications set out in sections 3.3 and 4 of this report.

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1 Visual Audit

The development site is indicated by the red outline on the plan adjacent and is supported with existing site context photographs taken around the site.

This study area is an existing public footpath stretching from Holt Town Tram Stop to the Etihad sports campus.

The existing route, also known as the City Link; is a formal tarmac footpath follows the tram line and crosses the River Medlock and terminates into the Etihad campus.

The SportsCity campus and the new Co-Op Live arena are key destinations on the periphery of the city centre. Both the Arena and the Etihad stadium are the main dominant buildings within the area. The surrounding area of SportsCity contains additional sporting attractions such as an athletics stadium, indoor tennis & the national squash centre.


The proposed site is afforded good public transport links with local bus routes and two tram stops in close vicinity. Vehicle transport routes to the site are provided along Alan Turning Way at the eastern end of the route or via Beswick St & Merrill St and the western point of the route.

The walking routes from the city to Holt Town is approx. 1 mile from Piccadilly train station.

There are two gated maintenance vehicle access points from Sports City Way onto the site. The site is used occasionally for over-spill car parking.

The path is covered by an existing lighting system. At various sections the path is fenced off between the tram lines and the river Medlock. The route passes through two bridges. There are a number of walls which contain graffiti.

There is a ramped pedestrian access from Alan Turing Way down to the canal tow path. To the northeast of the site, across Alan Turing Way is Philips Park.



1 – Location of proposed large signage.



2 – View west towards Merrill St & Every St.



3 – Pedestrian route from Holt Town Tram stop.



4 – View east towards Holt Town Tram stop.



8 – Etihad campus Metrolink stop.



7 – View west along the route.



6 – View west along the route back to Holt Town.



5 – View west along the route.

2 Crime Statistics & Analysis

All data below is based on crimes recorded between 1st March 2023 to 29th February 2024.

2.1 Crime Summary

Figure 1: Recorded Crime within 500m of Site

Domestic Burglary	Non-Domestic Burglary	Criminal Damage	Less Serious Wounding	Theft	Robbery	Serious Wounding	Theft from Motor Vehicle	Theft of Motor Vehicle	Bicycle Theft
7	16	53	201	29	6	<5	44	8	7

- 2.1.1 The overall rate of crime over the past 12 months has been below average for the Manchester division, with less serious wounding, criminal damage and vehicle crime having been the most commonly reported offences taking place. These offences have occurred all throughout the local area, particularly in the residential neighbourhoods to the west around Bradford Road to the north and Ashton New Road to the south. There has also been a couple of hotspots of offences at the Holt Town and Etihad campus tram stops, as well as within the Etihad Stadium.
- 2.1.2 Less serious woundings have predominantly occurred at the hotspots mentioned above, particularly at the nearby tram stops where there is a higher footfall due to commuters and customers passing through the area which increases the likelihood of crime and disorder issues. Assaults, harassment and public order offences have been the most reported less serious woundings taking place, with the majority of incidents involving disputes between unknown associates as well as some cases of domestic violence.
- 2.1.3 Criminal damage against vehicles has accounted for the majority of criminal damage offences taking place. Offenders have targeted vehicles parked throughout the local area in residential neighbourhoods and streets, as well as within the Etihad Campus car parks. In most cases offenders have used objects to smash the glazing in windows and damage the bodywork of cars. There have also been some cases of damage being done to the front windows and doors of properties, often related to disputes between neighbours.
- 2.1.4 Theft from motor vehicle has been the most reported vehicle crime offence, which has mainly involved offenders targeting secure unattended vehicles by smashing glazing or using objects/implements to force open doors before removing items from within.

2.2 Common Use-Specific M.O.s (Modus Operandi)

2.2.1 Criminal damage carried out against buildings, structures and landmarks by means of graffiti and smashed glazing.

To minimise the risk of criminal damage to property and street furniture:

- use robust materials in construction.
- actively monitor CCTV images of the public space as well as the buildings with a rapid response to emerging issues; and
- ensure repairs and maintenance are carried out regularly. Arson against bins within public spaces.

2.2.2 Theft of visitors' personal property.

Possible Solution – Footpaths / viewing areas should be as wide as possible so that unsupervised pedestrians do not have to pass too closely by others which could leave them vulnerable to thieves. The entrance to the facility and approaches should be illuminated to a high standard and CCTV should be provided.

2.2.3 Criminal damage carried out against buildings, structures and landmarks by means of graffiti:

Possible Solution – Where graffiti is not required a protective coating should be applied to any areas that may be vulnerable to graffiti (such as large expanses of blank walls and inside toilets) in order to facilitate rapid removal. Any proposed street furniture should be robust and vandal resistant. Flame retardant timber should be used where possible.


2.3 Risk Factors

The typical security risks for a development of this nature are:

- Personal robbery
- Theft of personal belongings
- Criminal damage to adjoining properties
- Arson
- Violence towards the public and staff
- Unauthorised access to buildings / private spaces
- Rowdy and inconsiderate behaviour
- Antisocial behaviour
- Loitering groups
- Alcohol and drug misuse
- Alcohol related disorder
- Rough sleeping

2.4 Criminal Damage (Parks): Risk Analysis

The data below relates to criminal damage offences within / against parks, recorded in the Manchester area during 2018 - 2019.





2.4.1 **Day / Time Range:** The risk of criminal damage peaks on a Saturday and Sunday during the afternoon and into the evening, peaking between 8pm – 9:30pm. Offenders often carry out criminal damage in the evening when there is less footfall in the area, giving offenders the perception that they are less likely to be identified. Offenders also use the cover of darkness in order to enter the area and exit the area unseen.

2.4.2 **Point of Entry:** In the local area the following entry points and MO's have been utilised most frequently:

- Graffiti on park statues and walls.
- Using implements in order to set fire to bins in public spaces.
- Damaging out houses by means of bodily pressure and implements, damaging doors/walls.
- Smashed glazing in windows and doors.
- Using bodily pressure and implements in order to damage fencing / netting surrounding the park.
- Using off road vehicles or cars to cause damage to grass fields within the park.

2.5 Theft (Parks): Risk Analysis



The data below relates to thefts within / against parks, recorded in the Manchester area during 2018 - 2019.



- 2.5.1 **Day / Time Range:** The risk of theft at parks in Manchester peak on a Saturday and Sunday during the afternoon and into the evening. Offenders have targeted properties located within the park, climbing on roofs and removing lead from the building. Offenders have also targeted insecure bikes, scooters, phones and bags, grabbing the property and making off out of the area.

2.6 Vehicle Crime: Risk Analysis

The data below relates to vehicle crime committed within 500m of the site.



- 2.6.1 **Day/Time Range:** The risk of vehicle crime peaks on Tuesday in the afternoon (15:00-16:00) and evening (20:00-22:00). Offenders tend to target vehicles in the afternoon during the working week as well as in the evening when they are often left unattended and out of sight of the owners for long periods of time, creating a perceived low risk opportunity for offenders.

3 Layout Appraisal

3.1 Proposed development

- 3.1.1 Development of external design installations along the City Link urban pathway with associated lighting.
- 3.1.2 Full Planning Permission and Advertisement Consent for the erection of illuminated and non-illuminated advertisements and external design installations along the City Link urban pathway.

3.2 Environmental features that can influence crime patterns.

- 3.2.1 Features of the physical environment can influence the patterns of criminal and anti-social behaviour. They affect potential offenders' perceptions about a possible crime site, their evaluations of the circumstances surrounding a potential crime site, and the availability and visibility of one or more witnesses, who might intervene, at or near a site. Offenders may decide whether to commit a crime in a location after they determine the following:
 - How easy will it be to enter the area?
 - How visible, attractive, or vulnerable do targets appear?
 - What are the chances of being seen?
 - If seen, will the people in the area do something about it?
 - Is there a quick, direct route for leaving the location after the crime is committed?
- 3.2.2 Aspects of the local environment that might help to reduce the risk of crime and disorder on and around the site are as follows:
 - the site is located across a number of neighbourhoods where significant developments are established, planned or under construction, the result of which will bring greater levels of activity and footfall on the streets around the site with an increase in passive surveillance from residents and staff of the planned developments. The public realm will improve due to the proposed works and along with street lighting; will make the area and route feel safer for pedestrians and users of the routes.
- 3.2.3 There are also some features that might facilitate crime and disorder, and these include:
 - the routes dissect some areas where there is a high volume of recorded crime. Criminals are already attracted to this area and may exploit other criminal opportunities.
 - the absence of regular street activity or passive surveillance for much of the day and night leaves can leave users passing through the area, vulnerable to criminal and anti-social activity.
- 3.2.4 Poor environments can also embolden offenders who may sense that a lack of care of the environment means that their actions are less likely to be challenged. Environmental decay can also deter investment in a neighbourhood.

3.3 Positive Aspects of the Proposal

The following proposed features would make a positive contribution to the prevention of crime and fear of crime.

- 3.3.1 The main public realm circulation routes are obvious, leading people directly to where they need to go. The proposals are intended to integrate with surrounding circulation routes.
- 3.3.2 The proposal will incorporate new signage, artworks and street furniture this will create an interesting landscape opportunity for all users. The hard & soft landscaping will help to generate a sense of place, pride and ownership for the community and create new links to existing neighbourhoods.
- 3.3.3 The regenerated public space is very likely to attract greater number of visitors, commuters & education groups which can add to the ambience of the place and improves passive surveillance and informal policing of the area.

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- 3.3.4 The linear layout has a relatively uncomplicated arrangement with good sight lines along the pathways with no pinch points. The proposed upgrading works will enhance access points and help to increase sight lines and reduce potential hiding places which could be exploited by offenders.
 - 3.3.5 The proposal provides the opportunity for an improved public realm route stretching from Holt Town to the Etihad campus aiding event goers, community users, commuters and leisure users within the local area. The route will be seen as an improved destination across a wide section of Manchester for all levels of accessibility.
 - 3.3.6 The scheme presents opportunities to incorporate lighting within the proposals, promoting a sense of safety within the area during the hours of darkness whilst also working in conjunction with the local ecology.
 - 3.3.7 All new lighting features and street furniture must be robust against acts of violence given the isolated nature of the site.
 - 3.3.8 The proposed development provides the opportunity to include security features built into the design and construction of the scheme and avoid the need for obtrusive retrofitted security measures that can increase the fear of crime. Security measures carefully incorporated into the design can ensure the building is reasonably secure, without visibly announcing that the design was concerned about crime.

3.4 Recommendations

The following points have been identified for further consideration and would need to be addressed for Design for Security to support the proposed scheme.

- 3.4.1 The works should incorporate the removal of legacy street furniture, signage and wayfinding which has become damaged, graffitied or no-longer fit for purpose. The new identity, signage and street furniture must not be undermined by existing information points/furniture which will detract the new installations. The impression of this legacy furniture creates an impression for users that the routes are poorly maintained and may impart feelings of insecurity for some users.
- 3.4.2 Consideration must be given to the anti-social use of motorbikes along the paths, already an issue within the area, where motorbikes are being driven at high speeds. The report calls for measures to be incorporated which will inhibit and/or reduce the opportunity for motorbikes to be driven for long distances at high speeds.
- 3.4.3 Landscape generally. Future soft landscaping growth and maintenance must be considered at the design stage. Hard landscape features and surfaces should be designed to withstand casual acts of vandalism which should be considered. Consideration should be given to the level of maintenance likely to be carried out when selecting landscape materials, in particular robustness and ease of repair or replacement following damage.
- 3.4.4 Maintenance of newly installed control measure (lighting, gates and any further access control features) should be incorporated into the management & maintenance procedures.
- 3.4.5 External lighting should be reviewed to ensure the pedestrian access/routes under bridges are safe and that the lighting supports ecology in the area.
- 3.4.6 Consider the creation of a 'Friends of', 'Local business' and 'youth organisation' groups, to support the management and maintenance of the public realm.
- 3.4.7 The proposed development works should help to increase the accessibility of such spaces to user groups who may feel more vulnerable in such spaces and who are of lower mobility. The greater the use of these spaces the less likely they will be populated by those acting anti-socially.
- 3.4.8 Consideration should be given to the waste collection, storage and disposal arrangements as part of the management strategy. It is not acceptable for bins to be left full for extended periods where they can breed a sense of mis-management and encourage further littering.
- 3.4.9 Consider installation of a "Help Point" for use by anyone in difficulties.
- 3.4.10 Management. The security of the site and its users will be dependent on implementation of management practises to ensure that entry to the site and accessibility within it can be effectively monitored and controlled (see section 5).
- 3.4.11 It is essential that all the physical security measures listed below are incorporated into the scheme. Integrated, risk-commensurate security measures aim to place secure physical barriers or surveillance

in the path of the criminal – making crime harder to commit and raising the risk of detection and possible capture, as well as promoting a feeling of safety in users.

4 Physical Security

The following checklist forms the physical security requirements for this scheme to achieve Secured by Design accreditation.

4.1 Landscaping

- ☐ Street furniture should be designed to withstand casual acts of vandalism. When selecting or designing street furniture, consider how easily and quickly items can be repaired or replaced following damage. When commissioning bespoke street furniture and public artworks it is also important to be mindful of the potential for attack and ease of repair. These features are best positioned where there is plenty of formal and informal surveillance, so any criminal acts are more likely to be witnessed.
- ☐ Use of loose surface materials in the publicly accessible areas of the scheme should be avoided. Small fragments of ground covering can be used as missiles against people and premises (both to gain entry and to commit criminal damage).
- ☐ Public open space areas should be subject to an effective maintenance contract. This should ensure that all damage is rectified in a timely manner, and that any such space will not be detrimental to its surroundings.
- ☐ Design of Chicanes, Chicanes should be considered at locations near egress points to support the reduction of cycle speeds which can be an issue between pedestrians and cyclists along the path. Chicanes also reduce the opportunity for cyclists and illegal motorbikes to undertake high speeds over long stretches, thus reducing conflict and/or injury between users.
- ☐ Ease of repair. It is likely that furniture will be subject to criminal damage. The design should be sufficiently robust to withstand this kind of attack, but also should be capable of rapid repair. Use of bespoke components may create delays in obtaining replacements.

4.2 Lighting

- ☐ External lighting should be provided in accordance with local ecology requirements. The spread of lighting should be evenly distributed with no areas of shadowing or pooling. Levels should be sufficient to support the ecology within the area. The position of light sources must not create glare or be dazzling at eye level.

4.3 CCTV

- ☐ Any CCTV system that may be used within this proposal will require certain specifications and intelligent placement of cameras to compliment the design of the development. Designers should consider the following points when planning a CCTV strategy:
- ☐ CCTV systems (and lighting that support them) require regular cleaning and maintenance to remain effective.
- ☐ Where necessary cameras that are vulnerable to damage should be protected from attack either by relocation to a higher level and using a bigger lens to achieve the view required or through the fitting of a vandal resistant housing.
- ☐ With regards to the retention of footage, the police prefer quality over quantity. The overall retention period should be dictated by what the system is designed to achieve, though it would be better to have good quality images over a 14-day period than poor ones over a 30-day period.
- ☐ Procedures for recovery of recordings are recommended to be established (e.g. trained staff / the CCTV system instruction manual to be readily available). This is to ensure that the images produced will be of an acceptable standard that will allow for identification of an individual which will stand up to scrutiny in court.
- ☐ **Acceptable Standard** - this generally requires a resolution of 720x576 pixels at a real time frame rate of 25 frames per second. (N.B. Both the camera and DVR must be capable of this – if the camera will only send low resolution images then it does not matter how high the resolution of the recording unit is).

- ☐ **Identification** – One of three levels of field of view. To identify an individual, the image must capture no less than 120% of the field of view (at least from the top of the individuals head to their knees). The remaining two levels of field of view are 'Overview' and 'Recognition', which whilst effective for observational purposes, are less likely to result in the identification of a person/offender.
- ☐ The intelligent placement of cameras helps to provide clear facial identification of individuals. Suitable locations would be: Main circulation routes / elevations and entrances to new pavilions / sheltered area between the two buildings / main gathering spaces.

4.4 Other

- ☐ Signage should be provided advising people of what to do if they get into difficulties or simply to report faults or offensive graffiti.
- ☐ Signage should be consistent throughout the area. It should help direct users to the safest/most convenient routes to and from key areas of the site, for example, bus stops and nearest points of interest where further assistance may be found.
- ☐ Surfaces that could be vulnerable to graffiti should be formed of a resistant material or have a resistant coating applied at the outset in order to facilitate rapid removal, e.g. 'easy-on' (see www.urbanhygiene.com for details).

5 Management & Maintenance

- 5.1.1 The upkeep of a development over its lifetime can be crucial to the level of security and safety within the area. Aspects of a development, which are left to deteriorate, have the potential to attract further crime. A maintenance plan should be drawn up to address issues such as:
 - Litter and graffiti removal to ensure that the site remains in good repair.
 - Regular inspection, service and repair to communal security features (lighting, signage, fencing & gates)
 - Trimming and pruning to shrubs and trees to ensure that sight lines are maintained, and coverage of lighting is not impaired.
- 5.1.2 Ensure that the site management of the structure and landscape can cope with the proposals remains in place.
- 5.1.3 Information regarding security features (such as specifications of materials and structures and systems performance) should be conveyed to the ultimate owners or managers of the site to ensure that any future replacements continue to provide the same level of security and maintain any security accreditation for the development.
- 5.1.4 As the facility is in a relatively quiet location, it will inevitably attract the attention of potential offenders, regular maintenance should be considered during the initial period, which can be reviewed and adapted as experience of site develops. The developer should liaise with the local policing team, and the site should be included in the patrols of the neighbourhood officers.

6 Construction

- 6.1.1 Untidy sites and their surroundings can be littered with debris accessible to vandals who often use loose materials as missiles to commit crime. The client should take measures appropriate to secure their site during construction, and control pedestrian and vehicular access in to and out of the site curtilage. It is also recommended that the contractor on this scheme is a member of the 'Considerate Constructors Scheme', who has committed to be a considerate and good neighbour, as well as clean, respectful, safe, environmentally conscious, responsible and accountable.
- 6.1.2 Site security contractors should be SIA (Security Industry Authority) approved to ensure professional standards are adhered to (please see <http://www.sia.homeoffice.gov.uk/pages/acs-intro.aspx> for more details).

7 Useful References

7.1 Secured by Design (SBD)

- 7.1.1 Secured by Design focuses on crime prevention at the design, layout and construction stages of homes and commercial premises and promotes the use of security standards for a wide range of applications and products. To apply for Secured by Design certification for your development, visit our online application form at: <http://www.designforsecurity.org/secured-by-design/sbd-accreditation/>

A Contact register

Date	Contact With	Summary of Contact
05/03/24	Oak View Group	CIS application submitted
08/03/24	Oak View Group	Client confirmation
29/02/24	DfS & Oak View Group	Site visit & client meeting
20/03/24	GMP	Invoice issued
13/03/24	Oak View Group	Invoice Paid
21/03/24	DfS	CIS completed

B Associated Documents

This report is based on the following drawings and supplementary information submitted by the applicant.

Drawing No.	Drawing Title	Date	Rev
	01_COOPLIVE_FINAL_DESIGN_PACK_240228	5/03/24	
	CWT Design Access Statement v3 (2)	8/03/24	

PLEASE NOTE - In the event of any subsequent material changes to the scheme, it will be necessary for Design for Security to reassess the comments made within this report.

C CIS Version History

Version	Revisions Made	Date
A		

D Glossary

Burglary Resistance Standards

BS PAS 23-1, 1999

General performance requirements for door / window assemblies.

A performance standard for door-sets and windows, which certifies that a particular door-set is fit for purpose. Door products must also have BS PAS 24 certification.

BS PAS 24-1, 2012

General security performance requirements for door/window assemblies.

An attack test standard for door-sets and windows. This is the minimum police requirement for Secured by Design dwellings, and is also applicable to French/double doors, and sliding doors.

ENV 1627-30 (Security Ratings WK1 to WK6)

Windows, doors, shutters - Burglar resistance Requirements and classification

The classification system used in ENV 1627-30 is aimed at the commercial market and is based on five elements:

- a) Resistance of glazing*
- b) Performance of hardware*
- c) Resistance to static loading*
- d) Resistance to dynamic loading*
- e) Burglary resistance by manual intervention*

LPS 1175 (Security Ratings 1 to 6)

Specification for testing and classifying the burglary resistance of building components

This includes doors, shutters, garage doors and grilles typically for commercial premises and higher risk domestic premises and is acceptable to the ABI and the Police. The standard has 6 levels, 6 being the highest, with levels 1 and 2 equivalent in many respects to BS PAS 24 and BS 7950.

STS201 Issue 4: 2012

Enhanced security requirements for door-sets and door assemblies for dwellings to satisfy the requirements of PAS23 and PAS24

STS202 Issue 3: 2011

Requirements for burglary resistance of construction products including hinged, pivoted, folding or sliding door-sets, windows, curtain walling, security grilles, garage doors and shutters.

This specifies a broadly similar range of attack tools and times to those specified at the lower levels of LPS1175.

EN 356, 2000 (Ratings P1A to P8A)

Glass in building. Security glazing. Testing and classification of resistance against manual attack.

A performance standard for manual attacks on glazing. P2A is comparable to the performance of a

6.8mm laminated glass, and P4A to that of a 9.5mm laminated glass.

Commonly Used Acronyms

CIT

Cash in transit (refers to vehicles, personnel and routines).

CPTED

Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design

CRS

Crime Reduction Specialist. Sometimes known as CPO (Crime Prevention Officer)

INPT

Integrated Neighbourhood Policing Team.

PVB / PolyVinyl Butyral (Glazing interlayer)

A commonly used interlayer used in the production of laminated glass.

LPCB (Loss Prevention Certification Board)

A brand of the BRE Global (Building Research Establishment) family. The LPCB work with insurers, Government, police, designers, manufacturers, contractors and end users to develop methods of assessing performance and reliability of security products to ensure their fitness for purpose.

UKAS (United Kingdom Accreditation Service)

The sole national accreditation body recognised by government to assess, against internationally agreed standards, organisations that provide certification, testing, inspections and calibration services.

Useful Websites

Design for Security

www.designforsecurity.org

Secured by Design

www.securedbydesign.com

RIBA Product Selector

www.ribaproductselector.com

LPCB – Red Book Live

www.redbooklive.com

Crime Reduction (Home Office)

www.crimereduction.homeoffice.gov.uk

DAC (Design Against Crime) Solution Centre

www.designagainstcrime.org

Building for Life

www.buildingforlife.org

CLG (Communities and Local Government)

www.communities.gov.uk