

CRIME IMPACT STATEMENT

A development of 41 apartments

on land bound by Ducie Street & Lomax Street, Manchester

FOR: **Rain City Developments (Ducie Street) Limited**

VERSION A: **02/05/2018**

2018/0245/CIS/01

Greater Manchester Police

designforsecurity

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CPT
CRIME PREVENTION TEAM

LAND BOUND BY DUCIE STREET & LOMAX STREET, MANCHESTER

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Development supported

Residential use of the site appears appropriate in the context of a broader regeneration of the area. However, this neighbourhood suffers from a high level of crime and disorder, so the design team must be cognisant of the need to ensure that the development is suitably secure and include measures which address the issues raised in this report. The principal recommendations are summarised as follows:

- Ensure the Ducie Street elevation of the ground floor apartments is secure
- Minimise the risk of offenders targeting the level 01 balcony
- Consider greater animation of the Lomax Street façade at street level
- Ensure the communal entrance is prominent, secure and suitably welcoming
- Improve the street environment around the site
- Ensure the cycle store is secure
- The development should be built in accordance with Secured by Design standards.

I am happy to support the proposed development subject to the adoption of the standards and recommendations set out in the report.



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1 Visual Audit

The photographs and plan below show the development site and its surroundings. The site, edged red on the plan, is currently used as a pay and display car park. It is located on land between Lomax Street and Ducie Street on the eastern edge of the city centre. The land to the east is also laid out as a pay and display car park. The Staycity aparthotel is located opposite the site on the north side of Lomax Street. The main entrance to Staycity is on the building's northern elevation, facing Laystall Street. The rear elevation includes windows to ground floor apartments and a shuttered entrance to the car lifts, which facilitate access to the basement car park. The rear elevation of a die casting works lies opposite the southern side of the site on Ducie Street. To the west, there is a whitewashed, two-storey, office premises, assumed to be B1 use; there is also a Grade II listed, mill building to the north-west of the site, thought to be vacant but previously occupied by a textile industry related business. At the side of the mill, to north-western corner of the site, a narrow street, Brock Street, connects Lomax Street with Laystall Street. At street level on Brock Street, a second car park entrance and refuse store are located on the western elevation of the Staycity building, whilst the mill has boarded up windows. The quality of the environment around the site is poor, with piecemeal, largely commercial/industrial development that has little active street frontage or that generate interest and activity. The site does, however, lie within the HS2 Manchester Piccadilly Strategic Regeneration Framework area. Produced by the City Council, this document seeks to guide the future development of land within the wider Piccadilly area. This site falls within a area known as East Village, where a mixed-use development with residential focus is encouraged. The Framework recommends buildings of up to 5 storeys, including apartment buildings.



The site, which is currently used for pay and display car parking




A westerly view along Lomax Street, with the site on the left & apartment windows of the 'Staycity' building on the right




The Looking east along Ducie Street, with the site on the left and industrial premises on the right





The Staycity aparthotel building lies immediately to the north of the site



A small, two storey, multi-tenanted, office building lies immediately west of the site



Brock Street, to the north-west of the site , the most direct route from the site towards the city centre

There have been 1,649 reported crimes reported in the neighbourhood around the site in the past 12 months. This volume of crime is exceptionally high but not unusual for neighbourhoods on the fringe of the city centre. The high concentration of car parking, night-time economy venues around the Northern Quarter, and the proximity of Piccadilly Station, all generate a high volume of crime. Around 40% of crime involves the use of, or the threat of, violence, 14% is theft, 23% is vehicle related (theft of, theft from, or damage to cars). Just 2% of crime relates to burglary of residential property, the focus of which is in the Ancoats/New Islington areas. Considering the quality of the environment around the site and the principal crime groups that affect residential developments, the principal risk areas associated with this development are likely to relate to: the security qualities of the doors and glazing on the exterior of the building and the quality of the doors to individual apartments to prevent theft and breaking and entering; the inclusion of an access control system to prevent intruders gaining entry to the building; the security of cycle stores; and, the quality of the streetscape around the building, which currently appears poor and attracts a wide range of crime and anti-social behaviour; and, the safety of residents leaving, and returning, to their homes during the hours at night.

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2 Crime Statistics & Analysis

All data below is based on crimes recorded between 1st March 2017 to 28th February 2018

2.1 Crime Summary

Recorded Crime within 500m of Site									
Domestic Burglary	Non-Domestic Burglary	Criminal Damage	Less Serious Wounding	Theft	Robbery	Serious Wounding	Theft from Motor Vehicle	Theft of Motor Vehicle	Bicycle Theft
32	103	144	670	232	57	15	227	49	91

2.1.1 Overall crime in this neighbourhood has been very high over the last 12 months, reflecting the site's location on the fringe of the city centre where there is a high density of people, cars, retail outlets and licensed premises, all of which contribute to the high level of crime and disorder. The area suffers from particularly high levels of theft from vehicle and bicycle theft with the majority of vehicle related crime occurring at car parks, particularly on Sheffield Street.

2.1 Modus Operandi used by offenders in committing burglary and vehicle crime in this neighbourhood & measures to reduce vulnerability

2.1.1 **Front doors of apartments have been forced open after offenders have gained access to unsecured communal areas**

- communal entry doors should be certified to PAS 24 or LPS 1175 sr2 security standards.
- access control systems should also be in place to prevent casual entry to the building, and to allow residents to vet visitors before allowing them access to the building.
- entrances should be kept to a minimum, be located in highly visible positions, and brightly illuminated to deter offenders from attempting entry.

2.1.2 **Doors and windows have been forced open with bodily pressure and tools**

To minimise the risk of offenders forcing doors:

- all external apartment doors should be certified to PAS 24 security standard - PAS 24 rated doors are very difficult to force open;
- Any secluded passageways to the side or rear of the building should be secured or avoided altogether wherever possible, such routes can facilitate access to vulnerable doors or windows as well as attract anti-social behaviour; and,
- external doors should be illuminated with dusk-to-dawn lighting. Light suggests a property is occupied, and the light will also highlight the actions of an offender, increasing the chance of a crime being witnessed.

2.1.3 **Ground floor windows were prised open or the glazing smashed in door or windows to gain access**

To minimise the risk of offenders prising open windows or breaking glass to gain entry:

- avoid the installation of opening windows at street level;
- install window locks and opening restrictors to any windows that are accessible from street level;
- use laminate glass on street level windows and doors; and,
- consider fitting grilles or security shutters to windows on the more secluded elevations.

2.1.4 **Bikes were stolen from apartment blocks**

To minimise the risk of bicycle theft:

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- provide convenient, secure cycle parking a secure store within the building, which has self-closing, self-locking doors or gates, and is only accessible to residents in possession of relevant access fob.

2.1.5 Doors and windows have been targeted when left insecure

To minimise the risk of 'walk-in/climb-in' burglaries:

- communal entrance doors and inner lobby doors should be self-closing and lock securely upon closure,
- defensible space should be provided between accessible balconies and the 'street';
- windows should be certified to the PAS 24 standard, and fitted with locks and tamper proof, opening restrictors; and,
- dusk-to-dawn lighting should be fitted to all external doors.

2.2 Risk Factors


The typical security risks for a development of this nature are:


- Burglary
- Theft from gardens/balconies
- Criminal damage to property
- Theft of, or from, vehicles
- Bogus callers and distraction burglary
- Anti-social behaviour
- Neighbour disputes
- Theft of plant and machinery, and criminal damage during the construction period

2.3 Crime Rates Comparison

Comparing crime rates in this neighbourhood to rates in Manchester & in Greater Manchester.

The rates below relates to crime committed within 500m of the site.






2.3.1 The rate of burglary per 1000 dwellings in the neighbourhood around the site is **64% lower** than the Manchester rate and **46% lower** than the Greater Manchester rate.


2.3.2 The rate of wounding crimes per 1000 dwellings in the neighbourhood around the site is **23% higher** than the Manchester rate and **124% higher** than the Greater Manchester rate.

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Criminal Damage



Vehicle Crime




2.3.3 The rate of incidents of criminal damage per 1000 dwellings in the neighbourhood around the site is **4% higher** than the Manchester rate but **52% higher** than the Greater Manchester rate.

2.3.4 The rate of incidents of vehicle crime per 1000 dwellings in the neighbourhood around the site is **160% higher** than the Manchester rate and **333% higher** than the Greater Manchester rate.


2.4 Burglary: Risk Analysis

The data below relates to domestic burglaries committed within 500m of the site.

Burglary Dwelling – Day Range




Burglary Dwelling – Time Range



2.4.1 Day Range: The risk of burglary is highest on Mondays, Wednesdays and Saturdays.

2.4.2 Time Range: The risk is highest during the afternoon. Offenders are most likely selecting these times as the occupants of the properties will be at work, leaving the property empty. This means that the likelihood of offenders being witnessed or apprehended is reduced.

Burglary Dwelling – Point of Entry



2.4.3 Point of Entry: In this neighbourhood, the following entry points and modus operandi have been used most frequently:


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- Exploiting unsecure doors and windows to gain entry to the premises, particularly front doors. Offenders are attempting to gain entry to several premises before finding one that is unsecured. It is likely that offenders are targeting premises in this way as most of the properties are apartments whose occupants will feel more secure and be less likely to secure their doors.
- Opening secured doors using bodily force or tools, such as screwdrivers or crowbars.
- Breaking windows to gain entry to premises.


2.5 Vehicle Crime: Risk Analysis

The data below relates to vehicle crime committed within 500m of the site.

Vehicle Crime – Day Range




Vehicle Crime – Time Range



2.5.1 Day Range: The risk of vehicle crime is very high throughout the week, and is slightly higher at the weekend.

2.5.2 Time Range: The risk is high throughout the day, but highest in the evenings. The cover of darkness on surface car parks, still heavily patronised by those working late into the evening, out of town visitors or frequenting night-time economy, makes offenders less conspicuous and CCTV is less likely to identify an perpetrator.

Vehicle Crime – Crime Location



2.5.3 Crime Location: Most (65%) vehicle crimes target vehicles parked in surface car parks. It is likely that this is because the density of vehicles in car parks offer offenders a greater opportunity to commit vehicle crime, and car parks allow offenders to find vehicles that contain valuables without arousing much suspicion as they are generally open to the public.

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3 Layout Appraisal

3.1 Proposed development

3.1.1 The proposed development involves the construction of an eight storey residential building containing a total of 41 apartments a mix of 13no. one bedroom and 28no. two bedroom. The building's footprint will occupy almost the entire site, with no space between the building and Ducie Street or Lomax Street. There will be an elevated, shallow recess to the ground floor on the Ducie Street elevation, which will be landscaped,

3.1.2 The building's sole, communal entrance will be on the Lomax Street façade. It will open into a large foyer which includes: a concierge desk; store room; a WC; seating area; and, residents' mail boxes. A second set of doors then controls access into a circulation corridor on which the lift to the upper floor is located. The stair core, a plant room, the cycle store and the refuse store are also served by this circulation, as are two apartments, located on the ground floor at the rear of the building, and whose outlook will be onto Ducie Street.

3.1.3 Floors 1-6 each contain six apartments. The seventh floor will have three apartments as well as a communal roof terrace.

3.1.4 Apartments above ground level will have an outlook over Ducie Street or Lomax Street. Those apartments on the north-western corner of the building will have the added benefit of a balcony, cantilevered over the undeveloped land at the western fringe of the site, (required for access purposes) at the end of Brock Street. Other than these balconies, amenity space is limited to the shallow recesses on the ground floor, (repeated on the upper floors) of the Ducie Street facing apartments, and the small communal terrace on the seventh floor.

3.1.5 The cycle store will be capable of accommodating 48 bicycles but can only be accessed via the entrance foyer and circulation corridor. Whilst there is an external door which can be made secure; there is no external door.

3.1.6 There is no car parking within the site.

3.1.7 The refuse store will be located on the ground floor of the building and accessed internally, by residents, from the circulation corridor, and externally, by contractors, via doors that open out onto Lomax Street.

3.1.8 Elsewhere on the ground floor, a substation with doors opening out onto Lomax Street is proposed, other plant rooms are located within the building with no external doors.

3.2 Positive Aspects of the Proposal

The following proposed features would make a positive contribution to the prevention of crime and fear of crime.

3.2.1 The proposals result in the redevelopment of a site that has limited merit in terms of contribution to activity, activity and viability of the neighbourhood.

3.2.2 Given the aspirations of the HS2 Piccadilly Manchester Strategic Regeneration Framework, the use of the site for residential purposes seems appropriate.

3.2.3 The proposed development will begin a process of creating a greater mixture of uses in the area, repopulating this part of the city, which will ultimately result in a much more vibrant neighbourhood, with activity throughout the day and into the evening. The regeneration of the area is likely to result in displacement of the sex trade from the area.

3.2.4 A concierge desk is included within the entrance lobby, suggesting that management staff will be on site for at least some of the time.

3.2.5 The main entrance faces the Lomax Street, which helps to promote street activity, improve lighting on the street, and facilitates natural surveillance over the street. That said, Ducie Street might be considered a more suitable elevation on which to locate the communal entrance, given Ducie Street's higher position in the hierarchy of streets.

3.2.6 The entrance lobby can easily be secured to reduce the risk of visitors or intruders tailgating into the building and entering the circulation/residential corridors without supervision.

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3.2.7 Level difference across the site mean that the ground floor apartments on the Ducie Street side of the building are somewhat elevated above street level. This elevation will reduce the risk of the residents of these two apartments being affected by problems associated with privacy and security of ground floor apartments.

3.2.8 Mail boxes are located within the secure lobby.

3.2.9 A refuse store is provided within the building, which can be accessed easily by residents and contractors.

3.2.10 A modest amount of amenity space is included within the development. As well as the obvious health and well-being benefits afforded by outdoor space, the inclusion of communal amenity space can help residents to build connections with each other, which helps to build 'social capital'. Residents who know each other tend to look out for each other's interests, which can result help to deter crime.

3.2.11 Secure cycle parking is included in the scheme.

3.3 Recommendations to improve the security of the development

Ground floor apartments

3.3.1 The close proximity of the ground floor apartments to the 'street' may result in the residents being susceptible to anti-social behaviour, including noise, verbal abuse, littering. There are many examples across the city where residents of ground floor apartments have permanently closed-over blinds to avoid the attentions of passers-by, or of passing criminals reconnoitring the contents of an apartment. The use of any balcony/terrace space is, then, also under-used. This results in a poorer living environment for residents and removes any opportunity for surveillance of the street by residents. It is, therefore, important to retain a degree of inter-visibility between the apartments and the street but there must be a balance between maintaining a suitable degree or privacy and security whilst promoting real, or a sense of, natural surveillance.

3.3.2 Given modus operandi used elsewhere in this neighbourhood, whilst slightly elevated above street level, and with a protective balustrade installed, there is still a significant risk of offenders targeting the two ground floor apartments - attempting to gain entry via the recessed terrace and through the windows or doors of the living room or bedrooms.

3.3.3 The design of the façade within the recess should seek to minimise the risk of forced entry or entry through unsecured openings. Consequently, window frames must be security rated, the glazing must be laminate and the windows must have opening restrictors and key-operated locks fitted. I recommend that if doors are installed, they should be used only on the living rooms. Like the windows, these doors must be security rated, fitted with laminate glazing and fitted with a form of opening restrictor or a motion sensor with audible alarm fitted across the opening.

3.3.4 Access onto the recess should be very difficult. The balustrade should be a laminate, opaque glass fitted flush with the outer wall so that there is no hand or foothold available to an intruder. A railing style balustrade would allow an offender to gain a hold to assist climbing and allow visibility of any items stored/placed in the space behind.



3.3.5 An alternative approach to securing the recess would be to install ornamental ironwork (*see image right*) to all, or the upper part of the opening, to secure the recess. Done well, it may add interest to the building and the streetscene; designed badly, it will create a fortress like appearance.

Level 01 04 RT06 apartment

3.3.6 Again, given modus operandi used locally, the balcony to the level 1 apartment presents a security risk. There have been instances where offenders have been able to climb, apparently unaided, or with the aid of street furniture or wheelie/eurobins, up to upper ground or first floor balconies before committing acts of burglary or theft. To eliminate this risk, the following should be considered: enclose the balcony with ornamental ironwork; made very difficult to climb and be fitted with an opaque glazed balustrade with the doors on the balcony security rated; enclose the open section with ironwork; or delete the balcony from this apartment.

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Lomax Street façade

3.3.7 The design team should explore the feasibility of adding greater animation/interest at street level on the Lomax Street elevation. Relocating the bin store and the sub-station doors to the western side of the building may create an opportunity to explore options for a more interesting façade.

3.3.8 I see no reason for the single leaf door to the refuse store. It should be deleted regardless of the location of the refuse store.

A prominent, secure entrance and inclusion of visitor access controls will reduce the risk of unwanted intruders

3.3.9 To create a welcoming development, aid legitimate visitors and reduce the risk of intruders gaining entry to the development, the communal entrance must be prominent, very well lit and secured with a security-certified door that is fitted with an electrically operated, multi-point lock, activated with a programmable, residents' fob. There should also be an audio-visual link to each apartment, so that residents can vet visitors prior to releasing the doors locking mechanism remotely to allow *bona fide* visitors access into the lobby before being met and escorted to the relevant apartment.

3.3.10 The doors connecting the lobby to the circulation corridor and lifts should include an electronic lock operated by residents' fob. The doors should be self-closing and lock upon closure.

3.3.11 The escape door should be purely for escape purposes and not used a means of entering or leaving the building.

3.3.12 The name of the development should be prominent at the communal entrance.

Cycle store

3.3.13 The cycle store may be better located on the Lomax Street side of the building, with access directly into the store, rather than wheeling bikes through the lobby where higher quality doors may be more susceptible to accidental damage from wheels and pedals. The external door must be self-closing and self-locking and must be particularly secure - rated to BS PAS 24, STS201, or LPS 1175 SR2.

3.3.14 If the store remains as shown on the layout plan, then the cycle store door should be self-closing and lock securely upon closure. It should be fitted with an electronic lock operated by a residents' fob. The cycle stands should allow cyclists to secure both of the wheels and the frame.

The streetscape around the development

3.3.15 Improve the quality of the streetscape of Lomax Street and Ducie Street by resurfacing the footpaths and reinstating kerbs, introducing measures to prevent on-pavement parking, relocating any poorly sited street furniture, and improving street lighting, to reflect the change in use of the site, and the area generally, from an area of car parking and industrial uses to an emerging residential quarter.

3.3.16 Poor quality environments tend to attract further abuse, whereas good quality streetscapes tend to be respected and are more likely to be maintained by landowners, residents and public bodies. A detailed design of the public realm around the scheme should be forwarded for comment as soon as is available.

4 Physical Security

The following checklist forms the physical security requirements for this scheme to achieve Secured by Design accreditation.

4.1 Doors

- ❑ The communal entrance door should be:
  - compliant with, and certified to, BS PAS 24, STS201, or LPS 1175 SR2;
  - include a multi-point electronic lock, (which is an integral part of the certification), capable of being operated via an electronic access control system; and,
  - self-closing and lock automatically on closure.
- ❑ Entry through the communal entrance door should be controlled by resident key-fob.
- ❑ An audio-visual unit should relay images (one way) and audio (two ways) from the communal entrance door to a handset in each apartment to allow communication between residents and visitors. Residents

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should be able to operate the locking mechanism of this entrance door remotely from within their apartments to allow *bona fide* visitors entry to the secure lobby. Visitors can then be escorted through the inner lobby doors by residents.

- ❑ The external escape door on the Lomax Street elevation should be compliant with, and certified to, BS PAS 24, STS201, or LPS 1175 SR2.
- ❑ The inner lobby doors on the ground floor should be compliant with, and certified to, BS PAS 24 or be a 44mm solid core door, in either case the doors should include an electronic lock. The door should be self-closing and lock automatically on closure. Entry through this door should be controlled by resident key-fob.
- ❑ Individual apartment entrance doors must be compliant with, and certified to, BS PAS 24, STS201, or LPS 1175 SR2. A door viewer and an opening limiter should be fitted, so that residents can identify visitors prior to opening the door fully.
- ❑ Apartment entrance doors should have fixed external handles or handles fitted with a split spindle, meaning access is only possible with a key when the door is closed.
- ❑ Doors allowing access to the recess on the ground floor Ducie Street elevation, to the balcony of the level 01 apartment, and the doors to the terrace of the level 07 apartments must be compliant with, and certified to, BS PAS 24, STS201, or LPS 1175 SR2.
- ❑ The cycle store door be 44mm, solid-core, and fitted with an electronic lock, operated by a resident key-fob.
- ❑ The door connecting the refuse store to the circulation corridor should be a Pas 24 rated door or a 44mm solid core door fitted with a Secured by Design certified electronic lock. Entry through this door (both in and out) should be controlled by resident key-fob.
- ❑ The external doors to the sub-station and the refuse store should be compliant with and certified to LPS 1175 SR2.

4.2 Windows

- ❑ Any ground floor, opening windows must be compliant with, and certified to, BS PAS 24 be fitted with key-operated locks, and have fixed/lockable opening restrictors (not releasable from the outside) limiting opening to 100mm.

4.3 Glazing

- ❑ Glazing within, and surrounding, the inner lobby doors and all ground floor windows must incorporate at least one pane of glass rated as P1A under EN 356. The remaining pane in a double glazed unit may be toughened glass.
- ❑ Doors allowing access to the recess on the ground floor Ducie Street elevation, to the balcony of the level 01 apartment, and the doors to the terrace of the level 07 apartments must incorporate at least one pane of glass rated as P1A under EN 356. The remaining pane in a double glazed unit may be toughened glass.
- ❑ Glazing within, and surrounding, the communal entrance doors must incorporate at least one pane of glass rated as P4A under EN 356. The remaining pane in a double glazed unit may be toughened glass.

4.4 Intruder Alarm

- ❑ It is good practice to fit an alarm to each apartment. If fitted, alarms should comply with BS EN 50131 and PD 6662 for wired systems or BS 6799 for wireless systems, and be linked to contacts on the entrance door of each apartment together with PIR detectors covering all ground floor rooms that have windows.

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4.5 Access Control

- ☐ Ideally, locks on all entrance doors, lobby doors, the individual apartment doors, the lift, and the cycle and refuse stores should be activated by a residents' fob.

4.6 Cycle Store

- ☐ The door to the cycle store should be a 44mm solid core door. It should be self-closing and self-locking, and fitted with a fob activated electronic lock, which meets 'Secured by Design' standards.
- ☐ Cycle stands/racks within the store should allow the cyclist to secure the wheels and frame to the stand/rack.

4.7 Landscaping

- ☐ There needs to be a significant improvement to the quality of the streetscape around the development and in the area generally. A detailed design of the public realm around the scheme should be forwarded for comment as soon as it is available.

4.8 Lighting

- ☐ Lighting must be provided to all external doors. Lights should be operated by photoelectric cell/daylight sensor. PIR security lighting is not recommended.
- ☐ Fittings should produce 'white' light, as opposed to yellow/orange light. Metal halide (or bulbs with a comparable output) should be used, as these offer superior colour rendition over alternatives such as high and low pressure sodium bulbs.

4.9 CCTV

- ☐ A CCTV system may be considered for the development. Designers should consider the following points when planning a CCTV strategy:

    - With regards to the retention of footage, the police prefer quality over quantity. The overall retention period should be dictated by what the system is designed to achieve, though it would be better to have good quality images over a 14-day period than poor ones over a 30-day period.
    - Procedures for recovery of recordings are recommended to be established (e.g. trained staff / the CCTV system instruction manual to be readily available). This is to ensure that the images produced will be of an acceptable standard that will allow for identification of an individual which will stand up to scrutiny in court.
        - **Acceptable Standard** - this generally requires a resolution of 720x576 pixels at a real time frame rate of 25 frames per second. (N.B. Both the camera and DVR must be capable of this – if the camera will only send low resolution images then it does not matter how high the resolution of the recording unit is).
        - **Identification** – One of three levels of field of view. To identify an individual, the image must capture no less than 120% of the field of view (at least from the top of the individuals head to their knees). The remaining two levels of field of view are 'Overview' and 'Recognition', which whilst effective for observational purposes, are less likely to result in the identification of a person/offender.

- ☐ The location of cameras should help to provide clear facial identification of individuals. Suitable locations for cameras would be: externally - at the communal entrance door and each of the four elevations; and, internally - within the lobby, the cycle store and the ground floor circulation corridor.
- ☐ Images should be recorded with images retained for 31 days, with recording equipment located in a secure room in the building or off site at an appropriate monitoring station.

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4.10 Other

- ❑ If smart meters are not fitted, the meter cupboard should be located in the secure lobby.
- ❑ To prevent damage or being used to climb to the level 01 balcony, rainwater pipes should be concealed at ground level.
- ❑ A strategy should be defined to ensure waste collection can take place whilst retaining a secure development.

5 Management & Maintenance

- ❑ A plan should be drawn up that includes details of contracts or other arrangements to maintain, *inter alia*: landscaping; CCTV; lighting; access controls; interior cleaning and signage.

6 Construction

- ❑ The developer should take appropriate measures to secure their site during construction, and control pedestrian and vehicular access in and out.
- ❑ The contractor on this scheme should be a member of the 'Considerate Constructors Scheme'.
- ❑ If employed, site security contractors should be Security Industry Authority approved (see http://www.sia.homeoffice.gov.uk/pages/acs-intro.aspx).

7 Secured by Design (SBD)

- ❑ Secured by Design focuses on crime prevention at the design, layout and construction stages of homes and promotes the use of security standards for a wide range of applications and products. To apply for Secured by Design certification for your development, visit our online application form at: http://www.designforsecurity.org/secured-by-design/sbd-accreditation/

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A Contact register

Date	Contact With	Summary of Contact
25.03.18	Lawrence Somerville, Tim Groom Architects	Request for Crime Impact Statement
17.04.18		Site visited
03.04.18	Lawrence Somerville, Tim Groom Architects	Report Issued

B Associated Documents

This report is based on the following drawings and supplementary information submitted by the applicant.

Drawing No.	Drawing Title	Date	Rev
0303_ 02_ 001	Location Plan	-	-
0303_ 02_ 003	Block Plan as Proposed	-	-
0303_ 02_ 00G	GA_Level 0	-	-
0303_ 03_ 001	GA_Level 1	-	-
0303_ 03_ 002	GA_Level 2	-	-
0303_03_003	GA_Level 3	-	-
0303_03_004	GA_Level 4	-	-
0303_03_005	GA_ Level 5	-	-
0303_03_006	GA_ Level 6	-	-
0303_03_007	GA_;Level 7	-	-
0303_03_008	GA_Roof	-	-
0303_05_005	Ducie Street Elevation	-	-
0303_05_006	East Facing Elevation	-	-
0303_05_008	Lomax Street Elevevation	-	-
0303_05_009	West Facing Elevation	-	-

PLEASE NOTE - In the event of any subsequent material changes to the scheme, it will be necessary for Design for Security to reassess the comments made within this report.

C CIS Version History

Version	Revisions Made	Date
A		

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D Glossary

Burglary Resistance Standards

BS 7950, 1997

Specification for enhanced security performance of casement and tilt/turn windows.

BS 4873, 2005: Specification for aluminium windows.

BS 7412, 2007: Specification for plastic windows made from PVC-U extruded hollow profiles.

BS 644-1, 2003: Wood windows. Specification for factory assembled windows - various types.

BWF:TWAS: Timber window accreditation scheme.

BS 6510, 2005: Specification for steel windows, sills, window boards & doors.

BS PAS 23-1, 1999

General performance requirements for door assemblies.

A performance standard for door sets, which certifies that a particular door set is fit for purpose. Door products must also have BS PAS 24 certification.

BS PAS 24-1, 2012

General security performance requirements for door assemblies.

An attack test standard for door sets, which certifies that a particular door, frame, lock and hardware set has withstood a series of physical tests. This is the minimum police requirement for Secured by Design dwellings, and is also applicable to French/double doors, and sliding doors.

ENV 1627-30 (Security Ratings WK1 to WK6)

Windows, doors, shutters - Burglar resistance Requirements and classification

The classification system used in ENV 1627-30 is aimed at the commercial market and is based on five elements:

a) Resistance of glazing

b) Performance of hardware

c) Resistance to static loading

d) Resistance to dynamic loading

e) Burglary resistance by manual intervention

LPS 1175 (Security Ratings 1 to 6)

Specification for testing and classifying the burglary resistance of building components

This includes doors, shutters, garage doors and grilles typically for commercial premises and higher risk domestic premises and is acceptable to the ABI and the Police. The standard has 6 levels, 6 being the highest, with levels 1 and 2 equivalent in many respects to BS PAS 24 and BS 7950.

STS01 Issue 4: 2012

Enhanced security requirements for doorsets and door assemblies for dwellings to satisfy the requirements of PAS23 and PAS24

As the title suggests this is an equivalent test standard to PAS 24, incorporating PAS 23 (fitness for purpose), published by Warrington Certification.

STS02 Issue 3: 2011

Requirements for burglary resistance of construction products including hinged, pivoted, folding or sliding doorsets, windows, curtain walling, security grilles, garage doors and shutters.

This specifies a broadly similar range of attack tools and times to those specified at the lower levels of LPS1175. However, STS202 does not extend to cover the higher levels of risk addressed within LPS1175 and the attack methods used differ.

EN 356, 2000 (Ratings P1A to P8A)

Glass in building. Security glazing. Testing and classification of resistance against manual attack.

A performance standard for manual attacks on glazing. P2A is comparable to the performance of a 6.8mm laminated glass, and P4A to that of a 9.5mm laminated glass.

Commonly Used Acronyms

CIT

Cash in transit (refers to vehicles, personnel and routines).

CPTED

Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design
(Learn more at ***www.designforsecurity.org/about/cpted***)

CRS

Crime Reduction Specialist. Sometimes known as CPO (Crime Prevention Officer)

INPT

Integrated Neighbourhood Policing Team.

PVB/PolyVinyl Butyral (Glazing interlayer)

A commonly used interlayer used in the production of laminated glass.

LPCB (Loss Prevention Certification Board)

A brand of the BRE Global (Building Research Establishment) family. The LPCB work with insurers, Government, police, designers, manufacturers, contractors and end users to develop methods of assessing performance and reliability of security products to ensure their fitness for purpose.

UKAS (United Kingdom Accreditation Service)

The sole national accreditation body recognised by government to assess, against internationally agreed standards, organisations that provide certification, testing, inspections and calibration services.

Useful Websites

Design for Security
www.designforsecurity.org
Secured by Design
www.securedbydesign.com
RIBA Product Selector
www.ribaproductselector.com
LPCB – Red Book Live
www.redbooklive.com
Crime Reduction (Home Office)
www.crimereduction.homeoffice.gov.uk
DAC (Design Against Crime) Solution Centre
www.designagainstcrime.org
Building for Life
www.buildingforlife.org
CLG (Communities and Local Government)
www.communities.gov.uk

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