



CRIME IMPACT STATEMENT

Land on Catherine Road

12 No. Apartments

FOR: ASCOT LTD

VERSION A: 21/05/2024

REFERENCE: 2024/0118/CIS/01

Greater Manchester Police

design**for**security



Land on Catherine Road

2024/0118/CIS/01

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Minor security improvements recommended

This development has been assessed against the principles of 'Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design' (CPTED), in order to reduce the opportunities for crime and the fear of crime.

The layout of the proposed scheme is considered acceptable, as long as the issues discussed in more detail within Section 3.3 of this report are addressed, namely:

- The proposed entrance to the building should be brought forward in line with the perimeter walls to prevent a recess, which can lead to an offender operating without fear of detection.
- The proposed access entry road and car park should be illuminated to adoptable standard, to reduce the potential for crime and fear of crime.
- Robust access controls to communal entrances/gate for residents/visitors, including a secure system for the delivery of post/parcels.

If these issues can be addressed as described within the report and the other physical security measures are incorporated into the proposed scope of work where appropriate, we would be happy to support the development

Matthew Granelli

Design for Security Consultant

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1 Visual Audit



The development site is indicated by the red outline on the plan adjacent and is supported with existing site context photographs taken around the site.

The site is located in Crumpsall which is approximately 5km north of Manchester city centre.

The boundary on Catherine Street is currently a masonry wall, with a wooden gate to the north east and a vehicle entrance adjacent to the gate. A masonry wall runs between the site and Catherine house to the east and the west boundary is made up of concrete post and concrete panels. To the south lies the existing buildings which front onto Bury Old Road (A665).

The state of the current site is unsecured, with a few signs of crime and disorder, including fly tipping and criminal damage. These elements can portray an unsafe and threatening environment.

The surrounding area is predominantly residential properties with a small number of commercial premises.



2 Crime Statistics & Analysis

All data below is based on crimes recorded between 1st April 2023 to 31st March 2024.

2.1 Crime Summary

Recorded Crime within 500m of Site									
Domestic Burglary	Non-Domestic Burglary	Criminal Damage	Less Serious Wounding	Theft	Robbery	Serious Wounding	Theft from Motor Vehicle	Theft of Motor Vehicle	Bicycle Theft
27	5	57	249	30	13	8	16	8	7

- 2.1.1 The overall rate of crime in the past 12 months is above average for the Manchester division, with less serious wounding, criminal damage and theft having been most commonly reported. Whilst these offences have taken place all throughout the local area, there has been a hotspot of offences taking place at Cheetham Hill shopping centre where there is a number of retail outlets and restaurants which leads to a higher footfall and increases the opportunities for offenders, and the likelihood of crime and disorder issues occurring.
- 2.1.2 Less serious woundings have taken place throughout the local area, particularly at the hotspot of offences at Cheetham Hill shopping centre. Assaults, harassment and public order offences have been the most reported less serious woundings taking place, with the majority of incidents involving disputes between unknown associates in public areas, as well as some cases of domestic violence.
- 2.1.3 Criminal damage to vehicles and dwellings has accounted for the majority of criminal damage offences taking place in the local area. Offenders have used objects and implements in order to damage the doors and glazing in the windows of both cars and properties, as well as instances of damage being dealt to garden fences and graffiti being used to vandalise walls.
- 2.1.4 The majority of theft offences have occurred at Cheetham Hill shopping centre, where offenders have used pickpocketing and distraction methods in order to remove items from the person such as wallets and mobile phones as well as targeted insecure items and bags on tabletops and benches. There have also been cases of parcels being stolen from doorsteps and communal areas of apartment buildings

2.2 Common Local M.O.s (Modus Operandi)

- 2.2.1 Smashed glazing in windows and doors.

Possible Solution - All ground floor/accessible glazing should include a laminated pane, which forms a much more robust barrier against shattering and penetration (see Section 5.3). Any glazed panels in or around doors should be small and set well-away from locking points.

- 2.2.2 Using bodily pressure or implements in order to force open secure windows and door or have been targeted when left insecure by residents.

Possible Solution - All external doors and windows should be certified to recognised security standards (see Section 4.1 & 4.2), which are independently proven to reduce the risk of forced entry and thus increase the chances of detection. The communal entrance doors should be self-closing and locking, thus reducing the opportunity of them being left insecure.

All individual apartments should also be secured with a robust entrance doorset (see Section 4.1), to ensure that any offender who may have gained access to the building (e.g. by tailgating, posing as a legitimate visitor etc.) cannot gain further access without drawing the attention of other residents. Doors off internal corridors should not be located in deep recesses, where an offender could operate without fear of detection.

- 2.2.3 Posing as legitimate residents and gaining access to communal areas of apartment buildings by tailgating residents and insecure doors.

Possible Solution - A robust access control system should be in place to allow residents to vet visitors to the building before allowing them access (see Section 4.1). The main communal entrance should be located in a highly visible position and should be well-lit to deter offenders from trying to gain unauthorised access. Consideration could also be given to 'airlock' lobby system, which features a secondary entrance

door that only releases when the external door has closed, reducing the opportunities for tailgating unnoticed.





2.3 Risk Factors

The typical security risks for a development of this nature are:

- Domestic burglary
- Theft from gardens, sheds or garages
- Criminal damage to dwellings and vehicles
- Theft of, or from, vehicles
- Bogus callers and distraction burglary
- Anti-social behaviour
- Neighbour disputes
- Theft and criminal damage during the construction period
- Unauthorised access to private spaces
- Poor maintenance of access control systems

2.4 Crime Rate Comparison




The rates below relates to crime committed within 500m of the site. England & Wales data was last recorded for January – December 2021.



- 2.4.1 The rate of domestic burglaries per 1000 dwellings is **29% lower** than Manchester as a whole, **8% lower** than Greater Manchester and **6% lower** than England & Wales.
- 2.4.2 The rate of woundings per 1000 dwellings is **38% lower** than Manchester as a whole, **15% lower** than Greater Manchester and **62% higher** than England & Wales.
- 2.4.3 The rate of incidents of criminal damage per 1000 dwellings is **23% lower** than Manchester as a whole, **2% higher** than Greater Manchester and **23% higher** than England & Wales.
- 2.4.4 The rate of incidents of vehicle crime per 1000 dwellings is **59% lower** than Manchester as a whole, **32% lower** than Greater Manchester and **18% lower** than England & Wales.

2.5 Domestic Burglary: Risk Analysis

The data below relates to domestic burglaries committed within 500m of the site.





2.5.1 **Day/Time Range:** The risk of domestic burglary is highest on Tuesday and just after midnight (00:00-02:00). Offenders tend to target dwellings late at night when it is dark and there is less footfall in the area, giving them the perception that they are less likely to be caught or identified.

2.5.2 **Point of Entry:** In the local area the following entry points and MO's have been utilised most frequently:

- In cases where the entry point has been recorded as "unknown", it is likely that the offender has exploited insecure windows or doors.
- Smashed glazing in windows and doors.
- Using bodily pressure or implements in order to force open secure windows and doors.

2.6 Vehicle Crime: Risk Analysis

The data below relates to vehicle crime committed within 500m of the site.



- 2.6.1 **Day/Time Range:** The risk of vehicle crime peaks on Tuesday around midday (12:00-13:00). Offenders tend to target vehicles at this time during the working week when they are often left unattended and out of sight of the owners for long periods of time, creating a perceived low risk opportunity for offenders.

3 Layout Appraisal

3.1 Proposed development

- 3.1.1 The proposed development is the construction of a 4-storey apartment building containing 12 no. self-contained apartments. The development will also provide 6 no. car parking spaces with a bin and bike store.

3.2 Positive Aspects of the Proposal


The following proposed features would make a positive contribution to the prevention of crime and fear of crime.

- 3.2.1 The proposed development will bring activity, overlooking and surveillance to the area during the day and night.
- 3.2.2 There will be 12 apartments, which is considered to be sufficient to provide a reasonable prospect of a presence of residents throughout the day and at the weekend, providing activity and passive supervision within the development, which can help to deter offenders from targeting the properties.
- 3.2.3 Access controls can easily be deployed at the communal entrance door to the property, in order to restrict access to residents and authorised visitors only.
- 3.2.4 Secure cycle and bin storage enclosures will be located within the parking area serving the properties.
- 3.2.5 Area of land between the proposed building and Catherine Road provides good defensive space to the property. Preventing them from being exposed and vulnerable to unauthorised access, damage and nuisance/anti-social behaviour (i.e. people banging on windows as they walk by - particularly late in the evening/at night when the surrounding bars/public houses in the town centre are busy), as well as a lack of privacy for residents.

3.3 Changes Needed and Recommendations

The following points have been identified for further consideration and would need to be addressed for Design for Security to support the proposed scheme.

- 3.3.1 The proposed entrance to the building should be brought forward in line with the building elevation to prevent a recess, which can allow an offender to operate without fear of detection.
- 3.3.2 Access to the rear of the apartment building should be restricted to residents to prevent misuse. The car parking area should be secured with access restricted to residents. There should be automated gates, installed at the entrance to the car park as close to flush with the front of the building as possible. The gates should operate on an access control system with access restricted to genuine residents. (See drawing below, red line shows potential position of automated gates).



- 3.3.3 Rear boundary. Security or either development if there is no boundary. (See drawing below, red line shows possible position of rear site boundary).



- 3.3.4 Bicycle parking should be within a robust, secure, and weatherproof, enclosure. Cycle stands should be Sheffield style stands, or similar, allowing both wheels and the frame to be secured. The entrance to the cycle store should be illuminated.
- 3.3.5 The apartment car parking area should be illuminated to a high standard (i.e. in accordance with BS 3659) and car parking spaces should be well defined to avoid any conflict. Any visitor spaces should be clearly marked.
- 3.3.6 External communal access doors must be compliant with and certified to BS PAS 24, STS202, or LPS 1175 SR2, including a lock capable of being operated via an electronic access control system. The communal entrance doors should be self-closing and secured with a multi-point electronic lock operating with an electronic access control system, these features should be permitted under the scope of the certification.
- 3.3.7 Access into the building should be controlled by a video entry phone system (with the picture viewable on the phone unit, rather than on a television set) so that residents can vet visitors before allowing them access into the building. There should be no unrestricted trade access into the building.
- 3.3.8 There should be a secondary access-controlled door into the circulation cores of the building to reduce the potential for tailgating.
- 3.3.9 A secure mail delivery system should be supplied, to allow delivery without access to the whole building. Given the emerging trend of parcel thefts (particularly at apartment blocks), consideration should also be a secure system for depositing parcels (see Section 4.1 for more information).
- 3.3.10 It is essential that all of the physical security measures listed below are incorporated into the scheme. Integrated, risk-commensurate security measures aim to place secure physical barriers or surveillance in the path of the criminal – making crime harder to commit and raising the risk of detection and possible capture, as well as promoting a feeling of safety in residents and visitors.

4 Physical Security

The following checklist forms the physical security requirements for this scheme to achieve Secured by Design accreditation.

4.1 Doors

- ☐ External communal access doors must be compliant with and certified to BS PAS 24, STS201, LPS 1175 SR2, LPS 2081 SR B, or STS 222, including a lock capable of being operated via an electronic access control system. The communal entrance doors should be self-closing and secured with a multi-point electronic lock and capable of being operated via an electronic access control system, these features should be permitted under the scope of the certification. Access into the build should be controlled by a video entry phone system (with the picture viewable on the phone unit, rather than on a television set) so that residents can vet visitors before allowing them access into the building. There should be no unrestricted trade access into the building.
- ☐ Secure through the wall mail boxes should be provided for each apartment.
- ☐ Apartment entrance doors must be compliant with and certified to BS PAS 24, STS201, LPS 1175 SR2, LPS 2081 SR B, or STS 222. Apartment entrance doors must have a door viewer.
- ☐ Any external french/double doors, sliding doors or bi-folding doors to ground floor private amenity terraces or to any potentially accessible first floor balconies must be compliant with and certified to BS PAS 24 and should include laminated glazing (see below).
- ☐ External escape-only doors (as with external doors in general) should be certified to BS PAS 24, STS201, LPS 1175 SR2, LPS 2081 SR B, or STS 222. It is crucial that the door ironmongery is permitted for use on these doors under the security certification of the product.

4.2 Windows

- ☐ Windows must be compliant with and certified to BS PAS 24.
- ☐ Ground floor and easily accessible opening lights (escape requirements permitting) must be key-lockable and have fixed/lockable opening restrictors (not releasable from the outside) limited to 100mm. Windows can be fully openable from the inside to allow ventilation of the dwellings in accordance with Approved Document O but the window restrictor must reengage when the window is closed.

4.3 Glazing

- ☐ Glazing to a height of 2400mm (or if otherwise accessible) must incorporate at least one pane of glass rated as P1A under EN 356. The remaining pane in a double-glazed unit may be toughened glass.

4.4 Alarms

- ☐ If an alarm is installed, then it should comply with either: BS EN 50131 and PD 6662 for wired systems or BS 6799 for wireless systems.
- ☐ If an alarm is installed, it should be linked to contacts on all external doors, (including internal doors into garages) and, PIR detectors should cover all ground floor rooms with windows.
If an alarm is not to be provided, there should be a 13amp, non-switched fuse spur to allow future residents to connect an alarm.

4.5 Boundaries

- ☐ The front of the property should be demarcated by low boundaries such as planting and/or railings to an approximate height of 1000mm.
- ☐ Any low boundaries that adjoin high boundaries should have transition panels/sections to prevent the low boundary being used as a climbing aid over the higher.

4.6 Landscaping

- ☐ In vulnerable locations such as entrances, parking areas and footpaths, low planting should not exceed 1000mm in height, and tree canopies should fall no lower than 2m from the ground. This is in order to allow people to see their surroundings better, make a rational choice of routes and eliminate hiding places. A maintenance agreement should stipulate that these planting dimensions would be adhered to.
- ☐ Loose surface materials in the publicly accessible areas of the scheme should be avoided. Small fragments of ground covering can be used as missiles against people and premises (both to gain entry and to commit criminal damage).

4.7 Lighting

- ☐ External lighting must be provided to the front and rear of dwellings, operated by photoelectric cell/daylight sensor (manual override is also permissible). PIR security lighting is not recommended for these locations and should not be employed unless advised.
- ☐ Fittings should produce 'white' light, as opposed to yellow/orange light. Metal halide (or bulbs with a comparable output) should be used, as these offer superior colour rendition over alternatives such as high- and low-pressure sodium bulbs.
- ☐ Lighting fixtures must not be positioned to provide climbing aids over boundary treatments. Electrical and architectural layouts should be developed together to avoid this.

4.8 Car Parking Areas

- ☐ Apartment car parking areas should be illuminated to a high standard.
- ☐ Car parking spaces should be clearly marked, and signage should indicate that these are for residents use only.

4.9 Other

- ☐ Any rainwater pipes should be square in profile and fixed back to the building fabric to prevent climbing to upper floor windows.

5 Management & Maintenance

5.1.1 The upkeep of a development over its lifetime can be crucial to the level of security and safety within. Aspects of a development, which are left to deteriorate, have the potential to attract further crime – a process known as 'the broken window theory'. A maintenance plan should be drawn up to address issues such as:

- Litter removal
- Repair to communal areas (lighting, signage, access controls)
- Trimming and pruning to shrubs and trees

5.1.2 Any public open space or amenity areas not under the ownership of residents should be subject to an effective maintenance contract. This should ensure that all damage is rectified in a timely manner, and that any such space will not be detrimental to its surroundings.

6 Construction

6.1.1 Untidy sites and their surroundings can be littered with debris accessible to vandals who often use loose materials as missiles to commit crime. The client should take measures appropriate to secure their site during construction, and control pedestrian and vehicular access in to and out of the site curtilage. It is also recommended that the contractor on this scheme is a member of the 'Considerate Constructors Scheme', who has committed to be a considerate and good neighbour, as well as clean, respectful, safe, environmentally conscious, responsible and accountable.

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- 6.1.2 Site security contractors should be SIA (Security Industry Authority) approved to ensure professional standards are adhered to (please see <http://www.sia.homeoffice.gov.uk/pages/acs-intro.aspx> for more details).

7 Useful References

7.1 Secured by Design (SBD)

- 7.1.1 Secured by Design focuses on crime prevention at the design, layout and construction stages of homes and commercial premises and promotes the use of security standards for a wide range of applications and products. To apply for Secured by Design certification for your development, visit our online application form at: <http://www.designforsecurity.org/secured-by-design/sbd-accreditation/>

A Contact register

Date	Contact With	Summary of Contact
25/03/24	Gold Sketch Studios	CIS application
27/03/24	Design for Security	CIS fee issued
11/04/24	Gold Sketch Studios	CIS confirmation
17/04/24	Design for Security	Site visit

B Associated Documents

This report is based on the following drawings and supplementary information submitted by the applicant.

Drawing No.	Drawing Title	Date	Rev
GSS23159 -	Land on Catherine Road - 501 - Site - Location and Block Plan		
GSS23159 -	Land on Catherine Road - 502 - Site - Proposed		
GSS23159.1	Land on Catherine Road - 003.3 - Proposed Plans and Elevations		
GSS23159.1	Land on Catherine Road - 004.3 - Proposed Plans and Elevations		

PLEASE NOTE - In the event of any subsequent material changes to the scheme, it will be necessary for Design for Security to reassess the comments made within this report.

C CIS Version History

Version	Revisions Made	Date
A		