



CRIME IMPACT STATEMENT

12-16 Piccadilly

Hotel, Café, Bar, Restaurant, Rooftop
Terrace and Exhibition Hall

For: **Lamington Group**

Version D: **24/05/24**

Ref: **2013/0677/CIS/03**

Greater Manchester Police

design**for**security

12-16 Piccadilly

2013/0677/CIS/03

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Minor security additions/design changes required

This development has been assessed against the principles of 'Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design' (CPTED), in order to reduce the opportunities for crime and the fear of crime.

The layout of the proposed scheme is considered acceptable, as long as the issues discussed in more detail within Section 3.3 of this report are addressed, which includes:

- Control of access into/around the hotel – including access controls to main entrance out-of-hours, upper floor bedroom corridor/access core to prevent non-guest access and staff-only access to ground floor/basement back-of-house areas.
- Cycle storage.
- Reception desk location and staffing levels

If these issues can be addressed as described within the report and the other physical security measures are incorporated, I would be happy to support the development.

Please note: Greater Manchester Police Design for Security will recommend to the local planning authority that a Secured by Design planning condition is added that reflects the physical security specification listed within Sections 4 & 5 of this report.

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1 Visual Audit

The development site is indicated by the red outline on the plan adjacent and is supported with existing site context photographs taken around the site.

The site is in central Manchester, close to Piccadilly railway station and Piccadilly Gardens. The Minshull Street crown court complex and probation office is also nearby.

The area contains a varied mix of premises, with old warehouse buildings having been converted or replaced with residential, commercial and other hotel buildings. There are also a number of licensed premises in the area, including the adjacent Waldorf public house, where incidents of violent disorder involving rival football fans have occurred – the proximity to Piccadilly railway station makes licensed premises in the area particularly vulnerable to this type of incident.


There is a multi-storey car park opposite the site on Chatham Street, and the stairwells / landings have been subject to abuse or used by rough sleepers.

The anonymity provided by the high footfall along Piccadilly gives offenders plenty of potential opportunities to commit crime.

Part of the development will involve refurbishment of the former bank building (currently vacant), and the remainder of the site has previously been used for a surface grade car parking.



1 – Proposed site on Piccadilly.




2 – View down Piccadilly towards Piccadilly gardens.



3 – View along Gore St towards the Waldorf Pub.




7 – View towards proposed site from Gore St.



6 – Former YMCA building



5 – Evidence of vehicle crime along Gore st



4 – Roby St. service access for a number of hotels

2 Crime Statistics & Analysis

All data below is based on crimes recorded between 1st May 2022 to 30th April 2023.

2.1 Crime Summary

Figure 1: Recorded Crime within 500m of Site

Domestic Burglary	Non-Domestic Burglary	Criminal Damage	Less Serious Wounding	Theft	Robbery	Serious Wounding	Theft from Motor Vehicle	Theft of Motor Vehicle	Bicycle Theft
77	171	353	2621	906	315	65	410	51	99

- 2.1.1 In the local area, the volume of crime is very high, particularly the levels of violence and theft, reflecting the site's location on the edge of the city centre. These types of crime are typical of those experienced in or within close proximity of city centres – where there is a concentration of retail, commercial and licensed premises, leading to a concentration of such crime and disorder issues. The majority of reported crimes have taken around Piccadilly Gardens, The Village and the Northern Quarter areas.
- 2.1.2 The majority of the violence in the local area has taken place in the evening and during early hours of the morning, with a higher volume of incidents typically experienced between Friday and Sunday – when more people visit the city and attend licensed premises, often for longer periods and consuming more alcohol, leading to conflicts.
- 2.1.3 Thefts in the local area have mostly been taking place within/around the licenced premises, restaurants and retail premises situated within the Arndale Centre, along Market Street and within Piccadilly Gardens and the Northern Quarter, with offenders primarily targeting mobile phones, wallets/purses and cash. Offenders have mostly used pick-pocketing and distraction methods to obtain the personal belongings.

2.2 Common Use-Specific M.O.s (Modus Operandi)

- 2.2.1 Offenders forcing open doors to hotel rooms to commit theft.

Possible Solution - All individual bedroom doors should ideally be security-certified to recognised security standards (see Section 4.1), which are independently proven to reduce the risk of forced entry and thus increase the chances of detection. Where this is not possible, access controls should be incorporated to limit and regulate access to bedroom floors.

- 2.2.2 Offenders entering rooms using forged or stolen electronic key cards or fobs.

Possible Solution - Auditable electric locking systems (such as Vingcard or similar) should be used, which can be easily activated/disabled electronically by reception staff.

- 2.2.3 Offenders, posing as guests or legitimate customers, accessing staff-only/restricted areas to steal property.

Possible Solution - The main reception should be located to have full view of everyone entering and leaving the premises and all routes to bedrooms and staff areas. All staff should understand and accept the need for security measures and should be trained to be vigilant and to report any suspicious behaviour. Access controls should be used to restrict access to vulnerable areas and there should be a secure area for staff to store their belongings while at work.

- 2.2.4 Theft of personal property from tabletops or from bags hung on chairs or stored under tables.

Possible Solution - Consideration should be given to tables and chairs designed to facilitate secure storage of belongings or adapted with 'Chelsea Clips' to reduce the opportunities to steal bags/coats. The layout of the premises can also help deter occurrences and increase surveillance opportunities. It should be generally uncluttered, allowing clear views of all spaces and avoiding any pinch points or areas of concealment. External seating areas should be enclosed to clearly define them as separate from adjacent pedestrian routes.

- 2.2.5 Glazing in doors and windows has been smashed to gain unauthorised access.

Possible Solution - All new ground floor/accessible glazing (including in and around doors) should include a laminated pane (see Section 4.3), which forms a much more robust barrier against shattering and penetration. The strength of the laminated glass should be relative to the strength of the door or window system in which it is fitted. Where possible, the size of any glazed elements within/directly adjacent to doors should be reduced and set well away from locking points.

2.2.6 Doors have been forced open with bodily pressure and tool/implements to gain entry

Possible Solution - All external doors should be certified to recognised security standards (see Section 5.1), which are independently proven to reduce the risk of forced entry and thus increase the chances of detection. Security-certified doors are the best long-term measure to address this risk and can be obtained to suit virtually all operational requirements.

2.3 Risk Factors - Hotels

The typical security risks for a development of this nature are:

- Burglary of hotel rooms
- Robbery to business
- Theft of personal belongings at work
- Criminal damage to property and vehicles
- Unauthorised access to buildings/private space
- Arson
- Cycle theft
- Employee theft
- Theft of/from parked vehicles
- Violence towards staff
- Theft and criminal damage during the construction period

2.4 Risk Factors – Restaurants and Drinking Establishments

The typical security risks for a development of this nature are:

- Burglary
- Robbery to business
- Criminal damage to property
- Alcohol-fuelled violence/conflict
- Miscellaneous theft to customers
- Rowdy and inconsiderate behaviour
- Conflict of use with neighbouring venues
- Violence towards staff
- Safety of staff personal belongings
- Robbery/wounding of patrons leaving premises
- Theft and criminal damage during the construction period

2.5 Risk Factors – Exhibition hall


The typical security risks for a development of this nature are:

- Burglary
- Criminal damage to property and vehicles
- Theft of personal property

-
- Theft of exhibits
 - Unauthorised access to private space
 - Internal theft
 - Cycle theft
 - Personal and business robbery
 - Violence towards staff
 - Arson

2.6 Non-Domestic Burglary (Hotels): Risk Analysis

The data below relates to non-domestic burglary offences within/against hotels, recorded in the Manchester area during 2018 - 2019.





2.6.1 **Day/Time Range:** The risk of burglary at Manchester hotels fluctuates throughout the week, peaking on Tuesday. During the day, the risk of burglary peaks during the early hours of the morning. It is likely that offenders target hotels at these times when guests are likely to be out of their rooms or when staffing levels are likely to be lower – allowing offender's time to attempt to gain unauthorised access without being detected.

2.6.2 **Point of Entry: Point of Entry:** In the local area the following entry points and MO's have been utilised most frequently:

- Offenders posing as legitimate customers to gain entry before targeting insecure doors/ restricted areas.
- Opening secured doors using bodily pressure and implements to gain access.
- Exploitation of insecure doors to gain entry to hotel room.
- In cases of unknown point of entry offenders have often gained possession of the hotel room key card and accessed the room, removing personal and business property.

2.7 Theft (Hotels): Risk Analysis


The data below relates to thefts within/against hotels, recorded in the Manchester area during 2018 - 2019.



- 2.7.1 **Day/ Time Range:** The risk of theft at Manchester hotels generally increases over the weekend. It is possible that the risk increases at these times when hotels typically have more guests and the opportunity to carry out such offences is greater. However, offenders do also target hotels between Monday and Friday, when they are typically less busy and they perceive a lower risk of being caught/challenged. The risk of theft is greatest around lunchtime and in the evening/early hours of the morning. This is when hotel restaurants, bars and gyms are likely to be at their busiest and, therefore, the opportunities to commit theft are greater. Thefts of personal property (such as mobile phones, bags and purses/wallets) are the most routinely stolen items.

2.1 Non-Domestic Burglary Risk Analysis: Restaurants / Cafés

The data below relates to non-domestic burglary offences within/against restaurants and cafés, recorded in the Manchester area during 2018 - 2019.





2.1.1 **Day / Time Range:** The risk of burglary at restaurants/cafes in Manchester fluctuates throughout the week, peaking on Monday, Thursday and Sunday. The risk of burglary peaks during the early hours of the morning, when premises are usually closed.

2.1.2 **Point of Entry:** In the local area the following entry points and MO's have been utilised most frequently:

- Forcing open secure windows and doors using bodily pressure and implements in order to gain access to the premises.
- Breaking glazing in windows and doors using implements.
- Forcing open shutters using bodily pressure and implements in order to access the windows and doors located underneath.
- Posing as a legitimate customer and exploiting insecure doors, accessing restricted areas and removing goods belonging to staff and the company.

2.2 Theft Risk Analysis: Restaurants / Cafés



The data below relates to thefts within/against restaurants and cafés, recorded in the Manchester area during 2018 - 2019.



- 2.2.1 **Day / Time Range:** During the week, the risk of theft at Manchester restaurants / cafes peaks over the weekend. Many premises experience higher levels of attendance at the weekend than during the week. Premises are also usually open for longer at the weekend and so the opportunities for offenders to commit theft is greater. The risk of theft peaks in the afternoon and into the evening. This reflects the times when restaurants / cafes are typically at their busiest and, therefore, the opportunities to commit theft are greater. Handbags, purses / wallets and mobile phones belonging to customers are the most routinely stolen items. Offenders have also targeted I.T equipment within premises, particularly tablets and laptops, as well as alcohol from storage rooms.

2.3 Vehicle Crime: Risk Analysis



The data below relates to vehicle crime committed within 500m of the site.



- 2.3.1 **Day/Time Range:** The risk of vehicle crime peaks on a Saturday during the afternoon period (12pm – 3:30pm). Offenders often target vehicles during the afternoon, particularly around the city centre, as vehicles are often left unattended for long periods of time, out of sight of the owner, creating a perceived low risk opportunity.

2.4 Burglary Other (Museums): Risk Analysis

The data below relates to burglary other offences within/against museums, recorded in the Greater Manchester area.





- 2.4.1 **Day Range:** The risk of burglary at museums across Greater Manchester is very low, peaking slightly on a Wednesday.
- 2.4.2 **Time Range:** During the day, the degree of risk of burglary is greatest in the early hours of the morning from 3:00am-5:30am. Offenders may target museums at this time when they are closed and unsupervised- all of which contribute to a lower perceived risk of being caught.
- 2.4.3 **Point of Entry:** The majority of burglaries were committed through doors which offenders forced open by applying bodily pressure. Ground floor windows were occasionally targeted as well.

Where there were acts of criminal damage against museum, these were most commonly committed against windows using implements to smash the glazing.

2.5 Misc Theft (Museums): Risk Analysis

The data below relates to miscellaneous thefts within/against museums, recorded in the Greater Manchester area.



- 2.5.1 **Day Range:** Levels of theft are greatest on Thursdays.
- Time Range:** The risk is concentrated during the daytime from 14:00-18:00, peaking from 16:30-18:00. This is when museums are at their busiest; therefore opportunities to offend are more abundant than at less busy times.

The most routinely stolen items were personal property, namely cash/wallets and handbags etc, which were most vulnerable when left insecure by their owners.

3 Layout Appraisal

3.1 Proposed development

- 3.1.1 Full planning permission for the erection of a 34 storey building (land at no. 14-16 Piccadilly) and conversion of adjacent building (no.12 Piccadilly) (basement to fourth floor) to create an aparthotel, including a ground floor cafe (Use Class E (b)), first floor exhibition hall (Use Class F1) and a rooftop bar and restaurant (Use Class E (b)), and associated works.

3.2 Positive Aspects of the Proposal

The following proposed features would make a positive contribution to the prevention of crime and fear of crime.

- 3.2.1 The proposed development will bring additional activity and surveillance to the area, at varying times of the day and night.
- 3.2.2 The building will present an active frontage onto Piccadilly and Gore Street, enlivening the street scene and helping to provide useful natural surveillance over the surrounding public realm.
- 3.2.3 The development will re-use an existing building which has been vacant for some time and has provided the opportunity for criminal and anti-social behaviour.
- 3.2.4 The new glazed elements of the buildings offer both surveillance opportunities and a greater level of artificial light onto the street/public realm.
- 3.2.5 The hotel reception area will be located directly adjacent to the entrance lobby at ground floor level.
- 3.2.6 The hotel bedrooms will be provided well-above street level, reducing the potential impacts of noise, nuisance and anti-social behaviour (particularly at night).
- 3.2.7 The proposed development provides the opportunity to include security features built into the design and construction of the building and avoid the need for obtrusive retro-fitted security measures that can increase the fear of crime. Security measures carefully incorporated into the design can ensure the building is reasonably secure, without visibly announcing that the design was concerned about crime.

3.3 Changes Needed and Recommendations

The following points have been identified for further consideration and would need to be addressed for Design for Security to support the proposed scheme.

- 3.3.1 Ground floor circulation and access control. Access to the lifts should be controlled using guest's room card. It would be beneficial for guests to be only permitted access to the floor on which their room is located. In view of the nature and prevalence of criminal and antisocial activity in the immediate vicinity of the site, it is imperative that effective access controls are installed and that a permanent reception and / or security presence is maintained at the ground floor level.
- 3.3.2 The control of access into and around the hotel is paramount to the security of the development. The reception desk and waiting area at ground floor level must be always staffed to meet and direct guests. All visitors should report to the reception for vetting by staff before gaining access to the rest of the building. Consideration needs to be given to the reception desk design and layout to provide opportunities for interaction between staff & residents, but also distance between reception staff and any potential aggressive visitors but also providing surveillance of all parts of the entrance lobby/waiting area. The ground floor entrance lobby must be covered by CCTV, monitored by staff at reception. At night, the main entrance doors should be secured and controlled by guest key card or controlled remotely by reception staff, via a video access control system (see Sections 4.1 & 4.5 for more information).
- 3.3.3 Any cycle storage for guests and staff should be in secure enclosures within the building, with access restricted to genuine cyclists only. If any cycle stands for short-stay use are proposed, they should be located where they can be observed from routinely occupied rooms and covered by CCTV. The choice of stand should enable cyclists to secure their bikes in at least two places.
- 3.3.4 Arrangements for collection of refuse should not allow further access within the building, nor require bins to be left outside for prolonged periods.

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- 3.3.5 Vehicle crime is significant in the area around the site and the provision of vehicle parking for staff and guests should not put their security at risk. I would recommend that guests be directed along safe routes to local car parks currently accredited with the Park Mark safer parking award (see www.parkmark.co.uk for details).
- 3.3.6 The reception desk entrance lobby of the hotel (off Piccadilly) must be staffed at all times to meet and direct guests. The lift serving all levels of the proposed extension building (as well as the doors to the bridge link between them) should only be accessible/operable by guest key card, ensuring that non-guests cannot access bedroom floors and guests can only gain to their building/floor and no other (see Sections 4.1/4.5). The access stairs should be for staff use and emergency escape purposes only. The basement back-of-house area should not be accessible to hotel guests.
- 3.3.7 It is essential that all the physical security measures listed below are incorporated into the scheme. Integrated, risk-commensurate security measures aim to place secure physical barriers or surveillance in the path of the criminal – making crime harder to commit and raising the risk of detection and possible capture, as well as promoting a feeling of safety in residents and visitors.

4 Physical Security

The following checklist forms the physical security requirements for this scheme to achieve Secured by Design accreditation.

4.1 Doors

- ☐ All external doors should be compliant with and certified to BS PAS 24, STS 202 or LPS 1175 SR2. It is crucial that the door ironmongery to any external escape-only doors is permitted under the security certification of the product. All escape-only doors should be alarmed (audible upon opening) and designed without visible external ironmongery. Security-certified louvred doorsets are available if required to refuse stores/substations (e.g. <http://www.securedbydesign.com/members/premier-ss-ltd/>).
- ☐ The lifts to the proposed building should only be accessible/operable by guest key card, ensuring that non-guests cannot access bedroom floors and guests can only gain to their floor and no other. The lifts should only operate to the ground floor of the building when meetings/conferences are being hosted (to prevent unauthorised access when the ground floor is not staffed) and should only operate to the basement via staff fob/swipe card. The doors into the stair cores at each level should be certified to BS PAS 24 or LPS 1175 SR2 and fitted with electromagnetic locks (permitted as part of the certification) connected to the fire alarm, so that guests at one level cannot access other levels. These doors should be alarmed and clearly signed to deter casual use. Once an emergency escape core is accessed by a member of the public, the only means of egress should be at ground floor level onto the street. Staff access/egress into or from the access stair core should be controlled via fob/swipe card.
- ☐ All individual hotel bedroom doorsets/frames should be robust/solid core (minimum 44mm thick), self-closing and secured with 3 hinges and an electronically operated lock, controlled by Vingcard or similar. They should also be fitted with door viewers and chain limiters.
- ☐ Internal doors/frames to the BOH, cellar, laundry, plant areas and stores (on all levels) should be solid core (min. 44mm thick), with 3 hinges and an electrically operated lock controlled by staff fob/keycard. The meeting rooms within the proposal should also be capable of being locked when unoccupied. Keys/passes should only be carried if required for duties and should be always accounted for.

4.2 Windows

- ☐ All ground and first floor windows, where possible, should be certificated to BS PAS 24. All other window designs/dimensions should take account of the requirements of the above standards, as certified products can carry dimensional restrictions. Any curtain walling panels should include laminated glazing (see below) and should be securely fixed directly to the floor slabs where possible, rather than to perimeter columns.
- ☐ Any ground and first floor opening lights (escape requirements permitting) should be key-lockable and have fixed/lockable opening restrictors (not releasable from the outside) limited to 100mm.

4.3 Glazing & Building Fabric

- ☐ All ground and first floor glazing must incorporate an internal pane of glass with a 1.5mm PVB interlayer (e.g. 7.5mm laminated glass), or a glass rated as P4A under EN 356. The remaining external pane in a double-glazed unit may be toughened glass.
- ☐ Any louvres to the building should be robustly constructed and fixed, to ensure they cannot be easily removed, and designed to ensure that they cannot be used as a climbing aid to reach upper floor windows or balconies.

4.4 Alarm

- ☐ All internal and external escape doors should be fitted with alarm contacts, linked to a 24/7 intruder alarm system.
- ☐ Alarm activations should be relayed to the hotel reception, so staff can investigate or call the authorities as appropriate.

4.5 Access Control

- ☐ Access control systems should be operable by staff swipe card/fob or by guest key-card, and not numeric key pads. The following doors should operate on access control:
 - The external entrance doors to the proposed extension building – operated by staff swipe card/fob only.
 - The doors to the bridge link – operated on access and egress by staff swipe card/fob or by guest key card.
 - The lifts serving all bedroom floors, the ground floor bar and the basement back-of house areas – operated by staff swipe card/fob (at all times) or by guest key card (to all bedroom levels and the ground floor bar only when meetings/conferences are being hosted).
 - All doors to the stair cores – operated on access and egress by staff swipe card/fob only.
 - All doors to the basement BOH, cellar, laundry, plant areas and stores (on all levels) – operated by staff swipe card/fob only.
- ☐ The electric locking system to be used throughout the building should be fully auditable (i.e., allows the retention of data, such as who accessed where and when), to allow for a better investigation into any incidents. Staff and guest key cards should be capable of being easily and quickly activated/disabled by staff to ensure that mis-use is prevented.

4.6 Lighting

- ☐ Dusk 'til dawn lights, operated by photoelectric cell/daylight sensor, should be installed to all external doors and the outside seating area.
- ☐ Fittings should produce 'white' light, as opposed to yellow/orange light, and fixtures must not be positioned where they may provide climbing aids up to high level windows/balconies. Electrical and architectural layouts should be developed together to avoid this.

4.7 CCTV

Any CCTV system that may be used within this proposal will require certain specifications and intelligent placement of cameras to compliment the design of the development. Designers should consider the following points when planning a CCTV strategy:

- ☐ CCTV systems (and lighting that support them) require regular cleaning and maintenance to remain effective.
- ☐ Where necessary cameras that are vulnerable to damage should be protected from attack either by relocation to a higher level and using a bigger lens to achieve the view required or through the fitting of a vandal resistant housing.
- ☐ With regards to the retention of footage, the police prefer quality over quantity. The overall retention period should be dictated by what the system is designed to achieve, though it would be better to have good quality images over a 14-day period than poor ones over a 30-day period.
- ☐ Procedures for recovery of recordings are recommended to be established (e.g. trained staff / the CCTV system instruction manual to be readily available). This is to ensure that the images produced will be of an [acceptable standard](#) that will allow for [identification](#) of an individual which will stand up to scrutiny in court.

Acceptable Standard - this generally requires a resolution of 720x576 pixels at a real time frame rate of 25 frames per second. (N.B. Both the camera and DVR must be capable of this – if the camera will only send low resolution images then it does not matter how high the resolution of the recording unit is).

Identification – One of three levels of field of view. To identify an individual, the image must capture no less than 120% of the field of view (at least from the top of the individuals head to their knees). The remaining two levels of field of view are '[Overview](#)' and '[Recognition](#)', which whilst effective for observational purposes, are less likely to result in the identification of a person/offender.

The intelligent placement of cameras helps to provide clear facial identification of individuals. Suitable locations would be: [all external doors](#), [the outside seating area](#), [all till/bar areas](#), [all lift/stair lobbies on each floor and the bridge link at third floor level](#).

4.8 Other

- ☐ Each guest bedroom should have a small wall or floor safe, operated by a personal identification number (PIN) selected by each new guest.
- ☐ The cycle store should be for the use of staff only and should include stands that allow staff/guests to lock both wheels and the crossbar to a stand rather than just the crossbar (wheel slots and butterfly racks are not suitable). For further information refer to our cycle storage guidance document: <http://designforsecurity.org/all-downloads/>
- ☐ A strategy should be prepared to ensure waste collection can take place whilst retaining a secure development.
- ☐ There should be no hard landscaping or features of the building that could inadvertently create sheltered/hiding places, ledges, seating or loitering spots. These features can encourage anti-social behaviour and raise the fear of crime.
- ☐ Any rainwater pipes should be square in profile and fixed back to the building fabric to prevent climbing to upper floor windows/balconies.

5 Internal Layout Guidance for Bar/Lounge

The internal layout of the ground floor bar/lounge area should be carefully considered, so as to maximise surveillance over customers and reduce the opportunities for criminals to exploit. It is highly recommended that the following good practice principles are adopted where applicable, so as not to undermine the security of the building shell.

5.1.1 Licensed premises can, if poorly managed, generate crime for the following reasons:

- **Opportunities** - Large numbers of people congregating in restaurants/licensed premises generates opportunities for crime. Unlike on-street populations, patrons are stationary for long periods of time, making them easier to target.
- **Lack of attention** - The movement of people, noise, social interaction and other factors mean patrons can be easily distracted.
- **Cohesion** – Particularly during busy periods, the large numbers and wide variety of groups of people that tend to frequent restaurants/licensed premises means that such a venue would lack ‘community territoriality’ (i.e. regular customers displaying an awareness of and care for the environment around them). This can limit any self-policing that might otherwise occur.
- **Customer turnover** – High turnover with high levels of customer movement within an establishment, are more likely to allow offenders to go unnoticed.
- **Valuable goods** – Often available and possibly on show, a particular problem in external seating areas. Patrons are likely to carry small, valuable, concealable goods – such as mobile phones, purses, wallets, keys etc.
- **Stealth** - Busy venues provide the anonymity necessary to commit offences.

In order to minimise these issues, it is recommended that the following good practice principles are adhered to:

- 5.1.2 The external entrance to the building must be staffed and effectively managed when in use (i.e. when meetings/conferences are being hosted) to ensure safe access/egress, avoid potential conflicts arising and ensure unauthorised access to the bar/lounge and up to bedroom floors is prevented. Staff should also have clear views of any access to W/Cs to monitor their use.
- 5.1.3 The internal layout of premises should be generally uncluttered with few places for concealment, allowing staff to monitor customer behaviour. The precise arrangement of internal furnishings should aid circulation and aim to achieve a balance between intimacy and visibility.
- 5.1.4 Consideration should be given to high/wide bars/service counter, which increase the distance between staff and any potentially aggressive patrons and aid surveillance of all parts of the premises. Tills should be positioned away from customers’ reach, but preferably fronting towards customers. Casual access to the rear of any bars/service counters should be prevented (e.g. with lockable hatches that cannot be easily scaled).
- 5.1.5 Consideration should be given to a chute deposit safe (certified to LPS 1183) behind any bar/till area, or an alternative management practice, which would reduce the amount of cash held in tills during busy periods.
- 5.1.6 All back-of-house/staff areas should not be publicly accessible (see Section 4.1) and there should be a secure area for staff to store their belongings whilst at work.

- 5.1.7 It is highly recommended that any customer tables are fitted with Chelsea Clips, to reduce the opportunities for theft (see below).



- 5.1.8 Public toilets can give rise to problems and the following issues should be considered:

- Fittings should be flush to avoid tampering and concealed cisterns, pipe work etc. should be used.
- Graffiti and vandal resistant materials, such as stainless steel, laminates and plastics should be considered.
- Consider hanging cubicle doors as outward opening as this will aid gaining access in an emergency. An alternative measure is to reduce toilet doors in size by a minimum of 200mm from the floor and to reduce the top height.
- Provide 'Chelsea Clip'/karibina style hooks on the back of cubicle doors or partitions for bags and coats.
- Consider the safety of vending machines. Cash boxes can be tampered with, consider fitting them with alarms.
- Consider setting out a rota and putting notices in toilet facilities that make users aware that regular checks will be carried out. A built in visited/checked chart should be provided.

6 Management & Maintenance

- 6.1.1 A comprehensive security regime for the management of the hotel and bar unit must be prepared and remain in place for the day-to-day running of the premises. There should be regular reviews/exercises to ensure that it remains accurate, workable and up-to-date. All staff should understand and accept the need for security measures and it should be made easy for people to raise concerns or report observations. The operating/maintenance plan should focus on issues such as:

- Opening and closing of premises, including staff arrival and departure;
- Cash management within the premises - consideration should be given to a chute deposit safe (certified to LPS 1183) behind any bar/till area, or an alternative management practice, which would reduce the amount of cash held in tills during busy periods;
- Cash-in-transit collections/deliveries and banking practices (which should take place in a secure room with a certified safe to meet insurance needs);
- Management of stock deliveries (servicing activities should not require any doors to remain open unattended for prolonged periods);
- Details of staff security training;
- Location and management of any smoking areas;
- Repairing damaged external and internal fittings, particularly security features e.g. alarm system, CCTV cameras etc;
- Cleaning and prompt removal of graffiti, litter etc; and
- Refuse collection arrangements, which should not require bins to be left accessible for extended periods.

-
- 6.1.2 All high value equipment (e.g. computers, projectors, flat screen monitors/televisions, tools, portable gym equipment etc.) should be property marked and securely fixed or stored to deter damage/theft. An accurate record should be maintained which logs all such items.
 - 6.1.3 Refuse collection arrangements should not require bins to be left in the street for extended periods/overnight. Servicing activities should not require any service doors to remain open unattended for prolonged periods.
 - 6.1.4 Adequate signage should be deployed in all areas not only to direct people throughout the building, but also to deter unauthorised access to staff/guest-only areas.

7 Construction

- 7.1.1 Untidy sites and their surroundings can be littered with debris accessible to vandals who often use loose materials as missiles to commit crime. The client should take measures appropriate to secure their site during construction, and control pedestrian and vehicular access in to and out of the site curtilage. It is also recommended that the contractor on this scheme is a member of the 'Considerate Constructors Scheme', who has committed to be a considerate and good neighbour, as well as clean, respectful, safe, environmentally conscious, responsible and accountable.
- 7.1.2 Site security contractors should be SIA (Security Industry Authority) approved to ensure professional standards are adhered to (please see <http://www.sia.homeoffice.gov.uk/pages/acs-intro.aspx> for more details).

8 Useful References

8.1 Secured by Design (SBD)

- 8.1.1 Secured by Design focuses on crime prevention at the design, layout and construction stages of homes and commercial premises and promotes the use of security standards for a wide range of applications and products. To apply for Secured by Design certification for your development, visit our online application form at: <http://www.designforsecurity.org/secured-by-design/sbd-accreditation/>

A Contact register

Date	Contact With	Summary of Contact
25/04/2023	Avision Young	CIS instruction received
27/04/2023	Avision Young	Fee / authorisation confirmed
10/05/2023	DfS	Site visit
28/04/2023	GMP	Invoice issued
10/05/2023	GMP	Proposed elevations & DAS requested
12/05/2023	Avision Young	Proposed elevations & DAS issued
18/05/2023	GMP	CIS completed
25/05/2023	GMP	CIS text amended to suit proposal uses. CIS issued
24/05/2024	GMP	CIS text amended to suit proposal uses. CIS issued

B Associated Documents

This report is based on the following drawings and supplementary information submitted by the applicant.

Drawing No.	Drawing Title	Date	Rev
2211(SK)0027	GA Plan Issue		A
2211(SK)0033	Site location plan		
	Design & Access Statement	May 2023	

PLEASE NOTE - In the event of any subsequent material changes to the scheme, it will be necessary for Design for Security to reassess the comments made within this report.

C CIS Version History

Version	Revisions Made	Date
A		
B	Minor amendments to scheme	22/05/23
C	Minor amendments to CIS	25/05/23

D Glossary

Burglary Resistance Standards

BS PAS 23-1, 1999

General performance requirements for door/window assemblies.

A performance standard for door sets and windows, which certifies that a particular door set is fit for purpose. Door products must also have BS PAS 24 certification.

BS PAS 24-1, 2012

General security performance requirements for door/window assemblies.

An attack test standard for door sets and windows. This is the minimum police requirement for Secured by Design dwellings, and is also applicable to French/double doors, and sliding doors.

ENV 1627-30 (Security Ratings WK1 to WK6)

Windows, doors, shutters - Burglar resistance Requirements and classification

The classification system used in ENV 1627-30 is aimed at the commercial market and is based on five elements:

- a) Resistance of glazing*
- b) Performance of hardware*
- c) Resistance to static loading*
- d) Resistance to dynamic loading*
- e) Burglary resistance by manual intervention*

LPS 1175 (Security Ratings 1 to 6)

Specification for testing and classifying the burglary resistance of building components

This includes doors, shutters, garage doors and grilles typically for commercial premises and higher risk domestic premises and is acceptable to the ABI and the Police. The standard has 6 levels, 6 being the highest, with levels 1 and 2 equivalent in many respects to BS PAS 24 and BS 7950.

STS201 Issue 4: 2012

Enhanced security requirements for door-sets and door assemblies for dwellings to satisfy the requirements of PAS23 and PAS24

STS202 Issue 3: 2011

Requirements for burglary resistance of construction products including hinged, pivoted, folding or sliding door-sets, windows, curtain walling, security grilles, garage doors and shutters.

This specifies a broadly similar range of attack tools and times to those specified at the lower levels of LPS1175.

EN 356, 2000 (Ratings P1A to P8A)

Glass in building. Security glazing. Testing and classification of resistance against manual attack.

A performance standard for manual attacks on glazing. P2A is comparable to the performance of a 6.8mm laminated glass, and P4A to that of a 9.5mm laminated glass.

Commonly Used Acronyms

CIT

Cash in transit (refers to vehicles, personnel and routines).

CPTED

Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design

CRS

Crime Reduction Specialist. Sometimes known as CPO (Crime Prevention Officer)

INPT

Integrated Neighbourhood Policing Team.

PVB / PolyVinyl Butyral (Glazing interlayer)

A commonly used interlayer used in the production of laminated glass.

LPCB (Loss Prevention Certification Board)

A brand of the BRE Global (Building Research Establishment) family. The LPCB work with insurers, Government, police, designers, manufacturers, contractors and end users to develop methods of assessing performance and reliability of security products to ensure their fitness for purpose.

UKAS (United Kingdom Accreditation Service)

The sole national accreditation body recognised by government to assess, against internationally agreed standards, organisations that provide certification, testing, inspections and calibration services.

Useful Websites

Design for Security

www.designforsecurity.org

Secured by Design

www.securedbydesign.com

RIBA Product Selector

www.ribaproductselector.com

LPCB – Red Book Live

www.redbooklive.com

Crime Reduction (Home Office)

www.crimereduction.homeoffice.gov.uk

DAC (Design Against Crime) Solution Centre

www.designagainstcrime.org

Building for Life

www.buildingforlife.org

CLG (Communities and Local Government)

www.communities.gov.uk