



CRIME IMPACT STATEMENT

RICHMOND PARK CAR PARK, FALLOWFIELD, MANCHESTER
UNIVERSITY BUILDING TO ACCOMMODATE COMMERCIAL
CATERING FACILITY, OFFICE SPACE & STORAGE

Greater Manchester Police
designforsecurity

FOR: Rider Levett Bucknall
VERSION B: 28/10/2024
REFERENCE: 2024/0325/CIS/01

Richmond Park Car Park, Fallowfield, Manchester

URN: 2024/0325/CIS/01

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Minor security improvements recommended

This development has been assessed against the principles of 'Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design' (CPTED), in order to reduce the opportunities for crime and the fear of crime.

The layout of the proposed scheme is considered acceptable, as long as the issues discussed in more detail within Section 3.3 of this report are addressed, namely:

- Consideration should be given to the double vehicular gates at the western end of the parking/servicing/storage compound being automated/access-controlled. If not, They should remain securely locked unless they are being utilised by authorised staff and must not be left open/insecure and unattended at any time. All fencing/gates should be designed/detailed to avoid climbing aids and gaps underneath.
- The relocated cycle store should not be placed where it could provide a climbing aid over secure fencing. Bollards should prevent damage to fencelines as well as ensure vehicles cannot be parked where they could form a climbing aid themselves.
- Access controls into/around the site and building.
- Prevent of unauthorised access to external stair/roof.

If these issues can be addressed as described within the report and the other physical security measures are incorporated, we would be happy to support the development.

Please note: Greater Manchester Police Design for Security will recommend to the local planning authority that a planning condition is added that reflects the physical security specification listed within Section 4 of this report.



Bradley Hart MTCP

Design for Security Consultant

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1 Visual Audit


The site is a car park to the north of Richmond Park – including 8 no. blocks of self-catering student accommodation set in the heart of the University of Manchester Fallowfield campus. The car park also includes a central sheltered cycle store and a large energy centre building to the north-east.

The site is bounded by similar student accommodation blocks to the west (Ashburne Hall) and east (Unsworth Park). To the north is a short residential cul-de-sac (Redshaw Close) and an area of open space to the rear of the residential properties fronting onto Old Hall Lane – separated from the site by high walls, Palisade fencing and dense vegetation/mature trees.

It is overlooked to some degree from the student accommodation blocks along the southern boundary, although the existing trees do impede overlooking from the upper floor windows to some degree.

The site can be accessed via Whitworth Lane to the west and Chancellors Way to the east – both of which are fitted with access-controlled vehicular arm barriers.

As well as student accommodation blocks, the wider Fallowfield campus includes teaching and research gardens, the Armitage Sports Centre (including grass and all-weather pitches) and The Limes – a catering and maintenance facility located to the south-west of the site, which the proposed development is to replace.



2 Crime Statistics & Analysis

2.1 Crime Summary

The data below is based on crimes recorded between 1st September 2023 to 31st August 2024.



Figure 1: Recorded Crime within 500m of Site

Domestic Burglary	Non-Domestic Burglary	Criminal Damage	Less Serious Wounding	Theft	Robbery	Serious Wounding	Theft from Motor Vehicle	Theft of Motor Vehicle	Bicycle Theft
44	5	20	102	36	19	<5	17	5	49

- 2.1.1 The overall rate of crime in the local area over the past 12 months has been below average for the Manchester division, although there are a number of areas of open space within the study area that lower the density of development and typically attract fewer crime and disorder incidents.
- 2.1.2 The most prevalent types of recorded crime within 500m of the site have been less serious wounding, cycle theft and domestic burglary, with particularly concentrations around/off the main arterial routes of Wilmslow Road (A6010) and Mosley Road (B5093), as well as at student accommodation blocks within the locale. Students tend to be more vulnerable to crime due to a number of factors including their age, lifestyle, income, tenure, employment status, occupancy and accommodation type. They also tend to be less security conscious and can leave windows, doors and property (such as cycles) insecure – particularly when properties are in multiple occupation.
- 2.1.3 As this CIS relates to a proposed catering/storage/office facility, the more detailed analysis below will focus on the most appropriate use-specific burglary and theft data.


2.2 Non-Domestic Burglary (Manchester Industrial/Storage/Distribution Premises): Risk Analysis

The data below relates to non-domestic burglary offences within/against industrial/storage/distribution premises, recorded in the Manchester area 2018-2019.



- 2.2.1 **Day Range:** During the week, the risk of burglary at Manchester industrial/storage/distribution premises peaks on Thursday and is lowest on Friday.
- 2.2.2 **Time Range:** The risk of burglary peaks late at night/during the early hours of the morning. Offenders often target industrial premises at these times when it is dark, industrial areas are typically quiet, units are closed or operate with fewer staff and offenders perceive a lower risk of being observed or detected.



M/cr Industrial/Storage Burglary – Point of Entry



- 2.2.3 **Point of Entry:** The majority of burglaries at Manchester industrial/storage/distribution premises have been committed through doors, which offenders have forced open doors using tools/implements or have smashed locks to gain entry. Windows have also been targeted (predominantly by smashing the glazing) as have shutters, which offenders have damaged or forced shutters upwards to gain access to doors and windows behind. Offenders have regularly used a variety of tools to gain unauthorised access – suggesting incidents are more likely to have been planned rather than being opportunistic. In a number of cases, the point of entry was unknown. This is likely to have been where offenders have posed as legitimate customers before gaining access to ‘staff only’/unauthorised areas and stealing property unnoticed.

2.3 Theft (Manchester Industrial/Storage/Distribution Premises): Risk Analysis


The data below relates to thefts within/against industrial premises, recorded in the Manchester area.



- 2.3.1 **Day Range:** The risk of theft at Manchester industrial/storage/distribution premises peaks on Friday.
- 2.3.2 **Time Range:** The risk of theft is greatest around midday and during the late evening. There are more opportunities for offenders to access buildings and private areas anonymously during the working day, before targeting the personal property of staff, as well as tools, plant and externally stored materials. External materials/equipment can often be vulnerable at night, particularly when compounds are not securely enclosed.

2.4 Non-Domestic Burglary (Manchester Restaurants/Café Premises): Risk Analysis



The data below relates to non-domestic burglary offences within/against restaurants and cafés, recorded in the Manchester area 2018-2019.



- 2.4.1 **Day Range:** The risk of burglary at restaurants/cafés in Manchester fluctuates throughout the week, peaking on Monday, Thursday, and Sunday.
- 2.4.2 **Time Range:** The risk of burglary peaks during the early hours of the morning, when premises are usually closed.
- 2.4.3 **Point of Entry:** In the majority of cases where entry points are known, offenders have entered Manchester restaurants/cafés through external doors. Doors have been forced open with bodily pressure and tools/implements and glazing within doors/windows has been smashed to gain entry. Offenders have also posed as legitimate customers before targeting insecure doors, tailgating, or using force to open internal doors to restricted areas when premises are open to the public.

2.5 Theft (Manchester Restaurants/Café Premises): Risk Analysis



The data below relates to thefts within/against restaurants and cafés, recorded in the Manchester area during 2018-2019.



- 2.5.1 **Day Range:** During the week, the risk of theft at Manchester restaurants/cafes peaks over the weekend. Many premises experience higher levels of attendance at the weekend than during the week. Premises are also usually open for longer at the weekend and so the opportunities for offenders to commit theft is greater.
- 2.5.2 **Time Range:** The risk of theft peaks in the afternoon and into the evening. This reflects the times when restaurants/cafes are typically at their busiest and, therefore, the opportunities to commit theft are greater. Handbags, purses/wallets, and mobile phones belonging to customers are the most routinely stolen items. Offenders have also targeted I.T equipment within premises, particularly tablets and laptops, as well as alcohol from storage rooms.


2.6 Non-Domestic Burglary (Manchester Office Premises): Risk Analysis

The data below relates to non-domestic burglary offences within/against offices, recorded in the Manchester area 2018-2019.



- 2.6.1 **Day Range:** During the week, the risk of burglary at office premises in Manchester is greatest on Tuesday, Thursday and Sunday.
- 2.6.2 **Time Range:** During the day, the risk of burglary at Manchester office premises rises into the evening/late at night. Such premises are often targeted at these times when they are closed and unoccupied, meaning offenders can attempt to gain unauthorised access without fear of being disturbed or identified.

Manchester Office Burglary – Point of Entry




- 2.6.3 **Point of Entry:** The majority of burglaries at offices in Manchester have been committed through doors. Burglaries against office buildings in this area do not appear to be opportunistic, with offenders often bringing tools with them that can be used to force open doors and cut locks. Offenders have also smashed glazed panels in doors and windows to gain entry. A large proportion of burglaries have been committed through ‘unknown’ and ‘legitimate’ points of entry, which are likely to have been where offenders (posing as legitimate customers, visitors or employees) have gained unauthorised access to staff only areas (i.e. through insecure doors, tailgating etc.) to steal property.


2.7 Theft (Manchester Office Premises): Risk Analysis

The data below relates to thefts within/against offices, recorded in the Manchester area 2018-2019.

Manchester Office Theft – Day Range





Manchester Office Theft – Time Range



- 2.7.1 **Day Range:** During the week, the risk of theft at Manchester offices is greatest on Monday and Tuesday and is generally lower over the weekend (when many are shut).
- 2.7.2 **Time Range:** During the day, the risk of theft is concentrated during normal working hours – peaking around midday. During these times, many office workers will take their lunch breaks, leaving unattended property at desks or in insecure areas. Thefts can also often happen at the end of the working day, when members of staff are finishing work and premises is likely to be less secure, such as while cleaning operations are carried out.

2.8 Local Vehicle Crime: Risk Analysis

The data below relates to vehicle crime committed within 500m of the site between 1st September 2023 to 31st August 2024.



- 2.8.1 **Day Range:** During the week, the risk of vehicle crime in the local area peaks on Sunday.
- 2.8.2 **Time Range:** During the day, the risk of vehicle crime fluctuates – peaking in the late afternoon/early evening. Students and staff often park their vehicles in the local area during the day, where offenders know that vehicles will be left unattended for long periods, leaving them potentially vulnerable.
- 2.8.3 Vehicles parked on streets or within open, communal areas/car parks, where they are easily accessible and cannot be easily overlooked by their owners, are often more vulnerable to attack than those parked on the driveways of individual properties or within secure parking facilities.

2.9 General Risk Factors

The typical security risks for a development of this nature are:

- Burglary
- Robbery to business
- Theft of personal belongings at work
- Criminal damage to property and vehicles
- Unauthorised access to buildings/private space
- Arson
- Cycle theft
- Employee theft
- Theft of/from parked vehicles
- Theft and criminal damage during the construction period

2.10 Common Local/Use Specific M.O.s (Modus Operandi)

2.10.1 Having looked at the crime data for the site/surrounding area and the proposed uses, the most frequent M.O's (modus operandi) used by offenders when targeting Manchester industrial/storage/distribution premises, restaurant/café premises and office premises are listed below, along with suggested measures to reduce the risk of them being utilised at the proposed development:

- **Manchester Industrial/Storage/Distribution & Offices:** Doors have been forced open using tools/implements or when they have been left insecure by members of staff.

Possible Solution - Although the location of doors should be considered (ideally placed where they can be readily observed, so that potential criminals would be more easily detected), it is inevitable that some will be located where they will benefit from lower levels of natural surveillance. All external doors should be certified to recognised security standards (see Section 4.1), which are independently proven to reduce the risk of forced entry and thus increase the chances of detection. Security-certified doors are the best long-term measure to address this risk and can be obtained to suit virtually all operational requirements. Good use of perimeter boundaries, lighting and CCTV (see Sections 4.6, 4.8 & 4.9) can also deter criminals by preventing access to vulnerable areas and increasing the chances of them being seen by security personnel or passers-by.

- **Manchester Industrial/Storage/Distribution, Restaurants/Cafes & Offices:** Glazing within doors and windows has been smashed to gain entry.

Possible Solution – All ground floor/accessible glazing (including in and around doors) should include a laminated pane (see Section 4.3), which forms a much more robust barrier against shattering and penetration. The strength of the laminated glass should be relative to the strength of the door or window system in which it is fitted. Where possible, the size of any glazed elements within/directly adjacent to doors should be reduced and set well away from locking points. Windows that are particularly vulnerable should be secured with security-certified shutters out-of-hours (see Section 4.2).

- **Manchester Industrial/Storage/Distribution, Restaurants/Cafes & Offices:** In a number of cases, the point of entry was 'unknown'. This is likely to have been where offenders have posed as legitimate customers, visitors or employees before gaining access to back-of-house/staff areas and stealing property unnoticed.

Possible Solution – There should be robust access control systems in place to ensure that callers to units are vetted and/or met and escorted before being allowed access into them (see Section 4.1/4.4). All individual rooms/areas should be capable of being secured when unoccupied and there should be secure areas for staff to store their belongings while at work. All staff should understand and accept the need for security measures and should be trained to be vigilant and to report any suspicious behaviour.

- **Manchester Industrial/Storage/Distribution & Offices:** Offenders have penetrated through walls and roofs to gain unauthorised access.

Possible Solution - Ideally, single storey building elements should be avoided. If they are absolutely necessary, care should be taken in their design to ensure that roof areas or upper floor windows are not accessible, for example, with the use of high-level/overhanging eaves, high balustrades etc. There should be no features of the building or any nearby hard/soft landscaping features that would facilitate climbing. Any 'accessible' skylights should incorporate at least one pane of laminated glazing and should be secured with internally fixed grilles/bars to prevent unauthorised access. The construction of the roof itself and all external walls should also be robust enough to withstand penetration (see Section 4.3).

- **Manchester Industrial/Storage/Distribution:** Theft of externally stored materials, tools and plant equipment

Possible Solution - The integrity of the boundary treatments should be evaluated and regularly checked for defects. Inappropriately parked vehicles/trailers and other externally stored items can obscure the spread of lighting and CCTV coverage, creating potential areas of intense shadowing and blind spots. It is recommended that this is considered in the external arrangement, and 'no store/park' areas specifically identified to avoid inadvertently blocking surveillance. Storage/parking areas close to boundaries should also be avoided as they may mask any damage to perimeter fencing (see Section 4.11).

3 Layout Appraisal

3.1 Proposed Development

- 3.1.1 The proposal is to erect a part single-storey, part two-storey building to replace the existing Limes facility on the Fallowfield campus, combining the University's Catering Central Processing Unit (CPU), Facilities Management Unit (FMC) and Residences Team to form a facility consisting of FM stores and workshops, catering facilities, staff workspaces and storage facilities.
- 3.1.2 The building will be located to the north of the existing car park, with a gated maintenance access route between the rear elevation of the building and the northern boundary of the site. The main entrance to the Limes element of the building will be to the east of the building frontage, with a turning head/service access/goods loading bay, 15 no. staff parking bays and 2 no. student parking bays to the east of the site (accessed from Chancellors Way). The western portion of the site will be reconfigured to provide 45 no. parking spaces, bike racks and cycle store (accessed from Whitworth Lane). The majority of the frontage and the western elevation of the building will be enclosed within a 2500mm high fenced compound, which will include an automated sliding vehicular gate to the east, manual double vehicular gates to the west and pedestrian gates to the east, west and south. The compound itself will include 5 no. vehicle charging spaces, 5 no. CPU van/tail lift/sprinter parking spaces, a compactor, a recycling and refuse compound, a container for scaffolding, a cherry picker parking space and jet wash/hose down zones.
- 3.1.3 The main building itself will house catering facilities at ground level (including freezer/cold/chiller rooms, prep rooms, cook room, dishwasher room, stores and staff facilities) and offices, meeting rooms, hot desking facilities for 10 no. FMC & CPU staff, workshop, staff facilities and stores/plant rooms at first floor level. The single storey element of the building will include an ESU store (including external equipment store, workshop etc.), a Residences store (including white goods etc.) and plant rooms. The building will be occupied by circa 20 staff across the FMC and CPU, with additional temporary contractors when required. FMC will be operational 08:00 to 19:00 Monday to Friday and CPU will be operational 07:00 to 01:00 every day.

3.2 Positive Aspects of the Proposal

The following proposed features would make a positive contribution to the prevention of crime and fear of crime.

- 3.2.1 The proposed development will bring additional activity and surveillance to the area – particularly during the day.
- 3.2.2 The proposed building will sit within an existing university campus, with well-established management practices and security protocols. It will be overlooked to some degree by the existing student accommodation buildings to the south and east when they are occupied and will benefit from some passive surveillance from Whitworth Lane/Chancellors Way.
- 3.2.3 The building will have a relatively simple footprint that will provide few potential places of concealment and facilitate efficient surveillance of external areas. The proposed fencelines/gates will prevent unauthorised access to the hidden route to the rear of the building and the external parking/servicing/storage compound to the building frontage.
- 3.2.4 The Limes element of the building will be served by an access-controlled main entrance, with access-controlled goods in/out doors and internal access-controls, in order to prevent unauthorised access and ensure authorised staff are only allowed access to areas required for their work. CCTV and an intruder alarm will also be incorporated.
- 3.2.5 The proposed and relocated parking spaces will be laid out in straight rows, with few obstacles to views across them at ground level, aiding surveillance opportunities.
- 3.2.6 The proposed development provides the opportunity to include security features built into the design and construction of the building and avoid the need for obtrusive retro-fitted security measures that can increase the fear of crime. Security measures carefully incorporated into the design can ensure the building is reasonably secure, without visibly announcing that the design was concerned about crime.

3.3 Points for Further Consideration

The following points have been identified for further consideration and would need to be addressed for Design for Security to support the proposed scheme.

- 3.3.1 It is noted that the maintenance route to the rear of the building and the parking/servicing/storage compound will be enclosed with 2500mm high LPS 1175 A1 (SR1) security rated CLD Dulok S1 welded-wire mesh fencing, which is Secured by Design (SBD) compliant. The detailing of the boundary treatments and gates will be essential to the security of the scheme and the following issues should be considered (also see Section 4.6 for more information):
- It is noted that the sliding vehicular gate to the east of the compound will be automated. It should operate via staff key fob/card with no automatic egress (i.e. access control both 'in' and 'out'), so that criminals cannot gain access to the area, attack parked vehicles, storage areas or the building and escape. The pedestrian gates to the compound should also be self-closing/locking and operated via staff key fob/swipe card. Any panic mechanisms required for emergency egress purposes should be fitted with a panic mechanism that cannot be reached/operated from the external face.
 - It is preferable for the double vehicular gates at the western end of the compound to also be automatic and operated in the same way as the sliding gate. If they are to be manually operated, the gates must remain securely locked unless they are being utilised by authorised staff and must not be left open/insecure and unattended at any time.
 - The detailing of the hinges and locking points of gates are often overlooked can inadvertently form footholds for offenders to easily scale secure boundaries. Mid-point horizontal elements, exposed hinges and large sliding bolt apertures/locking points should be avoided, or fitted with shrouding/protective plates to avoid the creation of footholds (see illustration opposite for example). Any gaps underneath gates should also be small enough to prevent access underneath them.
 - The indicated location of the cycle store on the site plan should be carefully considered to ensure it does not form a climbing aid over the secure fencing to the compound. Similarly, the proposed bollards between the parking areas and the compound fencing could be set away from the fencelines to allow them to not only prevent damage to them, but also ensure vehicles cannot be parked where they could form a climbing aid themselves.
- 3.3.2 The control and management of access into and around the building will be paramount to its security (see Section 4.4 for more information). The main entrance, as well as the goods in/out entrance, should be operated by staff key fob/card or remotely via video access controls linked to a staffed office. Internal access controls should also be incorporated to ensure areas/floors are only accessible to authorised personnel only and all other rooms should be capable of being secured when unoccupied.
- 3.3.3 The building will include an external stair, which provides access to the first floor of the building, as well as the roof. If publicly accessible, such external stairs can be vulnerable to fostering loitering/gathering, nuisance and anti-social behaviour and can leave upper floor doors, windows and roof areas potentially accessible and vulnerable to attack (although it is noted that it will be located within the secure compound enclosure and the stair will incorporate secure gates at roof level and just before first floor level). It is highly recommended that the first floor doorset is to the same physical security standard as those at ground level (see Section 4.1). The eaves of the single-storey element of the building should be as high as possible, in order to discourage unauthorised access to the roof. The design of the eaves should also discourage climbing e.g. with rounded/overhanging eaves, high balustrades etc. and there should be no other features of the building or nearby hard/soft landscaping features that may provide climbing aids onto the roof. The construction of any 'accessible' roof areas, as well as their specification of any rooflights, should be robust enough to withstand penetration (see Sections 4.2/4.3).
- 3.3.4 It is essential that all of the physical security measures listed below are incorporated into the scheme. Integrated, risk-commensurate security measures aim to place secure physical barriers or surveillance in the path of the criminal – making crime harder to commit and raising the risk of detection and possible capture, as well as promoting a feeling of safety in staff/users.



4 Physical Security

The following checklist forms the physical security requirements for this scheme to achieve Secured by Design accreditation.

4.1 Doors

- ☐ All external doorsets (at all levels) should be compliant with and certified to BS PAS 24, STS 202 BR2 or LPS 1175 SR2. It is crucial that the door ironmongery to any external escape-only doors is permitted under the security certification of the product. All escape-only doors should be alarmed (audible upon opening) and designed without visible external ironmongery. Security-certified louvred doorsets are also available if required to plant rooms etc. (see <https://www.securedbydesign.com/member-companies/accredited-product-search-for-SBD-approved-suppliers>).
- ☐ Any sectional loading bay doors must be tested and certified to LPS 1175 SR2. If circumstances could prevent this, please consult with Design for Security.
- ☐ The main entrance doorset to the Limes building, as well as the goods in/out entrance, should be secured with a multi-point electronic lock permitted as part of the certification, capable of being operated by staff fob/card or via video access controls linked to a staffed office (see Section 4.4 for more details).
- ☐ Internal doors to dedicated CPU or FMC areas for the access of authorised personnel only, or any rooms containing valuable equipment (e.g. computers, plant, staff belongings etc.), should be solid core (FD30 or higher), self-closing/locking, with 3 hinges and an electronic lock operated by staff key card/fob (again, see Section 4.4). All other doors/frames to individual rooms, stores, offices, workshops etc. should be solid core (min. 44mm thick), with 3 hinges and a 5 lever mortice deadlock or similar, so that they can be secured when unoccupied.

4.2 Windows & Shutters

- ☐ Windows and any potentially accessible rooflights should be compliant with and certified to BS PAS 24 or LPS 1175 SR2 where possible. All other window designs/dimensions should take account of the requirements of the above standards, as certified products can carry dimensional restrictions. Any curtain walling panels should include laminated glazing (see below) and should be fixed with a secure glazing retention system (e.g. with security glazing tape, with a dedicated security sealant/gasket or a secure mechanical fixing system from the glazing retention tests within the BS PAS 24 or LPS 1175 standards).
- ☐ Any ground floor/accessible opening lights (escape requirements permitting) should be lockable and have fixed/lockable opening restrictors (not releasable from the outside) limited to 100mm.
- ☐ If any shutters are to be installed, they should be tested and certified to LPS 1175 SR2 (or SR1 if perforated laths are required) and installed in accordance with manufacturer's instructions. Ideally, any external shutters should have shutter-boxes and guides built into the fabric of the building – where they would be less vulnerable to attack and less visually intrusive.

4.3 Glazing & Building Fabric

- ☐ All ground floor and easily accessible glazing (e.g. to any rooflights or any first floor windows accessible from single-storey elements) should incorporate at least one pane of glass with a 1.5mm PVB interlayer (e.g. 7.5mm laminated glass), or a glass rated as P4A under EN 356. The remaining pane in a double glazed unit may be toughened glass.
- ☐ If there are to be any vision panels within loading bay doors that cannot include laminated glazing, they should include a material of a similar strength (e.g. multi-layer acrylic/polycarbonate or hammerglass) to ensure they are resistant to shattering and penetration.
- ☐ There should be a block work wall (or material of similar strength e.g. welded-steel mesh) behind any cladding to the building, to a minimum height of 2000mm from external ground level, to ensure that the fabric of the building itself is not vulnerable to attack.

- ☐ There should be no features of the building (such as louvered features that could be used as a ladder, projecting window cills or brickwork features, canopies below the level of the single storey eaves, exposed rainwater down pipes etc.) or nearby hard/soft landscaping features (such as nearby boundaries, trees, lighting columns, handrails etc.) that may provide climbing aids onto the roof. Any louveres to the building should be robustly constructed and fixed, to ensure they cannot be easily removed, and designed to ensure that they cannot be used as a climbing aid to reach roof areas/upper floor windows.
- ☐ The construction of any potentially accessible areas of roof should also be carefully considered to prevent criminal intrusion. Certificated lightweight roof systems are available to LPS 1175 SR1 or STS 202 BR1. Alternatively, expanded metal or welded mesh should be incorporated between the skins of double-skinned roof coverings or within the roof space. Any rooflights should incorporate laminated glazing/polycarbonate and internally fixed security bars/grilles.
- ☐ Ideally, any publicly accessible sheltered areas/canopies should be designed-out or reduced as much as possible to avoid the creation of hiding places or congregation points that can often become a focal point for crime and anti-social behaviour.

4.4 Access Controls

- ☐ Access control systems should be operable by swipe card or fob, and not numeric keypads (which can be easily observed/shared and are rarely changed). The following gates/doors should operate on access control:
 - The vehicular and pedestrian gates to the staff parking/servicing/storage compound at the front/west side of the building (operated by staff key-fob/card only).
 - The main entrance and goods in/out entrance (operated by staff key-fob/card or via video access control system linked to a staffed office).
 - Any other external doors/shutters where regular staff access is required (operated by staff key-fob/card only).
 - Internal doors to dedicated CPU or FMC areas for the access of authorised personnel only e.g. off the main stair core (operated by staff key-fob/card only).
 - Any internal doors providing access to obvious high risk areas e.g. server rooms, high-value storage areas, staff changing facilities/lockers etc. (operated by staff key-fob/card only)
- ☐ The electric locking system to be used should be fully auditable (i.e. allowing the retention of data, such as who accessed where and when), to allow for a better investigation into any incidents. Staff cards/fobs should be capable of being easily and quickly activated/disabled to ensure that mis-use is prevented. Staff should only be allowed access to areas required for their work and keys/passes should only be carried if required for duties and should be accounted for at all times.

4.5 Alarm

- ☐ A monitored alarm system will be installed to cover the entire building (compliant with BS EN 50131 Grade 2), linked to contacts on all external doors, PIR detectors and staircores, with a signal terminating at a security control room or a recognized Alarm Receiving Centre (ARC).

4.6 Boundaries

- ☐ It is noted that the maintenance route to the rear of the building and the parking/servicing/storage compound will be enclosed with 2500mm high LPS 1175 A1 (SR1) security rated CLD Dulok S1 welded-wire mesh fencing, which is Secured by Design (SBD) compliant.
- ☐ The automatic sliding vehicular gate to the east of the compound should be operated via staff key fob/card with no automatic egress (i.e. access control both 'in' and 'out'), so that criminals cannot gain access to the area, attack parked vehicles, storage areas or the building and escape. The gate should operate with minimal lag – ensuring that it closes immediately once a vehicle has entered or exited the site, reducing the opportunity for tailgating. Consideration should be given to the double gates to the west of the compound also being automatic and operated in the same way. Automatic vehicular gates should preferably be sliding or single-leaf where possible, as they are often easier to secure and

operate remotely. If double gates are used, they should overlap when closed and should not be capable of being forced open. The pedestrian gates to the compound should also be self-closing/locking and operated via staff key fob/swipe card.

- ☐ Care should be taken to ensure that fencing panels are fixed securely to the posts (preventing tampering/removal) and that any level changes do not inadvertently facilitate climbing or leave large gaps underneath the panels/gates. There should be no centrally located horizontal bars to aid climbing and the gates should be located away from other climbing aids, such as low walls, streetlights, trees etc. Exposed hinges and large sliding bolt apertures/locking points should be avoided, or fitted with shrouding/protective plates (see opposite for example) to avoid the creation of footholds. The gap at the bottom of any gates should be small enough to stop anyone crawling through. Any release mechanism on the internal side of any pedestrian gates required to provide emergency egress should not be capable of being reached/operated from the external face of the fenceline/gate.



- ☐ The site boundary treatments should ideally be positioned on hard standing ground. Where this is not possible, ground conditions should be reviewed as extra measures may be required to create a secure boundary. Care should also be taken to ensure there are no trees/branches or any other hard landscaping features (such as street furniture, lighting columns, cycle stores etc.) immediately adjacent and on the publicly accessible side of any secure boundaries that could be used as a climbing aid to scale the fencing. Any such features should be pruned or removed where possible. Any existing lighting columns immediately adjacent to new fencelines may need to be fitted with anti-climb collars.

4.7 Parking Areas

- ☐ Lighting to all parking areas should be in accordance with BS 5489, with an average lux level 20 and a uniformity level of no less than 25%.
- ☐ The surface of the car parks should be even concrete/tarmac. The integrity of the surface treatment should be maintained to ensure that there is no loose material that can be used to commit crime.
- ☐ Bays and directional markings should be clearly demarcated to avoid confusion or conflict, with pedestrian routes/directions clearly signed.
- ☐ Traffic calming measures should be incorporated to limit the speed of vehicles within the site.

4.8 Lighting

- ☐ External lighting must be provided to all access routes within the site, in accordance with BS 5489.
- ☐ Dusk 'til dawn lights, operated by photoelectric cell/daylight sensor, should be installed to all external doors and loading bay shutters.
- ☐ Fittings should produce 'white' light, as opposed to yellow/orange light. LED or bulbs with a comparable output should be used, as these offer superior colour rendition over alternatives such as high and low pressure sodium bulbs.
- ☐ Lighting fixtures must not be positioned to provide climbing aids over boundary treatments. Electrical and architectural layouts should be developed together to avoid this.

4.9 CCTV

Any CCTV system that may be used within this proposal will require certain specifications and intelligent placement of cameras to compliment the design of the development. Designers should consider the following points when planning a CCTV strategy:

- ☐ CCTV systems (and lighting that support them) require regular cleaning and maintenance to remain effective.
- ☐ Where necessary cameras that are vulnerable to damage should be protected from attack either by relocation to a higher level and using a bigger lens to achieve the view required or through the fitting of a vandal resistant housing.

- ☐ With regards to the retention of footage, the police prefer quality over quantity. The overall retention period should be dictated by what the system is designed to achieve, though it would be better to have good quality images over a 14-day period than poor ones over a 30-day period.

- ☐ Procedures for recovery of recordings are recommended to be established (e.g. trained staff / the CCTV system instruction manual to be readily available). This is to ensure that the images produced will be of an **acceptable standard** that will allow for **identification** of an individual which will stand up to scrutiny in court.

Acceptable Standard - this generally requires a resolution of 720x576 pixels at a real time frame rate of 25 frames per second. (N.B. Both the camera and DVR must be capable of this – if the camera will only send low resolution images then it does not matter how high the resolution of the recording unit is).

Identification – One of three levels of field of view. To identify an individual, the image must capture no less than 120% of the field of view (at least from the top of the individuals head to their knees). The remaining two levels of field of view are **overview** and **recognition**, which whilst effective for observational purposes, are less likely to result in the identification of a person/offender.

- ☐ The intelligent placement of cameras helps to provide clear facial identification of individuals. Suitable locations would be: **all external entrances (at all levels), all facades of the building (including the external stair) and the parking/servicing/storage compound, the main entrance lobby and internal circulation areas and all parking areas/cycle stores.**

4.10 Landscaping

- ☐ In vulnerable locations such as around site/building entrances, parking areas and footpaths, low planting should not exceed 1000mm in height and tree canopies should fall no lower than 2000mm from the ground. This is in order to allow unimpeded surveillance and eliminate hiding places. A maintenance agreement should stipulate that these planting dimensions would be adhered to.
- ☐ Loose surface materials in the publicly accessible areas of the scheme should be avoided. Small fragments of ground covering can be used as missiles against people and premises (both to gain entry and to commit criminal damage).
- ☐ Planting must be avoided that will aid climbing over boundary treatments. The security of fences can be compromised if trees or street furniture are placed close by.

4.11 Other

- ☐ It is highly recommended that cycle stores or lockers are sourced from an SBD supplier - please see [Accredited Product Search \(securedbydesign.com\)](https://securedbydesign.com). If not, they should ideally be of steel-framed construction, with welded-wire mesh panels/roofs and lockable gates (with no exposed hinges or large sliding bolt apertures that could form a climbing aid). Cycle stores should include 'Sheffield' style racks, or similar, that allow residents to lock both wheels and the crossbar to a stand, rather than just the crossbar (wheel slots and butterfly racks are not suitable). For further information, please refer to our cycle storage guidance document: www.designforsecurity.org/all-downloads/.
- ☐ The position of any external storage areas should be carefully considered in relation to the following:
 - Their potential to block sight lines and create hiding places.
 - Their potential to obscure CCTV and lighting.
 - Their potential to create climbing aids that would assist unauthorised exit/entry over boundary fencing.
 - Their potential to obscure damage to fencelines.

Any proposed lighting columns, street furniture, cycle stores, tree/shrub planting etc. within or external to the site perimeter should also be reviewed in relation to the above issues.

- ☐ Any high value equipment should be property marked and securely fixed or stored to deter damage/theft. An accurate record should be maintained which logs all such items.
- ☐ Any lockers must be robust/secure and all staff should be encouraged to use them and not leave belongs unattended.

5 Management & Maintenance

- 5.1.1 A comprehensive security regime for the management of the site/building must be prepared and remain in place for the day-to-day running of the site. It should include issues such as:
- Opening and closing of the site/building, including staff arrival and departure;
 - Access-control procedures;
 - Management of any deliveries (servicing activities should not require any service doors to remain open unattended for prolonged periods); and
 - Details of staff security training.
- 5.1.2 The upkeep of a development over its lifetime can be crucial to the level of security and safety within. Aspects of a development, which are left to deteriorate, have the potential to attract further crime – a process known as ‘the broken window theory’. A maintenance plan should be drawn up to address issues such as:
- Litter/graffiti removal
 - Repair to communal areas (lighting, signage, access controls, CCTV etc.)
 - Frequent physical checks of all perimeter fencing to check for evidence of breaches
 - Trimming and pruning to shrubs and trees
- 5.1.3 There should be regular reviews/exercises to ensure that security regimes and maintenance plans remain accurate, workable and up-to-date. All staff should understand and accept the need for security measures and it should be made easy for people to raise concerns or report observations.
- 5.1.4 Adequate signage should be deployed in all areas not only to direct people throughout the site/building, but also to deter unauthorised access to staff-only/back-of-house areas.

6 Construction

- 6.1.1 Untidy sites and their surroundings can be littered with debris accessible to vandals who often use loose materials as missiles to commit crime. The client should take measures appropriate to secure their site during construction, and control pedestrian and vehicular access in to and out of the site curtilage. It is also recommended that the contractor on this scheme is a member of the ‘Considerate Constructors Scheme’, who has committed to be a considerate and good neighbour, as well as clean, respectful, safe, environmentally conscious, responsible and accountable.
- 6.1.2 Site security contractors should be SIA (Security Industry Authority) approved to ensure professional standards are adhered to (please see <http://www.sia.homeoffice.gov.uk/pages/acs-intro.aspx> for more details).

7 Useful References

7.1 Secured by Design (SBD)

- 7.1.1 Secured by Design focuses on crime prevention at the design, layout and construction stages of homes and commercial premises and promotes the use of security standards for a wide range of applications and products. To apply for Secured by Design certification for your development, visit our online application form at: <http://www.designforsecurity.org/secured-by-design/sbd-accreditation/>

A Contact Register

Date	Contact With	Summary of Contact
9 th September 2024	RLB	Receipt of CIS instruction form & plans
10 th September 2024	RLB	Quote issued & request for additional info
12 th September 2024	RLB	Confirmation of instruction & fee and receipt of additional info/plans
16 th September 2024	RLB	Email correspondence re: timescales & payment
2 nd to 15 rd October 2024	RLB	Email correspondence re: invoice, timescales & release of report
15 th October 2024	RLB	Version A of CIS report issued
21 st October 2024	RLB	Email received re: crime data & minor revisions to report

B Associated Documents

This report is based on the following drawings and supplementary information submitted by the applicant.

Drawing No.	Drawing Title	Date	Rev
LIMES-BUT-MS-ZZ-DR-A- 01100-P01	Existing Site Location Plan	26.04.24	P01
LIMES-BUT-B1-00-DR-A-04000-P03	Proposed Ground Floor Plan (Main Building)	20.08.24	P03
LIMES-BUT-B1-01-DR-A-04001-P03	Proposed First Floor Plan (Main Building)	20.08.24	P03
LIMES-BUT-B2-00-DR-A-04003-P02	Proposed Ground Floor Plan (Stores)	12.08.24	P02
LIMES-BUT-MS-R3-DR-A-04101-P02	Proposed Site Plan (Complete)	12.08.24	P02
LIMES-BUT-M3-ZZ-DR-A-05100-P03	Proposed Elevations-Site (Complete)	23.09.24	P03

PLEASE NOTE - In the event of any subsequent material changes to the scheme, it will be necessary for Design for Security to reassess the comments made within this report.

C CIS Version History

Version	Revisions Made	Date
A		
B	Minor amendment to wording	28/10/24

D Glossary

Burglary Resistance Standards

BS PAS 24

General security performance requirements for door/window assemblies.

An attack test standard for doorsets and windows. This is the minimum police requirement for Secured by Design dwellings, and is also applicable to French/double doors, and sliding doors.

BS EN 1627 (Security Ratings RC1 to RC6)

Windows, doors, shutters - Burglar resistance Requirements and classification

The classification system used in BS EN 1627 is aimed at the commercial market and is based on five elements:

- a) Resistance of glazing*
- b) Performance of hardware*
- c) Resistance to static loading*
- d) Resistance to dynamic loading*
- e) Burglary resistance by manual intervention*

LPS 1175 (Security Ratings 1 to 6)

Specification for testing and classifying the burglary resistance of building components

This includes doors, shutters, garage doors and grilles typically for commercial premises and higher risk domestic premises and is acceptable to the ABI and the Police. The standard has 6 levels, 6 being the highest, with levels 1 and 2 equivalent in many respects to BS PAS 24 and BS 7950.

STS 201

Enhanced security requirements for doorsets and door assemblies for dwellings to satisfy the requirements of PAS 24

STS 202

Requirements for burglary resistance of construction products including hinged, pivoted, folding or sliding doorsets, windows, curtain walling, security grilles, garage doors and shutters.

This specifies a broadly similar range of attack tools and times to those specified at the lower levels of LPS 1175.

BS EN 356 (Ratings P1A to P8A)

Glass in building. Security glazing. Testing and classification of resistance against manual attack.

A performance standard for manual attacks on glazing. P2A is comparable to the performance of a 6.8mm laminated glass, and P4A to that of a 9.5mm laminated glass.

Commonly Used Acronyms

CIT

Cash in transit (refers to vehicles, personnel and routines).

CPTED

Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design

CRS

Crime Reduction Specialist. Sometimes known as CPO (Crime Prevention Officer)

INPT

Integrated Neighbourhood Policing Team.

PVB/PolyVinyl Butyral (Glazing interlayer)

A commonly used interlayer used in the production of laminated glass.

LPCB (Loss Prevention Certification Board)

A brand of the BRE Global (Building Research Establishment) family. The LPCB work with insurers, Government, police, designers, manufacturers, contractors and end users to develop methods of assessing performance and reliability of security products to ensure their fitness for purpose.

UKAS (United Kingdom Accreditation Service)

The sole national accreditation body recognised by government to assess, against internationally agreed standards, organisations that provide certification, testing, inspections and calibration services.

Useful Websites

Design for Security

www.designforsecurity.org

Secured by Design

www.securedbydesign.com

RIBA Product Selector

www.ribaproductselector.com

LPCB – Red Book Live

www.redbooklive.com

Crime Reduction (Home Office)

www.crimereduction.homeoffice.gov.uk

DAC (Design Against Crime) Solution Centre

www.designagainstcrime.org

Building for Life

www.buildingforlife.org

CLG (Communities and Local Government)

www.communities.gov.uk