CRIME IMPACT STATEMENT

8 MOOR ROAD, WYTHENSHAWE

SHORT TERM ACCOMODATION (16 no. APARTMENTS)

FOR: Sumo Developments

VERSION B: 12/08/2024

REFERENCE: 2021/0072/CIS/01

Greater Manchester Police

designforsecurity

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CPT
CRIME PREVENTION TEAM

8 Moor Road, Wythenshawe

URN: 2021/0072/CIS/01

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Minor security improvements required

This development has been assessed against the principles of 'Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design' (CPTED), in order to reduce the opportunities for crime and the fear of crime.


Short-term accommodation facilities attract a more transient group of residents who, if not sensitively managed, can both generate and attract crime and disorder problems that may directly impact on the amenity of neighbouring residents. It is important that robust security measures and a suitable management plan have been developed and then designed into the scheme from the outset, in order to clearly demonstrate that crime and disorder issues have been considered and reasonable measures implemented to ensure that the development provides a safe and secure place for future residents.

The layout of the proposed scheme is considered acceptable, as long as the issues discussed in more detail within Section 3.3 of this report are addressed, namely:

- Secure enclosure of private space to the sides and rear of the building. Definition to street frontage to clearly define car park as in ownership/control of the facility and to discourage unauthorised access/mis-use.
- Robust control of access into/around the scheme, including a secure system for the delivery of post that does not require access to all areas/floors. The entrance lobby should work as an 'air lock' with external and internal doors controlled by staff.

If these issues can be addressed as described within the report and the other physical security measures are incorporated, we would be happy to support the development.

Please note: Greater Manchester Police Design for Security will recommend to the local planning authority that a planning condition is added that reflects the physical security specification listed within Section 4 of this report.



Bradley Hart MTCP

Design for Security Consultant

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1 Visual Audit

The site lies on the west side of Moor Road in the Baguley area of Wythenshawe, south Manchester.

The site is currently occupied by a dormer bungalow fronting onto Moor Road, with a front garden/off-road parking driveway to its frontage and a private garden area and open land to it's rear (formerly an allotment). The street frontage of the site is defined by high hedging, which provides some screening from the road but also impedes surveillance opportunities of and from the dwelling/parked vehicles.


To the immediate north is a vacant residential property fronting onto Moor Lane. The site also abuts the rear boundaries of the semi-detached and mews residential properties fronting onto Wythenshawe Road (B5167) to the north.

To the immediate south, the site abuts the rear boundaries of the bungalows fronting onto the short cul-de-sac off Moor Road and there are mews' of residential properties on the opposite side of Moor Road to the east that overlook the site to some degree (although their frontages are also formed by high hedging).

To the south-west of the site is a densely vegetated area of open space used as a fishing reserve, including 3 no. large ponds and high hedging/mature trees along the Moor Road and Crewe Road street frontages, beyond which is a business estate.

When open land or routes exist to the rear of sites and dwellings, they can often leave them vulnerable to unauthorised access (particularly when they benefit from little/no natural surveillance) – as they can provide easy access/escape routes for offenders to utilise unseen. Routes to the rear of dwellings can also experience nuisance and anti-social behaviour issues and can leave legitimate users intimidated/vulnerable, particularly after dark.

There is a Metrolink tram line along Moor Road to the immediate east of the site, running between the Wythenshawe Park stop, just to the north-east of the site (at the junction of Wythenshawe Road and Moor Road) and the Moor Road stop to the south.





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2 Crime Statistics & Analysis

All data below is based on crimes recorded between 1st November 2021 to 31st October 2022.

2.1 Crime Summary

Recorded Crime within 500m of Site									
Domestic Burglary	Non-Domestic Burglary	Criminal Damage	Less Serious Wounding	Theft	Robbery	Serious Wounding	Theft from Motor Vehicle	Theft of Motor Vehicle	Bicycle Theft
19	<5	61	232	21	6	<5	6	9	5

2.1.1 The most prevent types of recorded crime in the local area are less serious wounding and criminal damage, with particular concentrations around/off the main arterial route of Wythenshawe Road, around the Metrolink stops to the north (Wythenshawe Park) and south (Moor Road) and around/off the residential streets to the north of Wythenshawe Road.

2.1.2 Less serious wounding offences have occurred throughout the week, usually during the afternoon and late evenings. Stalking/Harassment and public order offences have been the highest recorded less serious woundings in the area, often involving known offenders and current/former partners, with most taking the form of verbal abuse and threats of violence.


2.1.3 Criminal damage offences have mostly been against dwellings and vehicles, with glazing often targeted. Offenders have used objects to smash the doors/windows of dwellings and the windows of vehicles, as well as using sharp instruments to slash car tyres.

2.1.4 As this Crime Impact Statement relates to a proposed short-term residential scheme, the more detailed analysis below will look at local residential burglary and vehicle crime.


2.2 Crime Rate Comparison

The rates below relates to crime committed within 500m of the site. England & Wales data was last recorded for January – December 2017.

Comparison of Domestic Burglary Rates at Site (km), Manchester and Greater Manchester



Comparison of Wounding Rates at Site (km), Manchester and Greater Manchester




2.2.1 The rate of domestic burglaries (i.e. incidents per 1,000 dwellings) in the local area is **41% lower** than the rate for Manchester as a whole, **25% lower** than the rate for Greater Manchester and **23% lower** than the rate for England & Wales.


2.2.2 The rate of woundings (i.e. incidents per 1,000 dwellings) in the local area is **34% lower** than the rate for Manchester as a whole, **10% lower** than the rate for Greater Manchester and **73% higher** than the rate for England & Wales.

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Comparison of Criminal Damage Rates at Site (km), Manchester and Greater Manchester



Comparison of Vehicle Crime Rates at Site (km), Manchester and Greater Manchester




2.2.3 The rate of incidents of criminal damage (i.e. incidents per 1,000 dwellings) in the local area is **3% lower** than the rate for Manchester as a whole, **27% higher** than the rate for Greater Manchester and **54% higher** than the rate for England & Wales.

2.2.4 The rate of incidents of vehicle crime (i.e. incidents per 1,000 dwellings) in the local area is **73% lower** than the rate for Manchester as a whole, **56% lower** than the rate for Greater Manchester and **47% lower** than the rate for England & Wales.


2.3 Domestic Burglary: Risk Analysis

The data below relates to domestic burglaries committed within 500m of the site.


Domestic Burglary – Day Range



Domestic Burglary – Time Range



Domestic Burglary – Point of Entry



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2.3.1 Day Range: During the week, the risk of domestic burglary in the local area peaks on Tuesday and is lowest on Sunday.

2.3.2 Time Range: During the day the risk fluctuates, peaking during the early hours of the morning, around midday and in the evening. Offenders frequently target residential premises at night when it is dark and streets generally benefit from less activity, footfall, surveillance and overlooking than during the day – meaning offenders perceive a lower risk of being observed or detected. During the day, residents are more likely to be away from home (at work or otherwise) and offenders can attempt to gain unauthorised access without fear of being disturbed.


2.3.3 Point of Entry: In the local area, the following entry points and MOs have been utilised most frequently:

- Doors have been targeted most frequently and have either been forced open with bodily pressure/implements or have been targeted when left insecure.
- There have been a number of incidents where the means of entry was legitimate or unknown – this is likely to have been when offenders have targeted insecure doors/windows unnoticed or have tailgated/posed as legitimate visitors to gain access to apartment blocks.
- Glazing within doors and windows has been smashed to gain entry.


2.4 Vehicle Crime: Risk Analysis

The data below relates to vehicle crime committed within 500m of the site.

Vehicle Crime – Day Range



Vehicle Crime – Time Range



2.4.1 Day Range: During the week, the risk of vehicle crime in the local area peaks on Friday.

2.4.2 Time Range: During the day, the risk peaks in the early hours of the morning and in the early evening when it is likely to be dark, streets are typically quieter and offenders perceive a lower risk of being witnessed/identified.

2.4.3 Vehicles parked within open communal areas/car parks or on-street, where they are easily accessible and cannot be easily overlooked by their owners, are often more vulnerable to attack than those parked within the curtilages of individual properties, within secure garages or within securely enclosed car parks directly overlooked from the buildings they serve.

2.5 General Risk Factors for Residential Schemes

2.5.1 The typical security risks for a development of this nature are:

- Domestic burglary
- Bogus callers and distraction burglary
- Criminal damage to property and vehicles
- Anti-social behaviour
- Theft of/from parked vehicles
- Unauthorised access to buildings/private space
- Tailgating (pedestrian and vehicular)
- Neighbour disputes

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- Poor maintenance of access control systems
- Theft and criminal damage during the construction period

2.6 Common Local M.O.s (Modus Operandi)

2.6.1 Having looked at the crime data for the site and the surrounding area, the most frequent M.O.s used by offenders when targeting residential properties are listed below, along with suggested measures to reduce the risk of them being utilised at the proposed development:

- Doors have been targeted most frequently and have either been forced open with bodily pressure/implements or have been targeted when left insecure.

  Possible Solution - All external doors should be certified to recognised security standards (see Section 4.1), which are independently proven to reduce the risk of forced entry and thus increase the chances of detection.

  All individual apartments should also be secured with a security-certified entrance doorset (see Section 4.1), to ensure that any offender who may have gained access to the building (e.g. by tailgating, posing as a legitimate visitor etc.) cannot gain further access without drawing the attention of other residents. Doors off internal corridors should not be located in deep recesses, where an offender could operate without fear of detection.

- There have been a number of incidents where the means of entry was legitimate or unknown – this is likely to have been when offenders have targeted insecure doors/windows unnoticed or have tailgated/posed as legitimate visitors to gain access to apartment blocks.

  Possible Solution - A robust access control system should be in place to allow staff or residents to vet visitors to the apartment block before allowing them access (see Section 4.1). The main communal entrance to the block should be located in a highly visible position and should be well-lit to deter offenders from trying to gain unauthorised access. Consideration could also be given to 'airlock' lobby system, which features a secondary entrance door that only releases when the external door has closed, reducing the opportunities for tailgating unnoticed.

- Glazing within doors and windows has been smashed to gain entry.

  Possible Solution - All ground floor/accessible glazing should also include a laminated pane, which forms a much more robust barrier against shattering and penetration (see Section 4.3). Any glazed panels in or around doors should ideally be small and set well-away from locking points.

  Again, unauthorised access to the rear of properties should be deterred by robust boundaries and the avoidance of open pedestrian routes/publicly accessible areas to their rear where possible.

- Vehicles have been targeted for theft of, theft from and criminal damage when parked on-street or within open car parks

  Possible Solution - It is essential that the development is designed so that resident's vehicles are secured and overlooked. Ideally, any surface communal parking areas serving apartments or groups of houses should be located directly in front of the dwellings they serve, clearly separated from the streets or any areas of adjacent open space/pedestrian routes. Any side, rear, undercroft or basement communal parking areas must be secured with automatic gates/shutters to prevent unauthorised access to where hidden doors, windows and parked vehicles could be attacked unseen.

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3 Layout Appraisal

3.1 Proposed Development

3.1.1 The proposal is to erect a 2/3 storey building, comprising of 16 no. short-term accommodation units for individuals and families run by Manchester City Council, designed to temporarily house people for a period of up to 3 months while suitable permanent accommodation can be found.

3.1.2 The Moor Road frontage of the site will be formed by a small car park, comprising of 3 no. spaces and a brick bin store. The scheme will comprise of a two buildings joined by single-storey, flat roof corridor link. The 'front building' will comprise of an entrance hall with adjacent staff office/reception hatch, a communal laundry, 2 no. ground floor units, 3 no. units at first floor level and 1 no. unit within the roofspace. The 'rear building' will comprise of a further 5 no. units at ground and first floor levels. The north and south sides and rear of the building will be enclosed as private amenity spaces for the use of residents and will include a cycle store for 18 no. cycles.

3.2 Positive Aspects of the Proposal

The following proposed features would make a positive contribution to the prevention of crime and fear of crime.

3.2.1 The proposed development will bring additional activity, overlooking and surveillance to the area at all times of the day and night.

3.2.2 The building will present active frontages to the car park and towards Moor Road, enlivening the street scene and helping to provide useful natural surveillance over the car park and the street.

3.2.3 The main communal entrance to the building will be located where it will be capable of being seen from the street, maximising surveillance over it and any visitors to the building.

3.2.4 Manchester City Council staff will be on-site at all times to monitor access to the building and manage the facility.

3.2.5 The communal parking area serving the building will be overlooked from within the building itself.

3.2.6 The proposed development provides the opportunity to include security features built into the design and construction of the scheme and avoid the need for obtrusive retro-fitted security measures that can increase the fear of crime. Security measures carefully incorporated into the design can ensure the buildings are reasonably secure, without visibly announcing that the design was concerned about crime.

3.3 Points for Further Consideration

The following points have been identified for further consideration and would need to be addressed for Design for Security to support the proposed scheme.

3.3.1 The sides and rear of the building should be enclosed and defined as private space, preventing unauthorised access to where hidden windows could be attacked unseen (see illustration opposite and Section 4.5 for more information). It is highly recommended that the frontage of the site is defined by low-level railings and planting, with a symbolic barrier at the entrance (e.g. formed by brick pillars and a change in surface colour/texture) to clearly define it and encourage a feeling of territoriality among the staff/residents, psychologically giving the impression that the area beyond is private (again, see illustration above and Section 4.5 for more information). There should also be clear signage to indicate the car park is for the use of staff, residents or visitors only.



2100mm high walls/railings/close-boarded fencing & gates to enclose sides/rear of the building & cycle/bin stores

2100mm high boundaries to adjacent private gardens

Low-level railings and planting to site frontage

Symbolic barrier to site entrance

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3.3.2 The main communal entrance serving the building should be formed by a security-certified, single-leaf doorset which is easier to secure with an electrically operated multi-point lock and remotely operate via a robust electronic access control system (see Section 4.1). Ideally, the main entrance should work as an 'air lock' - with the main external door remotely controlled by office staff, who can then release the internal door off the entrance hall once visitors have been vetted. If the office is left unattended at any point, the main external door should be controlled by means of a video entry phone system linked to each apartment, so that residents can vet callers to the building before allowing them access. In addition to a robust access control system for visitors, there should also be a secure system for the delivery of post/parcels that ensures access to all floors of the building is not required (again, see Section 4.1 for more information).

3.3.3 It is essential that all of the physical security measures listed below are incorporated into the scheme. Integrated, risk-commensurate security measures aim to place secure physical barriers or surveillance in the path of the criminal – making crime harder to commit and raising the risk of detection and possible capture, as well as promoting a feeling of safety in staff, residents and visitors.

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4 Physical Security

The following checklist forms the physical security requirements for this scheme to achieve Secured by Design accreditation.

4.1 Doors & Access Controls

- ☐ All external doors must be compliant with and certified to BS PAS 24, STS 201 or LPS 1175 SR2. It is crucial that the door ironmongery to any escape-only doors is permitted for use under the security certification of the product. Any escape-only doors should be alarmed (audible upon opening) and designed without visible external ironmongery.
- ☐ The main communal entrance to the building should be security-certified to one of the above standards, including a multi-point electronic lock permitted as part of the certification, capable of being operated remotely via an electronic access control system. It should be single-leaf, self-closing/locking and capable of being controlled by means of a video entry phone system (with the picture viewable on the phone unit, rather than on a television set) linked to each apartment, so that in the absence of Manchester City Council staff within the office adjacent to the entrance lobby, residents can vet callers to the building before allowing them access.
- ☐ There should be a secure system for the delivery of post/parcels without needing to provide access to all floors of the building. Ideally, deliveries should be made directly to postboxes within the main entrance lobby under the supervision of Manchester City Council staff. If not, postal delivery arrangements should allow for external deposits and internal withdrawals by residents or there should be a 'secure lobby' arrangement, with a secondary communal door to the same security specification as the outer door (and no access to the stair serving the upper floor apartments off the entrance lobby), to allow for deliveries to postboxes within a secure postal lobby without providing access to other areas/floors of the building. The postboxes themselves should be certified to Door & Hardware Federation Technical Specification 009 (TS 009), with letter box apertures to a maximum size of 260mm x 40mm (incorporating anti-fishing measures). All other deliveries should be made directly to the staff or residents via the access control system.
- ☐ All individual internal apartment entrance doorsets must also be compliant with and certified to BS PAS 24, STS 201 or LPS 1175 SR2. It is advised that these doors do not have fixed sidelights, and are provided with door viewers instead. Chain limiters to apartment entrance doors are recommended, but not generally essential.
- ☐ Internal access to access to the staff office and laundry should be secured with solid-core doors (min. 44mm thick), with 3 hinges and an electrically operated lock controlled by staff or resident key-fob.
- ☐ Given the likely transient nature of the residents of the scheme, resident fob/key-cards should be capable of being easily and quickly activated/disabled by Manchester City Council staff to ensure that mis-use is prevented.

4.2 Windows

- ☐ Windows must be compliant with and certified to BS PAS 24.
- ☐ All ground floor and any other easily accessible opening lights (escape requirements permitting) must be key-lockable and have fixed/lockable opening restrictors (not releasable from the outside), limited to 100mm.

4.3 Glazing

- ☐ All glazing up to a height of 2400mm above external ground level must incorporate at least one pane of glass rated as P1A under EN 356. The remaining pane in a double glazed unit may be toughened glass.

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4.4 Alarms

- [ ] Ideally, each apartment should have an intruder alarm to comply with BS EN 50131 for wired or wireless systems. If intruder alarms are installed, they should be linked to contacts on all doors and PIR detectors should cover any accessible rooms with windows. On-site staff should be alerted if an intruder alarm is triggered.

4.5 Boundaries

- [ ] The sides and rear of the building should be enclosed with walls, railings or close-boarded timber fencing and gates to a height of 2100mm (see illustration within Section 3.3). Care should be taken to ensure that any boundaries formed by a combination of walls and railings/fencing should have panels that are fixed flush with the outer skin of the brickwork below, leaving no steps/gaps that would provide a climbing aid. Any gates to private space should be self-closing and 'slam-to-lock' (i.e. an automatic deadlocking mortice latch, key operated from both sides), which cannot be left unlocked when shut. Exposed hinges and large apertures/locking points to any gates should be avoided, or fitted with shrouding/protective plates to avoid the creation of footholds. The hinges should also not provide footholds and the gap at the bottom of any gates should be small enough to stop anyone crawling through.
- [ ] The car park serving the building should be defined by 2100mm high walls or close-boarded timber fencing along the rear boundaries of the adjacent dwellings fronting onto Moor Road. The street frontage of the car park should be defined by low-level railings and planting, to an approximate height of 1200mm, to define it as in ownership/control of residents and entirely separate from the street. There should be a symbolic barrier at the entrance to the site (for example, formed by brick pillars and/or a change of road surface texture/colour etc.) to encourage a feeling of territoriality among the staff and residents, psychologically giving the impression that the area beyond is private and discouraging anyone without a legitimate reason from entering.
- [ ] Any low boundaries that adjoin high boundaries should have transition panels/sections to prevent the low boundary being used as a climbing aid over the higher.

4.6 Lighting

- [ ] Lighting to the parking area should be in accordance with BS 5489, and display an average lux level of 10, with a uniformity level of no less than 25%.
- [ ] Dusk 'til dawn lights, operated by photoelectric cell/daylight sensor, should be installed to all external doors.
- [ ] Fittings should produce 'white' light, as opposed to yellow/orange light. LED or bulbs with a comparable output should be used, as these offer superior colour rendition over alternatives such as high and low pressure sodium bulbs.
- [ ] Lighting fixtures must not be positioned to provide climbing aids over boundary treatments. Electrical and architectural layouts should be developed together to avoid this.

4.7 CCTV

Any CCTV system that may be used within this proposal will require certain specifications and intelligent placement of cameras to compliment the design of the development. Designers should consider the following points when planning a CCTV strategy:

- [ ] CCTV systems (and lighting that support them) require regular cleaning and maintenance to remain effective.
- [ ] Where necessary cameras that are vulnerable to damage should be protected from attack either by relocation to a higher level and using a bigger lens to achieve the view required or through the fitting of a vandal resistant housing.
- [ ] With regards to the retention of footage, the police prefer quality over quantity. The overall retention period should be dictated by what the system is designed to achieve, though it would be better to have good quality images over a 14-day period than poor ones over a 30-day period.

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☐ Procedures for recovery of recordings are recommended to be established (e.g. trained staff / the CCTV system instruction manual to be readily available). This is to ensure that the images produced will be of an *acceptable standard* that will allow for *identification* of an individual which will stand up to scrutiny in court.

Acceptable Standard - this generally requires a resolution of 720x576 pixels at a real time frame rate of 25 frames per second. (N.B. Both the camera and DVR must be capable of this – if the camera will only send low resolution images then it does not matter how high the resolution of the recording unit is).

Identification – One of three levels of field of view. To identify an individual, the image must capture no less than 120% of the field of view (at least from the top of the individuals head to their knees). The remaining two levels of field of view are *overview* and *recognition*, which whilst effective for observational purposes, are less likely to result in the identification of a person/offender.

☐ The intelligent placement of cameras helps to provide clear facial identification of individuals. Suitable locations would be: the main entrance lobby and all vehicle/cycle parking areas.

☐ If a CCTV system is to be installed, consideration should be given to allowing office staff to monitor the system, to ensure there can be an immediate response to any incidents recorded.

4.8 Landscaping

☐ In vulnerable locations such as around building entrances/frontages and parking areas, low planting should not exceed 1000mm in height and tree canopies should fall no lower than 2000m from the ground. This is in order to allow people to see their surroundings better and eliminate hiding places. A maintenance agreement should stipulate that these planting dimensions would be adhered to.

☐ Any landscape features (hard or soft) to communal areas of landscaping should not impede natural surveillance of/from dwellings or reduce the effectiveness of lighting or any CCTV provision. There should also be no hard landscaping that could inadvertently create seating or loitering spots (except within designated/intended areas). These features can encourage anti-social behaviour and raise the fear of crime.

☐ Loose surface materials in publicly accessible areas of the scheme should be avoided. Small fragments of ground covering can be used as missiles against people, dwellings and vehicles (both to gain entry and to commit criminal damage).

☐ Planting must be avoided that will aid climbing over any boundary treatments or up to upper floor windows. The security of fences and buildings can be compromised if trees or street furniture are placed close by.

4.9 Other

☐ There should be no features of the building (such as projecting window cills, exposed rainwater down pipes, projecting brickwork/cladding features etc.) or nearby hard/soft landscaping features (such as nearby boundaries, trees, lighting columns, handrails etc.) that may provide climbing aids up to upper floor windows.

☐ The external communal cycle store serving the building should be defined/enclosed by 1800-2100mm high railings with a self-closing, ‘slam to lock’ gate (i.e. an automatic deadlocking mortice latch, fob operated from both sides). It should include ‘Sheffield’ style racks, or similar, that allow residents to lock both wheels and the crossbar to a stand, rather than just the crossbar (wheel slots and butterfly racks are not suitable). For further information, please refer to our cycle storage guidance document: www.designforsecurity.org/all-downloads/.

☐ Similarly, the external communal bin store serving the building should be enclosed with 1800-2100mm high walls, railings or fire-resistant close-boarded timber fencing and a self-closing, ‘slam to lock’ gate. A strategy should be defined to ensure waste collection can take place while retaining a secure development.

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5 Management & Maintenance

5.1.1 A comprehensive security regime for the short-term accommodation scheme must be prepared and remain in place for the day-to-day running of the site. There should be regular reviews/exercises to ensure that it remains accurate, workable and up-to-date. All staff and residents should understand and accept the need for security measures and it should be made easy for people to raise concerns or report observations to the facilities management team.

5.1.2 The upkeep of a residential development over its lifetime can be crucial to the level of security and safety within. Aspects of a development, which are left to deteriorate, have the potential to attract further crime – a process known as 'the broken window theory'. A maintenance plan should be drawn up to address issues such as:

- Litter/graffiti removal
- Repair to communal areas (e.g. boundary treatments, lighting, access controls, signage etc.)
- Trimming and pruning to shrubs and trees

5.1.3 Any amenity areas should be subject to an effective maintenance contract, to ensure that all damage is rectified in a timely manner and that any such space will not be detrimental to its surroundings.

5.1.4 All high value equipment within communal/staff areas (e.g. computers, tools etc.) should be property marked and securely fixed or stored to deter damage/theft. An accurate record should be maintained which logs all such items.

6 Construction

6.1.1 Untidy sites and their surroundings can be littered with debris accessible to vandals who often use loose materials as missiles to commit crime. The client should take measures appropriate to secure their site during construction, and control pedestrian and vehicular access in to and out of the site curtilage. It is also recommended that the contractor on this scheme is a member of the 'Considerate Constructors Scheme', who has committed to be a considerate and good neighbour, as well as clean, respectful, safe, environmentally conscious, responsible and accountable.

6.1.2 Site security contractors should be SIA (Security Industry Authority) approved to ensure professional standards are adhered to (please see http://www.sia.homeoffice.gov.uk/pages/acs-intro.aspx for more details).

7 Useful References

7.1 Secured by Design (SBD)

7.1.1 Secured by Design focuses on crime prevention at the design, layout and construction stages of homes and commercial premises and promotes the use of security standards for a wide range of applications and products. To apply for Secured by Design certification for your development, visit our online application form at: http://www.designforsecurity.org/secured-by-design/sbd-accreditation/

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A Contact Register

Date	Contact With	Summary of Contact
15th November 2022	Corstorphine & Wright	Receipt of CIS instruction form & plans
15th November 2022	Corstorphine & Wright	Quote issued & request for additional info
16th November 2022	Corstorphine & Wright	Confirmation of instruction/fee
9-10th January 2023	Corstorphine & Wright	Email correspondence re: additional info and payment & receipt of D&A Statement
12th January 2023	Corstorphine & Wright	Email sent re: report completion & payment
31st January 2023	GMP Finance Dept	Confirmation of payment
31st January 2023	Corstorphine & Wright	Version A of CIS report issued
5th August 2024	Level 2 Architects	Receipt of amended plans & request for revised CIS report
6th August 2024	Level 2 Architects	Email sent re: timescale for revised CIS

B Associated Documents

This report is based on the following drawings and supplementary information submitted by the applicant.

Drawing No.	Drawing Title	Date	Rev
21901-MOR-CWA-XX-DR-A-2000	Site Location Plan (SUPERSEDED)	15/08/22	00
21901-MOR-CWA-00-DR-A-2001	GA – Proposed Ground Floor Plan (SUPERSEDED)	01/12/20	-
21901-MOR-CWA-01-DR-A-2002	GA – Proposed First Floor Plan (SUPERSEDED)	23/11/20	-
21901-MOR-CWA-02-DR-A-2003	GA – Proposed Second Floor Plan (SUPERSEDED)	23/11/20	-
21901-MOR-CWA-RF-DR-A-2004	GA – Proposed Roof Plan (SUPERSEDED)	09/08/22	-
21901-MOR-CWA-XX-DR-A-2011	GA Site Plan (SUPERSEDED)	09/08/22	-
21901-MOR-CWA-XX-DR-A-2011	GA Site Plan (SUPERSEDED)	09/08/22	-
21901-MOR-CWA-ZZ-DR-A-2101	GA – Proposed Sections (SUPERSEDED)	23/11/20	-
21901-MOR-CWA-ZZ-DR-A-2151	GA – Proposed Elevations (SUPERSEDED)	23/11/20	-
21901-MOR-CWA-ZZ-DR-A-2152	GA - Bay Elevations (SUPERSEDED)	10/08/22	-
21901-8000-00	Design & Access Statement (SUPERSEDED)	Aug 2022	00
469-1-PLN-005	Proposed Site Plan	-	B
469-1-PLN-007	Proposed Ground Floor Plan	-	B
469-1-PLN-008	Proposed First Floor Plan	-	B
469-1-PLN-009	Proposed Second Floor Plan	-	B
469-1-PLN-011	Proposed Elevations	-	A

PLEASE NOTE - In the event of any subsequent material changes to the scheme, it will be necessary for Design for Security to reassess the comments made within this report.

C CIS Version History

Version	Revisions Made	Date
A		
B	Scheme redesigned & number of units reduced to 16	12/08/24

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D Glossary

Burglary Resistance Standards

BS PAS 24
General security performance requirements for door/window assemblies.

An attack test standard for doorsets and windows. This is the minimum police requirement for Secured by Design dwellings, and is also applicable to French/double doors, and sliding doors.

BS EN 1627 (Security Ratings RC1 to RC6)
Windows, doors, shutters - Burglar resistance Requirements and classification

The classification system used in BS EN 1627 is aimed at the commercial market and is based on five elements:

a) Resistance of glazing

b) Performance of hardware

c) Resistance to static loading

d) Resistance to dynamic loading

e) Burglary resistance by manual intervention

LPS 1175 (Security Ratings 1 to 6)
Specification for testing and classifying the burglary resistance of building components

This includes doors, shutters, garage doors and grilles typically for commercial premises and higher risk domestic premises and is acceptable to the ABI and the Police. The standard has 6 levels, 6 being the highest, with levels 1 and 2 equivalent in many respects to BS PAS 24 and BS 7950.

STS 201
Enhanced security requirements for doorsets and door assemblies for dwellings to satisfy the requirements of PAS 24

STS 202
Requirements for burglary resistance of construction products including hinged, pivoted, folding or sliding doorsets, windows, curtain walling, security grilles, garage doors and shutters.

This specifies a broadly similar range of attack tools and times to those specified at the lower levels of LPS 1175.

BS EN 356 (Ratings P1A to P8A)

Glass in building. Security glazing. Testing and classification of resistance against manual attack.

A performance standard for manual attacks on glazing. P2A is comparable to the performance of a 6.8mm laminated glass, and P4A to that of a 9.5mm laminated glass.

Commonly Used Acronyms

CIT
Cash in transit (refers to vehicles, personnel and routines).

CPTED
Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design

CRS
Crime Reduction Specialist. Sometimes known as CPO (Crime Prevention Officer)

INPT
Integrated Neighbourhood Policing Team.

PVB/PolyVinyl Butyral (Glazing interlayer)
A commonly used interlayer used in the production of laminated glass.

LPCB (Loss Prevention Certification Board)
A brand of the BRE Global (Building Research Establishment) family. The LPCB work with insurers, Government, police, designers, manufacturers, contractors and end users to develop methods of assessing performance and reliability of security products to ensure their fitness for purpose.

UKAS (United Kingdom Accreditation Service)
The sole national accreditation body recognised by government to assess, against internationally agreed standards, organisations that provide certification, testing, inspections and calibration services.

Useful Websites

Design for Security
www.designforsecurity.org

Secured by Design
www.securedbydesign.com

RIBA Product Selector
www.ribaproductselector.com

LPCB – Red Book Live
www.redbooklive.com

Crime Reduction (Home Office)
www.crimereduction.homeoffice.gov.uk

DAC (Design Against Crime) Solution Centre
www.designagainstcrime.org

Building for Life
www.buildingforlife.org

CLG (Communities and Local Government)
www.communities.gov.uk

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