CRIME IMPACT STATEMENT

EXISTING WAREHOUSE BOUNDED BY BURSTOCK STREET, PEARY STREET, BROMLEY STREET & BILBROOK STREET, MANCHESTER

TEMPORARY USE OF WAREHOUSE FOR MUSIC EVENTS

Greater Manchester Police

designforsecurity

FOR: Connecting Dots Group

VERSION A: 05/11/2024

REFERENCE: 2024/0379/CIS/01

Produced by Greater Manchester Police
Copyright reserved by The Chief Constable

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Security improvements recommended

This development has been assessed against the principles of 'Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design' (CPTED) and reviewed in terms of its likely impact upon its surroundings from crime and disorder and public safety perspectives.

The site is somewhat isolated from neighbouring developments by transport corridors, vacant premises/sites and open land, leaving the site itself, any pedestrians travelling to/from the site and any parked vehicles belongings to staff/patrons remote/isolated and potentially vulnerable. A combination of robust physical security measures and on-site security/management procedures must be in place to deter crime and anti-social behaviour from occurring, both on-site (during events and out-of-hours) and along the main movement routes to/from the site, including:

- In order to securely enclosed the site out-of-hours and allow the admission/dispersal procedures to operate effectively, the site must be enclosed with secure perimeter fencing and gates. There should be a single main access/egress point to the site, to allow security to be focussed on that location. The gates at the entrance to the site and the entrances to the building must not be left open/unattended on non-event days/during servicing activities, ensuring that no-one can access the site/building without being noticed.
- On-site security presence at all times when events are being staged and alarm/CCTV systems monitored off-site at all other times.
- Staffing and monitoring of main entrance to site during events to control numbers, ensure safe access/egress and avoid potential conflicts arising. Security staff should also ensure the swift and safe dispersal of customers once an event is over, encouraging them to use the safest and most direct routes into the city/towards the transport hub at Victoria Station.
- Although it is noted that city centre transport interchanges and off-street parking facilities are within easy walking distance, consideration should be given to the provision of a staffed parking facility on nearby vacant land when events are staged if at all possible, in order to give patrons a safe area to park their vehicles close to the site and discourage on-street parking on surrounding inactive streets (where parked vehicles could be vulnerable to attack).
- Any new or replacement doorsets, shutters, windows and glazing should be to Secured by Design (SBD) standards. All internal doors to back-of-house/staff areas should be access controlled to prevent unauthorised access, with a secure Manager's/cash office (if required) - non-cash payment methods are preferred and should be encouraged.

Subject to all reasonable efforts being made to address these issues, as described within the report, we would be happy to support the development.

The overall security of the proposed scheme will be heavily reliant on the continuous effective management of the venue, rather than just the physical measures recommended in this report. Comprehensive risk assessments should be carried out in advance of events, in order to identify and address potential security issues.



Bradley Hart MTCP

Design for Security Consultant

Produced by Greater Manchester Police
Copyright reserved by The Chief Constable

Contents

1 Visual Audit 4
2 Crime Statistics & Analysis 5
2.1 Crime Summary
2.2 Non-Domestic Burglary (GM Event Spaces): Risk Analysis
2.1 Theft (GM Event Spaces): Risk Analysis
2.2 Non-Domestic Burglary (Manchester Licenced Premises): Risk Analysis
2.3 Theft (Manchester Licenced Premises): Risk Analysis
2.4 Local Vehicle Crime: Risk Analysis
2.5 General Risk Factors
2.6 Common Use-Specific M.O.s (Modus Operandi)
3 Layout Appraisal 11
3.1 Proposed Development
3.2 Positive Aspects of the Proposal
3.3 Recommendations to Improve Security
4 Physical Security 13
4.1 Any External Alterations
4.2 Internal Security & Access Controls
4.3 Alarm
4.4 Boundaries
4.5 Lighting
4.6 CCTV
4.7 Landscaping
5 Internal Layout Guidance 16
6 Management & Maintenance 18
7 Construction 19
8 Useful References 19
8.1 Secured by Design (SBD)

Appendix

A Contact Register 20
B Associated Documents 20
C CIS Version History 20
D Glossary 21

Produced by Greater Manchester Police
Copyright reserved by The Chief Constable

1 Visual Audit

The site is bounded by Bromley Street to the north, Peary Street to the east, Burstock Street to the south and Bilbrook Street to the west, on the north-eastern edge of Manchester city centre.

The site is occupied by a vacant part single-storey, part two storey warehouse building in a poor state of disrepair, with surrounding hard standing areas partially enclosed with welded-wire mesh fencing, retaining walls and scrub vegetation. Many of the existing door/window opening have been fortified with external grilles and roller shutters, although some appeared to be open/insecure at the time the site visit was carried out.

To the north of the site is a railway line carrying frequent train and tram services to/from Victoria Station to the west. There are arches underneath the railway line to the west, many of which are shuttered and some of which are open – featuring significant accumulations of rubbish from fly-tipping, widespread graffiti and sheltered/hidden spaces that can foster crime and anti-social behaviour issues.

Bilbrook Street and Burstock Street to the east and south of the building have been fitted with metal posts and barriers to prevent vehicular access. The adjacent cleared sites to the east, south and west (many of which were formerly in use as informal surface car parks) are vacant and overgrown with scrub vegetation. They are enclosed with walls/timber hoardings that have been heavily graffitied, as has the building within the site.

Crime and anti-social behaviour are often more likely to occur if an offenders presence does not attract attention and a place feels like it is not under supervision. Such derelict sites can encourage loitering/gathering and foster nuisance, anti-social behaviour and criminal activity. If signs of disorder (such as graffiti, smashed glazing etc.) are not repaired/removed immediately, they can often attract further abuse and trigger a downward spiral of neglect and loss of environmental quality - giving the impression that such sites are not owned or cared for by anybody and that crime and disorder is tolerated.

Due to its location and proximity to major trunk roads, the area is popular for daytime commuter and evening event parking, with vehicles parked on-street and left unattended for long period of times. Any available space on nearby streets and small parcels of open/undeveloped land in the neighbourhood are routinely occupied with parked vehicles.

At present, the area generally benefits from very low levels of activity, footfall, passive surveillance and direct overlooking, although this will probably change in the coming years as significant planned regeneration takes place.

Copyright reserved by The Chief Constable

2 Crime Statistics & Analysis

2.1 Crime Summary

The data below is based on crimes recorded between 1st October 2023 to 30th September 2024.

Figure 1: Recorded Crime within 500m of Site

Domestic Burglary	Non-Domestic Burglary	Criminal Damage	Less Serious Wounding	Theft	Robbery	Serious Wounding	Theft from Motor Vehicle	Theft of Motor Vehicle	Bicycle Theft
23	24	63	144	68	15	<5	113	9	11

2.1.1 The general volume of crime in the local area is above average for the Manchester division, particularly when it is considered that the study area includes large areas of undeveloped land/vacant plots, large industrial sites, major transport corridors and landscaped open space, all of which lower the levels of development/population density and typically attract fewer crime and disorder incidents. The most prevalent types of recorded crime have been less serious wounding, vehicle crime, theft and criminal damage – with particular hotspots around/off Rochdale Road/Angel Street, Dantzic Street and Redbank

2.1.2 Less serious wounding crimes have mostly consisted of assaults and public order offences, taking place within dwellings, within business premises (usually physically or verbally assaults with victims known to the offender) and on streets (usually carried out by unknown offenders in the late evening/early hours of the morning) – often with alcohol consumption being a contributing factor. Vehicles parked in private car parks and on-street are most frequently targeted. Theft from motor vehicles has been the highest recorded type of offence, with offenders frequently smashing windows to gain access and steal items, as well as removing vehicle registration plates. A large proportion of criminal damage crimes have also targeted vehicles. In cases of theft offences, offenders have primarily targeted insecure items such as mobile phones, wallets and bags left on tabletops and benches in public spaces, restaurants and retail outlets, as well as many cases of parcels being stolen from doorsteps.

2.1.3 As this Crime Impact Statement relates to a proposed music venue (with an ancillary bar), the more detailed analysis below will focus on use-specific burglary and theft, as well as local vehicle crime.

2.2 Non-Domestic Burglary (GM Event Spaces): Risk Analysis

The data below relates to non-domestic burglary offences within/against event spaces, recorded in the Greater Manchester area 2018-2019.

GM Event Spaces Burglary – Day Range



GM Event Spaces Burglary – Time Range



2.2.1 Day Range: During the week, the risk of burglary at event spaces in Greater Manchester peaks on Monday and Sunday, when they are less likely to be in use.

2.2.2 Time Range: During the day, the risk peaks in the evening/late at night, when they are likely to be closed or have fewer employees on-site, meaning offenders perceive a lower risk of being detected.

Copyright reserved by The Chief Constable

GM Event Spaces Burglary – Point of Entry



2.2.3 Point of Entry: At Greater Manchester event spaces, the following entry points and MOs have been utilised most frequently:

- Doors have been targeted most frequently, with offenders forcing them with implements/bodily pressure or targeting them.
- Shutters have also been forced open to gain access to premises or the doors/windows behind them.

2.1 Theft (GM Event Spaces): Risk Analysis

The data below relates to thefts within/against event space, recorded in the Greater Manchester area 2018–2019.

GM Event Space Theft – Day Range



GM Event Space Theft – Time Range



2.1.1 Day Range: During the week, the risk of theft at event spaces in Greater Manchester peaks on Saturday, when venues are often at their busiest.

2.1.2 Time Range: During the day, the risk peaks late at night – with offenders targeting the belongings of customers/patrons and staff (particularly mobile phones and purses/wallets), often by using pick pocketing and distraction techniques.

Produced by Greater Manchester Police
Copyright reserved by The Chief Constable

2.2 Non-Domestic Burglary (Manchester Licenced Premises): Risk Analysis

The data below relates to non-domestic burglary offences within/against licenced premises, recorded in the Manchester area 2018-2019.

M/cr Licensed Premises Burglary – Day Range



M/cr Licensed Premises Burglary – Time Range



M/cr Licensed Premises Burglary – Point of Entry



2.2.1 Day Range: In Manchester, the risk of burglary at licensed premises peaks between Monday and Wednesday and is lowest on Friday.

2.2.2 Time Range: The risk of burglary is highest in the early hours of the morning. Burglaries at commercial premises frequently take place during the night, when they are closed and the areas/streets where they are typically found are quieter than during the day – meaning offenders perceive the risk of being detected or identified as low.

2.2.3 Point of Entry: In the majority of cases where entry points are known, offenders have entered licensed premises through external doors. Most commonly, doors have been forced open with bodily pressure and hand tools/implements. In a number of cases, glazing in doors and windows has been smashed by offenders to gain unauthorised access. Where the point of entry was legitimate/unknown, this is likely to have been when offenders have posed as legitimate customers to gain access to premises when they are open, before targeting insecure doors, tailgating, or using force to open internal doors to restricted areas.

Produced by Greater Manchester Police
Copyright reserved by The Chief Constable

2.3 Theft (Manchester Licenced Premises): Risk Analysis

The data below relates to thefts within/against licenced premises, recorded in the Manchester area during 2018-2019.

M/cr Licensed Premises Theft – Day Range



M/cr Licensed Premises Theft – Time Range



2.3.1 Day Range: During the week, the risk of theft at Manchester licensed premises peaks over the weekend. On these days, many premises within the city centre area experience higher levels of attendance than during the week. Premises are also usually open for longer at the weekend and so the opportunity for offenders to commit theft is greater.

2.3.2 Time Range: The risk of theft peaks late at night and into the early morning. This reflects the times when licensed premises are at their busiest and therefore the opportunities to commit theft are greater. Handbags, purses/wallets, cash and phones belonging to customers are the most routinely stolen items - usually stolen from table tops, from bags hung on chairs/stored under tables or via pickpocketing and distraction methods. Theft of property belonging to staff is also common, with offenders posing as legitimate customers to gain access to unauthorised areas.

2.4 Local Vehicle Crime: Risk Analysis

The data below relates to vehicle crime committed within 500m of the site between 1st October 2023 to 30th September 2024.

Local Vehicle Crime – Day Range



Local Vehicle Crime – Time Range



2.4.1 Day Range: The risk of vehicle crime in the local area remains consistently high through the week, peaking slightly on Friday.

2.4.2 Time Range: During the day, the risk rises in the afternoon and into the evening/early hours of the morning. It is likely that offenders target vehicles at these times when people park on streets and in public car parks in the area for long periods of time, while working in the area/in the city, shopping or attending nearby events/attractions. Vehicles parked on streets or within the numerous temporary car parks on vacant sites around the edges of the city centre (particularly when they are not staffed, have poor lighting levels and poor surface/boundary treatments), where they are easily accessible and cannot be easily overlooked by their owners, are often more vulnerable to attack than those parked within secure car parks/basement parking facilities. Offenders also often target vehicles in the evening when it is dark, streets/car parks are quiet and they perceive the risk of being observed and identified as low.

Copyright reserved by The Chief Constable

2.5 General Risk Factors

2.5.1 Event Spaces: The typical security risks for a development of this nature are:

- Burglary
- Robbery
- Theft of personal property
- Unauthorised access to premises and back-of-house/staff areas
- Theft of/from parked cars and cycle security
- Criminal damage to premises and vehicles
- Violence towards staff and other users
- Controlled access (to staff/authorised patrons only)
- Theft of personal belongings from changing/dressing rooms
- Theft and criminal damage during the construction period

2.5.2 Licensed Premises: The typical security risks for a development of this nature are:

- Burglary
- Robbery to business
- Criminal damage to property
- Alcohol-fuelled violence/conflict
- Miscellaneous theft to customers
- Rowdy and inconsiderate behaviour
- Conflict of use with neighbouring venues
- Violence towards staff
- Safety of staff personal belongings
- Robbery/wounding of patrons leaving premises
- Theft and criminal damage during the construction period

2.6 Common Use-Specific M.O.s (Modus Operandi)

2.6.1 Having looked at the crime data for the proposed uses, the most frequent M.O's (modus operandi) used by offenders when targeting Greater Manchester event spaces and Manchester licenced premises are listed below, along with suggested measures to reduce the risk of them being utilised at the proposed development:

- Greater Manchester Event Spaces & Manchester Licensed Premises: Doors have been forced open with tools/implements and bodily pressure

  Possible Solution - All external doors should be certified to recognised security standards (see Section 4.1), which are independently proven to reduce the risk of forced entry and thus increase the chances of detection. Security-certified doors are the best long-term measure to address this risk and can be obtained to suit virtually all operational requirements. Good use of perimeter boundaries (see Section 4.4), lighting (see Section 4.5) and CCTV (see Section 4.6) can also deter criminals by preventing access to vulnerable areas and increasing the chances of them being seen by security personnel or passers-by.

- Greater Manchester Event Spaces: Shutters have been forced open by various means including using implements to force them upwards, using vehicles to ram them and using tools to cut through them

  Possible Solution - Roller shutters can appear secure in that they are difficult to penetrate, however physical security products are only as strong as their weakest component. A security-certified shutter (see Section 4.1) has an independently proven level of resistance, and ensures that all aspects of the shutter (locks, rails, laths etc.) have been scrutinised by professionals. If external

Copyright reserved by The Chief Constable

shutters are used, ideally the shutter boxes and guides should be built into the fabric of the building to deter tampering/attack.

- Manchester Licensed Premises: Glazing in doors and windows has been smashed to gain unauthorised access

  Possible Solution – All new ground floor/accessible glazing (including in and around doors) should include a laminated pane (see Section 4.1), which forms a much more robust barrier against shattering and penetration. The strength of the laminated glass should be relative to the strength of the door or window system in which it is fitted. Where possible, the size of any glazed elements within/directly adjacent to doors should be reduced and set well away from locking points.

- Manchester Licensed Premises: Offenders posing as legitimate customers, gaining access to staff only areas to steal items

  Possible Solution – There should be a secure area for staff to store their belongings while at work and all staff-only, back-of-house areas should be secured to prevent unauthorised public access (see Sections 4.2).

- Manchester Licensed Premises: Theft of personal property from table tops or from bags hung on chairs or stored under tables

  Possible Solution – Consideration should be given to tables and chairs designed to facilitate secure storage of belongings or adapted with 'Chelsea Clips' to reduce the opportunities to steal bags/coats (see Section 5). The layout of any bars/restaurants/lounges can also help deter occurrences and increase surveillance opportunities. It should be generally uncluttered, allowing clear views of all spaces and avoiding any pinch points or areas of concealment. External seating areas should be enclosed to clearly define them as separate from adjacent pedestrian routes.

Copyright reserved by The Chief Constable

3 Layout Appraisal

3.1 Proposed Development

3.1.1 Planning permission is being sought for a temporary use of the existing warehouse for 2-3 years as a music venue.

3.1.2 The southern portion of the building will house a stage at the western end, with a bar along the northern wall and portable toilets in the external space to the front (east) of the building. The proposed operational hours will be Friday 18:00 to 02:00 and Saturday 14:00 to 02:00 and the venue will operate with a capacity for 750 no. customers, with circa 40 no. staff (including an Event Director, an Event Manager, an Event Assistant, a Cloakroom Assistant, 13 no. SIA staff, 20 no. bar staff, a Litter Picker, an Artist Liaison and a Medic).

3.2 Positive Aspects of the Proposal

3.2.1 The following proposed features would make a positive contribution to the prevention of crime and fear of crime.

3.2.2 The proposal will bring back into use a currently vacant site and will provide additional activity, natural surveillance and overlooking to the area when events are taking place – both during the day and into the evening/night.

3.2.3 When events are being staged, the scheme will have external activity along the street frontage to Peary Street - enlivening the street scene and helping to provide useful natural surveillance over the surrounding public realm.

3.2.4 The venue will be required to apply for a Premises Licence, which will include a comprehensive set of conditions designed to regulate any negative impact that the proposed uses of the site may otherwise bring. Adherence to the conditions set out in the Premises Licence and a Dispersal Policy will be essential to prevent/deter crime and disorder incidents and limit disturbance to local residents.

3.2.5 Public transport (including buses, taxis, trams and trains) is easily accessible at Victoria Station, approximately 10 minutes walk to the west of the site.

3.3 Recommendations to Improve Security

3.3.1 The following points have been identified for further consideration and would need to be addressed for Design for Security to support the proposed scheme.

3.3.2 Although the site lies on the edge of the city centre, it is somewhat isolated from neighbouring developments by transport corridors, vacant premises/sites and open land. This means that the features that normally create a more secure neighbourhood are lacking, such as good levels of footfall, activity, passive surveillance and direct overlooking. The area also has contains features that might prove useful to offenders, such as unused/vacant land, poor sight lines, variable levels of lighting and unmanaged vegetation etc. This means that the site itself is currently at a greater risk of crime than if located within an established community. Pedestrians travelling to and from the site (particularly late at night) could be vulnerable, as could any parked vehicles. A combination of robust physical security measures and on-site security/management procedures must be in place to deter crime and anti-social behaviour from occurring, both on-site (during events and out-of-hours) and along the main movement routes to/from the site, including:

- In order to allow stewards to better monitor and control arrival to and departure from the venue, as well as provide an additional layer of security to the building shell, the site should be enclosed with secure perimeter fencing and gates (see Section 4.4 for more information), with a single access/egress point to allow security to be focussed on that location.
- When the site is staging events – including before (while equipment/facilities are being set up), during and after (while equipment/facilities are being dismantled) – there should be a 24/7 security staff presence on-site to undertaken frequent patrols, monitor CCTV/alarm systems and respond to any incidents experienced. At all other times, the site should be covered by CCTV and alarms systems that are monitored off-site to allow for an immediate response to anyone attempting to gain unauthorised access/cause damage out-of-hours (see Sections 4.3 & 4.6 for more information).

Copyright reserved by The Chief Constable

- The main entrance to the site off Peary Street must be staffed with security personnel during events to control numbers, ensure safe access/egress and avoid potential conflicts arising. The entrance itself should be clearly defined and well illuminated, with crowd control barriers to maintain order as customers queue. Provision should be made for electronic searching of customers to prevent weapons being taken into the site when required. Similarly, provision should also be made for preventing customers entering the site with controlled substances. All door/security staff engaged at the site should be provided by an SIA ACS approved security company.
- Security staff should also ensure the swift and safe dispersal of customers once an event is over. Trained security staff should be positioned at the exit and along Peary Street/Bromley Street as patrons leave, in order to advise them to keep noise to a minimum and encourage them to use the safest and most direct routes into the city/towards the transport hub at Victoria Station.
- Although it is noted that city centre transport interchanges and off-street parking facilities are within easy walking distance, consideration should be given to the provision of a staffed parking facility on nearby vacant land when events are staged if at all possible, in order to give patrons a safe area to park their vehicles close to the site and discourage on-street parking in the area (where parked vehicles are somewhat remote/isolated and potentially vulnerable to attack unseen). Any such parking facility should be enclosed (with a limited number of formalised entry/exit points overlooked by staffed positions), lit to an adequate/uniform level (avoiding areas of pooling/shadowing), frequently patrolled by staff and covered by a monitored CCTV system.

3.3.3 At present, the existing building appears to be in a poor state of repair – with some doors appearing to be open/insecure when the site visit was carried out. The building must be capable of being adequately secured – particularly as valuable/desirable equipment (such as audio/visual equipment, computers etc.) and alcohol may be stored within it. It is therefore highly recommended that any new or replacement doorsets, shutters, windows and glazing to be installed as part of the proposed scope of works, or in the future, are to Secured by Design (SBD) standards - see Section 4.1 for more information. All internal doors to back-of-house/staff areas, such as staff offices/facilities, bar cellar/storage area, dressing rooms etc, should be access-controlled to prevent unauthorised access (see Section 4.2). Non-cash payment methods are preferred and should be encouraged. Any bar/food serveries or market stalls/kiosks should either be cleared at the end of an event or should be capable of being secured out-of-hours/when not in use (with no cash left within them).

3.3.4 The operational hours of the venue should not conflict with nearby uses, particular where residential properties are in close proximity of the venue itself or along routes likely to be used by crowds leaving the venue late at night, as this can cause nuisance, conflict and generate police activity. The use of external areas in particular should be closely monitored and controlled in the evening.

3.3.5 It is essential that the physical security measures listed below are incorporated where appropriate into the scheme. Integrated, risk-commensurate security measures aim to place secure physical barriers or surveillance in the path of the criminal – making crime harder to commit and raising the risk of detection and possible capture, as well as promoting a feeling of safety in staff and customers.

Copyright reserved by The Chief Constable

4 Physical Security

4.1 Any External Alterations

It is strongly recommended that any external alterations to be carried out as part of the proposed scope of works, or in the future, should incorporate the following physical security measures:

☐ Any new external doorsets (including single-leaf, double-leaf, sliding or bi-folding) should be compliant with and certified to BS PAS 24, LPS 1175 SR2 or STS 202 BR2. It is crucial that the door ironmongery to any external escape-only doors is permitted under the security certification of the product. Escape-only doors should be alarmed (audible upon opening) and designed without visible external ironmongery.

☐ Any new windows, where possible, should be certificated to BS PAS 24. All other window designs/dimensions should take account of the requirements of the above standards, as certified products can carry dimensional restrictions. Any curtain walling panels should include laminated glazing (see below) and should be securely fixed.

☐ Any new shutters should be certified to LPS 1175 SR2 and installed in accordance with manufacturer's instructions. Where shutters are to be externally mounted, shutter boxes and guides should be built into the fabric of the building where possible, where they would be less visually intrusive and less vulnerable to damage.

☐ Any new glazing should incorporate an inner pane with a 1.5mm PVB interlayer (e.g. 7.5mm laminated glass), or a glass rated as P4A under EN 356. The outer pane should be a minimum of 6mm toughened or have no less than a 0.8mm PVB interlayer (e.g. 6.8mm laminated glass), or a glass rated as P2A under EN 356 (see Section 7.1 for more information). The glass should be well held in suitable gaskets in 35mm rebates or be in at least 30mm rebates if held in well bedded clamped gaskets or, preferably, bonded with silicon or polysulphide sealant.

4.2 Internal Security & Access Controls

☐ All back-of-house/staff areas should not be publicly accessible and there should be a secure area for staff to store their belongings whilst at work. Internal access doors/frames leading to the back-of-house/staff areas should be solid-core (min. 44mm thick), with 3 hinges and fitted with either auditable access controls (i.e. staff proximity readers or swipe cards). Doors to individual offices, staff rooms, storage areas or plant areas (as well as any dressing rooms/tech support rooms) should be solid-core (min. 44mm thick), with 3 hinges and key operated locks to secure them when unoccupied/when access is not required.

☐ It is highly recommended that cash-free forms of payment are adopted. If this is absolutely unachievable, there must be a secure Manager's/cash office, which should have solid masonry walls (with no adjacent false/suspended ceilings), a doorset certified to BS PAS 24 and a time delay safe providing adequate capacity and overnight cover. The cash office should contain a telephone and a mobile phone with a clear signal. The correct size and category of safe should be determined by an assessment of prospective takings and to meet insurance needs. Chute deposit safes (certified to LPS 1183) should be located behind each bar/servery, or an alternative management practice should be utilised which would reduce the amount of cash held in the tills during busy periods. The installation of a 'drug' safe may also be appropriate (to safely store confiscated controlled substances). This should have two keys - one held by Police and one by the premises supervisor. Both keys should be required to empty the safe and deposits can be made without a key. A formal protocol between operators and Greater Manchester Police will need to be put in place to manage such a facility.

☐ Staff should only be allowed access to areas required for their work. Any electric locking system to be used throughout the building should be fully auditable (i.e. allows the retention of data, such as who accessed where and when), to allow for a better investigation into any incidents. Any access control cards/fobs should be capable of being easily and quickly activated/disabled to ensure that mis-use is prevented. Keys/passes should only be carried if required for duties and should be accounted for at all times. The use of numeric keypad locks are not advised, as codes can be easily observed or shared and are rarely changed.

☐ Ideally, secure coat/bag storage should be provided in a supervised cloakroom, with a clearly defined queuing area to avoid crowding.

Copyright reserved by The Chief Constable

4.3 Alarm

- ☐ A comprehensive intruder alarm system should be installed to cover the building, linked to contacts on all external doors/shutters and PIR detectors. It is strongly recommended that any alarm system is monitored, with a response facility (i.e. linked to the on/off-site security team or an Alarm Receiving Centre).
- ☐ The alarm system should incorporate personal attack buttons for the use of staff in identified locations, such as behind bars/serveries, at the main entrance to the site and in any cash office.

4.4 Boundaries

- ☐ The site should be enclosed within a security perimeter formed by 2400mm high railings or high-security, rigid-panel, welded-wire mesh fencing and gates (please see https://www.securedbydesign.com/member-companies/accredited-product-search for a list of Police approved perimeter security suppliers). Care should be taken to ensure that panels are fixed securely to the posts (preventing tampering/removal) and that any level changes do not inadvertently facilitate climbing or leave large gaps underneath the panels/gates.
- ☐ The entrance to the site off Peary Street should be formed by 2400mm high gates. Exposed hinges and large sliding bolt apertures/locking points to any vehicular or pedestrian gates should be avoided, or fitted with shrouding/protective plates (see opposite) to avoid the creation of footholds. The gap at the bottom of any gates should be small enough to stop anyone crawling through. If panic mechanisms are required on the inner face of any pedestrian gates (for escape purposes), they should not be capable of being reached/operated from the external face of the fence/gate.

- ☐ Care should be taken to ensure there are no trees or any other hard/soft landscaping features (such as lighting columns, street furniture etc.) immediately adjacent and on the publicly accessible side of any secure boundaries that could be used as a climbing aid to scale the fencing. Any such features should be pruned or removed where possible. The site boundary treatment should also be positioned on hard standing ground. Where this is not possible, the ground conditions should be reviewed as extra measures may be required to create a secure boundary. It is highly recommended that condition of the fencing along the perimeter of the site is regularly inspected for signs of damage/attack and is repaired immediately if any incidents are experienced.
- ☐ Any external bin/recycling stores should be secure, lockable and fire resistant enclosures. A strategy should be defined to ensure waste collection can take place whilst retaining a secure development.

4.5 Lighting

- ☐ External lighting should be provided to the main site entrance gates and the external W/C area, in accordance with BS 5489.
- ☐ Dusk ‘til dawn lights, operated by photoelectric cell/daylight sensor, should be installed to all external doors and shutters.
- ☐ Fittings should produce ‘white’ light, as opposed to yellow/orange light. LED or bulbs with a comparable output should be used, as these offer superior colour rendition over alternatives such as high and low pressure sodium bulbs.
- ☐ Lighting fixtures must not be positioned to provide climbing aids over boundary treatments or to scale building structures. Electrical and architectural layouts should be developed together to avoid this.
- ☐ Internal lighting should be controlled from behind the bar or in a security/management room, away from public access. Zoned dimmers should be used to increase the control of areas from the bar/management office. An override should be provided, within easy reach of security staff, so that if an incident occurs the lighting level can be raised. This will also help at the end of an event so that staff can see to clear up, and patrons have no doubt that it is closing time and they should make their way out of the premises. The lighting override can also be linked to music controls so that, in the event of an incident, music can be turned off immediately as well as lighting increased.

Copyright reserved by The Chief Constable

4.6 CCTV

Any CCTV system that may be used within this proposal will require certain specifications and intelligent placement of cameras to compliment the design of the development. Designers should consider the following points when planning a CCTV strategy:

- ☐ CCTV systems (and lighting that support them) require regular cleaning and maintenance to remain effective.
- ☐ Where necessary cameras that are vulnerable to damage should be protected from attack either by relocation to a higher level and using a bigger lens to achieve the view required or through the fitting of a vandal resistant housing.
- ☐ With regards to the retention of footage, the police prefer quality over quantity. The overall retention period should be dictated by what the system is designed to achieve, though it would be better to have good quality images over a 14-day period than poor ones over a 30-day period.
- ☐ Procedures for recovery of recordings are recommended to be established (e.g. trained staff / the CCTV system instruction manual to be readily available). This is to ensure that the images produced will be of an *Acceptable Standard* that will allow for *Identification* of an individual which will stand up to scrutiny in court.

  Acceptable Standard - this generally requires a resolution of 720x576 pixels at a real time frame rate of 25 frames per second. (N.B. Both the camera and DVR must be capable of this – if the camera will only send low resolution images then it does not matter how high the resolution of the recording unit is).

  Identification – One of three levels of field of view. To identify an individual, the image must capture no less than 120% of the field of view (at least from the top of the individuals head to their knees). The remaining two levels of field of view are *Overview* and *Recognition*, which whilst effective for observational purposes, are less likely to result in the identification of a person/offender.
- ☐ The intelligent placement of cameras helps to provide clear facial identification of individuals. Suitable locations would be: the main entrance to the site and the building, all external elevations, all external/internal circulation spaces and all sales counters/till positions.
- ☐ The proposed CCTV system should be capable of being monitored by the on/off-site security teams, so there can be an immediate response to any incidents being recorded. It is also highly recommended that there is a linked public address facility, to inform any offenders who attempt to gain access out-of-hours that have been detected on site, that they are being monitored/recorded and that the police have been called.

4.7 Landscaping

- ☐ Any landscape features (hard or soft) within the site should not impede natural surveillance of/from the building or reduce the effectiveness of lighting (see Section 4.5) or any CCTV system (see Section 4.6).
- ☐ Any existing or proposed vegetation around the site should not exceed approx. 1000mm in height and tree canopies should fall no lower than approx. 2000m from the ground. This is in order to allow people to see their surroundings better and eliminate hiding places. A maintenance agreement should stipulate that these planting dimensions would be adhered to.
- ☐ Planting must be avoided that will aid climbing over boundary treatments. The security of fences can be compromised if trees or street furniture are placed close by.
- ☐ Loose surface materials in publicly accessible areas of the scheme should be avoided. Small fragments of ground covering can be used as missiles against people and premises (both to gain entry and to commit criminal damage).

Produced by Greater Manchester Police
Copyright reserved by The Chief Constable

5 Internal Layout Guidance

The internal layout of the premises should be carefully considered, so as to maximise surveillance over customers and reduce the opportunities for criminals to exploit. It is highly recommended that the following good practice principles are adopted where applicable, so as not to undermine the security of the building shell.

5.1.1 Events spaces can, if poorly managed, generate crime for the following reasons:

- Opportunities - Large numbers of people congregating in such premises generates opportunities for crime. Unlike on-street populations, patrons are stationary for long periods of time, making them easier to target.
- Lack of attention - The movement of people, noise, social interaction and other factors mean patrons can be easily distracted.
- Cohesion – Particularly during busy periods, the large numbers and wide variety of groups of people that tend to frequent such premises means that such a venue would lack 'community territoriality' (i.e. regular customers displaying an awareness of and care for the environment around them). This can limit any self-policing that might otherwise occur.
- Customer turnover – High turnover with high levels of customer movement within an establishment, are more likely to allow offenders to go unnoticed.
- Valuable goods – Often available and possibly on show, a particular problem in external seating areas. Patrons are likely to carry small, valuable, concealable goods – such as mobile phones, purses, wallets, keys etc.
- Stealth - Busy venues provide the anonymity necessary to commit offences.

5.1.2 The incidence and severity of disorder issues in large licensed/event venues and their environs are often linked to physical features of these locations, such as:

- High concentration of people;
- Crowd congestion;
- Services that do not cater for demand, i.e. insufficient serving staff;
- Physical hazards arising from type and placement of furniture/ancillary structures; and
- Insufficient and unclean toilets.

In order to minimise these issues, it is recommended that the following good practice principles are adhered to:

5.1.3 The main entrance to the site and the building must be effectively managed at busy periods to control numbers, ensure safe access/egress and avoid potential conflicts arising.

5.1.4 Customers entering/leaving the premises should be easily observed by staff. Staff should also have clear views of any W/Cs to monitor their use.

5.1.5 The internal layout of premises should be generally uncluttered with few places for concealment, allowing staff to monitor customer behaviour. The precise arrangement of internal furnishings should aid circulation and aim to achieve a balance between intimacy and visibility.

5.1.6 Consideration should be given to high/wide bars/service counters, which increase the distance between staff and any potentially aggressive patrons and aid surveillance of all parts of the premises. Tills should be positioned away from customers' reach, but preferably fronting towards customers. Casual access to the rear of any bars/service counters should be prevented (e.g. with lockable doors or hatches that cannot be easily scaled). Sufficient levels of service staff should be provided at busy periods to reduce waiting times and the potential for frustration, aggression and conflict.

5.1.7 All back-of-house/staff areas should not be publicly accessible (see Section 4.2) and there should be a secure area for staff to store their belongings whilst at work.

Copyright reserved by The Chief Constable

5.1.8 It is highly recommended that any customer tables are fitted with Chelsea Clips, to reduce the opportunities for theft (see below).

5.1.9 Adequate signage should be deployed to direct people throughout the site/building, but also to deter unauthorised access to staff-only/back-of-house areas.

5.1.10 Public toilets can give rise to crime and disorder issues and the following issues should be considered:

- Fittings should be flush to avoid tampering and concealed cisterns, pipe work etc. should be used.
- Graffiti and vandal resistant materials, such as stainless steel, laminates and plastics should be considered.
- Consider hanging cubicle doors as outward opening as this will aid gaining access in an emergency. An alternative measure is to reduce toilet doors in size by a minimum of 200mm from the floor and to reduce the top height.
- Provide 'Chelsea Clip'/karibina style hooks on the back of cubicle doors or partitions for bags and coats.
- Consider the safety of vending machines. Cash boxes can be tampered with, consider fitting them with alarms.
- Consider setting out a rota and putting notices in toilet facilities that make users aware that regular checks will be carried out. A built in visited/checked chart should be provided.

Copyright reserved by The Chief Constable

6 Management & Maintenance

6.1.1 The success of the proposal will be dependent on effective management of the premises and a zero tolerance policy should be adopted with customers who behave inappropriately. Comprehensive risk assessments should be carried out in advance of all events/uses, in order to identify and address potential security issues.

6.1.2 During events, the control of people entering the site will be essential to maintaining order, both inside and outside of the building. Strict monitoring of numbers entering the site must be undertaken, as overcrowding will facilitate criminal activity. Management of people awaiting entry will also be important, in order to prevent frustrations building up that could create disorder. The pavement outside the main entrance along Peary Street is not particularly wide and care must be taken to avoid creating obstacles for other pedestrians or vehicles. Signage will assist in directing people to appropriate queuing locations, but sufficient security staff will be needed to supervise the entry process and an outside security presence will be required at busy times.

6.1.3 Security staff should also ensure the swift and safe dispersal of visitors away from the venue after an event. Trained security staff should be positioned at the exits and entrances to site as visitors leave. Suitable notices should be displayed on all exits from the site advising visitors to keep noise to a minimum when leaving the venue.

6.1.4 All door/security staff engaged at the premises should be provided by an SIA ACS approved security company. Security staff should regularly patrol the entire site to ensure a visible presence to visitors and potential offenders.

6.1.5 The setting up, dismantling and operational processes involved in events can provide many opportunities for criminal activity, as an offender can act anonymously within the relatively transient community of temporary workers/delivery personnel, and gain access to otherwise secure areas. It is therefore essential that effective identification and verification procedures are put in place for the whole period of events.

6.1.6 The applicant should engage in dialogue with the local neighbourhood policing team in central Manchester and should give advance notice of events, so that appropriate policing arrangements can be made - Tel: 0161 856 3221, Email: citycentre@gmp.police.uk

6.1.7 A comprehensive security regime for the management of the site must be prepared and remain in place for its day-to-day running. There should be regular reviews/exercises to ensure that it remains accurate, workable and up-to-date. All staff should understand and accept the need for security measures and it should be made easy for people to raise concerns or report observations. The operating/maintenance plan should focus on issues such as:

- Opening and closing of site/building, including staff arrival and departure;
- Any cash management within the premises - including a chute deposit safe behind any bar/till area, or an alternative management practice, which would reduce the amount of cash held in tills during busy periods;
- Cash-in-transit collections/deliveries and banking practices (which should take place in a secure room with a certified safe to meet insurance needs);
- Management of stock deliveries (servicing activities should not require any service doors to remain open unattended for prolonged periods);
- Details of staff security training;
- Location and management of any smoking areas;
- Repairing damaged external and internal fittings, particularly security features e.g. fencing, access controls, alarm systems, CCTV cameras etc;
- Cleaning and prompt removal of graffiti and litter (regular litter patrols should be carried out inside and outside the premises, to prevent discarded bottles, glasses, cans etc. from being used to cause criminal damage or used as weapons); and
- Refuse collection arrangements (which should not require bins to be left accessible for extended periods).

Copyright reserved by The Chief Constable

6.1.8 The opening hours of the event space should be consistent with other such premises in the locale and should not unduly conflict with other nearby uses.

6.1.9 Any high value equipment (e.g. computers/TVs, music/DJ equipment, tools etc.) should be property marked and securely fixed or stored to deter damage/theft. An accurate record should be maintained which logs all such items.

7 Construction

7.1.1 Untidy sites and their surroundings can be littered with debris accessible to vandals who often use loose materials as missiles to commit crime. The client should take measures appropriate to secure their site during construction, and control pedestrian and vehicular access in to and out of the site curtilage. It is also recommended that the contractor on this scheme is a member of the 'Considerate Constructors Scheme', who has committed to be a considerate and good neighbour, as well as clean, respectful, safe, environmentally conscious, responsible and accountable.

7.1.2 Site security contractors should be SIA (Security Industry Authority) approved to ensure professional standards are adhered to (please see http://www.sia.homeoffice.gov.uk/pages/acs-intro.aspx for more details).

8 Useful References

8.1 Secured by Design (SBD)

8.1.1 Secured by Design focuses on crime prevention at the design, layout and construction stages of homes and commercial premises and promotes the use of security standards for a wide range of applications and products. To apply for Secured by Design certification for your development, visit our online application form at: http://www.designforsecurity.org/secured-by-design/sbd-accreditation/

Copyright reserved by The Chief Constable

A Contact Register

Date	Contact With	Summary of Contact
23rd October 2024	Gerald Eve LLP	Receipt of CIS instruction & plan
23rd October 2024	Gerald Eve LLP	Quote issued
25th October 2024	Gerald Eve LLP	Email correspondence re: CIS instruction & fee
28th October 2024	GMP Finance Dept	Confirmation of payment
28th October 2024	Gerald Eve LLP	Email correspondence re: timescales & additional info
31st October 2024	Gerald Eve LLP	Email correspondence re: timescales
31st October to 4th November 2024	GMP Licensing	Email correspondence with Divisional Licensing Officer

B Associated Documents

This report is based on the following drawings and supplementary information submitted by the applicant.

Drawing No.	Drawing Title	Date	Rev
-	Location Plan	-	-
S23-0462	Existing Floor Plan	17.05.23	-
-	Proposed Floor Plan	-	-

PLEASE NOTE - In the event of any subsequent material changes to the scheme, it will be necessary for Design for Security to reassess the comments made within this report.

C CIS Version History

Version	Revisions Made	Date
A		

Produced by Greater Manchester Police
Copyright reserved by The Chief Constable

D Glossary

Burglary Resistance Standards

BS PAS 24
General security performance requirements for door/window assemblies.

An attack test standard for doorsets and windows. This is the minimum police requirement for Secured by Design dwellings, and is also applicable to French/double doors, and sliding doors.

BS EN 1627 (Security Ratings RC1 to RC6)
Windows, doors, shutters - Burglar resistance Requirements and classification

The classification system used in BS EN 1627 is aimed at the commercial market and is based on five elements:

a) Resistance of glazing

b) Performance of hardware

c) Resistance to static loading

d) Resistance to dynamic loading

e) Burglary resistance by manual intervention

LPS 1175 (Security Ratings 1 to 6)
Specification for testing and classifying the burglary resistance of building components

This includes doors, shutters, garage doors and grilles typically for commercial premises and higher risk domestic premises and is acceptable to the ABI and the Police. The standard has 6 levels, 6 being the highest, with levels 1 and 2 equivalent in many respects to BS PAS 24 and BS 7950.

STS 201
Enhanced security requirements for doorsets and door assemblies for dwellings to satisfy the requirements of PAS 24

STS 202
Requirements for burglary resistance of construction products including hinged, pivoted, folding or sliding doorsets, windows, curtain walling, security grilles, garage doors and shutters.

This specifies a broadly similar range of attack tools and times to those specified at the lower levels of LPS 1175.

BS EN 356 (Ratings P1A to P8A)

Glass in building. Security glazing. Testing and classification of resistance against manual attack.

A performance standard for manual attacks on glazing. P2A is comparable to the performance of a 6.8mm laminated glass, and P4A to that of a 9.5mm laminated glass.

Commonly Used Acronyms

CIT
Cash in transit (refers to vehicles, personnel and routines).

CPTED
Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design

CRS
Crime Reduction Specialist. Sometimes known as CPO (Crime Prevention Officer)

INPT
Integrated Neighbourhood Policing Team.

PVB/PolyVinyl Butyral (Glazing interlayer)
A commonly used interlayer used in the production of laminated glass.

LPCB (Loss Prevention Certification Board)
A brand of the BRE Global (Building Research Establishment) family. The LPCB work with insurers, Government, police, designers, manufacturers, contractors and end users to develop methods of assessing performance and reliability of security products to ensure their fitness for purpose.

UKAS (United Kingdom Accreditation Service)
The sole national accreditation body recognised by government to assess, against internationally agreed standards, organisations that provide certification, testing, inspections and calibration services.

Useful Websites

Design for Security
www.designforsecurity.org

Secured by Design
www.securedbydesign.com

RIBA Product Selector
www.ribaproductselector.com

LPCB – Red Book Live
www.redbooklive.com

Crime Reduction (Home Office)
www.crimereduction.homeoffice.gov.uk

DAC (Design Against Crime) Solution Centre
www.designagainstcrime.org

Building for Life
www.buildingforlife.org

CLG (Communities and Local Government)
www.communities.gov.uk

Copyright reserved by The Chief Constable