



CRIME IMPACT STATEMENT

40 CHORLTON STREET, MANCHESTER
RESTAURANT (Approx. 500sqm.) & HOTEL (Approx. 2000sqm.)

Greater Manchester Police

designforsecurity

FOR: Cringle Corporation

VERSION A: 26/05/17

REFERENCE: 2006/0661/CIS/02

40 Chorlton Street, Manchester

URN: 2006/0661/CIS/02

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Minor security additions/design changes required


This development has been assessed against the principles of 'Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design' (CPTED), in order to reduce the opportunities for crime and the fear of crime.

The layout of the proposed scheme is considered acceptable, as long as the issues discussed in more detail within Section 3.3 of this report are addressed, namely:

- Control of access into/around the hotel – including access controls to main entrance out-of-hours, first floor bedroom corridor/access core to prevent non-guest access and staff-only access to ground floor/basement back-of-house areas.
- Protection to potentially vulnerable ground floor windows with glazing down to street level.
- No recessed doorways or external plant/air conditioning units etc. that could provide a climbing aid up to upper floor windows.

If these issues can be addressed as described within the report and the other physical security measures are incorporated, I would be happy to support the development.

Please note: Greater Manchester Police Design for Security will recommend to the local planning authority that a planning condition is added that reflects the physical security specification listed within Sections 4 & 5 of this report.



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Design for Security Consultant

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1 Visual Audit

The site is located on the west side of Chorlton Street, bounded by Canal Street to the south and Richmond Street to the north.


It is occupied by a 5 storey former cotton warehouse building, which abuts the back edge of the pavement on all sides. The ground floor of the building is in use as a bar fronting onto Canal Street. Floors 1 to 4 are currently vacant, but have previously been in use as a bar/club.

The building itself features a number of low level window openings along the Canal Street and Chorlton Street elevations that could be vulnerable to damage. Other similar window openings in the locale have been fitted with external grilles or bars to deter such abuse. The elevation along Richmond Street includes ground floor shuttered/grilled openings with plant features which could be used to climb up to upper floor windows and recessed doorways that could be vulnerable to fostering criminal activity, nuisance and anti-social behaviour.

Canal Street runs along the side of the Rochdale Canal and forms the centre of an area commonly known as Manchester's 'Gay Village'. The street itself is pedestrianised, lined with bars, clubs and restaurants and is often very busy (particularly at night and at weekends). The site is surrounded on all sides with premises open late into the evening and the area is a hotspot for incidents of nuisance, anti-social behaviour and violent assaults within the city centre.

In contrast, many of the premises along Richmond Street to the north of the site back onto the route itself, leaving numerous blank facades or window and door openings that have either been secured (with grilles or shutters) or have been bricked up. As a result, the route benefits from more limited levels of activity, pedestrian footfall/vehicular movement and natural surveillance/overlooking, in comparison to Canal Street and Chorlton Street.

City College lies just to the south-east of the site, fronting towards a landscaped area accessed off Sackville Street. There is a large multi-storey car park and coach station to the north-west (off Chorlton Street) and there are a variety of bars/restaurants, residential apartments, office buildings, University buildings and car parks within the vicinity of the site.



2 Crime Statistics & Analysis

All data below is based on crimes recorded between 1st May 2016 and 30th April 2017.

2.1 Crime Summary


Figure 1: Recorded Crime within 500m of Site

Burglary Dwelling	Burglary Other	Criminal Damage	Less Serious Wounding	Misc. Thefts	Robbery	Serious Wounding	Theft from Motor Vehicle	Theft of Motor Vehicle	Theft of Pedal Cycle
33	215	306	1932	928	309	58	205	39	203

- 2.1.1 In the last 12 months, the volume of crime in the local area has been extremely high – with the most prevalent types of crime being violence, miscellaneous thefts robbery, criminal damage and vehicle crime. These types of crime are typical of those experienced in or within close proximity of city centres – where there is often a concentration of retail, commercial and licensed premises, leading to a concentration of crime and disorder issues. The majority of the violence in the local area has taken place around/off Canal Street and in the evening/during early hours of the morning, with a higher volume of incidents typically experienced between Friday and Sunday – when more people tend to visit the Gay Village area and attend licensed premises, often for longer periods and consuming more alcohol, leading to conflicts.
- 2.1.2 As this Crime Impact Statement relates to a proposed restaurant and hotel, the more detailed analysis below will look at use-specific burglary and theft.


2.2 Burglary Other (Hotels): Risk Analysis

The data below relates to burglary other offences within/against hotels, recorded in the Manchester area.



- 2.2.1 **Day Range:** The risk of burglary at hotel premises in Manchester fluctuates throughout the week, peaking on Monday and Friday.
- 2.2.2 **Time Range:** During the day, the risk of burglary at Manchester hotels is greatest around lunchtime and is high in the late evening. It is likely that offenders target hotels at these times when guests are likely to be out of their rooms or when staffing levels are likely to be lower – allowing offenders time to attempt to gain unauthorised access without being detected.
- 2.2.3 **Point of Entry:** Where offenders have targeted hotels across Manchester, they have used the following points of entry:



Burglary Other – Point of Entry



- 2.2.4 In the majority of burglaries at city centre hotels, the point of entry has not been determined. It is likely that these burglaries have occurred when offenders have entered hotels posing as legitimate guests and gained access to hotel rooms without using force – possibly when they have been left insecure by cleaners or by using stolen or forged keys/cards. Doors have also been frequently targeted and offenders have applied bodily pressure or tools to force entry.

2.3 Miscellaneous Theft (Hotels): Risk Analysis


The data below relates to miscellaneous thefts within/against hotels, recorded in the Manchester area.



- 2.3.1 **Day Range:** The risk of theft at Manchester hotels generally increases over the weekend. It is possible that the risk increases at the weekend when hotels typically have more guests and the opportunity to carry out such offences is greater. However, offenders do also target hotels between Monday and Friday when they are typically less busy and the risk of being caught/challenged is lower.
- 2.3.2 **Time Range:** The risk of theft is greatest around lunchtime and in the evening/early hours of the morning. This is when hotel restaurants, bars and gyms are likely to be at their busiest and, therefore, the opportunities to commit theft are greater.

2.4 Burglary Other (Restaurants): Risk Analysis



The data below relates to burglary other offences within/against restaurants, recorded in the Manchester area.



- 2.4.1 **Day Range:** The risk of burglary at restaurants in Manchester fluctuates throughout the week, peaking on Monday.
- 2.4.2 **Time Range:** The risk of burglary peaks during the early evening (when restaurants are typically at their busiest) and during the early hours of the morning (when premises are usually closed).
- 2.4.3 **Point of Entry:** In the majority of cases where entry points are known, offenders have entered Manchester restaurants through external doors. Most commonly, doors have been forced open with bodily pressure and hand tools. In a number of cases, glazing in doors (and windows) has been smashed by offenders to gain unauthorised access. Where the point of entry is unknown, this is likely to have been when offenders have posed as legitimate customers to gain access to premises when they are open, before targeting insecure doors, tailgating, or using force to open internal doors to restricted areas.

2.5 Miscellaneous Theft (Restaurants): Risk Analysis

The data below relates to miscellaneous thefts within/against restaurants, recorded in the Manchester area.



- 2.5.1 **Day Range:** During the week, the risk of miscellaneous theft at Manchester restaurants peaks over the weekend. Many premises experience higher levels of attendance at the weekend than during the week. Premises are also usually open for longer at the weekend and so the opportunities for offenders to commit theft is greater.
- 2.5.2 **Time Range:** The risk of theft peaks in the afternoon and into the evening. This reflects the times when restaurants are typically at their busiest and, therefore, the opportunities to commit theft are greater. Handbags, purses/wallets and mobile phones belonging to customers are the most routinely stolen items. Theft of property belonging to staff is also common, with offenders posing as legitimate customers to gain access to unauthorised areas.

2.6 General Risk Factors

- 2.6.1 **Hotels:** The typical security risks for a development of this nature are:

- Burglary of hotel rooms
- Robbery to business
- Theft of personal belongings at work
- Criminal damage to property and vehicles
- Unauthorised access to buildings/private space
- Arson
- Cycle theft
- Employee theft
- Theft of/from parked vehicles
- Violence towards staff
- Theft and criminal damage during the construction period

- 2.6.2 **Restaurants:** The typical security risks for a development of this nature are:

- Burglary
- Robbery to business
- Criminal damage to property
- Alcohol-fuelled violence/conflict
- Miscellaneous theft to customers
- Rowdy and inconsiderate behaviour

- Conflict of use with neighbouring venues
- Violence towards staff
- Safety of staff personal belongings
- Robbery/wounding of patrons leaving premises
- Theft and criminal damage during the construction period

2.7 Common Use-Specific M.O.s (Modus Operandi)

2.7.1 Having looked at the crime data for the site and the surrounding area, the most frequent M.O's (modus operandi) used by offenders when targeting hotel and restaurant premises are listed below, along with suggested measures to reduce the risk of them being utilised at the proposed development:

- **Hotels:** Offenders forcing open doors to hotel rooms to commit theft
Possible Solution - All individual bedroom doors should ideally be security-certified to recognised security standards (see Section 4.1), which are independently proven to reduce the risk of forced entry and thus increase the chances of detection. Where this is not possible, access controls should be incorporated to limit and regulate access to bedroom floors.
- **Hotels:** Offenders entering rooms using forged or stolen electronic keycards or fobs
Possible Solution - Auditable electric locking systems (such as Vingcard or similar) should be used, which can be easily activated/disabled electronically by reception staff.
- **Hotels:** Offenders, posing as guests or legitimate customers, accessing staff-only/restricted areas to steal property
Possible Solution - The main reception should be located to have full view of everyone entering and leaving the premises and all routes to bedrooms and staff areas. All staff should understand and accept the need for security measures and should be trained to be vigilant and to report any suspicious behaviour. Access controls should be used to restrict access to vulnerable areas and there should be a secure area for staff to store their belongings while at work.
- **Hotels:** Theft of personal property from table tops or from bags hung on chairs or stored under tables
Possible Solution – Consideration should be given to tables and chairs designed to facilitate secure storage of belongings or adapted with 'Chelsea Clips' to reduce the opportunities to steal bags/coats. The layout of the premises can also help deter occurrences and increase surveillance opportunities. It should be generally uncluttered, allowing clear views of all spaces and avoiding any pinch points or areas of concealment. External seating areas should be enclosed to clearly define them as separate from adjacent pedestrian routes.
- **Restaurants:** Doors have been forced open with tools and bodily pressure
Possible Solution - All external doors should be certified to recognised security standards (see Section 5.1), which are independently proven to reduce the risk of forced entry and thus increase the chances of detection. Security-certified doors are the best long-term measure to address this risk and can be obtained to suit virtually all operational requirements.
- **Restaurants:** Glazing in doors and windows has been smashed to gain unauthorised access
Possible Solution – All new ground floor/accessible glazing (including in and around doors) should include a laminated pane (see Section 5.3), which forms a much more robust barrier against shattering and penetration. The strength of the laminated glass should be relative to the strength of the door or window system in which it is fitted. Where possible, the size of any glazed elements within/directly adjacent to doors should be reduced and set well away from locking points.
- **Restaurants:** Offenders posing as legitimate customers, gaining access to staff only areas
Possible Solution – There should be a secure area for staff to store their belongings while at work and all staff-only, back-of-house areas should be secured to prevent unauthorised public access (see Section 5.1).

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- **Restaurants:** Theft of personal property from table tops or from bags hung on chairs or stored under tables

Possible Solution – Consideration should be given to tables and chairs designed to facilitate secure storage of belongings or adapted with 'Chelsea Clips' to reduce the opportunities to steal bags/coats (see Section 6). The internal layout of the premises can also help deter occurrences and increase surveillance opportunities. It should be generally uncluttered, allowing clear views of all spaces and avoiding any pinch points or areas of concealment.

3 Layout Appraisal

3.1 Proposed Development

- 3.1.1 The proposal is to refurbish and extend the existing building to form a 6 storey hotel (approx. 2,000sqm.) and a ground floor restaurant (approx. 500sqm.).
- 3.1.2 The main entrance to the hotel will front onto Chorlton Street to the east. The ground floor of the hotel will house back-of-house areas and a small entrance lobby. The reception will be located at first floor level (along with a staff area and luggage store), with hotel rooms at first to fifth floor levels (including duplex suites at levels 5/6. The ground floor restaurant will front onto Canal Street and will be entirely separate from the proposed hotel use.

3.2 Positive Aspects of the Proposal

The following proposed features would make a positive contribution to the prevention of crime and fear of crime.

- 3.2.1 The proposed development will bring additional activity and surveillance to the area, at all times of the day and night.
- 3.2.2 The building will present an active frontage onto Canal Street and Chorlton Street, enlivening the street scene and helping to provide useful natural surveillance over the surrounding public realm.
- 3.2.3 The glazed façades of the building offer both surveillance opportunities and a greater level of artificial light onto the street/public realm.
- 3.2.4 The hotel reception area will be located directly adjacent to the entrance lobby at first floor level, providing staff with good views of all people entering/leaving the building. Staff will be able to observe and direct customers and deter unauthorised access to bedroom floors.
- 3.2.5 The layout of the hotel corridors provides clear views and contain no recessed areas. Doors within the communal corridors should contain a glazed element to improve passive surveillance.
- 3.2.6 The hotel bedrooms will be provided well-above street level, reducing the potential impacts of noise, nuisance and anti-social behaviour (particularly at night).
- 3.2.7 The proposed development provides the opportunity to include security features built into the design and construction of the building and avoid the need for obtrusive retro-fitted security measures that can increase the fear of crime. Security measures carefully incorporated into the design can ensure the building is reasonably secure, without visibly announcing that the design was concerned about crime.

3.3 Points for Further Consideration

The following points have been identified for further consideration and would need to be addressed for Design for Security to support the proposed scheme.

- 3.3.1 The control of access into and around the hotel is paramount to the security of the development. The reception desk at first floor level must be staffed at all times to meet and direct guests. All visitors should report to the reception for vetting by staff before gaining access to the rest of the building. A high, wide reception desk increases the distance between reception staff and any potential aggressive visitors and aids surveillance of all parts of the entrance lobby/waiting area. A personal attack alarm should be provided at the reception desk, which activates a loud alarm at the scene – clearly signalling that assistance has been requested. Given the first floor reception will be remote from the ground floor entrance lobby, it may be vulnerable to nuisance/anti-social behaviour (particularly late at night). The ground floor entrance lobby must be covered by CCTV, monitored by staff at the first floor reception. At night, the main entrance doors should be secured and controlled by guest key card or controlled remotely by reception staff, via a video access control system (see Sections 4.1 & 4.5 for more information).
- 3.3.2 The first floor corridor leading to the guest bedrooms and the staircore/lift serving the other floors of the building should be fitted with a security-certified doorset fitted with access controls (operated by guest key-cards), to ensure that only guests who have already booked in at reception and are staying at the hotel can access the bedroom floors (see Section 4.1/4.5). The ground floor/basement back-of-house areas should only be accessible to staff.

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- 3.3.3 The ground floor windows to Canal Street, Chorlton Street and Richmond Street should be security-certified (see Section 4.2) and should incorporate laminated glazing (see Section 4.3). Given their vulnerable location at street level, they should also be protected by robustly fixed decorative wrought-iron bars/railings – in order to provide a visual deterrent and protect them from kicking/criminal damage and unauthorised access. The upper ground floor windows of the building should also ideally be replaced with security-certified windows and laminated glazing. If not, the secondary glazing units to be provided internally should be certified/laminated (see Section 4.2 & 4.3).
 - 3.3.4 The hotel and restaurant portions of the building should be entirely separate, in order to eliminate confusion, conflict and the opportunity to gain unauthorised access to either use (e.g. by tailgating, by forcing open external or internal doors etc.).
 - 3.3.5 There should be no recessed doorways at ground floor level which can create sheltered, partially hidden spaces that could foster criminal activity, nuisance and anti-social behaviour. There should also be no external plant/air conditioning units or any other features of the buildings (such as louvered features that could be used as a ladder, projecting window cills, exposed rainwater down pipes etc.) that could form climbing aids.
 - 3.3.6 It is highly recommended that all of the physical security measures listed below are incorporated into the scheme. Integrated, risk-commensurate security measures aim to place secure physical barriers or surveillance in the path of the criminal – making crime harder to commit and raising the risk of detection and possible capture, as well as promoting a feeling of safety in residents and visitors.

4 Physical Security (Hotel)

The following checklist (Sections 4 & 5) forms the physical security requirements for this scheme to achieve Secured by Design accreditation.

4.1 Doors

- ☐ All external doors should be compliant with and certified to BS PAS 24, STS 202 or LPS 1175 SR2. It is crucial that the door ironmongery to any external escape-only doors is permitted under the security certification of the product. All escape-only doors should be alarmed (audible upon opening) and designed without visible external ironmongery.
- ☐ Reception staff should be able to remotely secure and control access through the main entrance door if/when required (e.g. into the evening/at night). Ideally, the main entrance should be formed by a single-leaf doorset (which is easier to secure with an electrically operated multi-point lock, capable of being operated via an electronic access control system). It should be self-closing and controlled by guest key-card (for guests that have already checked-in) or by means of a video entry phone system linked to the staffed reception.
- ☐ The first floor corridor leading to the guest bedrooms and the staircore/lift serving the other floors of the building should be fitted with a doorset certified to BS PAS 24 or LPS 1175 SR2. It should be fitted with electromagnetic locks permitted as part of the certification, operated by guest key-card (which should fail safe in the event of a fire alarm), ensuring that non-guests cannot access bedroom floors.
- ☐ All individual hotel bedroom doorsets/frames should be robust/solid core (minimum 44mm thick), self-closing and secured with 3 hinges and an electronically operated lock, controlled by Vingcard or similar. They should also be fitted with door viewers and chain limiters.
- ☐ Any doors off the access stairwell to the staff-only ground floor and basement floor levels should also be certified to BS PAS 24 or LPS 1175 SR2, operated by staff key-card. The lift should only operate to ground floor and basement levels via staff key-card.
- ☐ All doors/frames to staff areas/rooms, offices, plant areas, luggage stores and general stores should be robust/solid core (minimum 44mm thick) and fitted with auditable access controls. Careful consideration should be given to the design of any cash office, which should have solid masonry walls, no false/suspended ceilings, a security-certified doorset (to BS PAS 24 or LPS 1175 SR2) and a safe providing adequate capacity and overnight cover. The correct size and category of safe should be determined by an assessment of prospective takings and to meet insurance needs. Staff should only be allowed access to areas required for their work. Keys/passes should only be carried if required for duties and should be accounted for at all times.

4.2 Windows

- ☐ Any ground floor windows should be compliant with and certified to BS PAS 24 where possible. All other new window designs/dimensions should take account of the requirements of BS PAS 24, as certified products can carry dimensional restrictions. Any curtain walling panels should include laminated glazing (see below) and should be securely fixed directly to the floor slabs where possible, rather than to perimeter columns.
- ☐ All new first floor level windows should also be compliant with and certified to BS PAS 24. If the existing first floor windows are to be retained, there should be internal secondary glazing units installed certified to BS PAS 24 or LPS 1175 SR1 (e.g. <http://www.selectaglaze.co.uk/benefits/security-secondary-glazing>), which should incorporate laminated glazing (see below).
- ☐ Any ground or first floor opening lights (escape requirements permitting) should be key-lockable, and have fixed/lockable opening restrictors (not releasable from the outside) limited to 100mm.

4.3 Glazing & Building Fabric

- ☐ All ground and first floor glazing must incorporate an internal pane of glass with a 1.5mm PVB interlayer (e.g. 7.5mm laminated glass), or a glass rated as P4A under EN 356. The remaining external pane in a double glazed unit may be toughened glass.
- ☐ There should be a block work wall (or material of similar strength e.g. welded-steel mesh) behind any cladding to the building, to a minimum height of 2000mm from external ground level, to ensure that the fabric of the building itself is not vulnerable to attack.
- ☐ Any louvres to ground floor service/refuge areas should be robustly constructed and fixed, to ensure they cannot be easily removed, and designed to ensure that they cannot be used as a climbing aid to reach upper floor windows. Security-certified louvred doorsets are also available (e.g. <http://www.securedbydesign.com/members/premier-ss-ltd/>) if required.
- ☐ Internal walls between the restaurant and hotel portions of the building should either be of robust masonry construction or should incorporate timber sheathing (minimum 9mm thick) or expanded metal, in order to ensure that the fabric of the building itself is not vulnerable to attack/penetration.

4.4 Alarm

- ☐ All internal/external escape doors should be fitted with alarm contacts, linked to a 24/7 intruder alarm system.
- ☐ Alarm activations should be relayed to the hotel reception, so staff can investigate or call the authorities as appropriate.

4.5 Access Control

- ☐ Access control systems should be operable by staff swipe card/fob or by guest key-card, and not numeric key pads. The following doors should operate on access control:
 - The main entrance door out-of-hours.
 - The door into the bedroom corridor/access core at first floor level.
 - The doors off the stair lobby (and the lift) at ground and basement level and all other back-of-house areas/any cash office - for staff-only.
- ☐ The electric locking system to be used throughout the building should be fully auditable (i.e. allows the retention of data, such as who accessed where and when), to allow for a better investigation into any incidents. Staff and guest key-cards should be capable of being easily and quickly activated/disabled by staff to ensure that mis-use is prevented.

4.6 Lighting

- ☐ External lighting must be provided to the exterior of the building and the surrounding public realm, in accordance with BS 5489. Dusk 'til dawn lights, operated by photoelectric cell/daylight sensor, should be installed to all external doors.
- ☐ Fittings should produce 'white' light, as opposed to yellow/orange light, and fixtures must not be positioned where they may provide climbing aids up to high level windows. Electrical and architectural layouts should be developed together to avoid this.

4.7 CCTV

Any CCTV system that may be used within this proposal will require certain specifications and intelligent placement of cameras to compliment the design of the development. Designers should consider the following points when planning a CCTV strategy:

- ☐ CCTV systems (and lighting that support them) require regular cleaning and maintenance to remain effective.
- ☐ Where necessary cameras that are vulnerable to damage should be protected from attack either by relocation to a higher level and using a bigger lens to achieve the view required or through the fitting of a vandal resistant housing.
- ☐ With regards to the retention of footage, the police prefer quality over quantity. The overall retention period should be dictated by what the system is designed to achieve, though it would be better to have good quality images over a 14-day period than poor ones over a 30-day period.
- ☐ Procedures for recovery of recordings are recommended to be established (e.g. trained staff / the CCTV system instruction manual to be readily available). This is to ensure that the images produced will be of an [acceptable standard](#) that will allow for [identification](#) of an individual which will stand up to scrutiny in court.

[Acceptable Standard](#) - this generally requires a resolution of 720x576 pixels at a real time frame rate of 25 frames per second. (N.B. Both the camera and DVR must be capable of this – if the camera will only send low resolution images then it does not matter how high the resolution of the recording unit is).

[Identification](#) – One of three levels of field of view. To identify an individual, the image must capture no less than 120% of the field of view (at least from the top of the individuals head to their knees). The remaining two levels of field of view are ‘[Overview](#)’ and ‘[Recognition](#)’, which whilst effective for observational purposes, are less likely to result in the identification of a person/offender.
- ☐ The intelligent placement of cameras helps to provide clear facial identification of individuals. Suitable locations would be: [all external doors, the entrance lobby at ground floor level, the first floor reception and all lift/stair lobbies on each floor.](#)

4.8 Other

- ☐ Each guest bedroom should have a small wall or floor safe, operated by a personal identification number (PIN) selected by each new guest.
- ☐ There should also be no external plant/air conditioning units or any other features of the buildings (such as louvered features that could be used as a ladder, projecting window cills, exposed rainwater down pipes etc.) that could form climbing aids.

5 Physical Security (Restaurant)

5.1 Doors & Access Controls

- ☐ All external doorsets should be compliant with and certified to BS PAS 24, STS 202 or LPS 1175 SR2. It is crucial that the door ironmongery to any external escape-only doors is permitted under the security certification of the product. All escape-only doors should be alarmed (audible upon opening) and designed without visible external ironmongery.
- ☐ Any letterboxes within doors must be located a minimum of 400mm away from internal handle and locking hardware.
- ☐ All back-of-house/staff areas should not be publicly accessible. Internal doors to storage rooms, staff rooms, offices and bin stores should be solid-core and self-closing - fitted with auditable access controls (i.e. proximity readers or swipe cards) or secured with keys (carried by staff only if required for duties and accounted for at all times). Any cash office should have solid masonry walls, no adjacent false/suspended ceilings and a certified doorset to BS PAS 24 or LPS 1175 SR2. Staff should only be allowed access to areas required for their work. Keys/passes should only be carried if required for duties and should be accounted for at all times.

5.2 Windows

- ☐ All windows, where possible, should be certificated to BS PAS 24. All other window designs/dimensions should take account of the requirements of the above standards, as certified products can carry dimensional restrictions.
- ☐ Any curtain walling panels should include laminated glazing and should be securely fixed directly to the floor slabs where possible, rather than to perimeter columns.
- ☐ Any low-level windows with glazing down to street level may be vulnerable to damage and should be protected by ornate grilles or wrought-iron bars. The bars themselves should be set within the rebate of the window openings and should be designed with limited horizontal elements to prevent them from being used to climb up to upper floor windows.

5.3 Glazing & Building Fabric

- ☐ All glazing must incorporate at least one pane of glass with a 1.5mm PVB interlayer (e.g. 7.5mm laminated glass), or a glass rated as P4A under EN 356. The remaining pane in a double glazed unit may be toughened glass.
- ☐ There should be a block work wall (or material of similar strength e.g. welded-steel mesh) behind any cladding to the building, to a minimum height of 2000mm from external ground level, to ensure that the building fabric itself is not vulnerable to attack.
- ☐ Any louvres to refuge stores/service areas should be robustly constructed and fixed, to ensure they cannot be easily removed, and designed to ensure that they cannot be used as a climbing aid to reach upper floor windows or onto the roof. Security-certified louvred doorsets are also available (e.g. <http://www.securedbydesign.com/members/premier-ss-ltd/>) if required.
- ☐ Internal walls between the restaurant and hotel portions of the building should either be of robust masonry construction or should incorporate timber sheathing (minimum 9mm thick) or expanded metal, in order to ensure that the fabric of the building itself is not vulnerable to attack/penetration.

5.4 Alarm

- ☐ A comprehensive intruder alarm system should be installed to cover the premises, linked to contacts on all external doors and PIR detectors. It is strongly recommended that any alarm system is monitored, with a response facility (i.e. linked to an Alarm Receiving Centre, who will alert the key holder or a security patrol team).

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- ☐ It is also recommended that the alarm system should incorporate personal attack buttons for the use of staff in identified locations, such as behind the bar and in any cash office. The cash office should also contain a telephone and a mobile phone with a clear signal.

5.5 Lighting

- ☐ Dusk 'til dawn lights, operated by photoelectric cell/daylight sensor, should be installed to all external doors. Fittings should produce 'white' light, as opposed to yellow/orange light.

5.6 CCTV

Any CCTV system that may be used within this proposal will require certain specifications and intelligent placement of cameras to compliment the design of the development. Designers should consider the following points when planning a CCTV strategy:

- ☐ CCTV systems (and lighting that support them) require regular cleaning and maintenance to remain effective.
- ☐ Where necessary cameras that are vulnerable to damage should be protected from attack either by relocation to a higher level and using a bigger lens to achieve the view required or through the fitting of a vandal resistant housing.
- ☐ With regards to the retention of footage, the police prefer quality over quantity. The overall retention period should be dictated by what the system is designed to achieve, though it would be better to have good quality images over a 14-day period than poor ones over a 30-day period.
- ☐ Procedures for recovery of recordings are recommended to be established (e.g. trained staff / the CCTV system instruction manual to be readily available). This is to ensure that the images produced will be of an [acceptable standard](#) that will allow for [identification](#) of an individual which will stand up to scrutiny in court.

Acceptable Standard - this generally requires a resolution of 720x576 pixels at a real time frame rate of 25 frames per second. (N.B. Both the camera and DVR must be capable of this – if the camera will only send low resolution images then it does not matter how high the resolution of the recording unit is).

Identification – One of three levels of field of view. To identify an individual, the image must capture no less than 120% of the field of view (at least from the top of the individuals head to their knees). The remaining two levels of field of view are 'Overview' and 'Recognition', which whilst effective for observational purposes, are less likely to result in the identification of a person/offender.

- ☐ The intelligent placement of cameras helps to provide clear facial identification of individuals. Suitable locations would be: [the main entrance to the premises](#), [internal circulation areas](#) and [all sales counters/till positions](#).

6 Guidance on Internal Layout of Restaurant


The internal layout of the restaurant should be carefully considered, so as to maximise surveillance over customers and reduce the opportunities for criminals to exploit. It is highly recommended that the following good practice principles are adopted where applicable, so as not to undermine the security of the building shell.

6.1.1 Licensed premises and restaurants can, if poorly managed, generate crime for the following reasons:

- **Opportunities** - Large numbers of people congregating bars/restaurants generates opportunities for crime. Unlike on-street populations, patrons are stationary for long periods of time, making them easier to target.
- **Lack of attention** - The movement of people, noise, social interaction and other factors mean patrons can be easily distracted.
- **Cohesion** – Particularly during busy periods, the large numbers and wide variety of groups of people that tend to frequent bars/restaurants means that such a venue would lack 'community territoriality' (i.e. regular customers displaying an awareness of and care for the environment around them). This can limit any self-policing that might otherwise occur.
- **Customer turnover** – High turnover with high levels of customer movement within an establishment, are more likely to allow offenders to go unnoticed.
- **Valuable goods** – Often available and possibly on show, a particular problem in external seating areas. Patrons are likely to carry small, valuable, concealable goods – such as mobile phones, purses, wallets, keys, MP3 players etc.
- **Stealth** - Busy venues provide the anonymity necessary to commit offences.

6.1.2 In order to minimise these issues, it is recommended that the following good practice principles are adhered to:

- The main entrance to the premises must be effectively managed at busy periods to control numbers, ensure safe access/egress and avoid potential conflicts arising.
- Customers entering/leaving the premises should be easily observed by staff, who should also have clear views of any W/Cs to monitor their use.
- The internal layout the premises should be generally uncluttered with few places for concealment, allowing staff to monitor customer behaviour. The precise arrangement of internal furnishings should aid circulation and aim to achieve a balance between intimacy and visibility.
- It is highly recommended that customer tables are fitted with Chelsea Clips, to reduce the opportunities for theft (see below).



- Consideration should be given to high/wide bars/service counters, which increase the distance between staff and any potentially aggressive patrons and aid surveillance of all parts of the premises. Tills should be positioned away from customers' reach, but preferably fronting towards customers. Casual access to the rear of any bars/service counters should be prevented (e.g. with lockable hatches that cannot be easily scaled).
- Consideration should be given to a chute deposit safe (certified to LPS 1183) behind any bar/till area, or an alternative management practice, which would reduce the amount of cash held in tills during busy periods.

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- All back-of-house/staff areas should not be publicly accessible (see Section 5.1) and there should be a secure area for staff to store their belongings whilst at work.
 - Public toilets can give rise to problems and the following issues should be considered:
 - Fittings should be flush to avoid tampering and concealed cisterns, pipe work etc. should be used.
 - Graffiti and vandal resistant materials, such as stainless steel, laminates and plastics should be considered.
 - Consider hanging cubicle doors as outward opening as this will aid gaining access in an emergency. An alternative measure is to reduce toilet doors in size by a minimum of 200mm from the floor and to reduce the top height.
 - Provide 'Chelsea Clip'/karibina style hooks on the back of cubicle doors or partitions for bags and coats.
 - Consider the safety of vending machines. Cash boxes can be tampered with, consider fitting them with alarms.
 - Consider setting out a rota and putting notices in toilet facilities that make users aware that regular checks will be carried out. A built in visited/checked chart should be provided.

7 Management & Maintenance

- 7.1.1 A comprehensive security regime for the management of the hotel must be prepared and remain in place for the day-to-day running of the development. There should be regular reviews/exercises to ensure that it remains accurate, workable and up-to-date. All staff should understand and accept the need for security measures and it should be made easy for people to raise concerns or report observations.
- 7.1.2 The opening hours of the restaurant should be consistent with other such premises in the locale and should not unduly conflict with other nearby uses. Sufficient levels of service staff should be provided at busy periods to reduce waiting times and the potential for frustration, aggression and conflict. An operating/maintenance plan for the bars should also be prepared, which focuses on issues such as:
- Opening and closing of premises, including staff arrival and departure;
 - Cash management within the premises - consideration should be given to a chute deposit safe (certified to LPS 1183) behind any bar/till area, or an alternative management practice, which would reduce the amount of cash held in tills during busy periods;
 - Cash-in-transit collections/deliveries and banking practices (which should take place in a secure room with a certified safe to meet insurance needs);
 - Management of stock deliveries (servicing activities should not require any service doors to remain open unattended for prolonged periods);
 - Details of staff security training;
 - Location and management of any smoking areas;
 - Repairing damaged external and internal fittings, particularly security features e.g. alarm system, CCTV cameras etc;
 - Cleaning and prompt removal of graffiti, litter etc; and
 - Refuse collection arrangements.
- 7.1.3 All high value equipment (e.g. computers, projectors, flat screen monitors/televisions, tools, portable gym equipment etc.) should be properly marked and securely fixed or stored to deter damage/theft. An accurate record should be maintained which logs all such items.
- 7.1.4 Refuse collection arrangements should not require bins to be left in the street for extended periods/overnight. Servicing activities should not require any service doors to remain open unattended for prolonged periods.
- 7.1.5 Adequate signage should be deployed in all areas not only to direct people throughout the building, but also to deter unauthorised access to certain areas.

8 Construction

- 8.1.1 Untidy sites and their surroundings can be littered with debris accessible to vandals who often use loose materials as missiles to commit crime. The client should take measures appropriate to secure their site during construction, and control pedestrian and vehicular access in to and out of the site curtilage. It is also recommended that the contractor on this scheme is a member of the 'Considerate Constructors Scheme', who has committed to be a considerate and good neighbour, as well as clean, respectful, safe, environmentally conscious, responsible and accountable.
- 8.1.2 Site security contractors should be SIA (Security Industry Authority) approved to ensure professional standards are adhered to (please see <http://www.sia.homeoffice.gov.uk/pages/acs-intro.aspx> for more details).

9 Useful References

9.1 Secured by Design (SBD)

- 9.1.1 Secured by Design focuses on crime prevention at the design, layout and construction stages of homes and commercial premises and promotes the use of security standards for a wide range of applications and products. To apply for Secured by Design certification for your development, visit our online application form at: <http://www.designforsecurity.org/secured-by-design/sbd-accreditation/>

A Contact Register

Date	Contact With	Summary of Contact
10 th April 2017	Halliday Meecham	Receipt of CIS instruction form & plans. Email sent re: confirmation of instruction/fee
20 th April 2017	Halliday Meecham	Email sent re: confirmation of instruction/fee
8 th May 2017	Halliday Meecham	Email correspondence re: confirmation of instruction/fee
17 th May 2017	GMP Finance Dept	Confirmation of payment
22 nd May 2017	Halliday Meecham	Email correspondence re: update on progress

B Associated Documents

This report is based on the following drawings and supplementary information submitted by the applicant.

Drawing No.	Drawing Title	Date	Rev
SK 01	Contextual Elevation Previous Roof Scheme	07/02/2017	
-	View 01	-	-
-	View 02	-	-
-	View 03	-	-
-	View 04	-	-
SK 05	Contextual Elevation View Location Plan	07.02.2017	A
SK 04	Section, Proposed Roof	31/03/2017	-
00206	Level 06 Plan	22/03/2017	-
00205	Level 05 Plan	22/03/2017	-
00204	Level 02-04 Plan	22/03/2017	-
00203	Level 01 Plan	22/03/2017	-
00202	Level 00	22/03/2017	-
00201	Level-01	22/03/2017	-
SK 03	Contextual Elevation Proposed Roof with outline of original Planning Application Roof	31/03/2017	A

PLEASE NOTE - In the event of any subsequent material changes to the scheme, it will be necessary for Design for Security to reassess the comments made within this report.

C CIS Version History

Version	Revisions Made	Date
A		

D Glossary

Burglary Resistance Standards

BS PAS 23-1, 1999

General performance requirements for door/window assemblies.

A performance standard for doorsets and windows, which certifies that a particular doorset is fit for purpose. Door products must also have BS PAS 24 certification.

BS PAS 24-1, 2012

General security performance requirements for door/window assemblies.

An attack test standard for doorsets and windows. This is the minimum police requirement for Secured by Design dwellings, and is also applicable to French/double doors, and sliding doors.

ENV 1627-30 (Security Ratings WK1 to WK6)

Windows, doors, shutters - Burglar resistance Requirements and classification

The classification system used in ENV 1627-30 is aimed at the commercial market and is based on five elements:

- a) Resistance of glazing*
- b) Performance of hardware*
- c) Resistance to static loading*
- d) Resistance to dynamic loading*
- e) Burglary resistance by manual intervention*

LPS 1175 (Security Ratings 1 to 6)

Specification for testing and classifying the burglary resistance of building components

This includes doors, shutters, garage doors and grilles typically for commercial premises and higher risk domestic premises and is acceptable to the ABI and the Police. The standard has 6 levels, 6 being the highest, with levels 1 and 2 equivalent in many respects to BS PAS 24 and BS 7950.

STS201 Issue 4: 2012

Enhanced security requirements for doorsets and door assemblies for dwellings to satisfy the requirements of PAS23 and PAS24

STS202 Issue 3: 2011

Requirements for burglary resistance of construction products including hinged, pivoted, folding or sliding doorsets, windows, curtain walling, security grilles, garage doors and shutters.

This specifies a broadly similar range of attack tools and times to those specified at the lower levels of LPS1175.

EN 356, 2000 (Ratings P1A to P8A)

Glass in building. Security glazing. Testing and classification of resistance against manual attack.

A performance standard for manual attacks on glazing. P2A is comparable to the performance of a 6.8mm laminated glass, and P4A to that of a 9.5mm laminated glass.

Commonly Used Acronyms

CIT

Cash in transit (refers to vehicles, personnel and routines).

CPTED

Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design

CRS

Crime Reduction Specialist. Sometimes known as CPO (Crime Prevention Officer)

INPT

Integrated Neighbourhood Policing Team.

PVB/PolyVinyl Butyral (Glazing interlayer)

A commonly used interlayer used in the production of laminated glass.

LPCB (Loss Prevention Certification Board)

A brand of the BRE Global (Building Research Establishment) family. The LPCB work with insurers, Government, police, designers, manufacturers, contractors and end users to develop methods of assessing performance and reliability of security products to ensure their fitness for purpose.

UKAS (United Kingdom Accreditation Service)

The sole national accreditation body recognised by government to assess, against internationally agreed standards, organisations that provide certification, testing, inspections and calibration services.

Useful Websites

Design for Security

www.designforsecurity.org

Secured by Design

www.securedbydesign.com

RIBA Product Selector

www.ribaproductselector.com

LPCB – Red Book Live

www.redbooklive.com

Crime Reduction (Home Office)

www.crimereduction.homeoffice.gov.uk

DAC (Design Against Crime) Solution Centre

www.designagainstcrime.org

Building for Life

www.buildingforlife.org

CLG (Communities and Local Government)

www.communities.gov.uk