

CRIME IMPACT STATEMENT

Stockport Road

16 Residential units and 4 retail units

For: **PAUL BUTLER ASSOCIATES**

Version B: **31/07/24**

Ref: **2024/0092/CIS/01**

Greater Manchester Police

designforsecurity

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Stockport Road

2024/0092/CIS/01

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Development Supported with minor design changes advised

This development has been assessed using the principles of 'Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design' in order to identify any opportunities for crime and the fear of crime. The proposed scheme has been found acceptable in principle, but further consideration of certain aspects is recommended as stated in section 3.3 of this report, in order to gain our full support for this development at planning stage. These include:-

- Lighting and CCTV to alleyway
- Access control entry system
- Secure cycle store

Please note: Greater Manchester Police Design for Security will recommend to the local planning authority that a planning condition is added that reflects the physical security specification listed within Section 4 of this report.

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1 Visual Audit

The development site is indicated by the red outline on the plan adjacent and is supported with existing site context photographs taken around the site.

The proposed site is located in the Levenshulme district on the out-skirts Manchester city centre. The site is situated within an existing mixed-use area with commercial premises, education and residential uses. The development site is bounded by the rear alleyway, residential properties to the west, Midway St to the north and Stockport Road to the east.

To the west the area is mainly residential with the main train line between M/cr Piccadilly & Stockport beyond the houses and green space. Historically the housing stock is predominately populated with private terrace housing to the west of the site.

The alleyway to the rear of the site is in a poor state of management with large quantities of refuse, food waste, abandoned furniture and fly-tipping strewn the entire length of the alleyway.

The site is currently a commercial business selling carpts from a storage unit which pose an eyesore on the A6.

The site is well served with a number of bus routes.

Generally the area is poorly managed & maintained. Litter, graffiti and evidence of drug paraphernalia are common.




1 –Proposed site on Stockport Rd.


2 – Neighbouring buildings, residential & commercial.


3 – View south along Stockport Road.


4 – Residential use opposite the site on Midway St.

7 – View towards the rear of the site from Park Grove Rd.

6 – View west along Park Grove Rd.

5 – Existing alleyway to rear of the site.

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2 Crime Statistics & Analysis

All data below is based on crimes recorded between 1st May 2023 to 30th April 2024.

Crime Summary

Figure 1: Recorded Crime within 500m of Site

Domestic Burglary	Non-Domestic Burglary	Criminal Damage	Less Serious Wounding	Theft	Robbery	Serious Wounding	Theft from Motor Vehicle	Theft of Motor Vehicle	Bicycle Theft
49	14	50	322	55	24	9	54	26	15

2.1.1 The overall rate of crime in the past 12 months is above average for the Manchester division, with less serious wounding, theft and vehicle crime having been the most reported offences taking place. These offences have taken place all throughout the local area in the residential neighbourhoods surrounding the site, particularly at locations close to Stockport Road and Stovell Avenue to the east of the site.

2.1.2 The majority of less serious wounding offences have occurred in the residential neighbourhoods to the east of the proposed site, where assaults, harassment and public order offences have been the most reported less serious woundings taking place. Most of these incidents have involved disputes between known associates as well as cases of domestic violence.

2.1.3 Theft offences have taken place in public spaces all throughout the local area, with offenders primarily using pickpocketing and distraction techniques in order to remove items stored on the person such as mobile phones, wallets and purses. Offenders have also targeted insecure items, bags and coats on tabletops and benches/chairs in public areas, including parcels left on doorsteps.

2.1.4 Theft from motor vehicle has been the most reported vehicle crime offence, whereby offenders have targeted vehicles parked on streets all throughout the local area by smashing glazing in the windows of cars or vans before removing items from within.

2.2 Common Use-Specific M.O.s (Modus Operandi)

2.2.1 Opening of secured doors using bodily force, in particular through kicking open locked front doors.

Possible Solution - All external doors should be certified to recognised security standards (see section 4.1 & 5.1), which are independently proven to reduce the risk of forced entry and thus increase the chances of detection. A robust access control system should be in place to allow residents to vet visitors into apartment blocks before allowing them access to the building (also see section 4.1). The main communal entrances should be located in a highly visible position and should be well-lit to deter offenders from trying to gain unauthorised access.

2.2.2 The glazing within windows and doors have been smashed to gain unauthorised access.

Possible Solution - All ground floor/accessible windows should be certified to recognised security standards (see Section 4.2), with key operated locks and opening restrictors. All ground floor/accessible glazing should also include a laminated pane, which forms a much more robust barrier against shattering penetration (see Section 4.3). Any glazed panels in or around doors should be small and set well-away from locking points. Windows to accessible elevations should be protected by some defensible space, to define them as entirely separate from the street and protect them from attack and nuisance/anti-social behaviour.

2.2.3 Exploitation of insecure windows and doors.

Possible Solution - All individual apartments should also be secured with a security-certified entrance door-set (see Section 4.1), to ensure that any offender who may have gained access to the building (e.g. by tailgating, posing as a legitimate visitor etc.), cannot gain further access without drawing the attention of other residents. Doors off internal corridors should not be located in deep recesses, where an offender could operate without fear of detection.

2.2.4 Secure doors & windows have been forced open using body pressure, implements and tools.

Possible Solution - All ground floor / accessible windows should be certified to recognised security standards (see Section 4), with key-operated locks and opening restrictors. All ground floor / accessible

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glazing should include a laminated pane, which forms a much more robust barrier against shattering and penetration (see Section 4). Where possible, the size of any glazed elements within / directly adjacent to doors should be reduced and set well-away from locking point.

2.2.5 Shutters have been prised open to target doors/windows behind them

Possible Solution – A security-certified shutter (see Section 5.3) has an independently proven level of resistance and ensures that all aspects of the shutter (locks, rails, laths etc.) have been scrutinised by professionals. If external shutters are used, the shutter boxes and guides should be built into the fabric of the building to deter tampering / attack. Avoid locating shutters in concealed areas where a concerted attack from an offender is unlikely to be witnessed. Ensure that parked vehicles and stored materials do not obscure sight lines around the entrances

2.2.6 Offenders posing as legitimate customers, gaining access to staff only areas

To minimise the risk of offenders gaining access to staff only areas:

- access control systems should be considered to secure sensitive areas of the premises – e.g. staff rest room, kitchen, office and store room
- staff should be required to wear an appropriate form of clearly visible ID and/or a company uniform
- all doors separating public areas from staff only areas should be monitored by CCTV

Small, valuables lockers should be provided for staff to secure their personal effects within a secure room.

2.3 Risk Factors - Residential

The typical security risks for a development of this nature are:

- Domestic burglary
- Theft from gardens, sheds or garages
- Criminal damage to dwellings and vehicles
- Theft of, or from, vehicles
- Bogus callers and distraction burglary
- Anti-social behaviour
- Neighbour disputes
- Theft and criminal damage during the construction period
- Unauthorised access to private spaces
- Poor maintenance of access control systems

2.4 Risk Factors - Retail

The typical security risks for a development of this nature are:

- Commercial burglary
- Cash robbery
- Unauthorised access to private spaces/Tailgating
- Shoplifting
- Employee theft

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
- Theft of customer / staff property
- Criminal damage to property

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
2.5 Comparing crime rates in the neighbourhood around the site to those in Manchester and Greater Manchester

The rates below relates to crime committed within 500m of the site. England & Wales data was last recorded for January – December 2021.


Comparison of Burglary Dwelling Rates at Site (Km), Manchester, and Greater Manchester




Comparison of Wounding Rates at Site (Km), Manchester, and Greater Manchester



Comparison of Criminal Damage Rates at Site (Km), Manchester, and Greater Manchester



Comparison of Vehicle Crime Rates at Site (Km), Manchester, and Greater Manchester



2.5.1 The rate of domestic burglaries per 1000 dwellings is **7% lower** than Manchester as a whole, **20% higher** than Greater Manchester and **23% higher** than England & Wales.

2.5.2 The rate of woundings per 1000 dwellings is **42% lower** than Manchester as a whole, **21% lower** than Greater Manchester and **50% higher** than England & Wales.

2.5.3 The rate of incidents of criminal damage per 1000 dwellings is **51% lower** than Manchester as a whole, **36% lower** than Greater Manchester and **22% lower** than England & Wales.


2.5.4 The rate of incidents of vehicle crime per 1000 dwellings is **5% lower** than Manchester as a whole, **57% higher** than Greater Manchester and **91% higher** than England & Wales.

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
2.6 Domestic Burglary: Risk Analysis

The data below relates to domestic burglaries committed within 500m of the site.


Burglary dwelling – Day Range



Burglary dwelling – Time Range



Burglary Dwelling – Point of Entry



2.6.1 Day/Time Range: The risk of domestic burglary is highest on Sunday and just after midnight (00:00-01:00). Offenders often target dwellings late at night when it is dark and there is less footfall in the area, giving them the perception that they are less likely to be caught or identified.

2.6.2 Point of Entry: In the local area the following entry points and MO's have been utilised most frequently:


- Gaining access to insecure sheds by scaling garden fences and via insecure gates.
- In cases where the entry point has been recorded as 'unknown', it is likely that the offenders has exploited insecure windows or doors.
- Smashed glazing in the windows and doors.
- Using bodily pressure or implements in order to force open secure windows and doors.

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
2.7 Non-Burglary Risk Analysis – Retail Premises

The data below relates to non-domestic burglary offences within / against retail facilities, recorded in the Manchester area during 2018 - 2019.


Retail Burglary – Day Range



Retail Burglary – Time Range



Retail Burglary – Point of Entry



2.7.1 Day / Time Range: The risk of burglary at retail premises in Manchester is consistently high throughout the week, peaking on a Wednesday. During the day the risk of burglary at retail premises increases in the early hours of the morning (12am – 6am). Burglaries at commercial premises frequently take place during the night, when they are closed, and the streets are quiet. Offenders perceive the risk of being witnessed or apprehended at its lowest.

2.7.2 Point of Entry: In the local area the following entry points and MO's have been the occurred most frequently:


- Smashed glazing in windows and doors to gain entry to premises.
- Posing as a legitimate customer and tailgating / exploitation insecure doors to gain access to staff only areas.
- Forcing open shutters using bodily force and implements to gain entry.
- Opening secure doors using bodily pressure and implements to gain entry.

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
2.8 Theft Retail Facilities: Risk Analysis

The data below relates to thefts within / against retail facilities, recorded in the Manchester area during 2018 - 2019.

Retail Theft – Day Range



Retail Theft – Time Range




2.8.1 Day / Time Range: The risk of theft from retail premises in Manchester is consistently high throughout the week, peaking on a Friday and Saturday. During the day the risk of theft at retail premises peaks in the late morning and into the evening (10:30am – 8pm). Small, personal items are being targeted, mostly mobile phones, purses, and bags.


2.9 Vehicle Crime: Risk Analysis

The data below relates to vehicle crime committed within 500m of the site.

Vehicle Crime – Day Range



Vehicle Crime – Time Range



2.9.1 Day/Time Range: The risk of vehicle crime is highest on Thursday in the afternoon (14:00-16:00). Offenders often target vehicles in the afternoon during the working week when they tend to be left unattended and out of sight of the owners for long periods of time whilst they are at work, creating a perceived low risk opportunity for offenders.

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3 Layout Appraisal

3.1 Proposed development

3.1.1 The proposed development comprises a mixed-use scheme of an apartment block fronting Stockport Road and four retail units to the ground floor of the proposed block. The proposal comprises 16 new apartments, four retail units and cycle storage for residents.

3.2 Positive Aspects of the Proposal

The following proposed features would make a positive contribution to the prevention of crime and fear of crime.

3.2.1 The proposed building provides further ground floor activity in the form of commercial/retail spaces and new dedicated resident entrance lobby space. In-turn these uses offer good levels of activity and natural surveillance of the adjacent streets. Resident cycle storage is located at the rear of the entrance lobby, accessed off Swallow Street.

3.2.2 The footprint of the building facing onto the public realm is relatively simple and free from deeply recessed or concealed areas.

3.2.3 The proposed building clearly defines the different uses of the building, and all entrances can be easily located and navigated.

3.2.4 The layout of upper floor corridors is relatively free of projections or recesses that could impede sight lines. Doors within communal corridors should contain a glazed element to improve informal surveillance. Individual apartment entrance doors are positioned flush with the corridor walls removing the potential for concealment.

3.2.5 Cycle stores for residents' use are provided within the building. Entry to the stores must be restricted to genuine cyclists only, on application to the managers of the building. Racks within the enclosures should allow cyclists to lock the frame and both wheels and should be obtained from a Secured by Design-approved supplier (see www.securedbydesign.com for details).

3.2.6 The proposed development provides the opportunity to include security features built into the design and construction of the building and avoid the need for obtrusive retrofitted security measures that can increase the fear of crime. Security measures carefully incorporated into the design can ensure the building is reasonably secure, without visibly announcing that the design was concerned about crime.

3.3 Changes Needed and Recommendations

The following points have been identified for further consideration and would need to be addressed for Design for Security to support the proposed scheme.

3.3.1 Residential post/parcel/grocery room. Arrangements for the delivery of post should not allow postal or grocery delivery staff to have access to internal areas of the residential block beyond the GF reception space. Postal workers should not be given unfettered access to the entire building as this could potentially leave apartments and residents vulnerable. (see Section 4.1 for more information).

3.3.2 The residential stair and lift cores in the block will require access control allowing only building staff and residents' access beyond the reception space to upper floors, in order to create a secure lobby area.

3.3.3 Direct entry to the entrance foyer should be restricted to residents only via an access control system.

3.3.4 To minimise the risk of offender's tail-gating legitimate residents/visitors, the secondary doors into the lobby and stair cores, should also include access controls.

3.3.5 Access control required for management staff and resident use of the rear door on Hanover St for servicing and bin store access.

3.3.6 It is essential that the access door to the residential units within the lobby space is specifically for residents only via an access control system. This entrance door to the staircase should not allow free access to the retail units which are part of the proposed development.

3.3.7 It is essential that all of the physical security measures listed below are incorporated into the scheme. Integrated, risk-commensurate security measures aim to place secure physical barriers or surveillance

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in the path of the criminal – making crime harder to commit and raising the risk of detection and possible capture, as well as promoting a feeling of safety in users.

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4 Physical Security (Residential)

In addition to the layout issues highlighted in section 3, the following checklist (sections 4-7) forms the physical security requirements for this scheme to achieve Secured by Design accreditation if required.

4.1 Doors

- ☐ External communal access doors must be compliant with and certified to STS202 BR2 or LPS 1175 SR2. The communal entrance doors should be self-closing and secured with a multi-point electronic lock and capable of being operated via an electronic access control system, these features should be permitted under the scope of the certification.
- ☐ Arrangements for residents to admit visitors. Communal entrance and inner lobby / zone doors should be capable of being controlled by means of a video entry phone system (with the picture viewable on a phone unit, rather than on a television set) so that residents can confirm the identity of visitors before allowing them access themselves.
- ☐ Where secure lobbies are to be created, the secondary communal door must be to the same specification as the outer door - certified to BS PAS 24, STS 201 or LPS 1175 SR2, including a lock capable of being operated via an electronic access control system. The post boxes themselves should be of robust construction, with letter box apertures to a maximum size of 260mm x 40mm (incorporating anti-fishing measures). All other deliveries should be made directly to residents via the access-controlled main entrance.
- ☐ Apartment entrance doors must be compliant with and certified to BS PAS 24, STS 201 or LPS 1175 SR2. It is advised that these doors do not have fixed sidelights, and are provided with door viewers instead.
- ☐ Any letterboxes within doors must be located a minimum of 400mm away from internal handle and locking hardware.
- ☐ Doors to storage / meter rooms should have 44mm solid core doors, 3 hinges, with a mortised sash lock to BS3621/8621 to allow the rooms to be secured when not in use.
- ☐ External escape-only doors (as with external doors in general) should be certified to BS PAS 24, STS 201 or LPS 1175 SR2. It is crucial that the door ironmongery is permitted for use on these doors under the security certification of the product.
- ☐ The doors to the cycle store should be compliant with and certified to BS PAS 24 or LPS 1175 SR2, or be steel gates within steel frames. These doors/gates should both be self-closing and lock securely upon closure and be accessible by a programmable fob allowing secure entry and exit.

4.2 Windows

- ☐ Windows must be compliant with and certified to BS PAS 24.
- ☐ Ground floor and easily-accessible opening lights (escape requirements permitting) must be key-lockable, and have fixed/lockable opening restrictors (not releasable from the outside) limited to 100mm.

4.3 Glazing

- ☐ Glazing to a height of 2400mm (or if otherwise accessible) must incorporate at least one pane of laminated glass rated as P4A under EN 356. The remaining pane in a double glazed unit may be toughened glass.

4.4 Alarms

- ☐ If an alarm is installed then it should comply with either:
  - BS EN 50131 and PD 6662 for wired systems
  - BS 6799 for wireless systems

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☐ If an alarm is installed, it should be linked to contacts on all external doors, and PIR detectors should cover all ground floor rooms with windows.

4.5 Access Control

☐ Access control systems should be operable by swipe card or fob, and not numeric key pads. The following doors should operate on access control:

- All external doors where regular staff access is required.
- Doors separating internal zones / lobbies
- Any internal doors to obvious high risk or controlled areas (e.g. storage / bin store)
- Cycle store

4.6 Boundaries

☐ Inward opening automatic gates to provide access to the bin store area must be certified to one of the following standards:

- LPS 1175: Issue 7, SR2
- STS 202: Issue 3, BR2
- Sold Secure Gold

4.7 Landscaping

☐ Loose surface materials in the publicly accessible areas of the scheme should be avoided. Small fragments of ground covering can be used as missiles against people and premises (both to gain entry and to commit criminal damage).

4.8 Lighting

☐ External lighting must be provided to pedestrian routes within the site in accordance with BS 5489.

☐ Dusk ‘til dawn lights, operated by photoelectric cell/daylight sensor, should be installed to all external doors (manual override is also permissible).

☐ Fittings should produce ‘white’ light, as opposed to yellow/orange light. Metal halide (or bulbs with a comparable output) should be used, as these offer superior colour rendition over alternatives such as high and low pressure sodium bulbs.

4.9 Other

☐ Meter cupboards to apartments should be located to the fronts of properties only or within a secure cupboard / room inside the block but not inside individual apartments. Smart meters are acceptable.

☐ Partition walls between flats and corridors should be of masonry construction or include reinforcement such as a layer of expanded metal mesh.

☐ Consideration should be given to use of alternatives to lead in construction, and minimise the amount of metal on visible elevations of the buildings. Inspection covers should be capable of securing to reduce potential access to cabling.

5 Physical Security (Non-residential)

5.1 Doors

☐ External doors must be compliant with and certified to BS PAS 24, STS02, or LPS 1175 SR2.

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- [ ] External escape-only doors (as with external doors in general) should be certified to BS PAS 24:2012, or LPS 1175 SR2. It is crucial that the door ironmongery is permitted for use on these doors under the security certification of the product.
- [ ] Internal doors to storage rooms should be solid core, minimum 44mm thick with a multi-point locking mechanism.

5.2 Shutters

- [ ] Where grilles or shutters are required for additional protection the minimum certification required is:
  - LPS 1175: Issue 7 Security Rating 1
  - STS 202: Issue 3, Burglary Rating 1

5.3 Windows

- [ ] Windows must be compliant with and certified to BS PAS 24 or BS 7950.
- [ ] Ground floor and easily accessible opening lights (escape requirements permitting) must be key-lockable, and have fixed/lockable opening restrictors (not releasable from the outside) limited to 100mm.

5.4 Glazing

- [ ] All glazing up to a height of 2400mm (or if otherwise accessible) should incorporate at least one pane of glass with a 1.5mm PVB interlayer (e.g. 7.5mm laminated glass), or a glass rated as P1A under EN 356. The remaining pane in a double glazed unit may be toughened glass.

5.5 Alarms

- [ ] A monitored alarm system should be installed to cover all building on the site, linked to contacts on all external doors/shutters and PIR detectors covering all ground floor areas with windows, with a signal terminating at a recognized Alarm Receiving Centre (ARC) or security control room.

5.6 Access Control

- [ ] Access control systems should be operable by swipe card or fob, and not numeric key pads. The following doors should operate on access control:
  - All external doors where regular staff access is required.
  - Doors separating internal zones / lobbies
  - Any internal doors to obvious high risk or controlled areas (e.g. storage / server)

5.7 Lighting

- [ ] External lighting must be provided to pedestrian routes within the site in accordance with BS 5489.
- [ ] Dusk ‘til dawn lights, operated by photoelectric cell/daylight sensor, should be installed to all external doors.
- [ ] Fittings should produce ‘white’ light, as opposed to yellow/orange light. Metal halide (or bulbs with a comparable output) should be used, as these offer superior colour rendition over alternatives such as high and low pressure sodium bulbs.
- [ ] Lighting fixtures must not be positioned to provide climbing aids over boundary treatments. Electrical and architectural layouts should be developed together to avoid this.
- [ ] Internal lighting should be operated by detection devices which will automatically switch lights on with movement activity in each room.

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5.8 CCTV

- ☐ Any CCTV system that may be used within this proposal will require certain specifications and intelligent placement of cameras to compliment the design of the development. Designers should consider the following points when planning a CCTV strategy:
- ☐ CCTV systems (and lighting that support them) require regular cleaning and maintenance to remain effective.
- ☐ Where necessary cameras that are vulnerable to damage should be protected from attack either by relocation to a higher level and using a bigger lens to achieve the view required or through the fitting of a vandal resistant housing.
- ☐ With regards to the retention of footage, the police prefer quality over quantity. The overall retention period should be dictated by what the system is designed to achieve, though it would be better to have good quality images over a 14-day period than poor ones over a 30-day period.
- ☐ Procedures for recovery of recordings are recommended to be established (e.g. trained staff / the CCTV system instruction manual to be readily available). This is to ensure that the images produced will be of an acceptable standard that will allow for identification of an individual which will stand up to scrutiny in court.
- ☐ **Acceptable Standard** - this generally requires a resolution of 720x576 pixels at a real time frame rate of 25 frames per second. (N.B. Both the camera and DVR must be capable of this – if the camera will only send low resolution images then it does not matter how high the resolution of the recording unit is).
- ☐ **Identification** – One of three levels of field of view. To identify an individual, the image must capture no less than 120% of the field of view (at least from the top of the individuals head to their knees). The remaining two levels of field of view are 'Overview' and 'Recognition', which whilst effective for observational purposes, are less likely to result in the identification of a person/offender.
- ☐ The intelligent placement of cameras helps to provide clear facial identification of individuals. Suitable locations would be: Entrances to site, external areas all around the new building and ancillary facilities, external doors including emergency egresses / hatches, access-controlled doors & cycle parking areas

6 Management & Maintenance

6.1.1 The upkeep of a development over its lifetime can be crucial to the level of security and safety within. Aspects of a development, which are left to deteriorate, have the potential to attract further crime – a process known as 'the broken window theory'. A maintenance plan should be drawn up to address issues such as:

- Litter removal
- Repair to communal areas (lighting, signage, access controls)
- Trimming and pruning to shrubs and trees

6.1.2 Any public open space or amenity areas not under the ownership of residents should be subject to an effective maintenance contract. This should ensure that all damage is rectified in a timely manner, and that any such space will not be detrimental to its surroundings.

7 Construction

7.1.1 Untidy sites and their surroundings can be littered with debris accessible to vandals who often use loose materials as missiles to commit crime. The client should take measures appropriate to secure their site during construction, and control pedestrian and vehicular access in to and out of the site curtilage. It is also recommended that the contractor on this scheme is a member of the 'Considerate Constructors Scheme', who has committed to be a considerate and good neighbour, as well as clean, respectful, safe, environmentally conscious, responsible and accountable.

7.1.2 Site security contractors should be SIA (Security Industry Authority) approved to ensure professional standards are adhered to (please see http://www.sia.homeoffice.gov.uk/pages/acs-intro.aspx for more details).

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8 Useful References

8.1 Secured by Design (SBD)

8.1.1 Secured by Design focuses on crime prevention at the design, layout and construction stages of homes and commercial premises and promotes the use of security standards for a wide range of applications and products. To apply for Secured by Design certification for your development, visit our online application form at: http://www.designforsecurity.org/secured-by-design/sbd-accreditation/

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A Contact register

Date	Contact With	Summary of Contact
13/03/24	Paul Butler Assoc.	CIS application submitted
09/05/24	Paul Butler Assoc.	Client confirmation
09/05/24	DfS	Invoice issued
23/05/24	DfS	Site visit
18/06/24	DfS	CIS completed
31/07/24	DfS	CIS Revised, completed & issued

B Associated Documents

This report is based on the following drawings and supplementary information submitted by the applicant.

Drawing No.	Drawing Title	Date	Rev
A831_816	Stockport Road Preapplication [23.12.15]		

PLEASE NOTE - In the event of any subsequent material changes to the scheme, it will be necessary for Design for Security to reassess the comments made within this report.

C CIS Version History

Version	Revisions Made	Date
A		
B	Unit numbers revised	31/07/24

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D Glossary

Burglary Resistance Standards

BS PAS 23-1, 1999
General performance requirements for door/window assemblies.

A performance standard for door-sets and windows, which certifies that a particular door-set is fit for purpose. Door products must also have BS PAS 24 certification.

BS PAS 24-1, 2012
General security performance requirements for door/window assemblies.

An attack test standard for door-sets and windows. This is the minimum police requirement for Secured by Design dwellings, and is also applicable to French/double doors, and sliding doors.

ENV 1627-30 (Security Ratings WK1 to WK6)
Windows, doors, shutters - Burglar resistance Requirements and classification

The classification system used in ENV 1627-30 is aimed at the commercial market and is based on five elements:

a) Resistance of glazing

b) Performance of hardware

c) Resistance to static loading

d) Resistance to dynamic loading

e) Burglary resistance by manual intervention

LPS 1175 (Security Ratings 1 to 6)
Specification for testing and classifying the burglary resistance of building components

This includes doors, shutters, garage doors and grilles typically for commercial premises and higher risk domestic premises and is acceptable to the ABI and the Police. The standard has 6 levels, 6 being the highest, with levels 1 and 2 equivalent in many respects to BS PAS 24 and BS 7950.

STS201 Issue 4: 2012
Enhanced security requirements for door-sets and door assemblies for dwellings to satisfy the requirements of PAS23 and PAS24

STS202 Issue 3: 2011
Requirements for burglary resistance of construction products including hinged, pivoted, folding or sliding door-sets, windows, curtain walling, security grilles, garage doors and shutters.

This specifies a broadly similar range of attack tools and times to those specified at the lower levels of LPS1175.

EN 356, 2000 (Ratings P1A to P8A)

Glass in building. Security glazing. Testing and classification of resistance against manual attack.

A performance standard for manual attacks on glazing. P2A is comparable to the performance of a 6.8mm laminated glass, and P4A to that of a 9.5mm laminated glass.

Commonly Used Acronyms

CIT
Cash in transit (refers to vehicles, personnel and routines).

CPTED
Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design

CRS
Crime Reduction Specialist. Sometimes known as CPO (Crime Prevention Officer)

INPT
Integrated Neighbourhood Policing Team.

PVB/PolyVinyl Butyral (Glazing interlayer)
A commonly used interlayer used in the production of laminated glass.

LPCB (Loss Prevention Certification Board)
A brand of the BRE Global (Building Research Establishment) family. The LPCB work with insurers, Government, police, designers, manufacturers, contractors and end users to develop methods of assessing performance and reliability of security products to ensure their fitness for purpose.

UKAS (United Kingdom Accreditation Service)
The sole national accreditation body recognised by government to assess, against internationally agreed standards, organisations that provide certification, testing, inspections and calibration services.

Useful Websites

Design for Security
www.designforsecurity.org

Secured by Design
www.securedbydesign.com

RIBA Product Selector
www.ribaproductselector.com

LPCB – Red Book Live
www.redbooklive.com

Crime Reduction (Home Office)
www.crimereduction.homeoffice.gov.uk

DAC (Design Against Crime) Solution Centre
www.designagainstcrime.org

Building for Life
www.buildingforlife.org
CLG (Communities and Local Government)
www.communities.gov.uk

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