



CRIME IMPACT STATEMENT

Land bound by Goulden St, Chadderton St, Marshall
St and Cross Keys St, New Cross

99 No. Apartments

FOR: CROSS KEYS ST LTD

VERSION B: 9th May 2024

REFERENCE: 2023/0422/CIS/01

Greater Manchester Police

designforsecurity

Land bound by Goulden St, Chadderton St, Marshall St and Cross Keys St, New

2023/0422/CIS/01

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Development supported

This development has been assessed against the principles of 'Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design' (CPTED - <http://designforsecurity.org/about/crime-prevention-through-environmental-design/>), in order to reduce the opportunities for crime and the fear of crime. The following areas have been identified as a concern and should be addressed (see section 3.3 for more details).

- The duplex apartments which are located at lower ground floor level should have some form of defensible space/low boundary & gate to restrict the external spaces to residents.
- Vehicular access into the landscaped area should be restricted.

Additionally, there are a number of recommendations made in section 3.3 of this report which would enhance the security of the development, and it is highly recommended that these are considered. It is also recommended that the development is built to Secured by Design standards.



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
1 Visual Audit

The proposed development site can be seen on the adjacent map, edged in red. The site is located in the New Cross area of Manchester, on the edge of the city centre area.

The site is roughly rectangular and the boundaries are defined by Goulden Street, Chadderton Street, Marshall Street, and Cross Keys Street.

The site is presently used as a surface car parking area and a site compound for a nearby development. The car park appeared well used on the day of visiting and there was a high level of pedestrian activity on the surrounding streets.

In the local area there was some graffiti to external walls but otherwise very little evidence of criminal and antisocial behaviour. The area is a mix of uses but more recent developments in the area have been of apartment buildings.



2 Crime Statistics & Analysis

All data below is based on crimes recorded between 1st April 2023 to 31st March 2024.

Crime Summary

Figure 1: Recorded Crime within 500m of Site

Domestic Burglary	Non-Domestic Burglary	Criminal Damage	Less Serious Wounding	Theft	Robbery	Serious Wounding	Theft from Motor Vehicle	Theft of Motor Vehicle	Bicycle Theft
37	104	234	855	358	67	20	336	30	33

- 2.1.1 The overall crime rate in the local area is high for Manchester; however the location of the site should be taken into consideration. The site is located in the city centre where there is a high concentration of retail outlets and licenced premises which leads a higher rate of crime and disorder. Less serious wounding, theft and vehicle crime have been the highest recorded crimes in the area.
- 2.1.2 Less serious woundings are taking place throughout the local area with most offences taking place in the late evening and early hours of the morning over the weekend period when there is a greater volume of foot fall occurring within these premise types. The site is located within the Northern Quarter where there is a high number licenced premises. Offences have mostly consisted of assaults and public order offences.
- 2.1.3 Thefts are again taking place throughout the Northern Quarter which is situated to the north of the proposed site, with offenders targeting victims in bars and restaurants and removing insecure items – mostly mobile phones and bags. Offenders are also using pickpocketing and distraction methods in order to obtain personal items.
- 2.1.4 Vehicle crime in the area is high, with offenders mostly targeting vehicles using private car parks and on street parking facilities. Theft from motor vehicle has been the highest recorded vehicle crime taking place with smashed glazing being the most common entry point, removing goods from within the vehicle. Offenders are also removing vehicle registration plates using implements. Town and City Centres often experience a higher number of vehicle offences due to the number of vehicles parked for extended periods of time.

2.2 Common Use-Specific M.O.s (Modus Operandi)

- 2.2.1 Forcing open secure windows and doors using bodily pressure and implements in order to gain entry to the property.

Possible Solution - All external doors should be certified to recognised security standards (see section 4.1 & 5.1), which are independently proven to reduce the risk of forced entry and thus increase the chances of detection. Security-certified doors are the best long-term measure to address this risk and can be obtained to suit virtually all operational requirements

- 2.2.2 Exploitation of insecure windows and doors.

Possible Solution - Any ground floor opening lights should be restricted in opening to 100mm to prevent them being left vulnerable if unlocked. All external doors should be self-closing to prevent them being left in an insecure position and any external apartment doors should have a split-spindle or fixed handle to prevent these doors from being left insecure.

- 2.2.3 Smashed glazing in windows and doors using implements.

Possible Solution – All ground floor/accessible glazing should include a laminated pane, which forms a much more robust barrier against shattering and penetration (see section 4.2 & 5.2). Any glazed panels in or around doors should be small and set well-away from locking points.

- 2.2.4 Posing as a legitimate resident and gaining access to communal areas of apartment building via insecure doors and tailgating.

Possible Solution – All ground floor communal doors should be fitted with door closers and lock automatically, to prevent these doors from being left open and insecure. Any publicly accessible apartment entrance doors should be fitted with a split-spindle or fixed external handle to prevent them

from being opened from the outside when unlocked. Any accessible windows should be restricted in opening to prevent them from being fully opened if left insecure.

2.2.5 Forcing open shutters using implements and bodily force to gain access.

Possible Solution – Shutters (if applicable) should be certified to a relevant burglary standard.

2.2.6 Theft of parcels from communal areas

Possible Solution – There should be a secure parcel store provided for residents. The parcel store should be covered with a CCTV camera.

2.3 Risk Factors - Residential

The typical security risks for a development of this nature are:

- Domestic burglary
- Theft from gardens, sheds or garages
- Criminal damage to dwellings and vehicles
- Theft of, or from, vehicles
- Bogus callers and distraction burglary
- Anti-social behaviour
- Neighbour disputes
- Theft and criminal damage during the construction period
- Unauthorised access to private spaces
- Poor maintenance of access control systems





2.4 Risk Factors - Retail

The typical security risks for a development of this nature are:

- Commercial burglary
- Cash robbery
- Unauthorised access to private spaces/Tailgating
- Shoplifting
- Employee theft
- Theft of customer / staff property
- Criminal damage to property

2.5 Crime Rate Comparison




The rates below relates to crime committed within 500m of the site. England & Wales data was last recorded for January – December 2021.



- 2.5.1 The rate of domestic burglaries per 1000 dwellings is **73% lower** than Manchester as a whole, **65% lower** than Greater Manchester and **64% lower** than England & Wales.
- 2.5.2 The rate of woundings per 1000 dwellings is **41% lower** than Manchester as a whole, **19% lower** than Greater Manchester and **54% higher** than England & Wales.
- 2.5.3 The rate of incidents of criminal damage per 1000 dwelling is **11% lower** than Manchester as a whole, **17% higher** than Greater Manchester and **42% higher** than England & Wales.
- 2.5.4 The rate of incidents of vehicle crime per 1000 dwellings is **58% higher** than Manchester as a whole, **161% higher** than Greater Manchester and **217% higher** than England & Wales.

2.6 Domestic Burglary: Risk Analysis

The data below relates to domestic burglaries committed within 500m of the site.





2.6.1 **Day/Time Range:** The risk of domestic burglary peaks on a Thursday and Friday during the early hours of the morning (12am – 2:30am). Offenders often target properties during the early hours of the morning as it is dark and there is less footfall in the area, giving offenders the perception that they are less likely to be caught or identified.

2.6.2 **Point of Entry:** In the local area the following entry points and MO's have been utilised most frequently:

- Entering apartment buildings by forced entry and tailgating residents and entering communal areas.
- Exploitation of insecure windows and doors.
- Forcing open secure windows and doors using bodily pressure and implements in order to gain access to the building.
- Smashed glazing in windows and doors using implements.

2.7 Vehicle Crime: Risk Analysis

The data below relates to vehicle crime committed within 500m of the site.



- 2.7.1 **Day/Time Range:** The risk of vehicle crime peaks on a Friday and Saturday during the morning and into the evening, peaking in the evening (8pm – 10pm). Offenders often target vehicles throughout the day, around the city centre, as they are often left unattended and out of sight of the owner for long periods of time, creating a perceived low risk opportunity.

3 Layout Appraisal

3.1 Proposed development

- 3.1.1 The proposed development is of 99 no. apartments.

3.2 Positive Aspects of the Proposal


The following proposed features would make a positive contribution to the prevention of crime and fear of crime.

- 3.2.1 The main entrances into the building are taken from prominent locations where they can be seen from the public highway/footway.
- 3.2.2 The mix of uses will bring legitimate use to the building during the day, deterring offenders from targeting the building whilst residents are likely to be at work.
- 3.2.3 There will be a bicycle store within the building allowing residents to store their bicycles securely.
- 3.2.4 There is a second doorset between the main entrance and the circulation core reducing the potential for offenders to tailgate into residential areas of the building.

3.3 Changes Needed and Recommendations

The following points have been identified for further consideration and would need to be addressed for Design for Security to support the proposed scheme.

Residential



- 3.3.1 Access the lower ground floor duplex apartments is taken from a lower level than the courtyard area, these spaces might not be readily visible from the courtyard/public footway/highway which could leave residents, visitors, and the apartments vulnerable. To reduce the potential for misuse it is highly recommended that a low boundary (i.e. 1200-1500mm railings) and lockable gate are installed to restrict access to residents.
- 3.3.2 Vehicular access into the landscaped area should be prevented with bollards, trees, planters, or similar.
- 3.3.3 Views of, and within, the landscaped courtyard should be unimpeded, with low shrubbery not exceeding 1000mm and tree canopies falling no lower than 2400mm. The courtyard should be covered by a monitored CCTV system and there should be a management/security protocol for dealing with antisocial behaviour.
- 3.3.4 External communal access doors must be compliant with and certified to BS PAS 24, STS202, or LPS 1175 SR2, including a lock capable of being operated via an electronic access control system. The communal entrance doors should be self-closing and secured with a multi-point electronic lock and capable of being operated via an electronic access control system, these features should be permitted under the scope of the certification.
- 3.3.5 Access into the buildings should be controlled by a video entry phone system (with the picture viewable on the phone unit, rather than on a television set) so that residents can vet visitors before allowing them access into the building. There should be no unrestricted trade access into the building.
- 3.3.6 To prevent tailgating into the building there should be a secure lobby, with a residents/visitors passing through a second access control security rated door before they can enter the stair/lift core of the building.
- 3.3.7 Postal workers should not be allowed unfettered access throughout the development. Postal workers should be granted access only to the post rooms only or mail/parcels should be delivered directly to the concierge.
- 3.3.8 There should be a parcel store within the building so that any deliveries for residents can be securely stored and not left in communal areas. The parcel room should operate on an access control system and be covered by the building-wide CCTV system.
- 3.3.9 Doors into cycle stores should operate on an access control system, operated with resident's key card/fob. Bicycle racks should allow both wheels and the frame to be secured.

4 Physical Security (Apartments)

In addition to the layout issues highlighted in section 3, the following checklist (sections 4-7) forms the physical security requirements for this scheme to achieve Secured by Design accreditation if required.

4.1 Doors



External communal access doors must be compliant with and certified to BS PAS 24, STS201, LPS 1175 SR2, LPS 2081 SR B, or STS 222, including a lock capable of being operated via an electronic access

control system. The communal entrance doors should be self-closing and secured with a multi-point electronic lock and capable of being operated via an electronic access control system, these features should be permitted under the scope of the certification. Access into the build should be controlled by a video entry phone system (with the picture viewable on the phone unit, rather than on a television set) so that residents can vet visitors before allowing them access into the building. There should be no unrestricted trade access into the building.

- ☐ Where secure postal lobbies are to be created, the secondary communal door must be to the same specification as the outer door - certified to BS PAS 24, STS201, LPS 1175 SR2, LPS 2081 SR B, or STS 222, including a lock capable of being operated via an electronic access control system.
- ☐ Apartment entrance doors must be compliant with and certified to BS PAS 24, STS201, LPS 1175 SR2, LPS 2081 SR B, or STS 222. Apartment entrance doors must have a door viewer.
- ☐ Construction of internal walls surrounding internal apartment entrance doors (600mm either side of the door set) should incorporate a resilient layer to reduce the risk of anyone breaking through the wall to access the locking mechanism. The resilient layer should be timber (minimum thickness of 9mm) or expanded metal.
- ☐ External escape-only doors (as with external doors in general) should be certified to BS PAS 24, STS201, LPS 1175 SR2, LPS 2081 SR B, or STS 222. It is crucial that the door ironmongery is permitted for use on these doors under the security certification of the product.

4.2 Windows

- ☐ Ground floor and easily accessible windows must be compliant with and certified to BS PAS 24, LPS 1175 SR2, LPS 2081 SR A, STS 204, or STS 222.
- ☐ Ground floor and easily accessible opening lights (escape requirements permitting) must be key-lockable and have fixed/lockable opening restrictors (not releasable from the outside) limited to 100mm.

4.3 Glazing & Building Fabric

- ☐ Glazing to a height of 2400mm (or if otherwise accessible) must incorporate at least one pane of glass with a 1.5mm PVB interlayer (e.g. 7.5mm laminated glass), or a glass rated as P4A under EN 356. The remaining pane in a double glazed unit may be toughened glass.
- ☐ Any curtain walling panels should include laminated glazing and should be securely fixed directly to the floor slabs where possible, rather than to perimeter columns.
- ☐ There should be a block work wall or material of similar strength (e.g. welded-steel mesh) behind or within any new cladding/insulated panels to the building, to a minimum height of 2000mm from ground level, to ensure that the fabric of the building itself is not vulnerable to attack.

4.4 Alarms

- ☐ If an alarm is installed, then it should comply with either:
 - BS EN 50131 and PD 6662 for wired systems
 - BS 6799 for wireless systems
- ☐ If an alarm is not to be provided, there should be a 13amp, non-switched fuse spur to allow future residents to connect an alarm.

4.5 Access Control

- ☐ Access control systems should be operable by swipe card or fob, and not numeric keypads. The following areas/doors should operate on access control:
 - Communal entrances
 - Communal areas

- Bicycle stores
- Circulation cores
- Amenity space
- Staff only areas
- Parcel rooms

4.6 Bicycle Parking Areas

- ☐ Doors into the cycle parking area(s) must be certified to BS PAS 24, STS201, LPS 1175 SR2, LPS 2081 SR B, or STS 222, including a lock capable of being operated via an electronic access control system, with access restricted to registered residents (i.e. genuine bicycle owners).
- ☐ Cycle stands should either be U-profile or Sheffield style stands. If rack storage is used it should be possible for both wheels and the frame to be secured.

4.7 Landscaping

- ☐ There should be no hard landscaping that could inadvertently create seating or loitering spots (except within secure designated or otherwise-controlled areas). These features can encourage anti-social behaviour and raise the fear of crime.
- ☐ It is essential that good sightlines are maintained throughout the development to allow residents and visitors to actively survey the area for potential threats. Low level planting should not be in excess of 1000mm in height and tree crowns should fall no less than 2400mm to aid sightlines and natural surveillance.

4.8 Lighting

- ☐ External lighting must be provided to pedestrian routes within the development in accordance with BS 5489. Lighting should be taken from a variety of sources and levels (i.e. columns, up lighting) to provide a greater level of coverage and avoid shadows/pooling.
- ☐ Fittings should produce 'white' light, as opposed to yellow/orange light. Metal halide (or bulbs with a comparable output) should be used, as these offer superior colour rendition over alternatives such as high and low pressure sodium bulbs.
- ☐ Dusk 'til dawn lights, operated by photoelectric cell/daylight sensor, should be installed to all external doors.
- ☐ Doors within the basement parking area should be illuminated with a dedicated lighting source.
- ☐ Elevations of the building should be illuminated.

4.9 CCTV

- ☐ The proposed apartment development should be covered by a comprehensive CCTV system.
- ☐ It is important that an operational requirement for CCTV is drawn up for developments in accordance with their specific use and that the objectives for the CCTV system are clearly established before a tendering process is started. A useful reference to help achieve this goal is the CCTV Operational Requirements Manual 2009 ISBN 978-1-84726-902-7 Published April 2009 by the Home Office Scientific Development Branch.
- ☐ The CCTV system must have a recording format that is acceptable to the police with images of evidential quality. Staff should be sufficiently trained to operate the system and be able to make recordings available to police on request and an operational requirement must take account of this fact.
- ☐ Whilst the location of cameras is a site-specific matter it would be normal practice for the system to observe all vehicular and pedestrian entrances. Early discussions with an independent expert and potential installers can resolve a number of matters including:

-
- monitoring and recording requirements
 - activation in association with the intruder alarm
 - requirements for observation and facial recognition/identification
 - areas to be monitored and field of view.
 - activities to be monitored.
 - the use of recorded images
 - maintenance of equipment and the management of recording
 - subsequent ongoing training of operatives

☐ TV systems must be installed to BS EN 50132-7: CCTV surveillance systems for use in security applications.

☐ The CCTV system should be compatible with the existing or planned lighting system.

☐ CCTV systems should be registered with the Information Commissioner's Office (ICO) and be compliant with guidelines in respect to Data Protection and Human Rights legislation. Further information is available at this website: www.ico.org.uk.

☐ For guidance on the use of CCTV images as legal evidence see BS 7958: 215 Closed circuit television (CCTV). Management and operation. Code of practice. This document provides guidance and recommendations for the operation and management of CCTV within a controlled environment where data that may be offered as evidence is received, stored, reviewed or analysed. It assists owners of CCTV systems to follow best practice when gathering information of evidential quality. Remotely monitored detector activated CCTV systems must be installed in accordance with BS 8418: 2015 Installation and remote monitoring of detector operated CCTV systems - Code of practice.

5 Management & Maintenance

- 5.1.1 The upkeep of a development over its lifetime can be crucial to the level of security and safety within. Aspects of a development, which are left to deteriorate, have the potential to attract further crime – a process known as ‘the broken window theory’. A maintenance plan should be drawn up to address issues such as:
- Litter removal
 - Repair to communal areas (lighting, signage, access controls)
 - Trimming and pruning to shrubs and trees
- 5.1.2 Any public open space or amenity areas not under the ownership of residents should be subject to an effective maintenance contract. This should ensure that all damage is rectified in a timely manner, and that any such space will not be detrimental to its surroundings.

6 Construction

- 6.1.1 Untidy sites and their surroundings can be littered with debris accessible to vandals who often use loose materials as missiles to commit crime. The client should take measures appropriate to secure their site during construction, and control pedestrian and vehicular access in to and out of the site curtilage. It is also recommended that the contractor on this scheme is a member of the ‘Considerate Constructors Scheme’, who has committed to be a considerate and good neighbour, as well as clean, respectful, safe, environmentally conscious, responsible and accountable.
- 6.1.2 Site security contractors should be SIA (Security Industry Authority) approved to ensure professional standards are adhered to (please see <http://www.sia.homeoffice.gov.uk/pages/acs-intro.aspx> for more details).

7 Useful References

7.1 Secured by Design (SBD)

- 7.1.1 Secured by Design focuses on crime prevention at the design, layout and construction stages of homes and commercial premises and promotes the use of security standards for a wide range of applications and products. To apply for Secured by Design certification for your development, visit our online application form at: <http://www.designforsecurity.org/secured-by-design/sbd-accreditation/>

A Contact register

Date	Contact With	Summary of Contact
18/03/2024	Grant Kaye	CIS instruction received
02/05/2024	George Bissett	Revised plans
09/05/2024	George Bissett	Revised CIS

B Associated Documents

This report is based on the following drawings and supplementary information submitted by the applicant.

Drawing No.	Drawing Title	Date	Rev
1111-TGA-XX-00-DR-A-95300	GA - Level 00	Apr 24	P01
1111-TGA-XX-00-DR-A-95202	Site Plan	Apr 24	P01
1111-TGA-XX-01-DR-A-95301	GA – Level 01	Apr 24	P01
1111-TGA-XX-02-DR-A-95302	GA – Level 02-05	Apr 24	P01
1111-TGA-XX-06-DR-A-95306	GA – Level 06	Apr 24	P01
1111-TGA-XX-06-DR-A-95307	GA – Level 07	Apr 24	P01
1111-TGA-XX-08-DR-A-95308	GA – Level 08	Apr 24	P01
1111-TGA-XX-RF-DR-A-95309	GA – Roof Plan	Apr 24	P01
XX-ZZ-DW G-L-5000	S Courtyard 00 & Roof Terrace 08	01/05/24	3

PLEASE NOTE - In the event of any subsequent material changes to the scheme, it will be necessary for Design for Security to reassess the comments made within this report.

C CIS Version History

Version	Revisions Made	Date
A		
B	Minor amendments	09/05/2024