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Your Ref:
Our Ref: 2017/0400/CIS/01

Direct Line: 0161 856 5915

F.A.O. Matthew Lam

Date: 15.12.2023

Dear Matthew

Hatch Development, Oxford Road, Manchester

I understand that Stack has now taken over the long-term operation of the Site where Hatch is the current operator. Stack is therefore seeking to secure permanent planning permission to extend the current temporary use (as approved under Planning Permission Ref: ref. 124502/FO/2019); reconfigured to respond to Stack's operational requirements. This will involve a change to the layout of the shipping container units on-site and the increase in floorspace and capacity.

I am happy to confirm Design for Security's continuing support the development and, in particular, the imminent planning application that will seek approval for the retention of the facility on a permanent basis. Our support for the scheme is on the understanding the development will continue to be used for retail, food and beverage sales and for staging events.

As you know, I have reviewed the crime data for the neighbourhood in which Hatch is located. Whist the volume of crime was as high as it was in 2017 when the Crime Impact Statement was first drafted, I noted only a handful of incidents (of burglary, violent crime and theft) occurring at the venue. These types of crimes, especially theft and violent crimes, are often commonplace at busy, licensed venues along the Oxford Road corridor. This recent data, as far as it relates to Hatch, does not cause me any reason to alter my view that Design for Security should continue to support the development.

We are happy for you to submit the revised Crime Impact Statement, reference 2017/0400/CIS/01 revision B, in support of the application. I have added a paragraph in the Executive Summary confirming this. As always, our support is conditional upon the developer adhering, wherever feasible, to the recommendations set out with the Statement, and that the new operator continues to manage and maintain the facility in a responsible manner, again, in accordance with the relevant recommendations.

Yours faithfully

Adrian Murphy BSc Dip TP Dip Mgmt MRTPI
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CRIME IMPACT STATEMENT

A development of retail, food and beverage outlets on land adjacent to Oxford Road, Manchester

FOR: **Bruntwood Ltd**

VERSION B: **29.11.23**

2017/0400/CIS/01

Greater Manchester Police

designforsecurity

CPT
CRIME PREVENTION TEAM

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Originally produced in August 2017, the Statement has been reviewed following the opening and subsequent operation of Hatch. Recent crime data suggests that crime patterns in the neighbourhood have not changed significantly since the original analysis was undertaken; the volume of crime directly associated with the operation of Hatch is very low, unusually so for a food and beverage orientated scheme on the Oxford Road corridor. Design for Security consider the report valid and remain happy to support the proposals.

Development supported

The proposed development is welcomed and presents an opportunity to create a unique attraction to an otherwise poor environment beneath the Mancunian Way. Greater animation of this part of the Oxford Road corridor is necessary. The design of the scheme is very positive from a pedestrian safety perspective, a result of the greater pedestrian flows that are likely through the day and evening and the presence of traders with an interest in maintaining a safe and secure environment. Large numbers of customers may be attracted to the facility, which may require additional safety barriers between the development and the Oxford Road cycle lane but this will be dependent on the success of the development, the balance of uses and the hours of operation of for example the licensed operators.

Given the high levels of crime in the area currently, it is also likely that offenders will be attracted to the development so, the site and the individual premises within it will need to be secure, with security an integral element of the design and management of the development.

Design for Security is happy to support the scheme providing the recommendations set out in section 3.3 are addressed, the main points being:

- Installing fencing and shutters/gates to secure the perimeter of the site and the main entrance on Oxford Road when the development is closed for business.
- Installing appropriate lighting, CCTV and intruder alarm systems
- Storage containers that meet the LPS 1175 standard (or to the principles of LPS 1175) should be used.
- Employ management staff/security staff to assist traders and monitor customers, especially at the busier times of the week, evenings and weekends, in particular.

At the planning application stage, Greater Manchester Police Design for Security may make representations to Manchester Planning to require the inclusion of conditions that require aspects of the development to be built/installed in accordance with the physical security specification set out in section 4 of this report.

Adrian Murphy *MRTPI*

Consultant
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
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1 Visual Audit

The photographs and plan below show the development site and its surroundings. This site, edged in red on the plan, is located on the eastern of Oxford Road. The southern part of the site is located beneath the elevated section of the Mancunian Way and is used for car parking; it is separated from the Oxford Road footpath by tall steel railings. The remainder of the site forms part of the forecourt of the adjacent Oxford House building, (also known as Manchester Technology Centre). Oxford House is primarily an office building but has ground floor commercial uses, including an estate agent, Tesco Metro store, two ATM's, and a café, all of which face Oxford Road, the latter includes a secondary door on the side elevation adjacent to the site. The recessed part of the forecourt is currently enclosed with temporary fencing; a group of mature trees are regularly spaced at the centre recess, whilst raised brick planters are positioned at the southern edge A line of concrete bollards mark the boundary of private realm of Oxford House and the public realm. The remainder of the site, beneath the Mancunian Way, forms the edge of the car p [ark associated with Oxford House. In August 2016, a five year planning consent was granted for the erection of a temporary three-storey marketing suite building with ground floor cafe/gallery (Sui Generis) and flexible marketing and commercial floorspace at first and second floor (Sui Generis) along with related access, landscaping and associated works on broadly the same site. The consent has yet to be implemented. The proposed development considered within this report indicates a desire move forward with a different scheme. There is a current planning application to remodel Oxford House, which seeks consent to carry out: elevational alterations; change the use of the estate agent unit from A2 to B1 to facilitate the creation of a new entrance onto Oxford Road; and, landscape improvements to the forecourt. Public transport facilities along the Oxford Road corridor have improved greatly in the past 12 months in the vicinity of the site, with dedicated, protected, cycle paths and superior bus stops.




The context of the site looking south – showing Oxford House, a multi-storey office building with ground floor commercial uses, and the site beyond


Looking north along Oxford Road from beneath the Mancunian Way, with the site on the right




Chatime tea shop is situated immediately north of the site




The site includes an alcove adjacent to Oxford House


There are a group of mature trees within the recess


The southern part of the site, sits beneath the Mancunian Way, is enclosed with railings and the land used for car parking

There have been around 1345 reported crimes committed in the neighbourhood around the site in the past 12 months. By Greater Manchester standards, this is a very high number of offences but such a volume of crime is typical of neighbourhoods which are in, or adjacent to the city centre. The most common crime reported in the area analysed at around 33% of the total involved the use or threat of violence theft followed by theft (around 20%), principally theft of customer property in bars and cafes or student property in University buildings, of which there are very large numbers of both types of premises within the area analysed. Bicycle theft is common around 10% of all crime recorded in this area. Over 300 crimes were recorded as having occurred on Oxford Road/Oxford Street. When looking at the environment surrounding the development site, the types of offences committed in this neighbourhood that affect commercial premises, and the modus operandi used by offenders in committing such crimes, the principal areas of concern with proposed development are: offenders gaining access into the development and individual premises by means of forced entry; the safety of customer personal belongings as they eat and drink at the development.

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2 Crime Statistics & Analysis

All data below is based on crimes recorded between 1st June 2016 and 31st May 2017, and reviewed in November 2023

2.1 Crime Summary

Figure 1: Recorded Crime within 500m of Site

Burglary Dwelling	Burglary Other	Criminal Damage	Less Serious Wounding	Misc. Thefts	Robbery	Serious Wounding	Theft from Motor Vehicle	Theft of Motor Vehicle	Theft of Pedal Cycle
59	55	115	452	261	77	11	150	17	138

2.1.1 In the last 12 months over 1300 crimes were reported in the vicinity of the development, which is considered very high. This is a reflection of the concentration of people commercial premises (especially bars and take-aways), car parks and bicycles leads to increases in criminality. The area suffers from high levels of violence, which predominantly occurred over the weekend- when the risk of alcohol-related violence is at its greatest.

2.2 Typical modus operandi used in committing burglary and theft in this area & measures to reduce vulnerabilities

2.2.1 Shutters and grilles have been forced open using tools

To minimise the risk of offenders forcing shutters and grilles:

- only install LPS 1175 security rated shutters or grilles; and,
- avoid placing windows or doors in accessible but secluded areas, so avoiding the need to add additional security measures such as shutters to secure vulnerable openings.

2.2.2 Front and rear doors on commercial premises were forced open and glazed panels within front doors smashed to gain entry

To minimise the risk of offenders forcing the doors or smashing glazed panels:

- entrance and service doors should be certified to PAS 24 or LPS 1175;
- glazed doors, and windows, on side and rear elevations should be avoided;
- glazing within doors and to the shop display windows should include laminate rather than toughened glazing;
- the customer entrance doors should be visible from the 'street' rather than set within a recess or on more secluded elevations;
- external service areas should be enclosed with appropriately high fencing and locking gates;
- secluded public passageways to the sides and rear of premises should be avoided wherever possible as such routes can facilitate secluded access to service yards, as well as attract anti-social behaviour;
- all external doors should be illuminated by dusk-to-dawn lights; and,
- CCTV should be considered to record activity within and around exterior of the building.

2.2.3 Offenders posing as legitimate customers to steal goods from shops or gaining access to back-of-house area to steal personal belongings of staff

To minimise the risk of offenders gaining access to staff only areas:

- all doors separating public areas from staff only spaces, should be monitored by CCTV;
- sales counters should be located to facilitate staff supervision of the premises;
- high value goods should be located close to, or behind, sales counters;

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- access control systems should be installed to secure sensitive areas– e.g. stock rooms, staff rest rooms, and management offices;
- staff should be required to wear an appropriate form of clearly visible ID and/or a company uniform; and,
- small, valuables lockers should be provided for staff to secure their personal effects within a secure room.

2.2.4 Doors have been forced open and glazed panels within them have been smashed to gain entry

To minimise the risk of offenders forcing the doors or smashing glazed panels:

- entrance and service doors should be certified to PAS 24 or LPS 1175;
- glazed doors, and windows, on side and rear elevations should be avoided;
- glazing to any other doors and to the shop display windows should include laminate rather than toughened glazing;
- the customer entrance door should be visible to neighbouring properties and from the 'street' rather than set within a recess or on more secluded elevations;
- external service areas should be enclosed with appropriately high fencing and locking gates;
- secluded public passageways to the sides and rear of premises should be avoided wherever possible as such routes can facilitate secluded access to service yards, as well as attract anti-social behaviour; and,
- all external doors should be illuminated by dusk-to-dawn lights.

2.2.5 Offenders posing as legitimate customers in order to steal goods or gain access to staff-only areas and steal property

To minimise the risk of offenders stealing from premises:

- use overt CCTV to allow staff to monitor customer behaviour and include signs to warn customers that CCTV is in operation;
- create a secure 'back of house' to the unit, with fob or keypad controlled doors;
- locate customer entrance doors and 'back of house' doors in areas where staff can easily monitor movements in and out (back of house doors are best located adjacent to or behind service counters; and,
- include a safe within a secure room for the safe storage of cash and other valuables, and lockers for staff to store personal belongings whilst at work.

2.3 Risk Factors

The typical security risks for a development of this nature are:


- Burglary
- Robbery
- Shoplifting
- Theft by employees
- Theft of customer or staff property
- Criminal damage to property
- Acts of criminal damage during the construction period
- Violence towards staff and other users
- Anti-social behaviour

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
2.4 Burglary at retail premises: Risk Analysis

The data below relates to burglary recorded at retail premises in Manchester.

Burglary – Day Range




Burglary – Time Range



2.4.1 Day Range: The risk of burglary at retail premises is consistently high from Monday to Friday, with a slight drop over the weekend.

2.4.2 Time Range: The risk is greatest in the early hours of the morning from 00:00-04:00, when premises are closed, unoccupied and neighbouring streets are at their quietest - all of which contributes to a lower perceived risk of offenders being apprehended or witnessed.

Burglary – Point of Entry



2.4.3 Point of Entry: The most common entry point at retail premises in Manchester were as follows:


- Shutter protecting doors and windows were forced upwards using hand tools.
- Glazing was often smashed in the panels of doors, and both front and rear doors were forced open using bodily pressure or metal bars.
- During business hours, offenders have posed as customers before targeting insecure doors or following staff in order to gain access to restricted areas.

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
2.5 Theft at retail premises: Risk Analysis

The data below relates to theft and shoplifting recorded at retail premises in Manchester.

Theft – Day Range



Theft – Time Range




2.5.1 Day & Time Range: The risk of theft is very high throughout the week. Shoplifting accounted for the majority (89%) of instances of thefts. The risk is concentrated from 10:00-20:00, and greatest between 16:00-18:00. This corresponds with the opening hours of most shops.


2.6 Burglary at restaurants & cafes: Risk Analysis

The data below relates to burglary recorded at restaurants and cafes, recorded in Manchester.

Burglary – Day Range




Burglary – Time Range



2.6.1 Day & Time Range: The risk of burglary at restaurants and cafes in Manchester remains high throughout the week. The risk is greatest in the early hours of the morning from 02:00-05:00, when premises are closed, it is dark and street activity diminished; the prospect of being apprehended or witnessed in these circumstances is very low.

Burglary – Point of Entry



2.6.2 Point of Entry: Over half of burglaries at Manchester restaurants/cafes have been committed through doors. Offenders often forced front and rear doors using bodily pressure or tools, or smashed glazing in


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glazed panels to gain entry. A number of fire doors and rear doors were targeted when left insecure by staff. Offenders also posed as customers to gain entry.


2.7 Theft at restaurants & cafes: Risk Analysis

The data below relates to theft recorded at restaurants and cafes in Manchester.

Theft – Day Range



Theft – Time Range




2.7.1 Day & Time Range: The greatest risk of theft at restaurants and cafes occurs over the weekend (57%) when premises, particularly in the city centre, are often open for longer and experience higher levels of custom. The risk is greatest between 13:00-21:00, when premises are usually at their busiest. Personal property such as customers/staff mobile phones and wallets/purses were the most frequently targeted items, particularly when left insecure in bags on tables, or in coats hung on chairs.


2.8 Burglary at licensed premises: Risk Analysis

The data below relates to burglary recorded at licensed premises in Manchester.

Burglary – Day Range




Burglary – Time Range



2.8.1 Day & Time Range: There have been over 100 burglaries recorded at Manchester's licensed premises over the last 12 months. The risk is greatest on Sundays, perhaps related to a perception that there will be greater rewards after the busiest nights' trade, i.e. Fridays and Saturdays. The risk is greatest between 02:00-06:00.

Burglary – Point of Entry




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2.8.2 Point of Entry: The most frequently targeted entry points were doors, either forced open using hand tools or the glazing smashed glazed panels. Front doors were most commonly targeted when left insecure. Offenders have also posed as customers or staff in order to target cellars or restricted bar areas for cash or alcohol.


2.9 Theft at licensed premises: Risk Analysis

The data below relates to theft recorded at licensed premises in Manchester.

Theft – Day Range



Theft – Time Range



2.9.1 Day and Time Range: The majority of theft occurred over the weekend and from11:00-04:00 when opportunities for theft are more plentiful than at less busy times, particularly when victims have been drinking alcohol. Handbags were the most frequently stolen items, particularly when left insecure on tables or hung on chairs.

3 Layout Appraisal

3.1 Proposed development

3.1.1 The proposed development involves the erection of a series of part single, part two storey modular retail and food and beverage units, and an advertising screen.

3.1.2 The café and retail units, and the screen, will principally be focussed onto Oxford Road with other food and drink units arranged perpendicular to the road to create a courtyard within the Oxford House forecourt recess formed by the proposed units and the building itself.

3.1.3 It is the first phase of a two phase scheme to introduce food and beverage and retail units to the undercroft of the Mancunian Way.

3.1.4 It is proposed that the entrance to the courtyard will be fully shuttered for security purposes.

3.1.5 Two of the trees within the courtyard will be removed with four retained.

3.1.6 The site will be serviced via the existing service route to Oxford House, where access is gained via Brancaster Road.

3.2 Positive Aspects of the Proposal

The following proposed features would make a positive contribution to the prevention of crime and fear of crime.

3.2.1 The proposed development will make use of a rather sterile space and add considerable interest to an otherwise uninteresting section of the Oxford Road corridor.

3.2.2 The increased activity, improved lighting and natural surveillance associated with the development will greatly enhance the pedestrian experience on this section of the corridor as well as for those waiting at the bus stops.

3.2.3 Opening up the views into the Tech Hub will facilitate mutual surveillance between the development and the office space from the lower floors.

3.2.4 The proposed remodelling of Oxford House, including focussing the main entrance onto Oxford Road will improve the setting of the proposed development.

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3.2.5 The development will contribute to the growing diversity of Oxford Road, adding a facility which is likely to generate footfall throughout the week, and a significant visitor attraction. Together with the planned improvements to Oxford House, the environmental works to the corridor and the development at Circle Square, the proposed development will enhance the quality of the Oxford Road corridor. High quality spaces and places that are subject to ongoing management tend to attract less crime and disorder.

3.3 Recommendations to improve the security of the development and the surroundings

The following points have been identified for further consideration and would need to be addressed for Design for Security to support the proposed scheme.

3.3.1 Secure the walkway outside of business hours with a suitably secure roller shutter or gates.

3.3.2 Secure the rear boundaries of the development with suitable high robust fencing.

3.3.3 Container generally and the storage containers that meet the LPS 1175 standard (or at least adhere to the principles of LPS 1175 certification) should be used, to allow traders to securely store stock overnight.

3.3.4 Avoid measures that could aid climbing onto the roofs of units as a means to by-pass formal security measures.

3.3.5 Employ management staff/security guard to assist traders and monitor customers, especially at the busier times of the week - evenings in particular.

3.3.6 Install a CCTV system to monitor the site day and night.

3.3.7 Install lighting to British Standard 5489 to illuminate the development.

3.3.8 Providing secure cycle parking for staff and customers.

3.3.9 Installing Grippa™ clips or other similar property security clips to tables to allow customers in the food and beverage units and outdoor seating to secure their bags or coats/jackets.

3.3.10 Storing refuse securely at the rear of the site.

4 Physical Security

The following checklist forms the physical security requirements for this scheme to achieve a reasonable level of security.

4.1 Doors

❑ Ideally, entrance and service doors should be compliant with, and certified to, LPS 1175 SR2.

4.2 Locks

❑ Locks generally should meet the BS 3621 or 8621 standard.

❑ Padlocks should meet the Secure Gold standard.

4.3 Roller Shutters

❑ Wherever feasible, roller shutters should meet the LPS 1175 standard.

4.4 Access Control

❑ Because of their superior security properties, access control systems used to control entry at the high volume use doors/gates, for example, the rear, service entrance and to the back of house of the larger units should, ideally, be operable by swipe card or fob, rather than numeric key pads. The nature of the individual business, value of the stock and presence of management staff/security guards should all be considered when detailing the method of access control. It is understood that, generally, lock and key will be the most common method of controlling access.

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4.5 Glazing

- ☐ Glazing must incorporate at least one pane of glass rated as P4A under EN 356.
- ☐ Glazed areas should be protected out-of-hours with retractable shutters.

4.6 Security Presence and Intruder Alarm

- ☐ A hi-visibility, security guard presence is advised on the busier days and evenings, as much to assist customers as deter offenders.
- ☐ Ideally, a monitored intruder alarm system should be installed to all larger units and to storage containers. Alarms should have contacts on all external doors with PIR detectors covering the internal spaces of the units, with a signal terminating at the security control room/patrol team. It should have two secure signalling paths (one being GSM radio back-up), so that if either signalling path is tampered with by an intruder, or is faulty, the other continues to monitor for any further alarms and transmits them as 'confirmed activations' – extra confirmation that an intruder is on the premises and that the alarm isn't false.

4.7 Boundaries

- ☐ The rear of the development should be secured with a 2500-3000mm high fence and include a self-closing, self-locking service gates. The lock should be fob activated on the outer side and panic bar release on the inner side, (which cannot be activated from the outer side of the gate).

4.8 Lighting

- ☐ Dusk-to-dawn lighting, operated by photoelectric cell/daylight sensor, which meets the relevant section of BS 5489, should be installed to all areas of the development.
- ☐ Fittings should produce 'white' light, as opposed to yellow/orange light. Metal halide (or bulbs with a comparable output) should be used, as these offer superior colour rendition over alternatives such as high and low pressure sodium bulbs.

4.9 CCTV

- ☐ A CCTV system should be used within this proposal. It will require certain specifications and suitably located cameras to compliment the design of the development. Designers should consider the following points when planning a CCTV strategy:
  - With regards to the retention of footage, the police prefer quality over quantity. The overall retention period should be dictated by what the system is designed to achieve, though it would be better to have good quality images over a 14-day period than poor ones over a 30-day period.
  - Procedures for recovery of recordings are recommended to be established (e.g. trained staff / the CCTV system instruction manual to be readily available). This is to ensure that the images produced will be of an acceptable standard that will allow for identification of an individual which will stand up to scrutiny in court.
  - **Acceptable Standard** - this generally requires a resolution of 720x576 pixels at a real time frame rate of 25 frames per second. (N.B. Both the camera and DVR must be capable of this – if the camera will only send low resolution images then it does not matter how high the resolution of the recording unit is).
  - **Identification** – One of three levels of field of view. To identify an individual, the image must capture no less than 120% of the field of view (at least from the top of the individuals head to their knees). The remaining two levels of field of view are 'Overview' and 'Recognition', which whilst effective for observational purposes, are less likely to result in the identification of a person/offender.
- ☐ CCTV systems (and lighting that support them) require regular cleaning and maintenance to remain effective.
- ☐ Where necessary cameras that are vulnerable to damage should be protected from attack either by relocation to a higher level and using a bigger lens to achieve the view required or through the fitting of a vandal resistant housing.

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- The location of cameras should help to provide clear facial identification of individuals. Suitable locations for cameras would be: the Oxford Road façade, pathways between units, licensed premises internally and externally, the courtyard, the sales counter within the licensed units, and stock storage containers.
- Recording equipment should be securely stored on-site. Alternatively, images can be recorded and stored off site by a suitable monitoring/management company.

5 Management & Maintenance

- A maintenance plan should be drawn up to address issues such as litter removal, repair to lighting, signage, CCTV, access controls and landscape maintenance. Site security contractors should be Security Industry Authority (SIA) approved.

6 Construction

- The contractor should be a member of the 'Considerate Constructors Scheme' whilst security contractors should be SIA approved to ensure professional standards are adopted and maintained (please see http://www.sia.homeoffice.gov.uk/pages/acs-intro.aspx for more details).

A Contact Register

Date	Contact	Summary of Contact
24.05.17	Ellen Sanderson, Deloitte	Request for Crime Impact Statement
11.06.17		Site visit
03.08.17	Eleanor Sanderson, Deloitte & Simon Chesworth, Bruntwood	Report Issued
16.11.23	Matthew Lam, Deloitte	Request to update and rely on the CIS
29.11.23	Matthew Lam, Deloitte	Report updated and re-issued

B Associated Documents

This report is based on the following:

Drawing No.	Drawing Title	Date	Rev
	Oxford House_RentableAreas_9.5.17	24/05/17	
16004_DWG_PL_001	Location plan	June 2016	

PLEASE NOTE - In the event of any subsequent material changes to the scheme, it will be necessary for Design for Security to reassess the comments made within this report.

C CIS Version History

Version	Revisions	Date
A		02.08.17
B	Report reviewed and updated as necessary	29.11.23

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D Glossary

Burglary Resistance Standards

BS 7950, 1997

Specification for enhanced security performance of casement and tilt/turn windows.

BS 4873, 2005: Specification for aluminium windows.

BS 7412, 2007: Specification for plastic windows made from PVC-U extruded hollow profiles.

BS 644-1, 2003: Wood windows. Specification for factory assembled windows - various types.

BWF:TWAS: Timber window accreditation scheme.

BS 6510, 2005: Specification for steel windows, sills, window boards & doors.

BS PAS 23-1, 1999

General performance requirements for door assemblies.

A performance standard for door sets, which certifies that a particular door set is fit for purpose. Door products must also have BS PAS 24 certification.

BS PAS 24-1, 2012

General security performance requirements for door assemblies.

An attack test standard for door sets, which certifies that a particular door, frame, lock and hardware set has withstood a series of physical tests. This is the minimum police requirement for Secured by Design dwellings, and is also applicable to French/double doors, and sliding doors.

ENV 1627-30 (Security Ratings WK1 to WK6)

Windows, doors, shutters - Burglar resistance Requirements and classification

The classification system used in ENV 1627-30 is aimed at the commercial market and is based on five elements:

a) Resistance of glazing

b) Performance of hardware

c) Resistance to static loading

d) Resistance to dynamic loading

e) Burglary resistance by manual intervention

LPS 1175 (Security Ratings 1 to 6)

Specification for testing and classifying the burglary resistance of building components

This includes doors, shutters, garage doors and grilles typically for commercial premises and higher risk domestic premises and is acceptable to the ABI and the Police. The standard has 6 levels, 6 being the highest, with levels 1 and 2 equivalent in many respects to BS PAS 24 and BS 7950.

STS01 Issue 4: 2012

Enhanced security requirements for doorsets and door assemblies for dwellings to satisfy the requirements of PAS23 and PAS24

As the title suggests this is an equivalent test standard to PAS 24, incorporating PAS 23 (fitness for purpose), published by Warrington Certification.

STS02 Issue 3: 2011

Requirements for burglary resistance of construction products including hinged, pivoted, folding or sliding doorsets, windows, curtain walling, security grilles, garage doors and shutters.

This specifies a broadly similar range of attack tools and times to those specified at the lower levels of LPS1175. However, STS202 does not extend to cover the higher levels of risk addressed within LPS1175 and the attack methods used differ.

EN 356, 2000 (Ratings P1A to P8A)

Glass in building. Security glazing. Testing and classification of resistance against manual attack.

A performance standard for manual attacks on glazing. P2A is comparable to the performance of a 6.8mm laminated glass, and P4A to that of a 9.5mm laminated glass.

Commonly Used Acronyms

CIT

Cash in transit (refers to vehicles, personnel and routines).

CPTED

Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design
(Learn more at ***www.designforsecurity.org/about/cpted***)

CRS

Crime Reduction Specialist. Sometimes known as CPO (Crime Prevention Officer)

INPT

Integrated Neighbourhood Policing Team.

PVB/PolyVinyl Butyral (Glazing interlayer)

A commonly used interlayer used in the production of laminated glass.

LPCB (Loss Prevention Certification Board)

A brand of the BRE Global (Building Research Establishment) family. The LPCB work with insurers, Government, police, designers, manufacturers, contractors and end users to develop methods of assessing performance and reliability of security products to ensure their fitness for purpose.

UKAS (United Kingdom Accreditation Service)

The sole national accreditation body recognised by government to assess, against internationally agreed standards, organisations that provide certification, testing, inspections and calibration services.

Useful Websites

Design for Security
www.designforsecurity.org
Secured by Design
www.securedbydesign.com
RIBA Product Selector
www.ribaproductselector.com
LPCB – Red Book Live
www.redbooklive.com
Crime Reduction (Home Office)
www.crimereduction.homeoffice.gov.uk
DAC (Design Against Crime) Solution Centre
www.designagainstcrime.org
Building for Life
www.buildingforlife.org
CLG (Communities and Local Government)
www.communities.gov.uk

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