CRIME IMPACT STATEMENT

17 Quay Street, Manchester

Refurbishment Of Offices & 2 No. New Ground Floor Retail/Food & Beverage Units

FOR: 17 Quay Limited

VERSION A: 28th September 2022

REFERENCE: 2019/0774/CIS/01

Greater Manchester Police

designforsecurity

Produced by Greater Manchester Police
Copyright reserved by The Chief Constable

CPT
CRIME PREVENTION TEAM

17 Quay Street

2019/0774/CIS/01

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Recommendations made

This development has been assessed against the principles of 'Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design' (CPTED), in order to reduce the opportunities for crime and the fear of crime. The development is broadly acceptable, in terms of designing out crime; however, the recommendations made in section 3.3 should be addressed, including but not limited to:

- The recessed doorway on the Artillery Street elevation should be installed flush with the building elevation to prevent misuse.
- Access control, CCTV, alarm systems, and physical security measures should be carefully considered.

If the recommendations contained within section 3.3 are implemented, we would be supportive of the planning application.

Please note: Greater Manchester Police Design for Security will recommend to the local planning authority that a planning condition is added that reflects the physical security specification listed within Section 4 of this report.

Patrick Babb

Consultant

e: patrick.babb@designforsecurity.org

Produced by Greater Manchester Police
Copyright reserved by The Chief Constable

Contents

1 Visual Audit 4

2 Crime Statistics & Analysis 5

2.1 Crime Summary

2.2 Common Use-Specific M.O.s (Modus Operandi)

2.3 Risk Factors - Offices

2.4 Risk Factors - Retail

2.5 Risk Factors – Cafes / Restaurants

2.6 Burglary Risk Analysis – Offices

2.7 Burglary Risk Analysis – Retail Premises

2.8 Burglary Risk Analysis – Restaurants/Cafés

2.9 Theft Retail Facilities: Risk Analysis

2.10 Theft Restaurants / Cafés: Risk Analysis

2.11 Theft Offices: Risk Analysis

2.12 Vehicle Crime: Risk Analysis

3 Layout Appraisal 11

3.1 Proposed development

3.2 Positive Aspects of the Proposal

3.3 Changes Needed and Recommendations

4 Physical Security 13

4.1 Doors

4.2 Windows & Shutters

4.3 Glazing & Building Fabric

4.4 Bicycle Parking

4.5 Car Parking

4.6 Alarms

4.7 Access control

4.8 Lighting

4.9 CCTV

5 Management & Maintenance 14

6 Construction 15

7 Useful References 15

7.1 Secured by Design (SBD)

Appendix

A Contact register 16

B Associated Documents 16

C CIS Version History 16

Copyright reserved by The Chief Constable

1 Visual Audit

The proposed development site can be seen on the adjacent map, edged in red. The site is located in the city centre area of Manchester.

The site is positioned on the junction of Quay Street (A34) and Byrom Street, which form the Northern and Western site boundaries, to the East the site is bound by an adjacent building (Fifteen on Quay Street) and to the South the site is bound by Artillery Street.

The site is located in a central area of Manchester city centre, close to Spinningfields, St John Gardens, Deansgate, and the Great Northern. Opposite the site on Quay Street are the Opera House and 20 Stories. On Byrom Street Corben House Chambers lies opposite.





Copyright reserved by The Chief Constable

2 Crime Statistics & Analysis

All data below is based on crimes recorded between 1st September 2021 and 31st January 2019.

2.1 Crime Summary

Figure 1: Recorded Crime within 500m of Site

Domestic Burglary	Non-Domestic Burglary	Criminal Damage	Less Serious Wounding	Theft	Robbery	Serious Wounding	Theft from Motor Vehicle	Theft of Motor Vehicle	Bicycle Theft
16	99	175	1213	1221	82	39	414	36	63

2.1.1 The overall crime rate in the local area is high for Manchester, with less serious wounding, theft and vehicle crime being the highest reported crimes. The location of the proposed site should be taken into consideration when looking at the crime statistics as the site is located within the city centre where there is a high concentration of retail outlets, licenced premises, and restaurants, leading to an increase of crime and disorder in the area.

2.1.2 Less serious woundings have taken place throughout the local area, particularly to the north and east of the proposed site, around Deansgate which has a high volume of bars and retail facilities located along it, particularly around the junction of Quay Street, Peters Street and Deansgate where the Great Northern is located. Offences have mostly occurred over the weekend period (Friday – Sunday) during the late evening and early hours of the morning when most premises in the area are closing. Assaults and public order offences have been the highest recorded less serious woundings in the local area, with offences often taking place between known associates, with alcohol often being a factor.

2.1.3 Thefts have taken place throughout the area, with hotspots occurring to the south of the proposed site, around Deansgate and the Deansgate-Castleford Metrolink stop and around the bars located around Peters Street. Both areas have a high volume of foot fall due to public transport links, retail outlets and bars / restaurants. Offenders have mostly used pick pocketing techniques and distraction methods in order to obtain personal belongings, mostly mobile phones, bags, and purses / wallets. Offenders have also targeted insecure items (mostly mobile phones) left on or under tables in bars and restaurants.

2.1.4 Vehicle crime in the local area has mostly taken place in private car parks and vehicles using on street parking facilities. Theft from a motor vehicle has been the highest recorded vehicle crime with offenders using implements and objects in order to smash glazing and access the interior of the vehicle. Offenders have also targeted vehicle registration plates, using tools to remove them.

2.2 Common Use-Specific M.O.s (Modus Operandi)

2.2.1 Opening secure doors (all door types) using bodily pressure and implements to access the premises.

Possible Solution – All external doors should be certified to a burglary resistant standard (see section 4.2) which are designed to withstand a prolonged attempt to gain entry.

2.2.2 Breaking glazing in doors and windows, mainly to the front of the premises, using implements to gain access.

Possible Solution – Any ground floor or easily accessible glazing should contain a pane of laminate glazing, which cannot be easily smashed or shattered to gain entry.

2.2.3 Entering premises as legitimate customer and tailgating staff/ exploiting insecure doors to access staff only areas.

Possible Solution – Personnel gates or turnstiles should restrict access from the office foyer into the circulation core of the building. Any external doors should operate on an access control system.

2.2.4 Forcing open shutters using implements and bodily force to gain access.

Possible Solution – Any shutters should be certified to a recognised security standard (i.e. LPS 1175 SR2). Shutters certified to a burglary resistant standard are able to withstand prolonged, opportunist, attacks by criminals.

Copyright reserved by The Chief Constable

2.3 Risk Factors - Offices

The typical security risks for a development of this nature are:

- Burglary
- Violence towards staff
- Theft of personal belongings at work
- Criminal damage to property and vehicles
- Unauthorised access to buildings / private space
- Arson
- Cycle theft

2.4 Risk Factors - Retail

The typical security risks for a development of this nature are:

- Commercial burglary
- Cash robbery
- Unauthorised access to private spaces/Tailgating
- Shoplifting
- Employee theft
- Theft of customer / staff property
- Criminal damage to property

2.5 Risk Factors – Cafes / Restaurants

The typical security risks for a development of this nature are:

- Burglary
- Robbery to business
- Criminal damage to property
- Alcohol-fuelled violence / conflict if licensed
- Miscellaneous theft to customers
- Rowdy and inconsiderate behaviour
- Conflict of use with neighbouring venues
- Violence towards staff
- Safety of staff personal belongings
- Robbery / wounding of patrons leaving premises
- Theft and criminal damage during the construction period

Produced by Greater Manchester Police
Copyright reserved by The Chief Constable

2.6 Burglary Risk Analysis – Offices

The data below relates to non-domestic burglary offences within / against offices, recorded in the Manchester area during 2018 - 2019.

Office Burglary – Day Range



Office Burglary – Time Range



Office Burglary – Point of Entry



2.6.1 Day / Time Range: During the week, the risk of burglary at office premises in Manchester peaks on Tuesday and Sunday. During the day, the risk of burglary rises at night / into the early hours of the morning. Such premises are often targeted at these times when they are closed and unoccupied, meaning offenders can attempt to gain unauthorised access without fear of being disturbed or identified.

2.6.2 Point of Entry: In the local area, the following entry points have been utilised most frequently:

- Secure doors have been forced open using body pressure, implements and tools. Many burglaries committed in Manchester office buildings do not appear to be opportunistic, with offenders often bringing equipment with them that can be used to force open doors and cut locks.
- A large proportion of burglaries have been committed through 'unknown' points of entry, which are likely to have been where offenders (posing as legitimate customers, visitors, or employees) have gained unauthorised access to staff only areas (i.e. through insecure doors, tailgating etc.) to steal property.
- Glazing within windows and doors has been smashed to gain unauthorised access.
- Shutters have been prised open to target doors and windows behind them.

Copyright reserved by The Chief Constable

2.7 Burglary Risk Analysis – Retail Premises

The data below relates to non-domestic burglary offences within / against retail facilities, recorded in the Manchester area during 2018 - 2019.

Retail Burglary – Day Range



Retail Burglary – Time Range



Retail Burglary – Point of Entry



2.7.1 Day / Time Range: The risk of burglary at retail premises in Manchester is consistently high throughout the week, peaking on a Wednesday. During the day the risk of burglary at retail premises increases in the early hours of the morning (12am – 6am). Burglaries at commercial premises frequently take place during the night, when they are closed, and the streets are quiet. Offenders perceive the risk of being witnessed or apprehended at its lowest.

2.7.2 Point of Entry: In the local area the following entry points and MO's have been the occurred most frequently:

- Smashed glazing in windows and doors to gain entry to premises.
- Posing as a legitimate customer and tailgating / exploitation insecure doors to gain access to staff only areas.
- Forcing open shutters using bodily force and implements to gain entry.
- Opening secure doors using bodily pressure and implements to gain entry.

Produced by Greater Manchester Police
Copyright reserved by The Chief Constable

2.8 Burglary Risk Analysis – Restaurants/Cafés

The data below relates to non-domestic burglary offences within/against restaurants and cafés, recorded in the Manchester area during 2018 - 2019.

Restaurant/Cafe Burglary – Day Range



Restaurant/Cafe Burglary – Time Range



Restaurant/Cafe Burglary – Point of Entry



2.8.1 Day / Time Range: The risk of burglary at restaurants/cafes in Manchester fluctuates throughout the week, peaking on Monday, Thursday, and Sunday. The risk of burglary peaks during the early hours of the morning, when premises are usually closed.

2.8.2 Point of Entry: In the local area the following entry points and MO's have been utilised most frequently:

- Forcing open secure windows and doors using bodily pressure and implements in order to gain access to the premises.
- Breaking glazing in windows and doors using implements.
- Forcing open shutters using bodily pressure and implements in order to access the windows and doors located underneath.

2.8.3 Posing as a legitimate customer and exploiting insecure doors, accessing restricted areas, and removing goods belonging to staff and the company.

Produced by Greater Manchester Police
Copyright reserved by The Chief Constable

2.9 Theft Retail Facilities: Risk Analysis

The data below relates to thefts within / against retail facilities, recorded in the Manchester area during 2018 - 2019.

Retail Theft – Day Range



Retail Theft – Time Range



2.9.1 Day / Time Range: The risk of theft from retail premises in Manchester is consistently high throughout the week, peaking on a Friday and Saturday. During the day the risk of theft at retail premises peaks in the late morning and into the evening (10:30am – 8pm). Small, personal items are being targeted, mostly mobile phones, purses, and bags.

2.10 Theft Restaurants / Cafés: Risk Analysis

The data below relates to thefts within/against restaurants and cafés, recorded in the Manchester area during 2018 - 2019.

Restaurant/Cafe Theft – Day Range



Restaurant/Cafe Theft – Time Range



Day / Time Range: During the week, the risk of theft at Manchester restaurants / cafes peaks over the weekend. Many premises experience higher levels of attendance at the weekend than during the week. Premises are also usually open for longer at the weekend and so the opportunities for offenders to commit theft is greater. The risk of theft peaks in the afternoon and into the evening. This reflects the times when restaurants / cafes are typically at their busiest and, therefore, the opportunities to commit theft are greater. Handbags, purses / wallets, and mobile phones belonging to customers are the most routinely stolen items. Offenders have also targeted I.T equipment within premises, particularly tablets and laptops, as well as alcohol from storage rooms

Copyright reserved by The Chief Constable

2.11 Theft Offices: Risk Analysis

The data below relates to thefts within / against offices, recorded in the Manchester area during 2018 - 2019.

Office Theft – Day Range



Office Theft – Time Range



Day / Time Range: During the week, the risk of theft at Manchester offices is greatest during the working week, when the opportunities to offend are greater, and is significantly lower at the weekend, when many offices premises are closed or operate on reduced opening hours / staffing levels. During the day, the risk of theft is concentrated during normal working hours – peaking around midday. During these times, many office workers will take their lunch breaks, leaving unattended property at desks or in insecure areas. Thefts can also often happen at the end of the working day, when members of staff are finishing work and premises is likely to be less secure, such as while cleaning operations are carried out.

2.12 Vehicle Crime: Risk Analysis

The data below relates to vehicle crime committed within 500m of the site.

Vehicle Crime – Day Range



Vehicle Crime – Time Range



2.12.1 Day/Time Range: The risk of vehicle crime in the local area peaks on a Saturday and Sunday during the afternoon (12pm – 4pm) and evening (6pm – 10pm). Offenders have mostly targeted vehicles using private car parking and on street parking facilities. Vehicles are often left unsupervised for long periods of time in areas where footfall is reduced, creating perceived low risk opportunities for offenders.

3 Layout Appraisal

3.1 Proposed development

3.1.1 The proposed development includes the refurbishment of the existing office building and the creation of two no. ground floor flexible units.

Copyright reserved by The Chief Constable

3.2 Positive Aspects of the Proposal

The following proposed features would make a positive contribution to the prevention of crime and fear of crime.

3.2.1 The main reception desk at the lobby to the offices on first floor and above will be located in close proximity to the main entrance, allowing reception staff to vet those entering the building and accommodate visitors.

3.2.2 The reception desk is positioned where staff will be able to view the main entrance of the office element of the building.

3.2.3 The ground floor plans indicate that access into the main circulation core will be restricted with turnstiles/speed gates, preventing members gaining further access into the building.

3.2.4 The main entrance is positioned on Quay Street which experiences high levels of footfall during the day and in the evening – allowing for passive surveillance opportunities of the building.

3.2.5 The ground floor units and glazed façade will provide an active frontage to the building at ground floor level and does not have large expanses of blank facades at ground floor.

3.2.6 There will be a large cycle parking area with changing and shower facilities. This will allow staff to securely store their bicycles whilst they are at work where they are unlikely to be targeted by thieves. Staff will be able to store personal items whilst showering - reducing the potential for opportunist thefts.

3.3 Changes Needed and Recommendations

The following points have been identified for further consideration and would need to be addressed for Design for Security to support the proposed scheme.

3.3.1 The doorset adjacent the car park entrance, on the Artillery Street elevation, is recessed which could conceal an offender, or someone antisocially minded, from view and generate unwanted behaviour such as loitering, drug/alcohol use, vagrancy, and public urination. It is highly recommended that the doorset is positioned flush with the elevation of building to prevent misuse.

3.3.2 The office reception should be staffed during standard office hours (i.e.8am-6pm) to allow visitors to be vetted before being permitted access into the building. There should be a video/audio intercom on the main entrance to allow staff to vet visitors to the building when the main reception is not staffed.

3.3.3 Access into and around the office building should be governed with an auditable access control system.

3.3.4 Access into the proposed bicycle store should operate on an access control system, with access restricted to genuine users. Cycle stands should be Sheffield style, or similar, allowing both wheels and the frame to be locked.

3.3.5 All ground floor external doors should be illuminated with dusk-til-dawn lighting. Recessed entrances should be particularly illuminated to a high standard to deter antisocial behaviour (such as loitering and congregation).

3.3.6 The building should be covered by a monitored intruder alarm (see section 4.4 for more details).

3.3.7 Individual office suites should have a secure door set (i.e. BS PAS 24 or LPS 1175 SR 2). Individual offices and ground floor/basement commercial units should have the infrastructure so that any tenants can easily install an intruder alarm.

3.3.8 A comprehensive CCTV system should be installed to monitor all external doors and elevations, the reception area, circulation cores, all plant/back-of-house functions, and the cycle store. Individual offices and ground floor/basement commercial units should have the infrastructure so that any tenants can easily install a CCTV system if required.

3.3.9 Ground floor commercial units should have the appropriate infrastructure so that an access control system can easily be installed. The basement car park should be illuminated to a high standard and in accordance with BS 5489. Doors into the building from the car parking area should be certified to a burglary resistant standard and operate on an access control system.

3.3.10 Access into the basement car parking area should be restricted with a high speed, security rated, shutter.

3.3.11 Any blank facades should be treated with an anti-graffiti coating, to an approximate height of 2000mm, so that graffiti can easily be cleaned.

Copyright reserved by The Chief Constable

3.3.12 Any external seating areas should be well defined with the use of permanent, or removable/temporary, barriers, to prevent offenders from easily accessing tables and stealing personal property. It is highly recommended that any tables have a clip/hook on the underside so that bags can be stored securely and out of reach

4 Physical Security

The following checklist forms the physical security requirements for this scheme to achieve Secured by Design accreditation.

4.1 Doors

- ☐ External doorsets including the main entrance pass door, cycle access door, bin store doors and escape doors should be compliant with, and certified to, BS PAS 24 or LPS 1175 SR2. All of these doors should be self-closing and self-locking.
- ☐ The revolving entrance doors should be tested and certified to LPS 1175 SR2.
- ☐ Entrance doors to individual office suites should be compliant with and certified to BS PAS 24 or LPS 1175 SR2.

4.2 Windows & Shutters

- ☐ Where feasible, any ground level, opening windows should be certificated to LPS1175 or BS PAS 24, fitted with opening restrictors and with key operated locks.
- ☐ Curtain walling panels should include laminated glazing (see below) and should be securely fixed directly to the floor slabs where possible, rather than to perimeter columns.
- ☐ Any security shutters or grilles must be tested and certified to LPS 1175 SR2 (or SR1 if perforated laths are required).

4.3 Glazing & Building Fabric

- ☐ All accessible glazing (i.e. below a height of 2000mm from external ground level) must incorporate an internal pane of glass with a 1.5mm PVB interlayer (e.g. 7.5mm laminated glass), or a glass rated as P4A under EN 356. The remaining external pane in a double-glazed unit may be toughened glass.
- ☐ Any curtain walling panels should include laminated glazing and should be securely fixed directly to the floor slabs where possible, rather than to perimeter columns.
- ☐ Any louvres at ground floor level to plant areas/refuge stores should be robustly constructed and fixed, to ensure they cannot be easily removed or damaged. Security-certified louvred doorsets are also available if required (see https://www.securedbydesign.com/member-companies/accredited-product-search for SBD approved suppliers).

4.4 Bicycle Parking

- ☐ Doors in to the cycle parking area(s) must be certified to BS PAS 24, STS202, or LPS 1175 SR2, including a lock capable of being operated via an electronic access control system, with access restricted to registered residents (i.e. genuine bicycle owners)..
- ☐ Cycle stands should either be U-profile or Sheffield style stands. If rack storage is used it should be possible for both wheels and the frame to be secured.

4.5 Car Parking

- ☐ Access into the car parking area should be restricted with a high speed, security rated, shutter.
- ☐ The car parking area should be illuminated to a high standard in accordance with BS 5489.

Copyright reserved by The Chief Constable

4.6 Alarms

- ☐ A monitored intruder alarm system should be installed. Alarms should have contacts on all external doors or shutters, and PIR in rooms with windows. The alarm should include a signal terminating at the security control room/patrol team. The alarms should have two secure signalling paths (one being GSM radio back-up), so that if either signalling path is tampered with by an intruder, or is faulty, the other continues to monitor for any further alarms and transmits them as 'confirmed activations' – extra confirmation that an intruder is on the premises and that the alarm isn't false.
- ☐ Individual office suites/floors should also consider having an intruder alarm should the buildings be open, but some office remain closed. As a minimum individual offices or floorplates should have the infrastructure so that an alarm can be installed by future tenants.

4.7 Access control

- ☐ Access control systems should be operable by swipe card or fob, and not numeric keypads. The following doors should operate on access control:
  - The revolving entrance door and any pass doors.
  - All external doors.
  - Turnstiles/speed gates and/or lifts.
  - Car park entrance.
  - Staff only areas.
  - Plant areas and areas restricted to maintenance staff .
  - External cycle access doors, cycle store, and changing rooms.
  - Commercial units & back-of-house functions.
- ☐ The electric locking system to be used throughout the building should ideally be fully auditable (i.e. allows the retention of data, such as who accessed where and when), to allow for a better investigation into any incidents. Staff key-fobs/cards should be capable of being quickly activated or disabled when required, to ensure they are not misused. Staff should only be allowed access to areas required for their work.
- ☐ Lockers should be provided in the changing rooms for staff to store personal items whilst changing/showering.

4.8 Lighting

- ☐ Dusk-to-dawn lighting, operated by photoelectric cell/daylight sensor, and producing 'white' light, should be installed to all external doors of each building.

4.9 CCTV

- ☐ A CCTV camera system should be installed. Cameras should be capable of monitoring all building elevations - with particular emphasis on external doors (cameras should be able to observe people coming and going), and the entrance lobbies.
- ☐ Recording equipment should be located within a secure room or images may be recorded off-site at a suitable monitoring facility.
- ☐ CCTV monitoring screens should be located at the reception desk and or security office.

5 Management & Maintenance

5.1.1 A comprehensive security and maintenance regime for the management of the units must be prepared and remain in place for the day-to-day running of the building. There should be regular reviews/exercises to ensure that it remains accurate, workable, and up to date. All staff should

Copyright reserved by The Chief Constable

understand and accept the need for security measures, and it should be made easy for people to raise concerns or report observations. The operating/maintenance plan should focus on issues such as:

- Opening and closing the offices, including staff arrival and departure.
- Management of deliveries (servicing activities should not require any service doors to remain open unattended for prolonged periods).
- Details of staff security training.
- Location and management of any smoking areas.
- Repairing damaged external and internal fittings, particularly security features e.g. access control systems, alarm systems, CCTV cameras, lighting etc.
- Cleaning and prompt removal of graffiti, litter etc.
- Refuse collection arrangements.

5.1.2 All high value equipment within communal areas (e.g. computers, televisions, tools etc.) should be property marked and securely fixed or stored to deter damage/theft. An accurate record should be maintained which logs all such items.

- Refuse collection arrangements should not require bins to be left in the street for extended periods/overnight. Servicing activities should not require any service doors to remain open unattended for prolonged periods.

6 Construction

6.1.1 Untidy sites and their surroundings can be littered with debris accessible to vandals who often use loose materials as missiles to commit crime. The client should take measures appropriate to secure their site during construction, and control pedestrian and vehicular access in to and out of the site curtilage. It is also recommended that the contractor on this scheme is a member of the 'Considerate Constructors Scheme', who has committed to be a considerate and good neighbour, as well as clean, respectful, safe, environmentally conscious, responsible, and accountable.

6.1.2 Site security contractors should be SIA (Security Industry Authority) approved to ensure professional standards are adhered to (please see http://www.sia.homeoffice.gov.uk/pages/acs-intro.aspx for more details).

7 Useful References

7.1 Secured by Design (SBD)

7.1.1 Secured by Design focuses on crime prevention at the design, layout and construction stages of homes and commercial premises and promotes the use of security standards for a wide range of applications and products. To apply for Secured by Design certification for your development, visit our online application form at: http://www.designforsecurity.org/secured-by-design/sbd-accreditation/

Copyright reserved by The Chief Constable

A Contact register

Date	Contact With	Summary of Contact
15/9/2022	Arif Khaliq	CIS application received

B Associated Documents

This report is based on the following drawings and supplementary information submitted by the applicant.

Drawing No.	Drawing Title	Date	Rev
	Appendix 1 – Schedule of Areas		
10584_002A	Direct Line House Floor Plans	07/08/20	A
10584_004A	Direct Line House Sections	07/08/20	A
10584_003/3	Artillery Street Elevation	07/08/20	
10584_003/2	Byrom Street Elevation	07/08/20	
10584_003/1	Quay Street Elevation	07/08/20	
220022-3DR-00-DR-A-20102	Level 00 Proposed	22/05/22	P2
220022-3DR-00-DR-A-20103	Level 01 Proposed	22/05/22	P2
220022-3DR-00-DR-A-20104	Level 02 Proposed	22/05/22	P2
220022-3DR-00-DR-A-20105	Level 03 Proposed	22/05/22	P2
220022-3DR-00-DR-A-20106	Level 04 Proposed	22/05/22	P2
220022-3DR-00-DR-A-20107	Level 05 Proposed	22/05/22	P2
220022-3DR-00-DR-A-20101	Basement Proposed	22/05/22	P2

PLEASE NOTE - In the event of any subsequent material changes to the scheme, it will be necessary for Design for Security to reassess the comments made within this report.

C CIS Version History

Version	Revisions Made	Date
A		

Produced by Greater Manchester Police
Copyright reserved by The Chief Constable