

CRIME IMPACT STATEMENT

137 OXFORD ROAD, MANCHESTER

GROUND FLOOR COMMERCIAL UNIT WITH ANCILLARY BASEMENT FACILITIES & 20 no. UPPER FLOOR STUDENT APARTMENTS

Greater Manchester Police

designforsecurity

FOR: Soller Eight Ltd.

VERSION A: 08/07/2024

REFERENCE: 2021/0056/CIS/01

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137 Oxford Road, Manchester

URN: 2021/0056/CIS/01

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Minor design changes/security additions required


This development has been assessed against the principles of 'Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design' (CPTED), in order to reduce the opportunities for crime and the fear of crime.

The layout of the proposed scheme is only considered acceptable if the issues discussed in more detail within Section 3.3 of this report are addressed, namely:

- The entrance lobby, lift/stair core and cycle store serving the student accommodation portion of the building should be entirely separate from the commercial space at ground and basement levels – with no internal linkages between them – which could provide opportunities for offenders to exploit. If this is absolutely unachievable, walls and doors between uses must be of a secure standard to deter unauthorised access as much as possible.
- The bin store to the rear of the building must be securely enclosed and the narrow route between the bin store and the existing wall should be gated at it's outermost point to prevent unauthorised access. The disabled parking space to the rear building must be defined for short-term customer use only and must not be used on a long-term basis by residents or staff.
- Robust access controls for student accommodation residents/visitors, including a secure system for the delivery of post and parcels.

If these issues can be addressed as described within the report and the other physical security measures are incorporated, we would be happy to support the development.

Please note: Greater Manchester Police Design for Security will recommend to the local planning authority that a planning condition is added that reflects the physical security specification listed within Sections 4 & 5 of this report.



Bradley Hart MTCP

Design for Security Consultant

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Contents

1 Visual Audit 5

2 Crime Statistics & Analysis 6

2.1 Crime Summary

2.2 Local Crime Rate Comparison

2.3 Local Domestic Burglary: Risk Analysis

2.4 Local Vehicle Crime: Risk Analysis

2.5 Non-Domestic Burglary (Manchester Retail): Risk Analysis

2.6 Theft (Manchester Retail): Risk Analysis

2.1 Non-Domestic Burglary (Manchester Restaurants/Cafés): Risk Analysis

2.2 Theft (Manchester Restaurants/Cafés): Risk Analysis

2.3 General Risk Factors

2.4 Common Use-Specific M.O.s (Modus Operandi)

3 Layout Appraisal 15

3.1 Proposed Development

3.2 Positive Aspects of the Proposal

3.3 Points for Further Consideration

4 Physical Security (Residential) 17

4.1 Doors & Access Controls

4.2 Windows

4.3 Glazing & Building Fabric

4.4 Alarms

4.5 Boundaries

4.6 Lighting

4.7 CCTV

4.8 Other

5 Physical Security (Commercial Unit) 20

5.1 Doors & Access Controls

5.2 Windows & Shutters

5.3 Glazing & Building Fabric

5.4 Alarms

5.5 Lighting

5.6 CCTV

6 Internal Layout Guidance 22

6.1 Retail Premises

6.2 Cafe/Restaurant Premises

7 Management & Maintenance 24

8 Construction 25

9 Useful References 25

9.1 Secured by Design (SBD)

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Appendix

A Contact Register 26
B Associated Documents 26
C CIS Version History 26
D Glossary 27

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1 Visual Audit

The site lies at the junction of Oxford Road and Grosvenor Street, on the southern edge of Manchester city centre.

It is occupied by a 4 storey vacant building, with boarded-up frontages along the back edge of pavement. The facades of the building have been covered with posters and graffiti.

Such vacant buildings can often be the focus of nuisance/anti-social behaviour issues and criminal activity. If signs of disorder (such as graffiti, smashed glazing etc.) are not repaired/removed immediately, they can attract further abuse and trigger a downward spiral of neglect and loss of environmental quality - giving the impression that such sites are not owned or cared for by anybody and that crime and disorder is tolerated.

On the opposite side of Oxford Road from the site is All Saints Park – a small landscaped park surrounded by university buildings.

Oxford Road itself is a wide route, busy with vehicular and pedestrian traffic, which houses a number of university uses, commercial properties and licensed premises serving the primarily student population. There are a number of hot food takeaway units immediately adjacent to the site, along Oxford Road, and on the opposite side of Grosvenor Street from the site. There are also a number of licensed premises to the immediate east and south of the site. Such uses, which open late into the night, can provide legitimate activity and passive surveillance to an area, but can also attract crime and disorder issues and can foster nuisance and anti-social behaviour problems, particularly late at night and at the weekend.

To the immediate east of the site is a narrow, rear access alleyway running to the rear of the units fronting onto Oxford Road, which includes a number of parking spaces, refuse stores and rear access to the units. The route benefits from limited levels of activity, surveillance and overlooking and the adjacent buildings have been heavily fortified with shutters and bars/grilles to door and window openings.



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2 Crime Statistics & Analysis

2.1 Crime Summary

The data below is based on crimes recorded between 1st June 2023 to 31st May 2024.

Figure 1: Recorded Crime within 500m of Site

Domestic Burglary	Non-Domestic Burglary	Criminal Damage	Less Serious Wounding	Theft	Robbery	Serious Wounding	Theft from Motor Vehicle	Theft of Motor Vehicle	Bicycle Theft
29	47	137	674	315	59	12	166	16	112

2.1.1 The general volume of crime over the past 12 months in the local area has been high for the Manchester district – particularly levels of less serious wounding and theft. These types of crime are typical of those experienced in or within close proximity of city centres where there is often a higher concentration of retail, commercial and licensed premises, leading to a higher number of crime and disorder issues. The surrounding area also includes a number of university and hospital campuses, as well as a large student population. Students tend to be more vulnerable to crime due to a number of factors including their age, lifestyle, income, tenure, employment status, occupancy and accommodation type.


2.1.2 Recorded crimes have occurred throughout the area, with particular concentrations to the north (around/off Oxford Street/Whitworth Street West/Whitworth Street), along the Oxford Road corridor and around/off Cambridge Street. Less serious woundings have mostly occurred in public spaces or within/around the various drinking establishments to the north of the site - with assaults, harassment, and public order offences being the most reported. The majority of incidents have involved disputes between known associates, with alcohol consumption often being a factor. The majority of theft offences have also occurred in public spaces throughout the local area, as well as within retail outlets and university buildings. Offenders have primarily used pickpocketing and distraction methods in order to remove items from a person (such as mobile phones, wallets/purses etc.), as well as targeting insecure items left on tabletops and benches (such as bags, laptops etc.).

2.1.3 As this Crime Impact Statement relates to a proposed residential development for students and a commercial unit, the more detailed analysis below will look at residential burglary, vehicle crime and use-specific burglary/theft.


2.2 Local Crime Rate Comparison

The rates below relates to crime committed within 500m of the site. England & Wales data was last recorded for January – December 2021.

Comparison of Burglary Dwelling Rates at Site (km), Manchester and Greater Manchester



Comparison of Wounding Rates at Site (km), Manchester and Greater Manchester




2.2.1 The rate of domestic burglaries (i.e. incidents per 1,000 dwellings) in the local area is **63% lower** than the rate for Manchester as a whole, **52% lower** than the rate for Greater Manchester and **51% lower** than the rate for England & Wales.


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2.2.2 The rate of woundings (i.e. incidents per 1,000 dwellings) in the local area is **20% lower** than the rate for Manchester as a whole, **9% higher** than the rate for Greater Manchester and **109% higher** than the rate for England & Wales.

Comparison of Criminal Damage Rates at Site (km), Manchester and Greater Manchester



Comparison of Vehicle Crime Rates at Site (km), Manchester and Greater Manchester




2.2.3 The rate of incidents of criminal damage (i.e. incidents per 1,000 dwellings) in the local area is **10% lower** than the rate for Manchester as a whole, **18% higher** than the rate for Greater Manchester and **44% higher** than the rate for England & Wales.

2.2.4 The rate of incidents of vehicle crime (i.e. incidents per 1,000 dwellings) in the local area is **29% higher** than the rate for Manchester as a whole, **112% higher** than the rate for Greater Manchester and **158% higher** than the rate for England & Wales.


2.3 Local Domestic Burglary: Risk Analysis

The data below relates to domestic burglaries committed within 500m of the site.

Domestic Burglary – Day Range



Domestic Burglary – Time Range




2.3.1 Day Range: During the week, the risk of domestic burglary in the local area peaks on Wednesday and Friday.

2.3.2 Time Range: In the local area, the risk of burglary peaks late at night and during the early hours of the morning – when it is dark, streets tend to be quieter than during the day and offenders perceive a lower risk of being detected or identified.

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Domestic Burglary – Point of Entry




2.3.3 Point of Entry: In the local area, the following entry points and MOs have been utilised most frequently:

- In cases where the entry point is unknown, offenders are likely to have exploited insecure windows and doors, have posed legitimate visitors or have tailgated residents to gain unauthorised access without being noticed. Students generally tend to be less security conscious and can leave windows and door insecure – particularly when properties are in multiple occupation.
- Doors have also been forced open by offenders to gain access.
- Windows have been prised open using bodily pressure/implements.
- Glazing with windows and doors has been smashed to gain entry.


2.4 Local Vehicle Crime: Risk Analysis

The data below relates to vehicle crime committed within 500m of the site.

Vehicle Crime – Day Range



Vehicle Crime – Time Range



2.4.1 Day Range: During the week, the risk of vehicle crime in the local area peaks on Saturday, but remains relatively consistently high throughout the week.


2.4.2 Time Range: During the day, the risk of vehicle crime in the local area rises in the afternoon/early evening. University staff/students and hospital staff/patients/visitors often park their vehicles in the local area during the day, where offenders know that vehicles will be left unattended for long periods, leaving them potentially vulnerable. Vehicles parked on streets or within open, communal areas/car parks - where they are easily accessible and cannot be easily overlooked by their owners - are often more vulnerable to attack than those parked on the driveways of individual properties or within secure parking facilities. Theft from a motor vehicle and criminal damage to a vehicle are the most prevalent types of vehicle crime, with offenders smashing windows or picking locks to steal items, removing vehicle parts/reg plates and smashing windows/scratching paint to cause damage.

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
2.5 Non-Domestic Burglary (Manchester Retail): Risk Analysis

The data below relates to non-domestic burglary offences within/against retail facilities, recorded in the Manchester area 2018-2019.


Manchester Retail Burglary – Day Range



Manchester Retail Burglary – Time Range



Manchester Retail Burglary – Point of Entry



2.5.1 Day Range: The risk of burglary at retail premises in Manchester peaks slightly on Wednesday, but remains relatively consistently high across the week.

2.5.2 Time Range: During the day, the risk of burglary peaks late at night and during in the early hours of the morning. Offenders often target commercial premises at these times when they are closed, it is dark and the areas in which they are typically located are quiet - all of which contribute to offenders perceiving a lower risk of being observed or detected.

2.5.3 Point of Entry: In burglaries at Manchester retail premises, the following entry points and MOs have been utilised most frequently:


- A large proportion of burglaries have been committed through shutters, forcing them open by various means including using implements to force them upwards, using vehicles to ram them and using tools to cut through them.
- Offenders have also routinely forced open doors with bodily pressure and tools, as well as smashing glazed panels within them to gain unauthorised access.
- Windows have also been prised open or smashed by offenders.
- A high number of burglaries are recorded as having 'legitimate' or 'unknown' entry points. This is likely to have been where offenders have posed as legitimate customers before targeting restricted/back-of-house areas (such as staff rooms, stock rooms etc.) unnoticed.
- Offenders have gained access to premises by gaining access through the roofs of single-storey elements or by penetrating through walls.

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
2.6 Theft (Manchester Retail): Risk Analysis

The data below relates to thefts within/against retail facilities, recorded in the Manchester area 2018-2019.

Manchester Retail Theft – Day Range



Manchester Retail Theft – Time Range




2.6.1 Day/Time Range: During the week, the risk of theft at Manchester retail premises remains consistently high across the week. During the day, the risk of theft is concentrated in the afternoon and early evening. This is when retail premises are typically at their busiest and, therefore, the opportunities to offend are greater. The majority of thefts are either of staff property or of/from the handbags of shoppers (such as mobile phones, purses etc.). Thefts of staff property are more likely to be noticed at either midday, when lunch breaks are taken, or during the late afternoon when staff are leaving for the day.


2.1 Non-Domestic Burglary (Manchester Restaurants/Cafés): Risk Analysis

The data below relates to non-domestic burglary offences within/against restaurants and cafés, recorded in the Manchester area during 2018-2019.

M/cr Restaurant/Cafe Burglary – Day Range



M/cr Restaurant/Cafe Burglary – Time Range




2.1.1 Day Range: The risk of burglary at restaurants/cafes in Manchester fluctuates throughout the week, peaking on Monday, Thursday and Sunday.

2.1.2 Time Range: The risk of burglary peaks during the early hours of the morning, when premises are usually closed.

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M/cr Restaurant/Cafe Burglary – Point of Entry




2.1.3 Point of Entry: In the majority of cases where entry points are known, offenders have entered Manchester restaurants/cafes through external doors. Doors have been forced open with bodily pressure and tools/implements and glazing within doors/windows has been smashed to gain entry. Offenders have also posed as legitimate customers before targeting insecure doors, tailgating, or using force to open internal doors to restricted areas when premises are open to the public.

2.2 Theft (Manchester Restaurants/Cafés): Risk Analysis

The data below relates to thefts within/against restaurants and cafés, recorded in the Manchester area during 2018-2019.

M/cr Restaurant/Cafe Theft – Day Range



M/cr Restaurant/Cafe Theft – Time Range



2.2.1 Day Range: During the week, the risk of theft at Manchester restaurants/cafes peaks over the weekend. Many premises experience higher levels of attendance at the weekend than during the week. Premises are also usually open for longer at the weekend and so the opportunities for offenders to commit theft is greater.

2.2.2 Time Range: The risk of theft peaks in the afternoon and into the evening. This reflects the times when restaurants/cafes are typically at their busiest and, therefore, the opportunities to commit theft are greater. Handbags, purses/wallets and mobile phones belonging to customers are the most routinely stolen items. Offenders have also targeted I.T equipment within premises, particularly tablets and laptops, as well as alcohol from storage rooms.

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2.3 General Risk Factors

2.3.1 Residential: The typical security risks for a development of this nature are:

- Domestic burglary
- Bogus callers and distraction burglary
- Criminal damage to property and vehicles
- Theft from gardens, sheds or garages
- Anti-social behaviour
- Theft of/from parked vehicles
- Unauthorised access to buildings/private space
- Tailgating (pedestrian and vehicular)
- Neighbour disputes
- Poor maintenance of access control systems
- Theft and criminal damage during the construction period

2.3.2 Retail: The typical security risks for a development of this nature are:

- Burglary
- Robbery
- Shoplifting
- Violence towards staff
- Theft of personal belongings at work
- Criminal damage to property and vehicles
- Unauthorised access to buildings/private space
- Arson
- Employee theft
- Loitering groups
- Theft of/from parked vehicles
- Theft and criminal damage during the construction period

2.3.3 Restaurants & Cafes: The typical security risks for a development of this nature are:

- Burglary
- Robbery to business
- Criminal damage to property
- Alcohol-fuelled violence/conflict
- Miscellaneous theft to customers
- Rowdy and inconsiderate behaviour
- Conflict of use with neighbouring venues
- Violence towards staff
- Safety of staff personal belongings
- Robbery/wounding of patrons leaving premises
- Theft and criminal damage during the construction period

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2.4 Common Use-Specific M.O.s (Modus Operandi)

2.4.1 Having looked at the crime data for the site and the surrounding area, the most frequent MOs (modus operandi) used by offenders when targeting local residential properties and Manchester retail premises are listed below, along with suggested measures to reduce the risk of them being utilised at the proposed development:

- Local Residential: In cases where the entry point is unknown/legitimate, offenders are likely to have exploited insecure windows and doors, have posed legitimate visitors or have tailgated residents to gain unauthorised access without being noticed.

  Possible Solution - All external doors should be certified to recognised security standards (see Section 4.1), which are independently proven to reduce the risk of forced entry and thus increase the chances of detection. A robust access control system should be in place to allow the concierge/residents to vet visitors before allowing them access to the development. Consideration could also be given to 'airlock' lobby system, which features a secondary entrance door that only releases when the external door has closed, reducing the opportunities for tailgating unnoticed. The main communal entrance/s should also be located in a highly visible position and should be well-lit to deter offenders from trying to gain unauthorised access.

  All individual apartments should also be secured with a security-certified entrance doorset (also Section 4.1), to ensure that any offender who may have gained access to the building (e.g. by tailgating, posing as a legitimate visitor etc.) cannot gain further access without drawing the attention of other residents. Doors off internal corridors should not be located in deep recesses, where an offender could operate without fear of detection.

  All ground floor/accessible windows should also be certified to recognised security standards (see Section 4.2), with key operated locks and opening restrictors. Windows to accessible elevations should be protected by some defensible space, to define them as entirely separate from the street and offer them some protection from unauthorised access as well as nuisance/anti-social behaviour.

  All private spaces to the sides/rear of the buildings should be robustly enclosed, particularly where adjacent to publicly accessible space, to deter unauthorised access (see Section 4.5). Open pedestrian routes/accessible land to the rear of the properties should be avoided. Lighting to the front and rear of dwellings can also deter and reveal potential intruders, as well as reduce the fear of crime (see Section 4.6).

- Local Residential: Doors have also been forced open by offenders to gain access.

  Possible Solution - See above.

- Local Residential: Windows have been prised open using bodily pressure/implements.

  Possible Solution - See above.

- Local Residential: Glazing with windows and doors has been smashed to gain entry.

  Possible Solution - All ground floor/accessible glazing should include a laminated pane, which forms a much more robust barrier against shattering and penetration (see Section 4.3). Where possible, the size of any glazed elements within/directly adjacent to doors should be reduced and set well-away from locking points.

- Manchester Retail: A large proportion of burglaries have been committed through shutters, forcing them open by various means including using implements to force them upwards, using vehicles to ram them and using tools to cut through them

  Possible Solution - Roller shutters can appear secure in that they are difficult to penetrate, however physical security products are only as strong as their weakest component. A security-certified shutter (see Section 5.2) has an independently proven level of resistance, and ensures that all aspects of the shutter (locks, rails, laths etc.) have been scrutinised by professionals. If external shutters are used, ideally the shutter boxes and guides should be built into the fabric of the building to deter tampering/attack.

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- Manchester Retail & Restaurants/Cafes: Doors have been forced open with tools and bodily pressure to gain entry

  Possible Solution - All external doors should be certified to recognised security standards (see Section 5.1), which are independently proven to reduce the risk of forced entry and thus increase the chances of detection. Security-certified doors are the best long-term measure to address this risk and can be obtained to suit virtually all operational requirements. Good use of perimeter boundaries, lighting (see Section 5.5) and CCTV (see Section 5.6) can also deter criminals by preventing access to vulnerable areas and increasing the chances of them being seen by security personnel or passers-by.

- Manchester Retail: Windows have also been prised open or smashed by offenders

  Possible Solution - All external windows should be certified to recognised security standards (see Section 5.2) where possible, which are independently proven to reduce the risk of forced entry and thus increase the chances of detection. All ground floor/accessible glazing (including in and around doors) should include a laminated pane (see Section 5.3), which forms a much more robust barrier against shattering and penetration. Vulnerable shopfronts should be secured with security-certified shutters out-of-hours.

- Manchester Retail & Restaurants/Cafes: A high number of burglaries are recorded as having 'legitimate' or 'unknown' entry points. This is likely to have been where offenders have posed as legitimate customers before targeting restricted/back-of-house areas (such as staff rooms, stock rooms etc.) unnoticed

  Possible Solution – There should be a secure area for staff to store their belongings while at work and all staff-only, back-of-house areas should be secured to prevent unauthorised public access (see Section 5.1).

- Manchester Retail: Offenders have gained access to premises by gaining access through the roofs of single-storey elements or by penetrating through walls.

  Possible Solution - Ideally, single storey building elements should be avoided. If they are absolutely necessary, care should be taken in their design to ensure that roof areas or upper floor windows are not accessible, for example, with the use of high-level/overhanging eaves, high balustrades etc. There should be no features of the building or any nearby hard/soft landscaping features that would facilitate climbing. Any 'accessible' skylights should incorporate at least one pane of laminated glazing and should be secured with internally fixed grilles/bars to prevent unauthorised access. The construction of the roof itself and all external walls should also be robust enough to withstand penetration.

- Manchester Restaurants/Cafes: Glazing in doors and windows has been smashed to gain access

  Possible Solution – All ground floor/accessible glazing (including in and around doors) should include a laminated pane (see Section 5.3), which forms a much more robust barrier against shattering and penetration. The strength of the laminated glass should be relative to the strength of the door or window system in which it is fitted. Where possible, the size of any glazed elements within/directly adjacent to doors should be reduced and set well away from locking points.

- Manchester Restaurants/Cafes: Theft of personal property from table tops or from bags hung on chairs or stored under tables

  Possible Solution – Consideration should be given to tables and chairs designed to facilitate secure storage of belongings or adapted with 'Chelsea Clips' to reduce the opportunities to steal bags/coats (see Section 6). The layout of any bars/restaurants/lounges can also help deter occurrences and increase surveillance opportunities. It should be generally uncluttered, allowing clear views of all spaces and avoiding any pinch points or areas of concealment. External seating areas should be enclosed to clearly define them as separate from adjacent pedestrian routes.

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3 Layout Appraisal

3.1 Proposed Development

3.1.1 The proposal is to convert and extend the existing building to provide a large commercial unit at ground floor level (with ancillary facilities at basement level) and 4 no. upper floors comprising of a total of 20 no. student apartments. To the rear of the building will be a enclosed resident's bin store and 1 no. disabled parking space.

3.1.2 The ground floor commercial unit will front onto Oxford Road and will comprise of a sales/commercial area, staff service counter and W/C at ground level and a store, 2 no. offices/stores, a cycle store/staff shower and changing room and a plant room at basement level. The basement of the building will also incorporate a resident's cycle store served by the residential passenger/cycle lift. The student accommodation portion of the building will be served by an entrance lobby accessed off Grosvenor Street and the upper floors of the building will each comprise of 5 no. studio apartments and a communal laundry room.

3.2 Positive Aspects of the Proposal

The following proposed features would make a positive contribution to the prevention of crime and fear of crime.

3.2.1 The proposed development will bring a derelict building back into active use and provide additional activity, overlooking and natural surveillance to the area at all times of the day and night.

3.2.2 The building will present active frontages to Oxford Road and Grosvenor Street, enlivening the street scene and helping to provide useful natural surveillance over the surrounding public realm.

3.2.3 The principal residential entrance to the building and the external entrance to the ground floor commercial unit will be entirely separate and located in prominent positions, capable of being clearly seen from the public realm.

3.2.4 The proposed student apartments will be provided well above street level, meaning that residents' possessions cannot be easily observed and unauthorised entry is more effectively prevented. This also reduces the potential impacts of excessive noise, nuisance and anti-social behaviour (particularly at night).

3.2.5 The layout of the student accommodation corridors provide clear views and contain no recessed areas that could conceal criminal activity.

3.2.6 The proposed development provides the opportunity to include security features built into the design and construction of the building and avoid the need for obtrusive retro-fitted security measures that can increase the fear of crime. Security measures carefully incorporated into the design can ensure the building is reasonably secure, without visibly announcing that the design was concerned about crime.

3.3 Points for Further Consideration

The following points have been identified for further consideration and would need to be addressed for Design for Security to support the proposed scheme.

3.3.1 As proposed, the commercial unit will have internal doors linking to the student accommodation lift/stair core at ground and basement levels. This arrangement provides opportunities that offenders could exploit. The entrance lobby, lift/stair core and cycle store serving the student accommodation portion of the building should be entirely separate from the commercial space at ground and basement levels. This will eliminate any confusion/conflict, prevent any residents or visitors gaining unauthorised access to the commercial unit and prevent commercial staff or patrons gaining unauthorised access to the residential floors. If this is absolutely unachievable, any internal doors between uses at ground and basement levels should at least be security-certified (see Section 5.1) and alarmed, to deter unauthorised access. Internal walls between uses should also be robust enough to withstand penetration (see Section 5.3).

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3.3.2 If the narrow route between the secure resident's bin store and the existing wall to the rear of the building is left open/publicly accessible, it could foster loitering/gathering, nuisance and anti-social behaviour, as well as leave the hidden door to the rear of the building vulnerable to attack unseen. The bin store must be securely enclosed to prevent theft/mis-use and the route between the bin store and the existing wall should be gated at its outermost point to prevent unauthorised access (see Section 4.5 for more information). The disabled parking space to the rear building will be somewhat hidden/isolated and will benefit from limited levels of overlooking from within the building. It must be defined for short-term customer use only and must not be used on a long-term basis by residents or staff - leaving their vehicle vulnerable (particularly at night).

3.3.3 The main communal residential entrance to the building should be formed by a single-leaf, self-closing doorset secured with a multi-point electronic lock permitted as part of the security-certification, operated remotely via a video access control system (see Section 4.1 for more information). In addition to a robust access control system for visitors, there should also be a secure system for the delivery of post that does not require access to all floors of the building. Given the emerging trend of parcel thefts (particularly at apartment blocks) there should also be a secure system for depositing parcels, such as the smart parcel boxes used by the major internet shopping companies, incorporated within a secure postal lobby (see Section 4.1 for more information).

3.3.4 It is essential that all of the physical security measures listed below are incorporated into the scheme. Integrated, risk-commensurate security measures aim to place secure physical barriers or surveillance in the path of the criminal – making crime harder to commit and raising the risk of detection and possible capture, as well as promoting a feeling of safety in residents, visitors, staff and customers.

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4 Physical Security (Residential)

In addition to the layout issues highlighted in Section 3, the following checklist (Sections 4 & 5) forms the physical security requirements for this scheme to achieve Secured by Design accreditation if required.

4.1 Doors & Access Controls

- ☐ All external doorsets should be compliant with and certified to BS PAS 24, STS 201 or LPS 1175 SR2. It is crucial that the door ironmongery to any external escape-only doors is permitted under the security certification of the product. All escape-only doors should be alarmed (audible upon opening) and designed without visible external ironmongery.
- ☐ The main communal entrance to the student accommodation (off Grosvenor Street) should be security-certified to one of the above standards, single-leaf, self-closing and secured with a multi-point electronic lock permitted as part of the certification, operated by resident key-fob and capable of being operated via an electronic access control system. The entrance should be capable of being controlled by means of a video entry phone system (with the picture viewable on the phone unit, rather than on a television set), so that residents can confirm the identity of visitors before allowing them access.
- ☐ There should be a secure system for the delivery of post without needing to provide access to all floors of the building. Ideally, postal delivery arrangements should allow for external deposits and internal withdrawals by residents. If not, there should be a 'secure lobby' arrangement with a secondary communal door to the same security specification as the outer door, to allow for deliveries to postboxes within a secure postal lobby without providing access to other areas/floors of the blocks. The postboxes themselves should be certified to Door & Hardware Federation Technical Specification 009 (TS 009), with letter box apertures to a maximum size of 260mm x 40mm (incorporating anti-fishing measures). There should also be a secure system for depositing parcels within the secure postal lobby, such as the smart parcel boxes used by the major internet shopping companies. All other deliveries should be made directly to residents via the access control system.
- ☐ The rear entrance to the building should be a security-certified (see above), ideally single-leaf, self-closing/locking doorset secured with a multi-point electronic lock permitted as part of the certification, operated by resident key-card/fob only on access and egress.
- ☐ All individual internal apartment entrance doorsets must also be compliant with and certified to BS PAS 24, SPS 201 or LPS 1175 SR2. It is advised that these doors do not have fixed sidelights and are provided with door viewers instead. Chain limiters are recommended, but not generally essential.
- ☐ The internal doorsets to the communal laundry rooms on each level should be self-closing/locking and solid-core (min. 44mm thick), with 3 hinges and electrically operated lock controlled by resident key-fob/card. The basement cycle store should be secured with a self-closing/locking doorset compliant with and certified to BS PAS 24, STS 201 or LPS 1175 SR2, with a multi-point electronic lock permitted as part of the certification, operated by resident key-fob/card. Further information relating to the cycle store can be found within Section 4.8.
- ☐ Given the likely transient nature of the student residents of the scheme, any resident fob/key-cards should be capable of being easily and quickly activated/disabled by the landlord to ensure that mis-use is prevented. Any keys should be collected by the landlord (and accounted for at all times) when residents move on.

4.2 Windows

- ☐ All ground and first floor windows, where possible, should be certificated to BS PAS 24. All other window designs/dimensions should take account of the requirements of the above standards, as certified products can carry dimensional restrictions. Any curtain walling panels should include laminated glazing (see below) and should be fixed with a secure glazing retention system (e.g. with security glazing tape, with a dedicated security sealant/gasket or a secure mechanical fixing system from the glazing retention tests within the BS PAS 24 or LPS 1175 standards).

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☐ Any ground and first floor opening lights, escape requirements permitting, must be key-lockable and have fixed/lockable opening restrictors not releasable from the outside, limited to 100mm.

4.3 Glazing & Building Fabric

☐ All ground and first floor glazing must incorporate at least one pane of glass rated as P1A under EN 356. The remaining pane in a double glazed unit may be toughened glass.

☐ There should be no features of the building (such as projecting canopies/window cills, projecting façade details etc.) or nearby hard/soft landscaping features (such as nearby lighting columns, street furniture etc.) that may provide climbing aids up to upper level windows or over boundaries.


4.4 Alarms

☐ Ideally, each student apartment should have an intruder alarm fitted to comply with BS EN 50131. Alarms should be linked to contacts on apartment entrances and PIR detectors covering any accessible rooms with windows.

☐ Any escape only doors should be alarmed 24/7 and should be signed as such to deter casual use.

4.5 Boundaries

☐ The resident's bin store to the rear of the building should be enclosed with walls and lockable steel gates to a minimum height of 2100mm. The narrow route between the bin store and the existing wall should be gated at its outermost point (see illustration opposite) to prevent unauthorised access to this hidden space. The gate itself should also be to a minimum height of 2100mm, of steel construction, self-closing/locking and secured with a multi-point lock operated by resident key or fob.



☐ Mid-point horizontal elements, exposed hinges and large sliding bolt apertures/locking points to any gates should be avoided, or fitted with shrouding/protective plates to avoid the creation of footholds (see illustration opposite). The gaps at the bottom of any gates should be small enough to stop anyone crawling through. Any release mechanisms on the internal side of any pedestrian gate required for emergency egress purposes should not be capable of being reached/operated from the external face of the gates.



4.6 Lighting

☐ Dusk 'til dawn lights, operated by photoelectric cell/daylight sensor, should be installed to all external doors/gates.

☐ Fittings should produce 'white' light, as opposed to yellow/orange light. LED or bulbs with a comparable output should be used, as these offer superior colour rendition over alternatives such as high and low pressure sodium bulbs.

☐ Lighting fixtures must not be positioned to provide climbing aids over boundaries or up to high level windows. Electrical and architectural layouts should be developed together to avoid this.

4.7 CCTV

Any CCTV system that may be used within this proposal will require certain specifications and intelligent placement of cameras to compliment the design of the development. Designers should consider the following points when planning a CCTV strategy:

☐ CCTV systems (and lighting that support them) require regular cleaning and maintenance to remain effective.

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- [ ] Where necessary cameras that are vulnerable to damage should be protected from attack either by relocation to a higher level and using a bigger lens to achieve the view required or through the fitting of a vandal resistant housing.
- [ ] With regards to the retention of footage, the police prefer quality over quantity. The overall retention period should be dictated by what the system is designed to achieve, though it would be better to have good quality images over a 14-day period than poor ones over a 30-day period.
- [ ] Procedures for recovery of recordings are recommended to be established (e.g. trained staff / the CCTV system instruction manual to be readily available). This is to ensure that the images produced will be of an *acceptable standard* that will allow for *identification* of an individual which will stand up to scrutiny in court.

  Acceptable Standard - this generally requires a resolution of 720x576 pixels at a real time frame rate of 25 frames per second. (N.B. Both the camera and DVR must be capable of this – if the camera will only send low resolution images then it does not matter how high the resolution of the recording unit is).

  Identification – One of three levels of field of view. To identify an individual, the image must capture no less than 120% of the field of view (at least from the top of the individuals head to their knees). The remaining two levels of field of view are *overview* and *recognition*, which whilst effective for observational purposes, are less likely to result in the identification of a person/offender.
- [ ] The intelligent placement of cameras helps to provide clear facial identification of individuals. If a CCTV system is to be utilised, suitable locations for camera coverage would be: all facades of the building (including front and rear entrance doors), the main entrance lobby area, the lift/stair lobbies at each level and the basement cycle store.

4.8 Other

- [ ] The secure residential cycle store should include either secure lockers or stands that allow residents to lock both wheels and the crossbar to a stand rather than just the crossbar (wheel slots and butterfly racks are not suitable). For further information refer to our cycle storage guidance document: www.designforsecurity.org/all-downloads/.
- [ ] A strategy should be prepared to ensure waste collection can take place whilst retaining a secure development.
- [ ] Signage to indicate the name and address of the development, contact details of the management company and informing staff, residents and visitors that CCTV is in operation should be erected at the entrance to the building. Signage should also be erect to direct visitors, but also to deter unauthorised access to back-of-house/staff-only areas.

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5 Physical Security (Commercial Unit)

5.1 Doors & Access Controls

- ☐ All external doorsets should be compliant with and certified to BS PAS 24, STS 202 or LPS 1175 SR2. It is crucial that the door ironmongery to any external escape-only doors is permitted under the security certification of the product. Any letterboxes within doors must be located a minimum of 400mm away from internal handle and locking hardware.
- ☐ It is highly recommended that there are no internal doorsets providing access between the commercial and residential portions of the building, which could provide opportunities for offenders to exploit. Where this is absolutely unavoidable, any doorsets between uses at ground and basement levels must be compliant with and certified to BS PAS 24, STS 202 or LPS 1175 SR2. Any escape ironmongery should be permitted under the security certification of the product and they should be alarmed (and signed as such) to deter casual use or attack.
- ☐ All back-of-house/staff areas to any retail units or cafe/restaurant premises should not be publicly accessible. Internal access doors to staff/back-of-house areas and the doorsets to the basement storage rooms/offices, staff room, cycle store and plant room should be solid-core (minimum 44mm thick) and self-closing/locking - fitted with auditable access controls (i.e. proximity readers or swipe cards) or secured with keys. Any cash office should have solid masonry walls, no adjacent false/suspended ceilings and a certified doorset to BS PAS 24 or LPS 1175 SR2. Staff should only be allowed access to areas required for their work. Keys/passes should only be carried if required for duties and should be accounted for at all times.
- ☐ Any electric locking system to be used throughout the premises should be fully auditable (i.e. allows the retention of data, such as who accessed where and when), to allow for a better investigation into any incidents. Any staff cards/fobs should be capable of being easily and quickly activated/disabled to ensure that mis-use is prevented.

5.2 Windows & Shutters

- ☐ All windows should be compliant with and certified to BS PAS 24 where possible. All other window designs/dimensions should take account of the requirements of the above standards, as certified products can carry dimensional restrictions.
- ☐ Any curtain walling panels should include laminated glazing (see below) and should be fixed with a secure glazing retention system (e.g. with security glazing tape, with a dedicated security sealant/gasket or a secure mechanical fixing system from the glazing retention tests within the BS PAS 24 or LPS 1175 standards).
- ☐ Any shutters to be installed should be tested and certified to LPS 1175 SR2 (or SR1 if perforated laths are required) and installed in accordance with manufacturer's instructions. Ideally, any external shutters should have shutter-boxes and guides built into the fabric of the building – where they would be less vulnerable to attack and would be less visually intrusive.

5.3 Glazing & Building Fabric

- ☐ All glazing must incorporate internal pane of glass with a 1.5mm PVB interlayer (e.g. 7.5mm laminated glass), or a glass rated as P4A under EN 356. The remaining external pane in a double glazed unit may be toughened glass.
- ☐ Any internal walls between the commercial and residential portions of the building (at ground and basement levels) should either be of robust masonry construction or should incorporate timber sheathing (minimum 9mm thick) or expanded metal, in order to ensure that the building fabric is not vulnerable to attack/penetration.

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5.4 Alarms

☐ A monitored alarm system should be installed to cover the commercial unit, linked to contacts on all external doors/shutters and PIR detectors covering all ground floor areas with windows, with a signal terminating at a recognized Alarm Receiving Centre (ARC). The alarm itself should have two secure signalling paths (one being GSM radio back-up).

5.5 Lighting

☐ External lighting must be provided to the exterior of the building/surrounding public realm, in accordance with BS 5489. Dusk 'til dawn lights, operated by photoelectric cell/daylight sensor, should be installed to all external doors.

☐ Fittings should produce 'white' light, as opposed to yellow/orange light. LED or bulbs with a comparable output should be used, as these offer superior colour rendition over alternatives such as high and low pressure sodium bulbs.

☐ Lighting fixtures must not be positioned to provide climbing aids over boundaries or up to high level windows. Electrical and architectural layouts should be developed together to avoid this.

5.6 CCTV

Any CCTV system that may be used within this proposal will require certain specifications and intelligent placement of cameras to compliment the design of the development. Designers should consider the following points when planning a CCTV strategy:

☐ CCTV systems (and lighting that support them) require regular cleaning and maintenance to remain effective.

☐ Where necessary cameras that are vulnerable to damage should be protected from attack either by relocation to a higher level and using a bigger lens to achieve the view required or through the fitting of a vandal resistant housing.

☐ With regards to the retention of footage, the police prefer quality over quantity. The overall retention period should be dictated by what the system is designed to achieve, though it would be better to have good quality images over a 14-day period than poor ones over a 30-day period.

☐ Procedures for recovery of recordings are recommended to be established (e.g. trained staff / the CCTV system instruction manual to be readily available). This is to ensure that the images produced will be of an *acceptable standard* that will allow for *identification* of an individual which will stand up to scrutiny in court.

Acceptable Standard - this generally requires a resolution of 720x576 pixels at a real time frame rate of 25 frames per second. (N.B. Both the camera and DVR must be capable of this – if the camera will only send low resolution images then it does not matter how high the resolution of the recording unit is).

Identification – One of three levels of field of view. To identify an individual, the image must capture no less than 120% of the field of view (at least from the top of the individuals head to their knees). The remaining two levels of field of view are *overview* and *recognition*, which whilst effective for observational purposes, are less likely to result in the identification of a person/offender.

☐ The intelligent placement of cameras helps to provide clear facial identification of individuals. Suitable locations would be: commercial unit frontages/facades, the main entrance, internal circulation areas, all sales counters/till positions and any customer seating areas.

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6 Internal Layout Guidance

The internal layout of any retail units or café/restaurant premises should be carefully considered, so as to maximise surveillance over customers and reduce the opportunities for criminals to exploit. Design for Security understands that the designers and client may not always know who will be occupying their units once complete, and therefore, the end-user requirements. It is highly recommended that the following good practice principles are adopted where applicable, so as not to undermine the security of the building shell.

6.1 Retail Premises

6.1.1 Clear views should also remain from the premises through to the public realm, i.e. large promotional signs should not obstruct views.

6.1.2 Careful consideration should be given to the location of paypoints to ensure that staff have full surveillance over the entrance to the unit.

6.1.3 Internal aisles and product displays should be aligned to assist surveillance from pay points and avoid blind-spots. There should be no items of high-value displayed close to the entrance of the unit.

6.1.4 Consideration should be given to a chute deposit safe (certified to LPS 1183) behind any tills, or an alternative management practice, which would reduce the amount of cash held in tills during busy periods.

6.1.5 All back-of-house/staff areas should not be publicly accessible (see Section 5.1) and there should be a secure area for staff to store their belongings whilst at work.

6.2 Cafe/Restaurant Premises

6.2.1 Cafes/restaurants/licensed premises can, if poorly managed, generate crime for the following reasons:

- Opportunities - Large numbers of people congregating in restaurants/licensed premises generates opportunities for crime. Unlike on-street populations, patrons are stationary for long periods of time, making them easier to target.
- Lack of attention - The movement of people, noise, social interaction and other factors mean patrons can be easily distracted.
- Cohesion – Particularly during busy periods, the large numbers and wide variety of groups of people that tend to frequent restaurants/licensed premises means that such a venue would lack 'community territoriality' (i.e. regular customers displaying an awareness of and care for the environment around them). This can limit any self-policing that might otherwise occur.
- Customer turnover – High turnover with high levels of customer movement within an establishment, are more likely to allow offenders to go unnoticed.
- Valuable goods – Often available and possibly on show, a particular problem in external seating areas. Patrons are likely to carry small, valuable, concealable goods – such as mobile phones, purses, wallets, keys etc.
- Stealth - Busy venues provide the anonymity necessary to commit offences.

In order to minimise these issues, it is recommended that the following good practice principles are adhered to:

6.2.2 The main entrance to the premises must be effectively managed at busy periods to control numbers, ensure safe access/egress and avoid potential conflicts arising.

6.2.3 Customers entering/leaving the premises through the main entrance should be easily observed by staff. Staff should also have clear views of any W/Cs to monitor their use.

6.2.4 The internal layout of premises should be generally uncluttered with few places for concealment, allowing staff to monitor customer behaviour. The precise arrangement of internal furnishings should aid circulation and aim to achieve a balance between intimacy and visibility.

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6.2.5 Consideration should be given to high/wide bars/service counters, which increase the distance between staff and any potentially aggressive patrons and aid surveillance of all parts of the premises. Tills should be positioned away from customers' reach, but preferably fronting towards customers. Casual access to the rear of any bars/service counters should be prevented (e.g. with lockable hatches that cannot be easily scaled).

6.2.6 Consideration should be given to a chute deposit safe (certified to LPS 1183) behind any bar/till area, or an alternative management practice, which would reduce the amount of cash held in tills during busy periods.

6.2.7 All back-of-house/staff areas should not be publicly accessible (see Section 5.1) and there should be a secure area for staff to store their belongings whilst at work.

6.2.8 It is highly recommended that any customer tables are fitted with Chelsea Clips, to reduce the opportunities for theft (see below).



6.2.9 Public toilets can give rise to problems and the following issues should be considered:

- Fittings should be flush to avoid tampering and concealed cisterns, pipe work etc. should be used.
- Graffiti and vandal resistant materials, such as stainless steel, laminates and plastics should be considered.
- Consider hanging cubicle doors as outward opening as this will aid gaining access in an emergency. An alternative measure is to reduce toilet doors in size by a minimum of 200mm from the floor and to reduce the top height.
- Provide 'Chelsea Clip'/karibina style hooks on the back of cubicle doors or partitions for bags and coats.
- Consider the safety of vending machines. Cash boxes can be tampered with, consider fitting them with alarms.
- Consider setting out a rota and putting notices in toilet facilities that make users aware that regular checks will be carried out. A built in visited/checked chart should be provided.

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7 Management & Maintenance

7.1.1 A comprehensive security regime for the management of the student scheme must be prepared and remain in place for the day-to-day running of the site. There should be regular reviews/exercises to ensure that it remains accurate, workable and up-to-date. All staff and residents should understand and accept the need for security measures and it should be made easy for people to raise concerns or report observations to the facilities management team.

7.1.2 The upkeep of a residential development over its lifetime can be crucial to the level of security and safety within. Aspects of a development, which are left to deteriorate, have the potential to attract further crime – a process known as 'the broken window theory'. A maintenance plan should be drawn up to address issues such as:

- Litter/graffiti removal
- Repair to communal areas (e.g. boundary treatments, access controls, lighting, signage etc.)
- Trimming and pruning to shrubs and trees

7.1.3 Tennant key-cards should be capable of being easily and quickly activated/disabled by staff to ensure that mis-use is prevented.

7.1.4 Any high value equipment to communal areas (e.g. computers, flat screen monitors/televisions, tools etc.) should be property marked and securely fixed or stored to deter damage/theft. An accurate record should be maintained which logs all such items.

7.1.5 The operating/maintenance plans should also be prepared for the commercial unit, focusing on issues such as:

- Opening and closing of premises, including staff arrival and departure;
- Cash management within the premises - consideration should be given to a chute deposit safe (certified to LPS 1183) behind any bar/till area, or an alternative management practice, which would reduce the amount of cash held in tills during busy periods;
- Cash-in-transit collections/deliveries and banking practices (which should take place in a secure room with a certified safe to meet insurance needs);
- Management of stock deliveries (servicing activities should not require any service doors to remain open unattended for prolonged periods);
- Details of staff security training;
- Location and management of any smoking areas;
- Repairing damaged external and internal fittings, particularly security features e.g. access control systems, alarm systems, CCTV cameras, lighting etc;
- Cleaning and prompt removal of graffiti, litter etc; and
- Refuse collection arrangements.

7.1.6 The opening hours of any retail units or café/restaurant premises should be consistent with other such premises in the locale and should not unduly conflict with other nearby uses. Sufficient levels of service staff should be provided at busy periods to reduce waiting times and the potential for frustration, aggression and conflict.

7.1.7 Refuse collection arrangements should not require bins to be left accessible for extended periods. Servicing activities should also not require any service doors to remain open and unattended for prolonged periods.

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8 Construction

8.1.1 Untidy sites and their surroundings can be littered with debris accessible to vandals who often use loose materials as missiles to commit crime. The client should take measures appropriate to secure their site during construction, and control pedestrian and vehicular access in to and out of the site curtilage. It is also recommended that the contractor on this scheme is a member of the 'Considerate Constructors Scheme', who has committed to be a considerate and good neighbour, as well as clean, respectful, safe, environmentally conscious, responsible and accountable.

8.1.2 Site security contractors should be SIA (Security Industry Authority) approved to ensure professional standards are adhered to (please see http://www.sia.homeoffice.gov.uk/pages/acs-intro.aspx for more details).

9 Useful References

9.1 Secured by Design (SBD)

9.1.1 Secured by Design focuses on crime prevention at the design, layout and construction stages of homes and commercial premises and promotes the use of security standards for a wide range of applications and products. To apply for Secured by Design certification for your development, visit our online application form at: http://www.designforsecurity.org/secured-by-design/sbd-accreditation/

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A Contact Register

Date	Contact With	Summary of Contact
20th June 2024	AshtonHale	Receipt of CIS instruction form & plans
21st June 2024	AshtonHale	Quote issued & request for additional plans/info
21st June 2024	AshtonHale	Confirmation of instruction/fee. Additional plans/info to follow
8th to 9th July 2024	AshtonHale	Email correspondence re: report completion, payment & VAT receipt
9th July 2024	GMP Finance	Confirmation of payment

B Associated Documents

This report is based on the following drawings and supplementary information submitted by the applicant.

Drawing No.	Drawing Title	Date	Rev
060_SKE_240614_01	Proposed Basement and Ground Floor Plans	-	-
060_SKE_240614_02	Proposed First and Second Floor Plans	-	-
060_SKE_240614_03	Proposed Third and Fourth Floor Plans	-	-
060_SKE_240614_04	Proposed Roof Plan	-	-
060_SKE_240617_00	3D External Visualisation	-	-
060_SKE_240617_01	3D External Visualisation	-	-

PLEASE NOTE - In the event of any subsequent material changes to the scheme, it will be necessary for Design for Security to reassess the comments made within this report.

C CIS Version History

Version	Revisions Made	Date
A		

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D Glossary

Burglary Resistance Standards

BS PAS 24
General security performance requirements for door/window assemblies.

An attack test standard for doorsets and windows. This is the minimum police requirement for Secured by Design dwellings, and is also applicable to French/double doors, and sliding doors.

BS EN 1627 (Security Ratings RC1 to RC6)
Windows, doors, shutters - Burglar resistance Requirements and classification

The classification system used in BS EN 1627 is aimed at the commercial market and is based on five elements:

a) Resistance of glazing

b) Performance of hardware

c) Resistance to static loading

d) Resistance to dynamic loading

e) Burglary resistance by manual intervention

LPS 1175 (Security Ratings 1 to 6)
Specification for testing and classifying the burglary resistance of building components

This includes doors, shutters, garage doors and grilles typically for commercial premises and higher risk domestic premises and is acceptable to the ABI and the Police. The standard has 6 levels, 6 being the highest, with levels 1 and 2 equivalent in many respects to BS PAS 24 and BS 7950.

STS 201
Enhanced security requirements for doorsets and door assemblies for dwellings to satisfy the requirements of PAS 24

STS 202
Requirements for burglary resistance of construction products including hinged, pivoted, folding or sliding doorsets, windows, curtain walling, security grilles, garage doors and shutters.

This specifies a broadly similar range of attack tools and times to those specified at the lower levels of LPS 1175.

BS EN 356 (Ratings P1A to P8A)

Glass in building. Security glazing. Testing and classification of resistance against manual attack.

A performance standard for manual attacks on glazing. P2A is comparable to the performance of a 6.8mm laminated glass, and P4A to that of a 9.5mm laminated glass.

Commonly Used Acronyms

CIT
Cash in transit (refers to vehicles, personnel and routines).

CPTED
Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design

CRS
Crime Reduction Specialist. Sometimes known as CPO (Crime Prevention Officer)

INPT
Integrated Neighbourhood Policing Team.

PVB/PolyVinyl Butyral (Glazing interlayer)
A commonly used interlayer used in the production of laminated glass.

LPCB (Loss Prevention Certification Board)
A brand of the BRE Global (Building Research Establishment) family. The LPCB work with insurers, Government, police, designers, manufacturers, contractors and end users to develop methods of assessing performance and reliability of security products to ensure their fitness for purpose.

UKAS (United Kingdom Accreditation Service)
The sole national accreditation body recognised by government to assess, against internationally agreed standards, organisations that provide certification, testing, inspections and calibration services.

Useful Websites

Design for Security
www.designforsecurity.org

Secured by Design
www.securedbydesign.com

RIBA Product Selector
www.ribaproductselector.com

LPCB – Red Book Live
www.redbooklive.com

Crime Reduction (Home Office)
www.crimereduction.homeoffice.gov.uk

DAC (Design Against Crime) Solution Centre
www.designagainstcrime.org

Building for Life
www.buildingforlife.org

CLG (Communities and Local Government)
www.communities.gov.uk

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