

CRIME IMPACT STATEMENT

2 SEYMOUR ROAD, CRUMPSALL, MANCHESTER

COMMUNITY CENTRE, INCLUDING CAFÉ, SHARED WORKSPACE, PRAYER HALL & CLASSROOMS

FOR: Minhaj Ul Quran International UK (MQI UK)

VERSION A: 17/05/2024

REFERENCE: 2009/0778/CIS/01

Greater Manchester Police

designforsecurity

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CPT
CRIME PREVENTION TEAM

2 Seymour Road, Crumpsall, Manchester

URN: 2009/0778/CIS/01

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Minor security additions/improvements required


This development has been assessed against the principles of 'Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design' (CPTED), in order to reduce the opportunities for crime and the fear of crime.

The layout of the proposed scheme is considered acceptable, as long as the issues discussed in more detail within Section 3.3 of this report are addressed, namely:

- Secure enclosure of sides and rear of the building out-of-hours to prevent access to where hidden doors and windows could be attacked unseen and where the partially hidden space could foster loitering/gathering, nuisance and anti-social behaviour issues. During operational hours, automatic vehicle gates/bollards should be utilised to limit vehicular access to all but staff/authorised personnel.
- Consideration should be given to the main entrance to the community centre being capable of being access-controlled if/when required (e.g. during quiet times or when classes/events for specific groups are being hosted). The interior of the building should be capable of being 'zoned', so that particular floors, areas or rooms can be secured while other areas of the building are in use.
- Prevention of unauthorised access to the roof of any single storey elements, maximised surveillance over parking areas and provision of secure cycle parking for staff and visitors.

If these issues can be addressed as described within the report and the other physical security measures are incorporated, we would be happy to support the development.

Please note: Greater Manchester Police Design for Security will recommend to the local planning authority that a planning condition is added that reflects the physical security specification listed within Section 4 of this report.



Bradley Hart MTCP

Design for Security Consultant

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1 Visual Audit

The site lies on the south side of Seymour Road, in the Crumpsall/Cheetham Hill area of north Manchester.

The site is currently occupied by a servicing/MOT garage building to the street frontage, with an external yard and garage colony to the rear – accessed through mesh gates to the west side of the building. The building itself is in a poor state of repair, with shutters and grilles securing its window/door openings.


To the immediate west of the site is a restaurant (at the junction of Seymour Road and Old Bury Road) and a parade of commercial/retail/takeaway units fronting onto Bury Old Road. There is a gated rear service area to the rear of the units, accessed off Seymour Road, which directly abuts the western boundary of the site (formed by high concrete panel fencing and barbed wire). Both the gates to the rear of the site itself and the rear of the adjacent commercial units were open/insecure when the site visit was carried out – leaving the hidden rear elevations of the premises accessible and potentially vulnerable to unseen, unauthorised access. The adjacent restaurant has been retro-fitted with overt security measures (such as ground and upper floor shutters and barbed wire) – indicating crime and disorder incidents have previously been experienced.

To the immediate east of the site is a similar car servicing garage/spares shop and external storage yard, beyond which are large residential properties – many of which are in multiple occupation.

On the opposite side of Seymour Road from the site is a high wall/fence to the King David School/Yavneh Yeshivah High School site – meaning the site benefit from little/no direct overlooking.

Part of the eastern boundary of the site abuts a small landscaped garden area to commemorate the former use of the land as a Wesleyan Cemetery, which lies at a lower ground level at the corner of a large surface car park serving a Tesco store (accessed off Thomas Street). The boundary to the site is defined by high fencing hidden by mature trees and vegetation.

The site lies on the edge of Cheetham Hill village, including a variety of retail, commercial and leisure uses, as well as licensed premises and hot food takeaways. While these can often provide legitimate activity and surveillance opportunities, such premises can sometimes be a focal point for crime and disorder incidents - particularly late at night/at the weekend.















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2 Crime Statistics & Analysis

2.1 Crime Summary

The data below is based on crimes recorded in the local area between 1st May 2023 to 31st April 2024.

Figure 1: Recorded Crime within 500m of Site

Domestic Burglary	Non-Domestic Burglary	Criminal Damage	Less Serious Wounding	Theft	Robbery	Serious Wounding	Theft from Motor Vehicle	Theft of Motor Vehicle	Bicycle Theft
23	12	71	412	55	25	7	32	20	11

2.1.1 The general volume of crime in the local area is high, with less serious wounding, criminal damage and theft being the most prevalent types of recorded crime. The site lies on the edge of Cheetham Hill district centre and these types of crime are typical of those experienced in or within close proximity of city/town/district centres – where there is often a concentration of retail, commercial and licensed premises, leading to a concentration of crime and disorder issues.


2.1.2 Less serious woundings have primary taken place around/off the main arterial routes of Bury Old Road (A665) and Middleton Road (A576), as well as the residential streets to the north-east of the site. Assaults, harassment and public order offences have been the most reported less serious woundings, with the majority of incidents involving disputes between unknown associates (occurring within retail, restaurant and licensed premises), as well as altercations between neighbours and cases of domestic violence. Criminal damage offences have primarily been against vehicles (smashing windows and damaging vehicle bodywork), as well as to residential properties (including damage to windows/doors and graffiti). The majority of theft offences have occurred in and around the district centre, where offenders have used pickpocketing and distraction methods to steal personal items, such as mobile phones, wallets and purses. Offenders have also targeted insecure items left on tabletops and benches in public spaces or restaurants.

2.1.3 As this Crime Impact Statement relates to a proposed community centre with prayer hall and shared workspace, the more detailed analysis below will look at use specific burglary/theft.


2.1 Non-Domestic Burglary (GM Community Centres): Risk Analysis

The data below relates to non-domestic burglary offences within/against community centres, recorded in the Greater Manchester area 2018-2019.

GM Community Centre Burglary – Day Range




GM Community Centre Burglary – Time Range



2.1.1 Day/Time Range: During the week, the risk of burglary at Greater Manchester community centres remains relatively consistent, with the exception of Tuesday – when it is slightly lower. During the day, the risk of burglary peaks in the early hours of the morning and during the early evening. At night, when it is dark and streets are quiet, offenders often perceive a lower risk of being observed or detected. During the early evening, community centres are likely to be at their busiest, meaning offenders posing as legitimate patrons can attempt to gain unauthorised access to restricted areas without being noticed.

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GM Community Centre Burglary – Point of Entry




2.1.2 Point of Entry: The following entry points and M.O.s have been the occurred most frequently:

- The majority of incidents have occurred through 'unknown' entry points, which is likely to have been where offenders posing as legitimate service users have gained entry to internal restricted areas by forcing doors, by tailgating or by targeting insecure doors unnoticed.
- Doors (particularly fire doors) have been forced open with bodily pressure/implements/tools or have been targeted when left insecure to gain access.
- Windows have also been prised open and targeted when insecure.
- The glazing within doors and windows has been smashed to gain entry.
- Shutters have been forced upwards/penetrated to gain access to the doors and windows behind them.


2.2 Theft (GM Community Centres): Risk Analysis

The data below relates to thefts within/against community centres, recorded in the Greater Manchester area 2018-2019.

Greater Manchester Community Centre Theft – Day Range



Greater Manchester Community Centre Theft – Time Range




2.2.1 Day/Time Range: Incidents of theft at Greater Manchester community centres peak on Monday and are lowest on Tuesday. During the day, the risk of theft is concentrated in the afternoon/early evening. This aligns with the standard opening and closing times for many community centres, when more people attend them and, therefore, the opportunities for theft are greater. The most routinely targeted items are items of personal property belong to patrons and staff members, particularly laptops, mobile phones and handbags.

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
2.3 Non-Domestic Burglary (GM Places of Worship): Risk Analysis

The data below relates to non-domestic burglary offences within/against places of worship, recorded in the Greater Manchester area 2018-2019.


GM Places of Worship Burglary – Day Range



GM Places of Worship Burglary – Time Range



GM Places of Worship Burglary – Point of Entry



2.3.1 Day Range: During the week, the risk of burglary at places of worship in Greater Manchester is greatest on Friday and Tuesday.

2.3.2 Time Range: During the day, the risk of burglary peaks in the evening and into the early hours of the morning. Offenders frequently target buildings at these times, when it is dark, streets are typically quieter than during the day and they are likely to be unoccupied, resulting in them perceiving a lower risk of being observed or identified than during daylight hours.

2.3.3 Point of Entry: Across Greater Manchester, the following entry points and MO's have been utilised most frequently at places of worship:


- Doors have been targeted most frequently, both to the front and rear of buildings, and have been either forced open with bodily pressure/implements or have been targeted when left insecure.
- Windows (particularly to the rear of buildings) have also been prised open or exploited when left insecure.
- The glazing within doors and windows has been smashed to gain entry.
- In cases where access has been recorded as 'unknown' or 'legitimate', it is likely that offenders have posed as legitimate users while buildings are open to access restricted/non-public areas unnoticed.

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
2.4 Theft (GM Places of Worship): Risk Analysis

The data below relates to thefts within/against places of worship, recorded in the Greater Manchester area 2018-2019.

GM Places of Worship Theft – Day Range



GM Places of Worship Theft – Time Range




2.4.1 Day Range: During the week, the risk of theft at Greater Manchester places of worship is greatest on Thursday, Friday and Sunday.

2.4.2 Time Range: The risk of theft is greatest during the afternoon and into the early evening. During the day, when the majority of places of worship are open to the public, there are more opportunities for offenders to access buildings and private areas/rooms anonymously, before targeting both personal property (such as laptops, purses, bags etc.) and property belong to the place of worship. Offenders have also targeted building materials, particularly lead flashing, copper piping and paving slabs.


2.5 Non-Domestic Burglary (Manchester Offices): Risk Analysis

The data below relates to non-domestic burglary offences within/against offices, recorded in the Manchester area 2018-2019.

Manchester Office Burglary – Day Range



Manchester Office Burglary – Time Range




2.5.1 Day Range: During the week, the risk of burglary at office premises in Manchester is greatest on Tuesday, Thursday and Sunday.

2.5.2 Time Range: During the day, the risk of burglary at Manchester office premises rises into the evening/late at night. Such premises are often targeted at these times when they are closed and unoccupied, meaning offenders can attempt to gain unauthorised access without fear of being disturbed or identified.

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Manchester Office Burglary – Point of Entry




2.5.3 Point of Entry: The majority of burglaries at offices in Manchester have been committed through doors. The majority of burglaries against office buildings do not appear to be opportunistic, with offenders often bringing tools with them that can be used to force open doors and cut locks. Offenders have also smashed glazed panels in doors and windows to gain entry. A large proportion of burglaries have been committed through 'unknown' and 'legitimate' points of entry, which are likely to have been where offenders (posing as legitimate customers, visitors or employees) have gained unauthorised access to staff only areas (i.e. through insecure doors, tailgating etc.) to steal property.


2.6 Theft (Manchester Offices): Risk Analysis

The data below relates to thefts within/against offices, recorded in the Manchester area 2018-2019.

Manchester Office Theft – Day Range



Manchester Office Theft – Time Range



2.6.1 Day Range: During the week, the risk of theft at Manchester offices is greatest on Monday and Tuesday and is generally lower over the weekend (when many are shut).


2.6.2 Time Range: During the day, the risk of theft is concentrated during normal working hours – peaking around midday. During these times, many office workers will take their lunch breaks, leaving unattended property at desks or in insecure areas. Thefts can also often happen at the end of the working day, when members of staff are finishing work and premises is likely to be less secure, such as while cleaning operations are carried out.

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
2.7 Local Vehicle Crime: Risk Analysis

The data below relates to vehicle crime committed within 500m of the site.

Vehicle Crime – Day Range



Vehicle Crime – Time Range



2.7.1 Day Range: During the week, the risk of vehicle crime in the local area fluctuates – peaking on Tuesday, Thursday and Saturday.

2.7.2 Time Range: The risk of vehicle crime peaks in the local area peaks during the day and the early evening. It is likely that offenders target vehicles at these times when people park on streets and in car parks in the area for long periods of time, while working or shopping in the district centre or while visiting nearby places of worship. Vehicles parked on streets or within publicly accessible car parks, where they are easily accessible and cannot be easily overlooked by their owners, are often more vulnerable to attack than those parked within secure car parks/basement parking facilities.

2.8 Common Use-Specific M.O.s (Modus Operandi)

2.8.1 Having looked at the crime data for the site and the surrounding area, the most frequent MOs (modus operandi) used by offenders when targeting Greater Manchester community centres, Greater Manchester places of worship and Manchester offices are listed below, along with suggested measures to reduce the risk of them being utilised at the proposed development:

- GM Community Centres, GM Places of Worship & Manchester Offices: The majority of incidents have occurred through 'unknown' entry points, which is likely to have been where offenders posing as legitimate service users have gained entry to internal restricted areas by forcing doors, by tailgating or by targeting insecure doors unnoticed.

  Possible Solution – The main entrance to the centre and all internal areas/rooms restricted to staff and officials should operate on an access control system, to restrict unauthorised entry. All individual rooms should be capable of being secured when unoccupied and there should be a secure area for staff/officials to store their belongings while at the premises (see Sections 4.1/4.4).

- GM Community Centres, GM Places of Worship & Manchester Offices: Doors (particularly fire doors) and windows have been forced open with bodily pressure/implements/tools or have been targeted when left insecure to gain access.

  Possible Solution - All external doors and windows should be certified to recognised security standards (see Sections 4.1 & 4.2), which are independently proven to reduce the risk of forced entry and thus increase the chances of detection. It may be necessary for more vulnerable doors or windows to be fitted with security-certified shutters, bars, grilles or perforated metal/polycarbonate panels, in order to provide some additional protection (see Section 4.2). Good use of perimeter boundaries (see Section 4.6), lighting (see Section 4.7) and CCTV (see Section 4.8) can deter criminals from attempting entry by discouraging access to vulnerable areas and increasing the chances of them being seen by security personnel or passersby.

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- GM Community Centres, GM Places of Worship & Manchester Offices: The glazing within doors and windows has been smashed to gain entry.

  Possible Solution – All ground floor/accessible glazing (including in and around doors) should include a laminated pane (see Section 4.3), which forms a much more robust barrier against shattering and penetration. The strength of the laminated glass should be relative to the strength of the door or window system in which it is fitted. Where possible, the size of any glazed elements within/directly adjacent to doors should be reduced and set well away from locking points. 'Shopfronts' should also be secured with security-certified shutters out-of-hours (see Section 4.2).

- GM Community Centres: Shutters have been forced upwards/penetrated to gain access to the doors and windows behind them.

  Possible Solution - Roller shutters can appear secure in that they are difficult to penetrate, however physical security products are only as strong as their weakest component. A security-certified shutter (see Section 4.2) has an independently proven level of resistance, and ensures that all aspects of the shutter (locks, rails, laths etc.) have been scrutinised by professionals. If external shutters are used, the shutter boxes and guides should be built into the fabric of the building if possible to deter tampering/attack.

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3 Layout Appraisal

3.1 Proposed Development

3.1.1 The proposal is to erect a part 1/2/3 storey community and Islamic centre, with associated parking. The centre will provide cultural and community focused activities, events, courses, classes and workshops for residents and local workers in the area.

3.1.2 The building will occupy the north-eastern portion of the site, with a vehicular access route off Seymour Road to the west of the building (fitted with automating bollards) leading to a car park comprising of 14 no. spaces for staff members enclosed with 1800mm high walls/fencing. The building itself will incorporate a café, servery and kitchen and a shared workspace and meeting pods at ground level, in addition to a prayer hall with its own dedicated entrance/foyer, storage and ablution hall (as well as a rear service entrance). The first floor of the building will house an additional shared workspace/meeting pods, a meeting room, a classroom/flexible space and female prayer hall, with associated ablutions hall, W/Cs and plant room. The second floor of the building will be formed by a meeting space/classroom along with a rooftop garden/allotment area.

3.1.3 The building will be operational Monday to Thursday 13:00 to 20:00, Friday 12:00 to 20:00 and Saturday & Sunday 11:00 to 16:00. The community centre elements of the building will close on Fridays to accommodate the Faith Centre on it's main day of prayer. Similarly, the Faith Centre will close on weekdays to accommodate the occupancy of the community centre. The building will be operated by 2 no. admin staff, 1 no. manager and 3 no. teachers.

3.2 Positive Aspects of the Proposal

The following proposed features would make a positive contribution to the prevention of crime and fear of crime.

3.2.1 The proposed development will bring additional activity, overlooking and surveillance to the area.

3.2.2 The glazed façades of the proposed building offer both surveillance opportunities over the street, side access route and parking area and a greater level of artificial light onto the surrounding public realm.

3.2.3 The principal entrances to the building will be along the western elevation of the building, where they will be capable of being seen from the street. Only the service entrance will be hidden to the rear of the building.

3.2.4 The community and worship portions of the building will be largely separate, allowing each use to be independently secured when the other is in use to prevent unauthorised access.

3.2.5 The proposed development provides the opportunity to include security features integral to the design and construction of the building and avoid the need for obtrusive retro-fitted security measures that can increase the fear of crime. Security measures carefully incorporated into the design can ensure the building is reasonably secure, without visibly announcing that the design was concerned about crime.

3.3 Points for Further Consideration

The following points have been identified for further consideration and would need to be addressed for Design for Security to support the proposed scheme.

3.3.1 As proposed, the sides and rear of the site will be enclosed with 1800mm high walls/fencing, with automatic bollards to the site entrance to limited vehicular access to all but staff. Outside of operational hours/at night, this will leave the sides and rear of the site open and accessible to pedestrians – where hidden doors and windows could be attacked unseen and where the partially hidden space could foster loitering/gathering, nuisance and anti-social behaviour issues – particularly in this high crime area (see Section 2). The west side and rear of the building should be enclosed with 2100-2400mm high boundaries (see Section 4.6 for more details), with pedestrian and vehicular gates at the site entrance that can be secured out-of-hours to prevent unauthorised access. During operational hours, the vehicular gate/s could be automatically operated via staff key-fob or a manual gate could be locked open and automatic bollards utilised to limit vehicular access to all but staff/authorised personnel. The narrow space between the eastern elevation of the building and the adjacent vehicle garage should also be closed off along the front building line to prevent unauthorised access.

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3.3.2 The proposed building is likely to have numerous uses and facilities, frequented by a large numbers of visitors and a wide range of user groups within the community. This can provide opportunities for criminals to legitimately and anonymously enter the building and target vulnerable areas. Consideration should be given to the main entrance to the building being capable of being access-controlled, so that the entrance can be secured if/when required but visitors can still contact officials/staffs if they wish to enter (see Section 4.1 for more information). The community centre and faith centre elements of the building will be capable of being independently used and secured, but in additional to this, the whole interior of the building should be capable of being 'zoned' (see Section 4.4) so that particular floors, areas or rooms can be secured while other areas of the building are in use (e.g. preventing access to upper floors when an event is being staged at ground floor level).

3.3.3 Given the retro-fitted anti-climb measures apparent in the locale, the eaves of the single-storey element (above the service entrance) should be as high as possible and designed to discourage climbing (e.g. with rounded/overhanging eaves, high balustrades etc.). There should be no features of the building or nearby hard/soft landscaping features that may provide climbing aids on the roof/up to upper floor windows. Any upper floor windows potentially accessible from the roof of single-storey elements (either to the building itself or adjacent buildings) should be to the same physical security specification as those at ground level (see Sections 4.2 & 4.3).

3.3.4 Surveillance opportunities should be maximised over the parking area, which should be well-lit (see Section 4.7) and covered by CCTV (see Section 4.8) ideally monitored from within the building. Any secure cycle store for the use of officials/staff members must be a secure enclosure, with an access-controlled gate (see Section 4.10 for more information). Public cycle parking areas should be located in a well-overlooked location and should allow visitors to secure their cycles within lockers or to stands that allow multi-point locking (also see Section 4.10).

3.3.5 It is essential that all of the physical security measures listed below are incorporated into the scheme. Integrated, risk-commensurate security measures aim to place secure physical barriers or surveillance in the path of the criminal – making crime harder to commit and raising the risk of detection and possible capture, as well as promoting a feeling of safety in users.

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4 Physical Security

The following checklist forms the physical security requirements for this scheme to achieve Secured by Design accreditation.

4.1 External Doors

- ☐ All external doors (both single and double leaf) must be compliant with and certified to BS PAS 24, STS 202 or LPS 1175 SR2.
- ☐ It is recommended that the main entrance to the community portion of the building (located on the western elevation) is secured with a multi-point electronic lock permitted as part of the certification, capable of being operated via an audio-visual access control system linked to a staff office. Centre officials or staff should be able to remotely secure and control access through main entrance if/when required (e.g. during quiet times or when classes/events for specific groups are being hosted). The external entrance to the prayer hall (also located on the western elevation) should be secured and only opened when it is in use/supervised.
- ☐ The service entrance to the rear of the building should also be security-certified, self-closing/locking and secured with a multi-point electronic lock permitted as part of the certification, operated by staff key-fob.
- ☐ Any external escape-only doors should also be security-certified to one of the above standards. It is crucial that the door ironmongery is permitted for use on these doors under the security certification of the product. All escape-only doors should be alarmed (audible upon opening) and designed without visible external ironmongery.

4.2 Windows

- ☐ Windows should be compliant with and certified to BS PAS 24 or LPS 1175 SR2 where possible. All other window designs/dimensions should take account of the requirements of the above standards, as certified products can carry dimensional restrictions. Any curtain walling panels should include laminated glazing (see below) and should be fixed with a secure glazing retention system (e.g. with security glazing tape, with a dedicated security sealant/gasket or a secure mechanical fixing system from the glazing retention tests within the BS PAS 24 or LPS 1175 standards).
- ☐ Any ground floor/potentially accessible opening lights (escape requirements permitting) should be lockable and have fixed/lockable opening restrictors (not releasable from the outside) limited to 100mm.
- ☐ If any shutters are to be installed, they should be tested and certified to LPS 1175 SR2 (or SR1 if perforated laths are required) and installed in accordance with manufacturer's instructions. Ideally, any external shutters should have shutter-boxes and guides built into the fabric of the building – where they would be less vulnerable to attack and less visually intrusive.

4.3 Glazing & Building Fabric

- ☐ All ground floor and first floor glazing should incorporate at least one pane of glass with a 1.5mm PVB interlayer (e.g. 7.5mm laminated glass), or a glass rated as P4A under EN 356. The remaining pane in a double glazed unit may be toughened glass.
- ☐ There should be a block work wall (or material of similar strength e.g. welded-steel mesh) behind any cladding to the building, to a minimum height of 2000mm from external ground level, to ensure that the fabric of the building itself is not vulnerable to attack.
- ☐ There should be no features of the building (such as louvered features that could be used as a ladder, projecting window cills or brickwork features, canopies, exposed rainwater down pipes etc.) or nearby hard/soft landscaping features (such as nearby low walls/planters, trees, lighting columns, handrails etc.) that may provide climbing aids up to upper floor windows. Any large glazed panels at ground floor level that could be vulnerable to damage from vehicles should be protected by anti-ram bollards or hard landscaping features.
- ☐ Consideration should be given to an anti-graffiti coating to any large expanses of blank walls (e.g. such as 'easy-on' protective coating, please see www.urbanhygiene.com for more information) that prevent it from adhering to the surface. If the surface is defaced, it can then be easily and quickly removed.

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4.4 Internal Security

☐ The proposed building includes a number of uses and facilities and is likely to be frequented by large numbers of visitors and a wide range of user groups. This can provide opportunities for criminals to legitimately and anonymously enter the building and target vulnerable areas without being noticed. It is therefore highly recommended that the building is capable of being 'zoned' – with all floors/areas of the building capable of being independently secured when they are not in use, in order to prevent unauthorised access when other parts of the building are occupied. All internal doors/frames to each floor (off the stair/lift lobbies) and to each of the prayer halls, offices, meeting rooms, classrooms and stores/plant rooms should be solid core (FD30 or higher), with 3 hinges and a manual deadlock or an electronic lock operated by staff key card/fob, so that they can be secured when unoccupied.

☐ Any cash rooms/offices and any other rooms containing valuable equipment (such as audio/visual equipment, computers etc.) should have solid masonry walls, no adjacent false/suspended ceilings and a security-certified doorset (i.e. to BS PAS 24). All high value equipment should be property marked and securely fixed or stored to deter damage/theft. An accurate record should be maintained which logs all such items.

☐ There should be a secure area for staff/officials to store their belongings whilst at the centre, secured with a self-closing/locking solid-core door (ideally operated by staff key card/fob). Any lockers must be robust/secure and all users must be encouraged to use them and not leave belongs unattended.

☐ Any electric locking system to be used throughout the building/site should be fully auditable (i.e. allows the retention of data, such as who accessed where and when), to allow for a better investigation into any incidents. Cards/fobs should be capable of being easily and quickly activated/disabled to ensure that mis-use is prevented. Staff should only be allowed access to areas required for their work and keys/passes should only be carried if required for duties and should be accounted for at all times. The use of numeric keypads is not advised, as codes can be easily observed or shared and are rarely changed.

☐ The internal layout of the café premises should be carefully considered, so as to maximise surveillance over customers and reduce the opportunities for criminals to exploit. Customers entering/leaving the premises should be easily observed by staff, who should also have clear views of the access to the upper floors and W/Cs to monitor their use. The internal layout the premises should be generally uncluttered with few places for concealment, allowing staff to monitor customer behaviour. The precise arrangement of internal furnishings should aid circulation and aim to achieve a balance between intimacy and visibility. Consideration should be given to a high and wide bar, which increase the distance between staff and any potentially aggressive patrons and aid surveillance of all parts of the premises. Tills should be positioned away from customers' reach, but preferably fronting towards customers. Casual access to the rear of the servery should be prevented (e.g. with a lockable hatch that cannot be easily scaled). It is highly recommended that customer tables are fitted with Chelsea Clips, to reduce the opportunities for theft (see below).



4.5 Alarm

☐ A comprehensive intruder alarm system should be installed to cover the building, linked to contacts on all external doors and PIR detectors to rooms with accessible windows. It is strongly recommended that any alarm system is monitored, with a response facility (i.e. linked to a recognised Alarm Receiving Centre, who will alert the key holder or a security patrol team).

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4.6 Boundaries

- ☐ The west side and rear of the site should be enclosed with walls, close-boarded timber fencing or railings and pedestrian/vehicular gates to a height of 2100-2400mm from external ground level (please see https://www.securedbydesign.com/member-companies/accredited-product-search for a list of Police approved perimeter security suppliers). Care should be taken to ensure that any boundaries formed by a combination of walls and fencing/railing panels should have panels that are fixed flush with the outer skin of the brickwork below, leaving no steps/gaps that would provide a climbing aid. Horizontal slated fencing panels are not recommended as they can act as a ladder to aid scaling.

- ☐ During the day/operational hours, the pedestrian gate at the site entrance can remain open to allow access and either an automatic vehicular gate/s or automatic bollards should be utilised, controlled via staff card/key-fob on access and egress (i.e. no induction loop), to prevent unauthorised use of the car park. If double gates are used, they should overlap when closed and should not be capable of being forced open. Care should be taken to ensure that any fencing/railing panels are fixed securely to the posts (preventing tampering/removal) and that any level changes do not inadvertently facilitate climbing or leave large gaps underneath panels/gates. There should be no centrally located horizontal bars to aid climbing and the gates should be located away from other climbing aids, such as low walls, streetlights, trees etc. Exposed hinges and large sliding bolt apertures/locking points should be avoided, or fitted with shrouding/protective plates (see opposite for example) to avoid the creation of footholds. The gap at the bottom of any gates should be small enough to stop anyone crawling through.



- ☐ The narrow space between the eastern elevation of the building and the adjacent vehicle garage should also be closed off along the front building line with 2100-2400mm high railings or a gate, to prevent unauthorised access.

- ☐ Care should also be taken to ensure there are no trees or any other hard landscaping features (such as street furniture, lighting columns, bins etc.) immediately adjacent and on the publicly accessible side of any secure boundaries that could be used as a climbing aid to scale the fencing. Any such features should be pruned or removed where possible. Any existing lighting columns immediately adjacent to new fencelines may need to be fitted with anti-climb collars.

4.7 Car Park & Lighting

- ☐ Lighting to all parking areas should be in accordance with BS 5489, with an average lux level 20 and a uniformity level of no less than 25%.

- ☐ Dusk ‘til dawn lights, operated by photoelectric cell/daylight sensor, should be installed to all external doors.

- ☐ Fittings should produce ‘white’ light, as opposed to yellow/orange light. LED (or bulbs with a comparable output) should be used, as these offer superior colour rendition over alternatives such as high and low pressure sodium bulbs. Lighting fixtures must not be positioned to provide climbing aids over boundary treatments or up to high level windows. Electrical and architectural layouts should be developed together to avoid this.

- ☐ The surface of the car park should be even concrete/tarmac. The integrity of the surface treatment should be maintained to ensure that there is no loose material that can be used to commit crime.

- ☐ Bays should be clearly demarcated to avoid confusion or conflict, with pedestrian routes/directions clearly signed.

4.8 CCTV

Any CCTV system that may be used within this proposal will require certain specifications and intelligent placement of cameras to compliment the design of the development. Designers should consider the following points when planning a CCTV strategy:

- ☐ CCTV systems (and lighting that support them) require regular cleaning and maintenance to remain effective.

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- ☐ Where necessary cameras that are vulnerable to damage should be protected from attack either by relocation to a higher level and using a bigger lens to achieve the view required or through the fitting of a vandal resistant housing.
- ☐ With regards to the retention of footage, the police prefer quality over quantity. The overall retention period should be dictated by what the system is designed to achieve, though it would be better to have good quality images over a 14-day period than poor ones over a 30-day period.
- ☐ Procedures for recovery of recordings are recommended to be established (e.g. trained staff / the CCTV system instruction manual to be readily available). This is to ensure that the images produced will be of an *acceptable standard* that will allow for *identification* of an individual which will stand up to scrutiny in court.

  Acceptable Standard - this generally requires a resolution of 720x576 pixels at a real time frame rate of 25 frames per second. (N.B. Both the camera and DVR must be capable of this – if the camera will only send low resolution images then it does not matter how high the resolution of the recording unit is).

  Identification – One of three levels of field of view. To identify an individual, the image must capture no less than 120% of the field of view (at least from the top of the individuals head to their knees). The remaining two levels of field of view are *overview* and *recognition*, which whilst effective for observational purposes, are less likely to result in the identification of a person/offender.
- ☐ The intelligent placement of cameras helps to provide clear facial identification of individuals. Suitable locations would be: all entrances and facades of the building, all external and internal circulation areas and all vehicle/cycle parking areas.

4.9 Landscaping

- ☐ Any landscape features (hard or soft) should not impede natural surveillance of/from the building or reduce the effectiveness of lighting or CCTV coverage (see above).
- ☐ In vulnerable locations such as around entrances, building facades, parking areas and along pedestrian routes, low planting should not exceed approx. 1000mm in height and tree canopies should fall no lower than approx. 2000m from the ground. This is in order to allow people to see their surroundings better, make a rational choice of routes and eliminate hiding places. A maintenance agreement should stipulate that these planting dimensions would be adhered to. Loose surface materials in publicly accessible areas of the scheme should be avoided. Small fragments of ground covering can be used as missiles against people, premises and parked vehicles (both to gain entry and to commit criminal damage).
- ☐ The robust management of any landscaped spaces is essential to encourage active use and enjoyment, whilst making abuse less likely to occur. Poor management and maintenance can lead to a downward spiral of neglect and loss of environmental quality, encouraging nuisance, vandalism and other anti-social or criminal behaviour. If signs of disorder (such as criminal damage, graffiti, littering etc.) are not repaired/removed immediately, they can often attract further abuse.
- ☐ Planting must be avoided that will aid climbing over boundary treatments. The security of fences can be compromised if trees or street furniture are placed close by.

4.10 Other

- ☐ It is highly recommended that cycle stores or lockers are sourced from an SBD supplier - please see Accredited Product Search (securedbydesign.com). If not, any staff cycle store should ideally be of steel-framed construction, with welded-wire mesh panels/roofs and lockable gates (with no exposed hinges or large sliding bolt apertures that could form a climbing aid) and containing 'Sheffield' style stands. Any cycle parking area for public use should be located where it can be well-overlooked from within the building and should also include 'Sheffield' stands, which both wheels and the crossbar can be locked to rather than just the crossbar (wheel slots and butterfly racks are not suitable). There should be no open shelter provided, which may foster loitering/gathering, nuisance and anti-social behaviour. For further information refer to our cycle storage guidance document: http://designforsecurity.org/downloads.
- ☐ Any external bin/recycling stores should be secure, lockable and fire resistant enclosures. A strategy should be defined to ensure waste collection can take place whilst retaining a secure development.

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5 Management & Maintenance

5.1.1 A comprehensive security regime for the management of the site/building must be prepared and remain in place for the day-to-day running of the site. It should include issues such as:

- Opening and closing of the site/building, including staff arrival and departure;
- Access-control procedures;
- Any cash management within premises;
- Management of any deliveries (servicing activities should not require any service doors to remain open unattended for prolonged periods); and
- Details of staff security training.

5.1.2 The upkeep of a development over its lifetime can be crucial to the level of security and safety within. Aspects of a development, which are left to deteriorate, have the potential to attract further crime – a process known as 'the broken window theory'. A maintenance plan should be drawn up to address issues such as:

- Litter/graffiti removal
- Repair to communal areas (e.g. lighting, signage, access controls, CCTV etc.)
- A weekly physical check of all perimeter fencing to check for evidence of breaches
- Trimming and pruning to any shrubs and trees

5.1.3 There should be regular reviews/exercises to ensure that security regimes and maintenance plans remain accurate, workable and up-to-date. All staff should understand and accept the need for security measures and it should be made east for people to raise concerns or report observations.

5.1.4 Adequate signage should be deployed in all areas not only to direct people throughout the site/building, but also to deter unauthorised access to staff-only/back-of-house areas.

6 Construction

6.1.1 Untidy sites and their surroundings can be littered with debris accessible to vandals who often use loose materials as missiles to commit crime. The client should take measures appropriate to secure their site during construction, and control pedestrian and vehicular access in to and out of the site curtilage. It is also recommended that the contractor on this scheme is a member of the 'Considerate Constructors Scheme', who has committed to be a considerate and good neighbour, as well as clean, respectful, safe, environmentally conscious, responsible and accountable.

6.1.2 Site security contractors should be SIA (Security Industry Authority) approved to ensure professional standards are adhered to (please see http://www.sia.homeoffice.gov.uk/pages/acs-intro.aspx for more details).

7 Useful References

7.1 Secured by Design (SBD)

7.1.1 Secured by Design focuses on crime prevention at the design, layout and construction stages of homes and commercial premises and promotes the use of security standards for a wide range of applications and products. To apply for Secured by Design certification for your development, visit our online application form at: http://www.designforsecurity.org/secured-by-design/sbd-accreditation/

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A Contact Register

Date	Contact With	Summary of Contact
8th February 2024	Glide Construction	Receipt of CIS instruction form
26th February 2024	Glide Construction	Email sent requesting plans
29th February 2024	Glide Construction	Pre-app information received
1st March 2024	Glide Construction	Quote issued with request for additional info
16th April 2024	Glide Construction	Confirmation of instruction/fee. Receipt of latest drawings
17th April 2024	Glide Construction	Request for additional info in lieu of D&A Statement
9th May 2024	Glide Construction	Receipt of additional info
13th May 2024	Glide Construction	Email sent re: timescales & payment
14th May 2024	GMP Finance Dept	Confirmation of payment

B Associated Documents

This report is based on the following drawings and supplementary information submitted by the applicant.

Drawing No.	Drawing Title	Date	Rev
-	Pre-Planning Application Document	July 2022	-
0256-(01) 011	Site Plan	-	-
0256-(01) 013	Location Plan	-	-
0256-(04) 002	Proposed Ground Floor Plan	-	-
0256-(04) 003	Proposed First Floor Plan	-	-
0256-(04) 004	Proposed Second Floor Plan	-	-
0256-(04) 005	Proposed Roof Plan	-	-
0256-(04) 006	Proposed East Elevation	-	-
0256-(05) 007	Proposed South Elevation	-	-
0256-(05) 008	Proposed West Elevation	-	-
0256-(05) 009	Proposed North Elevation	-	-
0256-(06) 019-	Proposed Section	-	-
0256-020	Proposed Bay Elevation	-	-
0256-022	Proposed Boundary Treatment	-	-

PLEASE NOTE - In the event of any subsequent material changes to the scheme, it will be necessary for Design for Security to reassess the comments made within this report.

C CIS Version History

Version	Revisions Made	Date
A		

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D Glossary

Burglary Resistance Standards

BS PAS 24
General security performance requirements for door/window assemblies.

An attack test standard for doorsets and windows. This is the minimum police requirement for Secured by Design dwellings, and is also applicable to French/double doors, and sliding doors.

BS EN 1627 (Security Ratings RC1 to RC6)
Windows, doors, shutters - Burglar resistance Requirements and classification

The classification system used in BS EN 1627 is aimed at the commercial market and is based on five elements:

a) Resistance of glazing

b) Performance of hardware

c) Resistance to static loading

d) Resistance to dynamic loading

e) Burglary resistance by manual intervention

LPS 1175 (Security Ratings 1 to 6)
Specification for testing and classifying the burglary resistance of building components

This includes doors, shutters, garage doors and grilles typically for commercial premises and higher risk domestic premises and is acceptable to the ABI and the Police. The standard has 6 levels, 6 being the highest, with levels 1 and 2 equivalent in many respects to BS PAS 24 and BS 7950.

STS 201
Enhanced security requirements for doorsets and door assemblies for dwellings to satisfy the requirements of PAS 24

STS 202
Requirements for burglary resistance of construction products including hinged, pivoted, folding or sliding doorsets, windows, curtain walling, security grilles, garage doors and shutters.

This specifies a broadly similar range of attack tools and times to those specified at the lower levels of LPS 1175.

BS EN 356 (Ratings P1A to P8A)

Glass in building. Security glazing. Testing and classification of resistance against manual attack.

A performance standard for manual attacks on glazing. P2A is comparable to the performance of a 6.8mm laminated glass, and P4A to that of a 9.5mm laminated glass.

Commonly Used Acronyms

CIT
Cash in transit (refers to vehicles, personnel and routines).

CPTED
Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design

CRS
Crime Reduction Specialist. Sometimes known as CPO (Crime Prevention Officer)

INPT
Integrated Neighbourhood Policing Team.

PVB/PolyVinyl Butyral (Glazing interlayer)
A commonly used interlayer used in the production of laminated glass.

LPCB (Loss Prevention Certification Board)
A brand of the BRE Global (Building Research Establishment) family. The LPCB work with insurers, Government, police, designers, manufacturers, contractors and end users to develop methods of assessing performance and reliability of security products to ensure their fitness for purpose.

UKAS (United Kingdom Accreditation Service)
The sole national accreditation body recognised by government to assess, against internationally agreed standards, organisations that provide certification, testing, inspections and calibration services.

Useful Websites

Design for Security
www.designforsecurity.org

Secured by Design
www.securedbydesign.com

RIBA Product Selector
www.ribaproductselector.com

LPCB – Red Book Live
www.redbooklive.com

Crime Reduction (Home Office)
www.crimereduction.homeoffice.gov.uk

DAC (Design Against Crime) Solution Centre
www.designagainstcrime.org

Building for Life
www.buildingforlife.org

CLG (Communities and Local Government)
www.communities.gov.uk

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