



CRIME IMPACT STATEMENT

10 MINSHULL STREET & 11 BLOOM STREET

78 APARTMENTS

FOR: **BEECH CONSTRUCTION**

VERSION B: 19.01.18

2016/0064/CIS/01

Greater Manchester Police

design**for**security

10 MINSHULL STREET & 11 BLOOM STREET

2016/0064/CIS/01

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

This Statement, originally produced in February 2016, has been updated following revisions to the scheme. Crime patterns in this neighbourhood have not changed significantly and Design for Security still consider the analysis contained within the report relevant.

Development Supported

The development of the site for residential use is welcomed. Whilst generally very well designed from a crime prevention perspective, there are several issues that will need to be addressed to improve the overall security of the development. These security recommendations are set out in section 3.3 of this report, and include addressing:

- the privacy and security of lower ground floor apartments
- ensuring all entrance doors are adequately secure
- creating a secure lobby at both of the main entrances
- devising an access control strategy to ensure that all areas of the two buildings are secure

At the planning application stage, Greater Manchester Police Design for Security will make representations to Manchester City Council to require the recommendations contained within this report to be supported by an appropriate planning condition as well as a condition requiring the development to achieve Secured by Design accreditation. If the recommendations in the report are suitably addressed there is no reason why the development would not achieve the SBD award.



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Consultant

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
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1 Risk Audit

The development site and its surroundings are shown on the plan and photographs below. The site consists of two grade II listed buildings, 10 Minshull Street (Mindel House) and 11 Bloom Street. Both buildings are late Victorian, brick built, former warehouses, with stone detailing, and include accommodation in lower ground, upper ground and four upper floors. A narrow, secure, service passageway, accessed from either Bloom Street (to the north-west) or Richmond Street (to the south-west), separates the two buildings. Both buildings have facades on both Richmond Street and Bloom Street. The main entrance to Mindel House is located at the corner of Minshull Street and Bloom Street. 11 Bloom Street's main entrance faces Bloom Street and is situated at the western edge of the building. Both buildings have secondary entrances, which reflect previous sub-division of the buildings as well as service requirements. Minshull Street Crown Court is situated on the eastern side of Minshull Street opposite Mindel House. Canal Street to the south-west of the proposed development site, is dominated by licensed premises, the rear elevations to which face Richmond Street. Activity on this section of Richmond Street is largely related to the servicing activities of the various licensed premises – e.g. deliveries, refuse disposal, staff smoking




Mindell House, with the main entrance at the corner of Minshull Street and Bloom Street



11 Bloom Street with Mindell House and the Crown Court in the background



Richmond Street looking towards the Crown Court with the 11 Bloom Street on the left of the image and the rear elevations of Canal Street bars and restaurants on the right



The main entrance to 11 Bloom Street is located adjacent to the Bloom Street pay and display car park



The gated passageway that separates the two buildings



The gable end of 11 Bloom Street viewed from the Richmond Street car park

There have been over 3,600 reported crimes in the past 12 months in the neighbourhood around the site. The Village (Canal Street area) is a focal point for crime, largely linked to the night-time economy of the area. The development site is sufficiently close to Canal Street as to be directly affected by the volume and types of crime committed. The most common crime recorded on Minshull Street is violent crime, accounting for half of the 24 incidents reported. More than 150 crimes have been reported on Bloom Street, around half of which is crimes involving the use of, or threat of, violence. Theft accounts for about 30% of the crimes reported on Bloom Street, with vehicle related crime around 15%. Richmond Street has a much lower number (63) of reported crimes. Violent crime again accounts for around half of the crimes recorded on Richmond Street, whilst theft is the next most common with over 20 incidents recorded. Domestic burglary is generally dispersed throughout the neighbourhood, although there is some concentration around the halls of residence within the former UMIST campus. The presence of apartments in the vicinity of Canal Street is likely to attract the criminals that are active in this neighbourhood, whilst anti-social behaviour is more likely to be reported, a result of the increase residents affected.

2 Crime Statistics & Analysis

The following information has been produced to give an insight into the types and volume of crime experienced across Greater Manchester and North Manchester. Particular attention is paid to the area surrounding Minshull Street and to crimes, which research shows, can be affected by the built environment. All data is based on crimes recorded between 1st January 2015 and 31st December 2015.

2.1 Crime Overview

- 2.1.1 Over the previous 12 months, there have been 221,270 crimes reported across Greater Manchester, of these, 32,528 incidents (15%) have occurred on the North Manchester Division (the City Centre lies within this division) with 29,266 (90%) of these victim based crimes (crimes with a specific identifiable victim).
- 2.1.2 When looking at the figures in more detail, the number of crimes recorded within a Km² centred on the development site over the previous 12 months is as follows:

Figure 1: Recorded Crime in Km ² Centred on Site									
Burglary Dwelling	Burglary Other	Criminal Damage	Less Serious Wounding	Theft	Robbery	Serious Wounding	Theft from Motor Vehicle	Theft of Motor Vehicle	Theft of Pedal Cycle
56	203	296	1315	1064	154	38	279	20	167

- 2.1.3 The most frequently occurring offences over the previous 12 months in the research area have been less serious wounding, theft and criminal damage. These types of crime are typical of those experienced in or within close proximity of district, town or city centres – where there is often a concentration of retail, commercial and licensed premises, leading to a concentration of crime and disorder issues. The majority of the violence in the local area has taken place in the evening and during early hours of the morning, with a higher volume of incidents typically experienced between Friday and Sunday – when more people visit the city and attend licensed premises (often for longer periods and consuming more alcohol, leading to conflicts).
- 2.1.4 As this Crime Impact Statement has been prepared for a residential development the more detailed analysis below will look at residential burglary and vehicle crime.


2.2 Residential Burglary: Risk Analysis

- 2.2.1 Residential burglary accounts for 5% (1,579 offences) of victim based crimes recorded within North Manchester; a figure which has decreased compared to the previous year (January 2014 – December 2014). The graph below shows how the rate of residential burglary committed within a Km² centred on the site compares to that of the Local Planning Authority area and Greater Manchester.



The rate of burglary per dwelling in the neighbourhood analysed is **40% lower** than the rate experienced in the City of Manchester and is **comparable** to the Greater Manchester rate.

- 2.2.2 **Point of entry:** Where offenders have targeted residential properties within a Km² centred on the site, they have used the following points of entry:



- 2.2.3 The majority of residential burglaries in the neighbourhood have been committed through doors, particularly those to the front of properties. Offenders in this area have commonly targeted flats/apartments – gaining access to communal areas by deception, by tailgating, or through insecure communal entrances, before targeting individual dwellings. Doors have been forced open with tools and/or bodily pressure and have also been targeted when left insecure.
- 2.2.4 **Day range:** The risk of burglary is greatest on Monday.
- 2.2.5 **Time range:** The risk is concentrated during the day and into the evening. Offenders often target residential properties during the day when residents are likely to be out at work and at night when it is dark and they perceive the risk of being caught or identified as low.

2.3 Vehicle Crime: Risk Analysis

- 2.3.1 Vehicle crime accounts for 10% (2,933 offences) of victim based crimes recorded within North Manchester; a figure which has increased compared to the previous year (January 2014 – December 2014). The graph below shows how the rate of vehicle crime committed within a Km² centred on the site compares to that of the City of Manchester and Greater Manchester.



The rate of vehicle crime per dwelling in the neighbourhood around the site is **275% higher** than that of the City of Manchester and **320% higher** than Greater Manchester rate.

- 2.3.2 **Day range:** The risk of vehicle crime is greatest on Wednesday.

- 2.3.3 **Time range:** The risk peaks in the afternoon and the evening. Offenders often target vehicles during the day when cars are left unattended in communal car parks or on-streets. Vehicles parked within open, public car parks or on streets, where they are easily accessible and unsupervised, are more vulnerable than those parked within enclosed car parks that have electronic surveillance and/or a guard present.

2.4 Risk Factors

2.4.1 The typical security risks for a development of this nature are:

- Burglary
- Criminal damage to property and vehicles
- Theft of/from parked vehicles
- Poor maintenance of access control systems
- Unauthorised access (tailgating)
- Antisocial behaviour
- Neighbour disputes
- Theft and criminal damage during the construction period

2.5 Modus operandi used in committing burglary in this area & recommendations to reduce risk

2.5.1 Doors have been forced open using bodily pressure and/or tools

To minimise the risk of offenders forcing doors:

- all communal entry doors, service doors and apartment doors should be certified to PAS 24 security standard - PAS 24 rated doors are very difficult to force open;
- communal entry doors should be visible from the 'street' not set within deep recesses or on secluded elevations. Offenders will be less inclined to target properties where their actions may be witnessed; and,
- external doors should be illuminated by an external dusk til dawn light. Light suggests a property is occupied, and light will also highlight the actions of an offender, increasing the chance of a crime being witnessed.

2.5.2 Offenders gaining unauthorised access through communal entrances to target individual apartments entrance doors

To minimise the risk of offenders gaining unauthorised entry through communal entrances to target individual apartments:

- communal entry doors/gates should be self-closing and automatically lock upon closure;
- communal entrances should be located on the most prominent elevations and be illuminated through the hours of darkness;
- an air lock entry system (secondary door/gate) should be included to minimise the risk of offenders tailgating residents and legitimate visitors/delivery staff; and,
- inner lobby doors and/or the lifts should include access controls to prevent intruders gaining access to the upper floors.

2.5.3 Windows have been targeted when left insecure

To minimise the risk of offenders targeting insecure doors:

- all upper and lower ground level, opening windows should be certified to PAS 24, and include key operated locks and opening restrictors, (or be fixed closed); and,
- opening windows should be fitted with opening restrictors limiting opening to 100mm.

2.6 Risk Factors

The typical security risks for a development of this nature are:

- Burglary
- Criminal damage to property including parked vehicles
- Theft of/from parked vehicles
- Cycle theft
- Unauthorised access to buildings/private space
- Neighbour disputes
- Antisocial behaviour
- Theft and criminal damage during the construction period

3 Layout Appraisal

3.1 Proposed development

- 3.1.1 The proposed development comprises the remodelling of Mindel House, and remodelling and extending 11 Bloom Street, to create 78 apartments – 36 in Mindel House and 42 in number 11 Bloom Street. Accommodation is provided on across seven floors of Mindel House (lower ground up to the attic space on the fifth floor) and seven floors in number 11 Bloom Street (lower ground to fifth floor and within the proposed top floor, glazed, extension). There will be 61 two bed apartments and 17 one bed.
- 3.1.2 The principal communal residential entrance to Mindel House will remain at the corner of Minshull Street and Bloom Street. The main entrance to 11 Bloom Street will remain at the western fringe of the building facing Bloom Street. Both of these entrances have steps.
- 3.1.3 Glazed, secondary entrances will be provided at either end of the passageway between the two buildings, with entrance doors into the respective buildings from the passageway; this is also the accessible route into each building.
- 3.1.4 Cycle parking is provided within the lower ground floor of the Bloom Street building and within the central passageway.
- 3.1.5 Escape doors are provided from each building out onto Richmond Street.
- 3.1.6 There is no vehicle parking provision within the scheme.
- 3.1.7 Refuse storage for all apartments is provide at both upper and ground level of number 11 Bloom Street.
- 3.1.8 Amenity space is provided on the roof of 11 Bloom Street where a spacious, communal terrace will be created. The passageway between the buildings will widened, with the removal of a wall, to create a modest courtyard, providing some, limited, amenity space at street level. Several apartments overlooking the courtyard will benefit from having balconies.

3.2 Positive Aspects of the Proposal

The following proposed features would make a positive contribution to the prevention of crime and fear of crime.

- 3.2.1 The building and proposed uses will add interest, natural surveillance and activity to streetscene throughout the day and into the night.
- 3.2.2 The proposed development will result in the re-use of largely vacant buildings, which otherwise may attract criminal and anti-social behaviour.
- 3.2.3 The proposed redevelopment for residential purposes is appropriate given the location and nature of the buildings and the continuing demand for residential accommodation within the city centre.

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- 3.2.4 The development will add some daytime activity to this part of the Village, where there is currently little - a reflection of the land uses on and around the site – surface car parking, law courts and the service entrances to bars and clubs.
 - 3.2.5 The layout of the development is good. It addresses all the surrounding streets in an appropriate manner with the main entrances in suitable locations on the Minshull Street and Bloom Street facades.
 - 3.2.6 Living room windows on all upper floors of the building will facilitate natural surveillance of the surrounding streets. The prospective increase in natural surveillance of the public realm is likely to help control criminal and anti-social behaviour and give a greater sense of safety to the passing public.
 - 3.2.7 The additional lighting from the development, from the apartments and communal entrances will add to the illumination of these streets. Pedestrians are likely to feel safer and more confident in using these streets during the hours of darkness in particular if lighting levels are enhanced. Some types of anti-social behaviour are less likely to occur on brightly lit streets.
 - 3.2.8 The communal entry doors can be easily fitted with appropriate access controls to allow residents to vet visitors prior to allowing entry.
 - 3.2.9 Defensible space is provided around the building in the form of the secured courtyard, the external and internal communal entrance doors, and lower ground floor windows will be protected with full window height, ornate ironwork.
 - 3.2.10 The central courtyard will be secured with appropriately high, robust, fencing and gates. The gates must be self-closing and lock automatically upon closure.
 - 3.2.11 Cycle theft is a significant issue in the city centre so the provision of secure cycle parking within the central courtyard, is welcomed, although I wonder whether there is enough provision particularly given the lack of on-site vehicle parking. I would also like to see it moved away from the two entrances where it is more easily seen by passing offenders to a more central location within the courtyard. If cycle storage is well designed and secure, residents with valuable bikes will be inclined to use it. Conversely, if it is too small to meet the demand or is poorly designed and poorly located, residents will have little confidence in using it and it may become redundant. Cycles are then likely to be stored in less appropriate areas or within apartments, which has implications for maintenance of the communal areas within the buildings.
 - 3.2.12 The roof top amenity space provides residents with a space to meet. Such provision can help to foster interaction between residents, which helps to build social capital within a development. Schemes where residents build a sense of community are less likely to tolerate inappropriate behaviour by others as well as being more willing to challenge unfamiliar faces in the development. Well managed schemes, from a management company and resident perspective, are also less likely to see high turnover of residents. When occupants lose confidence in a development it can often follow that offenders exploit the situation, which then exacerbates an already poor situation.
 - 3.2.13 Secure bin storage is provided on the site in a suitable location although it is not clear how residents are to access the refuse store. This will need to be clarified as it may impact on access controls.

3.3 Recommendations to improve the security of the development and its surroundings

Essential

- 3.3.1 The location of the lower ground floor windows in relation to the surrounding streets is likely to compromise the privacy of prospective lower ground floor residents. If not addressed, the passing public will be able to see into the apartments, which will compromise the privacy of those residents as well as their security and that of their possessions. Any exposed glazing may attract anti-social behaviour which, late at night, could be especially uncomfortable. Residents often react to such exposure by permanently drawing the curtains/blinds, and whilst such an approach may improve privacy and security, it results in a poorer living space, with a lack of natural light. Consequently, it is recommended that a privacy film be applied to all lower ground floor windows or semi-opaque glass be fitted to these windows.
- 3.3.2 The gates to the bin store should include self-closing mechanisms. These gates should include fob activated electronic locks, which automatically engage as the doors close.
- 3.3.3 An access management plan should be formulated, which defines the location and type of access controls used on communal doors and gates. A programmable suited fob system would be ideal.

Desirable

- 3.3.4 Arrangements for postal delivery should be defined. A through-the-door/wall system is most suitable. An alternative would be to provide boxes within the two entrance lobbies. In both cases, the aim is to limit the extent to which delivery personnel have access to the development. Delivery personnel with no vested interest in keeping the building secure are more likely to allow people to 'tailgate'.

4 Physical Security

The following checklist forms the physical security requirements for this scheme to achieve the Secured by Design award.

4.1 Doors

- ☐ All communal entry doors should be compliant with, and certified to, BS PAS 24, STS202, or LPS 1175 SR2, should include a fob activated, multi-point electronic lock, (which is an integral part of the certification). If the original entrance doors to the two buildings are retained and re-used, they should be fitted with an automatic, self-activating multi-point, electronic locking system, which conforms to TS 621.
- ☐ Residents should be able to operate the locking mechanism of communal entry doors remotely from within their apartments to allow *bona fide* visitors entry. Audio-visual units should relay images (one way) and audio (two ways) from the appropriate communal entrance door to a handset in each apartment. To complement the accessible route created off the central passageway, a similar arrangement should be in place at the Bloom Street entry gate.
- ☐ Signage should be used to direct visitors to the appropriate entrance door or gate, and once inside the buildings, to the relevant apartment.
- ☐ The internal lobby doors of both buildings should include an electronic lock to create a secure space and minimise the risk of intruders tailgating legitimate residents or visitors.
- ☐ Both communal entrance doors and inner lobby doors should be self-closing and automatically lock securely upon closure.
- ☐ Individual apartment entrance doors should be compliant with, and certified to, BS PAS 24 and include a door viewer. Chain opening limiters are also recommended. Ideally, these doors should have fixed outer handles so that the only way in is with a key.
- ☐ The external face of the two escape doors onto Richmond Street should be free of any handles or other grip points. These door should also be self-closing and lock securely upon closure and only be used in an emergency. Signs should convey conditions of use and sanctions for abuse.

4.2 Windows

- ☐ If they are able to be opened, the upper ground floor windows should be fitted with tamper-proof, opening restrictors, limiting opening to 100mm, and window locks.

4.3 Glazing

- ☐ Glazing on the external facades (both to doors and windows) of the building must incorporate at least one pane of glass rated as P1A under EN 356 (upper floors). The remaining pane in a double glazed unit may be toughened glass.

4.4 Courtyard entrance doors

- ☐ The doors to the central courtyard should be either rated to the PAS 24 or LPS 1175 standard or be fitted with TS621 rated locks. The structure in which they are set should be at least 3000mm high. The doors should be self-closing and lock automatically upon closure. The lock should be activated by a fob from the street side of the doors. The Bloom Street door should be designated the accessible entrance,

so should include audio visual links to each apartment and residents should be able to release the locking mechanism from within their apartment.

4.5 Intruder Alarm

- ☐ Ideally, an intruder alarm should be installed to each apartment with contacts fitted to the entrance doors and PIR detectors in rooms of the upper ground floor that have windows.

4.6 Access Control

- ☐ Access control systems should be operable by fob or swipe card, and not numeric key pads. The communal entrance doors, internal upper ground floor lobby doors, the entry gates and the bin store should operate on an access control system.

4.7 Lighting

- ☐ Dusk 'til dawn lights, operated by photoelectric cell/daylight sensor, should be installed to all external doors, the two entry gates and the passageway between the two buildings. PIR lighting is not suitable.
- ☐ Fittings should produce 'white' light, as opposed to yellow/orange light. Metal halide (or bulbs with a comparable output) should be used, as these offer superior colour rendition over alternatives such as high and low pressure sodium bulbs.

4.8 CCTV

- ☐ A CCTV system should be included within this proposal and, if so, it will require certain specifications and suitably located cameras to compliment the design of the development. Designers should consider the following points when planning a CCTV strategy:
 - With regards to the retention of footage, the police prefer quality over quantity. The overall retention period should be dictated by what the system is designed to achieve, though it would be better to have good quality images over a 14-day period than poor ones over a 30-day period.
 - Procedures for recovery of recordings are recommended to be established (e.g. trained staff / the CCTV system instruction manual to be readily available). This is to ensure that the images produced will be of an **acceptable standard** that will allow for **identification** of an individual which will stand up to scrutiny in court.
 - **Acceptable Standard** - this generally requires a resolution of 720x576 pixels at a real time frame rate of 25 frames per second. (N.B. Both the camera and DVR must be capable of this – if the camera will only send low resolution images then it does not matter how high the resolution of the recording unit is).
 - **Identification** – One of three levels of field of view. To identify an individual, the image must capture no less than 120% of the field of view (at least from the top of the individuals head to their knees). The remaining two levels of field of view are '**Overview**' and '**Recognition**', which whilst effective for observational purposes, are less likely to result in the identification of a person/offender.
- ☐ CCTV systems (and lighting that support them) require regular cleaning and maintenance to remain effective.
- ☐ Where necessary cameras that are vulnerable to damage should be protected from attack either by relocation to a higher level and using a bigger lens to achieve the view required or through the fitting of a vandal resistant housing.
- ☐ The location of cameras should help to provide clear facial identification of individuals. Suitable locations for cameras would be: all entrances to the two buildings, the upper ground floor lobbies, the two entry gates and the cycle parking area.

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- ☐ Recording equipment should be securely stored on site, for example, within the secure plant room. Alternatively, images can be recorded and stored off site by a suitable monitoring/management company.

5 Management & Maintenance

- ☐ Over its lifetime, attention to the maintenance of a development can be crucial retaining a secure and safe scheme. Aspects of a development, which are left to deteriorate, have the potential to attract crime. Consequently, a maintenance plan should be drawn up to address issues such as repair to communal areas - including lighting, CCTV, signage and access controls.

6 Construction

- ☐ The client should take measures appropriate to secure the site during construction, and control pedestrian and vehicular access into, and out of, the site. The contractor on this scheme should be a member of the 'Considerate Constructors Scheme', who has committed to be a considerate and good neighbour, as well as clean, respectful, safe, environmentally conscious, responsible and accountable.
- ☐ Site security contractors should be SIA (Security Industry Authority) approved to ensure professional standards are adhered to (please see <http://www.sia.homeoffice.gov.uk/pages/acs-intro.aspx> for more details).

7 Secured by Design (SBD)

- ☐ Secured by Design focuses on crime prevention at the design, layout and construction stages of homes and promotes the use of security standards for a wide range of applications and products. To apply for Secured by Design certification for your development, visit our online application form at: <http://www.designforsecurity.org/secured-by-design/sbd-accreditation/>

A Contact register

Date	Contact With	Summary of Contact
22.01.16	Konstantinos Karageorgos	Request for Crime Impact Statement
03.02.16		Site visit
29.02.16	Konstantinos Karageorgos	Report issued
07.01.18	Matthew Browne, Beech	Revised plans received
19.01.18	Matthew Browne, Beech	Report re-issued

B Associated Documents

This report is based on the following drawings and supplementary information submitted by the applicant.

Drawing No.	Drawing Title	Date	Rev
061_152	Minshull Street proposed lower ground floor	August '17	A
061_153	Minshull Street proposed upper ground floor	August '17	A
061_154	Minshull Street proposed first floor	August '17	A
061_155	Minshull Street proposed second floor	August '17	A
061_156	Minshull Street proposed third floor	August '17	A
061_157	Minshull Street proposed fourth floor	August '17	A
061_159	Minshull Street proposed roof	August '17	A
061_160	Bloom Street proposed lower ground floor	August '17	A
061_161	Bloom Street proposed upper ground floor	August '17	A
061_162	Bloom Street proposed first floor	August '17	A
061_163	Bloom Street proposed second floor	August '17	A
061_164	Bloom Street proposed third floor	August '17	A
061_165	Bloom Street proposed fourth floor	August '17	A
061_166	Bloom Street proposed fifth floor	August '17	A
061_167	Bloom Street proposed roof	August '17	A
061_213	Minshull Street proposed elevations	August '17	A
061_214	Bloom Street Proposed elevations	August '17	A
061_550	Alleyway proposed	August '17	A

PLEASE NOTE - In the event of any subsequent material changes to the scheme, it will be necessary for Design for Security to reassess the comments made within this report.

C CIS Version History

Version	Status	Revisions Made
A		
B		Plans revised - report amended to reflect updated plans

D Glossary

Burglary Resistance Standards

BS 7950, 1997

Specification for enhanced security performance of casement and tilt/turn windows.

BS 4873, 2005: Specification for aluminium windows.

BS 7412, 2007: Specification for plastic windows made from PVC-U extruded hollow profiles.

BS 644-1, 2003: Wood windows. Specification for factory assembled windows - various types.

BWF:TWAS: Timber window accreditation scheme.

BS 6510, 2005: Specification for steel windows, sills, window boards & doors.

BS PAS 23-1, 1999

General performance requirements for door assemblies.

A performance standard for door sets, which certifies that a particular door set is fit for purpose. Door products must also have BS PAS 24 certification.

BS PAS 24-1, 2012

General security performance requirements for door assemblies.

An attack test standard for door sets, which certifies that a particular door, frame, lock and hardware set has withstood a series of physical tests. This is the minimum police requirement for Secured by Design dwellings, and is also applicable to French/double doors, and sliding doors.

ENV 1627-30 (Security Ratings WK1 to WK6)

Windows, doors, shutters - Burglar resistance Requirements and classification

The classification system used in ENV 1627-30 is aimed at the commercial market and is based on five elements:

- a) Resistance of glazing
- b) Performance of hardware
- c) Resistance to static loading
- d) Resistance to dynamic loading
- e) Burglary resistance by manual intervention

LPS 1175 (Security Ratings 1 to 6)

Specification for testing and classifying the burglary resistance of building components

This includes doors, shutters, garage doors and grilles typically for commercial premises and higher risk domestic premises and is acceptable to the ABI and the Police. The standard has 6 levels, 6 being the highest, with levels 1 and 2 equivalent in many respects to BS PAS 24 and BS 7950.

STS01 Issue 4: 2012

Enhanced security requirements for doorsets and door assemblies for dwellings to satisfy the requirements of PAS23 and PAS24

As the title suggests this is an equivalent test standard to PAS 24, incorporating PAS 23 (fitness for purpose), published by Warrington Certification.

STS02 Issue 3: 2011

Requirements for burglary resistance of construction products including hinged, pivoted, folding or sliding doorsets, windows, curtain walling, security grilles, garage doors and shutters.

This specifies a broadly similar range of attack tools and times to those specified at the lower levels of LPS1175. However, STS202 does not extend to cover the higher levels of risk addressed within LPS1175 and the attack methods used differ.

EN 356, 2000 (Ratings P1A to P8A)

Glass in building. Security glazing. Testing and classification of resistance against manual attack.

A performance standard for manual attacks on glazing. P2A is comparable to the performance of a 6.8mm laminated glass, and P4A to that of a 9.5mm laminated glass.

Commonly Used Acronyms

CIT

Cash in transit (refers to vehicles, personnel and routines).

CPTED

Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design
(Learn more at www.designforsecurity.org/about/cpted)

CRS

Crime Reduction Specialist. Sometimes known as CPO (Crime Prevention Officer)

INPT

Integrated Neighbourhood Policing Team.

PVB/PolyVinyl Butyral (Glazing interlayer)

A commonly used interlayer used in the production of laminated glass.

LPCB (Loss Prevention Certification Board)

A brand of the BRE Global (Building Research Establishment) family. The LPCB work with insurers, Government, police, designers, manufacturers, contractors and end users to develop methods of assessing performance and reliability of security products to ensure their fitness for purpose.

UKAS (United Kingdom Accreditation Service)

The sole national accreditation body recognised by government to assess, against internationally agreed standards, organisations that provide certification, testing, inspections and calibration services.

Useful Websites

Design for Security

www.designforsecurity.org

Secured by Design

www.securedbydesign.com

RIBA Product Selector

www.ribaproductselector.com

LPCB – Red Book Live

www.redbooklive.com

Crime Reduction (Home Office)

www.crimereduction.homeoffice.gov.uk

DAC (Design Against Crime) Solution Centre

www.designagainstcrime.org

Building for Life

www.buildingforlife.org

CLG (Communities and Local Government)

www.communities.gov.uk