



## CRIME IMPACT STATEMENT

Castlefield Viaduct, Manchester

Castlefield Viaduct Phase Two

FOR: NATIONAL TRUST

VERSION A: 27<sup>th</sup> June 2024

REFERENCE: 2021/0347/CIS/02

Greater Manchester Police

designforsecurity

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# Castlefield Viaduct

2021/0347/CIS/02

## EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

### Development supported

This development has been assessed against the principles of 'Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design' (CPTED - <http://designforsecurity.org/about/crime-prevention-through-environmental-design/>), in order to reduce the opportunities for crime and the fear of crime. The proposed scheme has been found generally acceptable, subject to consideration given to the recommendations made in section 3.3.



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# Contents

|   |                                                |    |
|---|------------------------------------------------|----|
| 1 | Visual Audit.....                              | 4  |
| 2 | Crime Statistics & Analysis.....               | 5  |
|   | 2.1 Crime Summary                              |    |
|   | 2.2 Common Use-Specific M.O.s (Modus Operandi) |    |
|   | 2.3 Risk Factors                               |    |
|   | 2.4 Criminal Damage (Parks): Risk Analysis     |    |
|   | 2.5 Theft (Parks): Risk Analysis               |    |
|   | 2.6 Vehicle Crime: Risk Analysis               |    |
| 3 | Layout Appraisal.....                          | 9  |
|   | 3.1 Proposed development                       |    |
|   | 3.2 Positive Aspects of the Proposal           |    |
|   | 3.3 Changes Needed and Recommendations         |    |
| 4 | Management & Maintenance .....                 | 9  |
| 5 | Construction .....                             | 10 |
| 6 | Useful References .....                        | 10 |
|   | 6.1 Secured by Design (SBD)                    |    |

## Appendix


|   |                           |    |
|---|---------------------------|----|
| A | Contact register .....    | 11 |
| B | Associated Documents..... | 11 |
| C | CIS Version History ..... | 11 |

# 1 Visual Audit

The proposed development can be seen on the adjacent map, edged in red. The site is located on the outskirts of the Manchester city centre area, with the entrance located in the Castlefield area.

The Castlefield Viaduct is a 330 metre long Victorian-era steel viaduct that has been partly transformed into an urban park, with the second phase of the development to extend the existing offering.

The entrance to the site can be gained easily from the existing Metrolink station, Manchester Central, from the existing car park, and by foot from Castlefield by stairs/elevator.



## 2 Crime Statistics & Analysis

All data below is based on crimes recorded between 1<sup>st</sup> June 2023 to 31<sup>st</sup> May 2024.

### 2.1 Crime Summary

Figure 1: Recorded Crime within 500m of Site

| Domestic Burglary | Non-Domestic Burglary | Criminal Damage | Less Serious Wounding | Theft | Robbery | Serious Wounding | Theft from Motor Vehicle | Theft of Motor Vehicle | Bicycle Theft |
|-------------------|-----------------------|-----------------|-----------------------|-------|---------|------------------|--------------------------|------------------------|---------------|
| 37                | 19                    | 104             | 351                   | 146   | 30      | 7                | 255                      | 12                     | 15            |

- 2.1.1 The overall rate of crime over the past 12 months has been high for the Manchester division, with less serious wounding, vehicle crime and theft having been the most reported offences taking place. These types of crime are typical of those experienced in or within close proximity of district, town or city centres where there is often a higher concentration of retail, commercial and licensed premises, leading to a higher number of crime and disorder issues. Whilst the offences are occurring throughout the local area there has been a higher concentration occurring to the east of the proposed site around Deansgate.
- 2.1.2 Less serious wounding offences have occurred all throughout the local area, particularly around Chester Road and Deansgate to the south and east of the proposed site. Assaults, harassment and public order offences having been the most reported less serious woundings taking place, with the majority of incidents involving disputes between known associates or customers within restaurants/bars and alcohol consumption often being a factor.
- 2.1.3 Theft from motor vehicle has been the most reported vehicle crime taking place, whereby offenders have targeted vehicles parked on the streets and within parking facilities throughout the local area, particularly at a hotspot of offences at the Euro car parks to the east of the proposed site around Deansgate. Offenders have in most cases used implements in order to smash glazing in the windows of cars before removing items from within, as well used tools to remove vehicle parts and registration plates.
- 2.1.4 The majority of theft offences have also occurred east of the site towards the town centre. Offenders have primarily targeted insecure items on tabletops and benches in public spaces or restaurants, as well as having used pickpocketing and distraction techniques to remove items stored on the person such as mobile phones, wallets and purses.

### 2.2 Common Use-Specific M.O.s (Modus Operandi)

- 2.2.1 Criminal damage carried out against buildings and landmarks by means of graffiti

*Possible Solution - A protective coating should be applied to any areas that may be vulnerable to graffiti (such as large expanses of blank walls and inside toilets) in order to facilitate rapid removal. Any proposed street furniture should be robust and vandal resistant. Flame retardant timber should be used where possible.*

- 2.2.2 Theft of personal property in the local area by means of pickpocketing and distraction methods.

*Possible Solution – Footpaths / viewing areas should be as wide as possible so that unsupervised pedestrians do not have to pass too closely by others which could leave them vulnerable to thieves. The entrance to the facility and approaches should be illuminated to a high standard and CCTV should be provided.*

### 2.3 Risk Factors

The typical security risks for a development of this nature are:

- Personal robbery
- Theft of personal belongings

- 
- Criminal damage to adjoining properties
  - Arson
  - Violence towards the public and staff
  - Unauthorised access to buildings/private spaces
  - Rowdy and inconsiderate behaviour
  - Antisocial behaviour
  - Loitering groups
  - Alcohol and drug misuse
  - Alcohol related disorder
  - Rough sleeping

## 2.4 Criminal Damage (Parks): Risk Analysis

The data below relates to criminal damage offences within / against parks, recorded in the Manchester area during 2018 - 2019.





2.4.1 **Day / Time Range:** The risk of criminal damage peaks on a Saturday and Sunday during the afternoon and into the evening, peaking between 8pm – 9:30pm. Offenders often carry out criminal damage in the evening when there is less footfall in the area, giving offenders the perception that they are less likely to be identified. Offenders also use the cover of darkness in order to enter the area and exit the area unseen.

2.4.2 **Point of Entry:** In the local area the following entry points and MO's have been utilised most frequently:

- Graffiti on park statues and walls.
- Using implements in order to set fire to bins in public spaces.
- Damaging out houses by means of bodily pressure and implements, damaging doors/walls.
- Smashed glazing in windows and doors.
- Using bodily pressure and implements in order to damage fencing / netting surrounding the park.
- Using off road vehicles or cars to cause damage to grass fields within the park.

## 2.5 Theft (Parks): Risk Analysis



The data below relates to thefts within / against parks, recorded in the Manchester area during 2018 - 2019.



- 2.5.1 **Day / Time Range:** The risk of theft at parks in Manchester peak on a Saturday and Sunday during the afternoon and into the evening. Offenders have targeted properties located within the park, climbing on roofs and removing lead from the building. Offenders have also targeted insecure bikes, scooters, phones and bags, grabbing the property and making off out of the area.

## 2.6 Vehicle Crime: Risk Analysis

The data below relates to vehicle crime committed within 500m of the site.



- 2.6.1 **Day/Time Range:** The risk of vehicle crime peaks on Friday in the evening (18:00-20:00). Offenders often target vehicles at this time when they tend to be left unattended and out of sight of the owners for long periods of time, creating a perceived low risk opportunity for offenders.

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## 3 Layout Appraisal

### 3.1 Proposed development

- 3.1.1 Full planning application and Listed Building Consent for Castlefield Viaduct Phase Two, incorporating permanent use of Phase One as an urban park and associated alterations to site layout.

### 3.2 Positive Aspects of the Proposal

*The following proposed features would make a positive contribution to the prevention of crime and fear of crime.*

- 3.2.1 The main entrance to the site is gated and locked when the park is closed. There are anti climb measures to prevent climbing over the gate and adjacent boundary, into the development.
- 3.2.2 There is a large planter adjacent the entrance which will prevent vehicles from being driven towards the entrance, or into the park.
- 3.2.3 Armco barriers have been installed to protect the adjacent boundary fence and the parapet adjacent the staircase.
- 3.2.4 Access into the viaduct is restricted to those who have booked in advanced and there is a limited number of visitors allowed into the park at one time.
- 3.2.5 There is a monitored CCTV system that covers the existing development.
- 3.2.6 The proposed secondary access point will allow for more options for egress in the event of an emergency.

### 3.3 Changes Needed and Recommendations

*The following points have been identified for further consideration and would need to be addressed for Design for Security to support the proposed scheme.*

- 3.3.1 The proposed central visitor building should be built to Secured by Design standards with all doors, windows, and glazing certified to a burglary resistant standard (i.e. BS PAS 24). The building should be covered by an intruder alarm system. Entrances into the building should be illuminated.
- 3.3.2 The existing monitored CCTV system should be extended to phase 2 of the development. There should be sufficient illumination to ensure that the CCTV system can be effective when it is dark, and the viaduct is open. There should be good coverage of the visitor building and the proposed secondary exit.
- 3.3.3 Sightlines within the viaduct should be well maintained to enable staff to have good views throughout the development. The positioning of trees and vegetation should be designed to allow good views and to prevent the creation of any hiding spaces that could be misused.
- 3.3.4 The secondary access/egress point should be capable of being robustly secured when the development is closed. There should be a robust, full height, lockable gate at the entrance to the proposed staircase to restrict access and reduce the potential for misuse out of the viaducts opening times.
- 3.3.5 There should be robust policies in place for evacuation, lockdown, reporting of suspicious behaviour, and search procedures.

## 4 Management & Maintenance

- 4.1.1 The upkeep of a development over its lifetime can be crucial to the level of security and safety within. Aspects of a development, which are left to deteriorate, have the potential to attract further crime – a process known as ‘the broken window theory’. A maintenance plan should be drawn up to address issues such as:
- Litter removal
  - Repair to communal areas (lighting, signage, access controls)
  - Trimming and pruning to shrubs and trees

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## 5 Construction

- 5.1.1 Untidy sites and their surroundings can be littered with debris accessible to vandals who often use loose materials as missiles to commit crime. The client should take measures appropriate to secure their site during construction, and control pedestrian and vehicular access in to and out of the site curtilage. It is also recommended that the contractor on this scheme is a member of the 'Considerate Constructors Scheme', who has committed to be a considerate and good neighbour, as well as clean, respectful, safe, environmentally conscious, responsible and accountable.
- 5.1.2 Site security contractors should be SIA (Security Industry Authority) approved to ensure professional standards are adhered to (please see <http://www.sia.homeoffice.gov.uk/pages/acs-intro.aspx> for more details).

## 6 Useful References

### 6.1 Secured by Design (SBD)

- 6.1.1 Secured by Design focuses on crime prevention at the design, layout and construction stages of homes and commercial premises and promotes the use of security standards for a wide range of applications and products. To apply for Secured by Design certification for your development, visit our online application form at: <http://www.designforsecurity.org/secured-by-design/sbd-accreditation/>

## A Contact register

| Date       | Contact With  | Summary of Contact       |
|------------|---------------|--------------------------|
| 11/06/2024 | Marc Zablotny | CIS application received |
| 11/06/2024 | Simon McNulty | CTSA meeting             |
| 20/06/2024 | n/a           | Site visit               |
|            |               |                          |
|            |               |                          |
|            |               |                          |
|            |               |                          |

## B Associated Documents

This report is based on the following drawings and supplementary information submitted by the applicant.

| Drawing No.      | Drawing Title                  | Date | Rev |
|------------------|--------------------------------|------|-----|
| 12.2413 (GA)000  | - Masterplan                   |      |     |
| 12.2413 (GA)002  | - Phase 2 landscape masterplan |      |     |
| 12. 2413 (PL)003 | - Site plan                    |      |     |
| 2024-06-04       | C Via Phase 02 Pre-App         |      |     |
|                  |                                |      |     |
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|                  |                                |      |     |

PLEASE NOTE - In the event of any subsequent material changes to the scheme, it will be necessary for Design for Security to reassess the comments made within this report.

## C CIS Version History

| Version | Revisions Made | Date |
|---------|----------------|------|
| A       |                |      |
|         |                |      |