



CRIME IMPACT STATEMENT

Premier House, Blackfriars Street

Padel Tennis Courts

FOR: CUBE ARCHITECTURE AND DESIGN LTD

Greater Manchester Police

VERSION A: 25th June 2024

designforsecurity

REFERENCE: 2021/0376/CIS/01

Premier House, Blackfriars Street

2021/0376/CIS/01

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Development supported

This development has been assessed against the principles of 'Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design' (CPTED - <http://designforsecurity.org/about/crime-prevention-through-environmental-design/>), in order to reduce the opportunities for crime and the fear of crime. The proposed scheme has been found acceptable and if submitted to the local planning department in its current form we will support the application.



Patrick Babb

Consultant

e: patrick.babb@designforsecurity.org

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

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1 Visual Audit

The proposed development site can be seen on the adjacent site, edged in red. The site is located in the city centre area of Manchester, on the junction of Deansgate and Blackfriars.

The site forms part of the Renaissance hotel redevelopment and the proposed covered padel courts will be positioned to the front of the development (Deansgate elevation) and be positioned behind the site hoarding whilst the hotel is redeveloped.

The local area is generally commercial with some residential apartment buildings. Deansgate, at ground floor level, has numerous retail/café/restaurant units and it is also one of the main nighttime economy areas of Manchester city centre.



2 Crime Statistics & Analysis

All data below is based on crimes recorded between 1st June 2023 to 31st May 2024.

2.1 Crime Summary

Figure 1: Recorded Crime within 500m of Site

Domestic Burglary	Non-Domestic Burglary	Criminal Damage	Less Serious Wounding	Theft	Robbery	Serious Wounding	Theft from Motor Vehicle	Theft of Motor Vehicle	Bicycle Theft
16	171	282	1,673	597	154	33	378	33	73

- 2.1.1 The overall rate of crime over the past 12 months has been high for the Manchester division which is to be expected given the sites location close to the city centre. Less serious wounding, theft and vehicle crime have been the highest recorded offences taking place. These types of crime are typical of those experienced in or within close proximity of district, town or city centres where there is a high concentration of retail, commercial and licensed premises, often leading to a higher number of crime and disorder issues. These offences have occurred throughout the local area, with a higher concentration to the southeast of the proposed site towards to the city centre.
- 2.1.2 Less serious woundings have taken place throughout the local area, particularly to the southeast towards the city centre. Assaults, harassment and public order offences have been the highest recorded less serious woundings, with disputes often occurring between unknown associates and alcohol consumption being a factor.
- 2.1.3 Thefts have also taken place throughout the area, where offenders have used pickpocketing and distraction techniques in order to obtain items stored on the person such as mobile phones, purses and wallets, as well as targeting insecure items left on or under tables in bars and restaurants or benches in public spaces.
- 2.1.4 Vehicle crime in the local area has mostly taken place in private car parks and vehicles using on street parking facilities. Theft from a motor vehicle has been the highest recorded vehicle crime whereby offenders have used objects and implements in order to smash glazing and access the interior of the vehicle before removing items from within. Offenders have also targeted vehicle registration plates, using tools to remove them.

2.2 Common Use-Specific M.O.s (Modus Operandi)

- 2.2.1 Posing as legitimate customers and entering employee only areas through insecure doors or tailgating staff members

Possible Solution – The main entrance to the gym should be staffed at all times or a robust access control system should be in place to ensure that the proposed gym unit is only accessible to members. There should be secure lockers for the use of customers and any staff only areas should be fitted with self-closing, solid-core doors fitted with auditable access controls, in order to prevent unauthorised access.

- 2.2.2 Opening of secured lockers using stolen or copied keys.

Possible Solution - Typically thefts occur at sports facilities when customers leave property unattended in communal areas or in unsecured lockers whilst taking part in activities, returning to find property missing. The main entrance to the gym should be staffed at all times or a robust access control system should be in place to ensure that the gym unit is only accessible to members. There should be secure lockers for the use of customers and clear signage to encourage their use. Lockers should ideally be located where they can be well-overlooked and where potential offenders are more likely to be witnessed (see Section 4.2).

- 2.2.3 Theft of valuable items such as phones, wallets and laptops from changing rooms that have been left insecure.

Possible Solution – Typically theft occurs at sports facilities when customers leave property unattended in communal areas or in unsecured lockers whilst taking part in activities, returning to find property missing. Provide sufficient secure lockers for customers to store valuable items. Locate lockers where they are not hidden from view, so a potential offender is more likely to be witnessed. Changing rooms should be locked when not in use and no members of public should be allowed past the reception area.

- 2.2.4 Forcing open secure windows and doors using bodily pressure and implements in order to gain access to the property.

Possible Solution - All external doors should be certified to recognised security standards (see Section 4.1), which are independently proven to reduce the risk of forced entry and thus increase the chances of detection. Security-certified doorsets have resisted a series of professional attacks (using a variety of tools) including to the door itself, the frame, the locks, and the fittings. They are the best long-term measure to address this risk and can be obtained to suit virtually all operational requirements. Good use of perimeter boundaries, lighting and CCTV can also deter criminals by preventing access to vulnerable areas and increasing the chances of them being seen by staff, security personnel or passers-by. Consideration should also be given to security-certified shutters (see Section 4.1) to protect particularly vulnerable/hidden doors.

- 2.2.5 Smashed glazing in windows and doors using implements.


Possible Solution - An appropriate glazing specification should be used to adequately secure the building. All ground floor/accessible glazing should include a laminated pane, which forms a much more robust barrier against shattering and penetration (see Section 4.3).

2.3 Risk Factors – Leisure Centres

- Burglary
- Theft of user/staff belongings
- Other theft from premises
- Theft of/from parked cars
- Uncontrolled access
- Criminal damage to property and vehicles
- Arson
- Violence towards staff and other users
- Cycle security
- Cash robbery/attacks on vending machines
- Anti-social behaviour
- Loitering groups
- Theft and criminal damage during the construction period

2.4 Non-Domestic Burglary Leisure Facilities: Risk Analysis

The data below relates to non-domestic burglary offences within/against leisure facilities (including leisure centres, sports centres and gyms), recorded in the Greater Manchester area.





2.4.1 Day/ Time Range: During the week, the risk of burglary at Greater Manchester leisure facilities peaks on Thursday/Friday and is slightly lower on Saturday. During the day, the risk of burglary peaks during the late afternoon/early evening and during the early hours of the morning. During the late afternoon/early evening, leisure facilities are often at their busiest, meaning offenders can take advantage of busy staff and anonymity among higher numbers of legitimate customers. Offenders often target commercial properties at night, when they are often closed (or operate with a reduced number of on-site staff), it is dark and the streets/areas in which they are typically located are quieter than during the day – meaning offenders perceive a lower risk of being observed or detected.

2.4.2 Point of Entry: The following entry points and MO's have been utilised most frequently by offenders targeting Greater Manchester leisure facilities:

- Doors and windows have been forced open by offenders using bodily pressure and implements.
- The glazing within doors and windows has been smashed to gain entry.
- Where the point of entry is 'legitimate' or 'unknown', this is likely to have been where offenders have posed as legitimate customers to gain access to premises when they are open, before targeting insecure doors, tailgating or using force to open internal doors to restricted areas without being noticed.

2.5 Theft Leisure Facilities: Risk Analysis



The data below relates to thefts within/against leisure facilities (including leisure centres, sports centres and gyms), recorded in the Greater Manchester area.



- 2.5.1 **Day/ Time Range:** During the week, the risk of theft at Greater Manchester leisure facilities peaks on Tuesday, but remains consistently high throughout the week. During the day, the risk of theft rises in the afternoon and peaks in the evening. This is when leisure facilities are typically at their busiest and the opportunities to offend are greater. Personal property belonging to staff and customers, such as mobile phones and cash, are the most routinely targeted items – taking place most often in changing/locker rooms and staff-only areas.

2.6 Vehicle Crime: Risk Analysis

The data below relates to vehicle crime committed within 500m of the site.



- 2.6.1 **Day/Time Range:** The risk of vehicle crime is highest on Saturday around midnight (23:00-01:00). Offenders tend to target vehicles at this time when they are often left unattended and out of sight of the owners for long periods of time, creating a perceived low risk opportunity for offenders.

3 Layout Appraisal

3.1 Proposed development

- 3.1.1 The proposed development is of 2 no. covered padel courts within the hoarded site boundary of the Renaissance hotel which is being redeveloped.

3.2 Positive Aspects of the Proposal

The following proposed features would make a positive contribution to the prevention of crime and fear of crime.

- 3.2.1 The development will bring activity to the site during its redevelopment, which will potentially deter criminals from operating in the area.
- 3.2.2 The site is located in a busy city centre area, where visitors to the development will largely feel they are in a safe environment during the day and in the evening.
- 3.2.3 There is a high level of illumination on the surrounding streets which will facilitate visitors to the site during the evening and when it is dark.

3.3 Changes Needed and Recommendations

The following points have been identified for further consideration and would need to be addressed for Design for Security to support the proposed scheme.

- 3.3.1 There should be some form of access control to restrict access to the padel courts to genuine users and to allow staff flexibility over who enters the building, i.e. some form of restriction on the outer or inner door into the facility, which can be controlled by staff or electronically (i.e. with the use of a booking app).
- 3.3.2 The main entrance to the building should be robust and ideally certified to a burglary resistant standard.
- 3.3.3 Lockers should be provided so that users can secure any personal property whilst using the padel courts.
- 3.3.4 Consideration should be given to creating a cashless facility or minimising the amount of cash held on the premises – particularly overnight, to deter offenders from targeting the premises to steal cash.
- 3.3.5 The temporary padel courts should be covered with an alarm and CCTV system to deter offenders from targeting the facility.
- 3.3.6 The main entrance into the building should be illuminated so that it can be used safely when it is dark.

4 Management & Maintenance

- 4.1.1 The upkeep of a development over its lifetime can be crucial to the level of security and safety within. Aspects of a development, which are left to deteriorate, have the potential to attract further crime – a process known as ‘the broken window theory’. A maintenance plan should be drawn up to address issues such as:
- Litter removal
 - Repair to communal areas (lighting, signage, access controls)
 - Trimming and pruning to shrubs and trees

5 Construction

- 5.1.1 Untidy sites and their surroundings can be littered with debris accessible to vandals who often use loose materials as missiles to commit crime. The client should take measures appropriate to secure their site during construction, and control pedestrian and vehicular access in to and out of the site curtilage. It is

also recommended that the contractor on this scheme is a member of the 'Considerate Constructors Scheme', who has committed to be a considerate and good neighbour, as well as clean, respectful, safe, environmentally conscious, responsible and accountable.

- 5.1.2 Site security contractors should be SIA (Security Industry Authority) approved to ensure professional standards are adhered to (please see <http://www.sia.homeoffice.gov.uk/pages/acs-intro.aspx> for more details).

6 Useful References

6.1 Secured by Design (SBD)

- 6.1.1 Secured by Design focuses on crime prevention at the design, layout and construction stages of homes and commercial premises and promotes the use of security standards for a wide range of applications and products. To apply for Secured by Design certification for your development, visit our online application form at: <http://www.designforsecurity.org/secured-by-design/sbd-accreditation/>

A Contact register

Date	Contact With	Summary of Contact
29/05/24	Connor Robinson	CIS application confirmed

B Associated Documents

This report is based on the following drawings and supplementary information submitted by the applicant.

Drawing No.	Drawing Title	Date	Rev
AS858-01	Extg Floor Plans		
AS858-02	Extg Elevations		
AS858-03	Prop Floor Plans		
AS858-04	Prop Elevations		
AS858-05	Padel Court Plan and Elevations		
AS858-06	Location Plan		

PLEASE NOTE - In the event of any subsequent material changes to the scheme, it will be necessary for Design for Security to reassess the comments made within this report.

C CIS Version History

Version	Revisions Made	Date
A		