



CRIME IMPACT STATEMENT

9 SOUTH KING STREET, MANCHESTER
CHANGE OF USE OF GROUND & BASEMENT FLOORS TO TATTOO STUDIO

Greater Manchester Police
designforsecurity

FOR: Bull Riders of Montana Limited
VERSION A: 30/08/2024
REFERENCE: 2024/0287/CIS/01

9 South King Street, Manchester

2024/0287/CIS/01


EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Design changes not required

This development has been assessed against the principles of 'Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design' (CPTED), in order to reduce the opportunities for crime and the fear of crime.

The proposal will not achieve Secured by Design (SBD) accreditation without the replacement of all existing external building elements (such as glazing, windows and doors) to SBD standards. Nevertheless, we are happy to endorse this development, subject to all other measures being incorporated into the proposed scope of works (see Section 3).

The overall security of the development will be heavily reliant on the continuous effective management of the premises, rather than just the physical measures recommended in the report.



Bradley Hart MTCP

Design for Security Consultant

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1 Visual Audit

The site lies at the junction of South King Street and Ridgefield, within Manchester city centre.

The ground floor unit is currently vacant and was last in use as a retail store for vintage football shirts. It has glazed shop frontages along both South King Street and Ridgefield, with an entrance door located at the junction itself. The glazing along South King Street has been smashed.

South King Street runs parallel with King Street – a wide, pedestrianised route fronted onto by high end retail and designer fashion outlets, as well as cafes and restaurants. The upper floors of the buildings along King Street are primarily in office and residential use.

South King Street is a narrower route, that benefits from more limited levels of activity, footfall, passive surveillance and direct overlooking. Many of the units fronting onto King Street back onto the route and feature largely blank facades along it. There is a large scheme under construction on the opposite side of South King Street from the site, which does feature a large glazed frontage along the route.

The upper floors of the building above the site are in residential use, with no internal access between the ground/basement floors and the upper floors. To the immediate east, there is a blank ground floor façade, with recessed doorways (which can often foster nuisance and anti-social behaviour issues in city centre locations). To the immediate east is a bakery and café fronting onto King Street and on the opposite side of Ridgefield is an art gallery, also fronting onto King Street. Ridgefield itself is secured with rising bollards adjacent to the site.



2 Crime Statistics & Analysis

All data below is based on crimes recorded between 1st August 2023 to 31st July 2024.

2.1 Crime Summary


Figure 1: Recorded Crime within 500m of Site

Domestic Burglary	Non-Domestic Burglary	Criminal Damage	Less Serious Wounding	Theft	Robbery	Serious Wounding	Theft from Motor Vehicle	Theft of Motor Vehicle	Bicycle Theft
13	180	280	2,062	737	173	44	295	30	72


- 2.1.1 In the local area, the volume of crime is very high, particularly the levels of violence and theft, reflecting the site's location within the city centre. These types of crime are typical of those experienced in or within close proximity of city centres – where there is a concentration of retail, commercial and licensed premises, leading to a concentration of such crime and disorder issues.
- 2.1.2 Less serious wounding offences have occurred all throughout the local area, with particular concentrations around/off Quay Street (to the south), Deansgate (to the west) and Market Street (to the north) - the majority of which have involved disputes between known associates or customers within retail outlets, restaurants and bars, with alcohol consumption often being a factor. Recorded thefts have been concentrated in the same areas, which have a high volume of footfall due a concentration of public transport links, licenced premises, restaurants and retail premises. Offenders have primarily used pick-pocketing techniques and distraction methods to obtain personal belongings, mostly mobile phones, bags and purses/wallets. Offenders have also targeted insecure items (particularly mobile phones) left on or under tables in bars and restaurants.

2.2 Non-Domestic Burglary (Retail Premises): Risk Analysis

The data below relates to non-domestic burglary offences within/against retail facilities, recorded in the Manchester area 2018-2019.



- 2.2.1 **Day Range:** The risk of burglary at retail premises in Manchester peaks slightly on Wednesday, but remains relatively consistently high across the week.
- 2.2.2 **Time Range:** During the day, the risk of burglary peaks late at night and during in the early hours of the morning. Offenders often target commercial premises at these times when they are closed, it is dark and the areas in which they are typically located are quiet - all of which contribute to offenders perceiving a lower risk of being observed or detected.




2.2.3 **Point of Entry:** In burglaries at Manchester retail premises, the following entry points and MO's have been utilised most frequently:

- A large proportion of burglaries have been committed through shutters, forcing them open by various means including using implements to force them upwards, using vehicles to ram them and using tools to cut through them.
- Offenders have also routinely forced open doors with bodily pressure and tools, as well as smashing glazed panels within them to gain unauthorised access.
- Windows have also been prised open or smashed by offenders.
- A high number of burglaries are recorded as having 'legitimate' or 'unknown' entry points. This is likely to have been where offenders have posed as legitimate customers before targeting restricted/back-of-house areas (such as staff rooms, stock rooms etc.) unnoticed.
- Offenders have gained access to premises by gaining access through the roofs of single-storey elements or by penetrating through walls.

2.3 Theft (Manchester Retail): Risk Analysis

The data below relates to thefts within/against retail facilities, recorded in the Manchester area 2018-2019.



2.3.1 **Day/Time Range:** During the week, the risk of theft at Manchester retail premises remains consistently high across the week. During the day, the risk of theft is concentrated in the afternoon and early evening. This is when retail premises are typically at their busiest and, therefore, the opportunities to offend are greater. The majority of thefts are either of staff property or of/from the handbags of shoppers (such as mobile phones, purses etc.). Theft of staff property are more likely to be noticed at

either midday, when lunch breaks are taken, or during the late afternoon when staff are leaving for the day.

2.4 General Risk Factors

2.4.1 The typical security risks for a development of this nature are:

- Burglary
- Robbery
- Unauthorised access to non-public areas
- Theft of personal belongings at work
- Violence towards staff/other customers
- Criminal damage to premises
- Employee theft
- Loitering groups
- Theft and criminal damage during the construction period

2.5 Common Use-Specific M.O.s (Modus Operandi)

2.5.1 Having looked at the crime data for the site and the surrounding area, the most frequent M.O's (modus operandi) used by offenders when targeting Manchester retail premises are listed below, along with suggested measures to reduce the risk of them being utilised at the proposed development:

- A large proportion of burglaries have been committed through shutters, forcing them open by various means including using implements to force them upwards, using vehicles to ram them and using tools to cut through them.

Possible Solution - Roller shutters can appear secure in that they are difficult to penetrate, however physical security products are only as strong as their weakest component. A security-certified shutter (to LPS 1175 SR 1/2) has an independently proven level of resistance, and ensures that all aspects of the shutter (locks, rails, laths etc.) have been scrutinised by professionals. If external shutters are used, ideally the shutter boxes and guides should be built into the fabric of the building to deter tampering/attack.

- Offenders have also routinely forced open doors with bodily pressure and tools, as well as smashing glazed panels within them to gain unauthorised access.

Possible Solution - All external doors should be certified to recognised security standards (see Section 3.2), which are independently proven to reduce the risk of forced entry and thus increase the chances of detection. Security-certified doors are the best long-term measure to address this risk and can be obtained to suit virtually all operational requirements. Good use of perimeter boundaries, lighting and CCTV can also deter criminals by preventing access to vulnerable areas and increasing the chances of them being seen by security personnel or passers-by.

- Windows have also been prised open or smashed by offenders.

Possible Solution - All external windows should be certified to recognised security standards (see Section 3.2) where possible, which are independently proven to reduce the risk of forced entry and thus increase the chances of detection. All ground floor/accessible glazing (including in and around doors) should include a laminated pane (see Section 3.2), which forms a much more robust barrier against shattering and penetration. Vulnerable shopfronts should be secured with security-certified shutters out-of-hours.

- A high number of burglaries are recorded as having 'legitimate' or 'unknown' entry points. This is likely to have been where offenders have posed as legitimate customers before targeting restricted/back-of-house areas (such as staff rooms, stock rooms etc.) unnoticed.

Possible Solution – There should be a secure area for staff to store their belongings while at work and all staff-only, back-of-house areas should be secured to prevent unauthorised public access.

-
- Offenders have gained access to premises by gaining access through the roofs of single-storey elements or by penetrating through walls.

Possible Solution - Ideally, single storey building elements should be avoided. If they are absolutely necessary, care should be taken in their design to ensure that roof areas or upper floor windows are not accessible, for example, with the use of high-level/overhanging eaves, high balustrades etc. There should be no features of the building or any nearby hard/soft landscaping features that would facilitate climbing. Any 'accessible' skylights should incorporate at least one pane of laminated glazing and should be secured with internally fixed grilles/bars to prevent unauthorised access. The construction of the roof itself and all external walls should also be robust enough to withstand penetration.

3 Scheme Appraisal

3.1 Proposed Development

- 3.1.1 The proposal is to change the use of the ground floor, basement and sub-basement floors of the building from retail use (Use Class E) to a tattoo studio (Use Class Sui Generis).
- 3.1.2 The ground floor of the premises will house a service desk and a client seating area, as well as a waste storage area and W/C. Basement level -1 will house a small event space with store and W/C and basement level -2 will house a treatment room (with 6 no. treatment benches and a cleaning/prep area), a staff room/VIP room, a staff kitchen and W/Cs.

3.2 Any External Alterations

It is strongly recommended that if any external alterations to be carried out, either as part of the proposed scope of works or in the future, the following physical security specifications are adhered to:

- ☐ Any new external doorsets (at ground and basement levels) should be compliant with and certified to BS PAS 24, STS 202 or LPS 1175 SR2. It is crucial that the door ironmongery to any external escape-only doors is permitted under the security certification of the product. Escape-only doors should be alarmed (audible upon opening) and designed without visible external ironmongery.
- ☐ Any new windows, where possible, should be certificated to BS PAS 24. All other window designs/dimensions should take account of the requirements of the above standards, as certified products can carry dimensional restrictions. Any curtain walling panels should include laminated glazing (see below) and should be fixed with a secure glazing retention system (e.g. with security glazing tape, with a dedicated security sealant/gasket or a secure mechanical fixing system from the glazing retention tests within the BS PAS 24 or LPS 1175 standards).
- ☐ Any new glazing (to windows and doors) should incorporate an inner pane of glass with a 1.5mm PVB interlayer (e.g. 7.5mm laminated glass), or a glass rated as P4A under EN 356. The remaining outer pane in a double glazed unit may be toughened glass.
- ☐ Any new shutters should be certified to LPS 1175 SR2 (or SR1 if perforated laths are required) and installed in accordance with manufacturer's instructions.

3.3 Internal Security

The internal security and layout of the premises should be carefully considered, so as to maximise surveillance over customers and reduce the opportunities for criminals to exploit. It is highly recommended that the following good practice principles are adopted where applicable:

- ☐ The entrance to the premises must be effectively managed during operational hours. The service desk at ground floor level should be staffed at all times, so that all customers entering/leaving the premises can be observed, greeted and directed/accompanied by staff. If the service desk is not staffed at any point during operational hours, the main entrance to the building should be secured to prevent unauthorised access, with doorbell or similar for customers to use if they wish to enter. Staff should then come to the entrance to greet/vet the caller before allowing them access.
- ☐ The interior of the premises should be capable of being 'zoned' so that each basement floor can be secured while other areas of the premises are in use (e.g. preventing access to basement level -2 when an event is being staged at basement level -1, or vice versa). The doors to each basement level should be solid core (FD30 or higher), with 3 hinges and a manual deadlock or an electronic lock operated by staff key card/fob, so that they can be secured when unoccupied.
- ☐ All back-of-house/staff areas should not be publicly accessible and there should be a secure area for staff to store their belongings whilst at work. Doors to any back-of-house/staff only areas should be solid-core (min. 44mm thick) and fitted with either auditable access controls (i.e. proximity readers or swipe cards) or secured with key operated locks (carried by staff only if required for duties and accounted for at all times) to prevent public access. Key-coded locks are not recommended as codes can be easily observed or shared and are rarely changed. All staff should understand and accept the need for security measures and should be trained to be vigilant and to report any suspicious behaviour.

- ☐ Non-cash forms of payment should be encouraged, but if cash is taken and kept on site it is highly recommended that there is a designated cash office with solid masonry walls (and no adjacent false/suspended ceilings), a doorset security-certified to BS PAS 24 and a safe providing adequate capacity and overnight cover. All high value equipment should be property marked and securely fixed or stored to deter damage/theft. An accurate record should be maintained which logs all such items.
- ☐ Staff should have clear views of the access to all W/Cs to monitor their use. The internal layout the premises should be generally uncluttered with few places for concealment, allowing staff to monitor customer behaviour.

3.4 Alarm

- ☐ An alarm should be installed to cover the premises, linked to contacts on all doors and PIR detectors. It is strongly recommended that any alarm system is monitored, with a response facility (e.g. linked to an Alarm Receiving Centre or security control room, who will alert the key holder).
- ☐ It is also recommended that the alarm system should incorporate personal attack buttons for the use of staff in identified locations, such as within private treatment rooms or in any cash office (which should also contain a telephone and a mobile phone with a clear signal).

3.5 Lighting

- ☐ Dusk 'til dawn lights, operated by photoelectric cell/daylight sensor, should be installed to all external doors. Fittings should produce 'white' light, as opposed to yellow/orange light.

3.6 CCTV

3.6.1 Any CCTV system that may be used within this proposal will require certain specifications and intelligent placement of cameras to compliment the design of the development. Designers should consider the following points when planning a CCTV strategy:

- ☐ CCTV systems (and lighting that support them) require regular cleaning and maintenance to remain effective.
- ☐ Where necessary cameras that are vulnerable to damage should be protected from attack either by relocation to a higher level and using a bigger lens to achieve the view required or through the fitting of a vandal resistant housing.
- ☐ With regards to the retention of footage, the police prefer quality over quantity. The overall retention period should be dictated by what the system is designed to achieve, though it would be better to have good quality images over a 14-day period than poor ones over a 30-day period.
- ☐ Procedures for recovery of recordings are recommended to be established (e.g. trained staff / the CCTV system instruction manual to be readily available). This is to ensure that the images produced will be of an [acceptable standard](#) that will allow for [identification](#) of an individual which will stand up to scrutiny in court.

Acceptable Standard - this generally requires a resolution of 720x576 pixels at a real time frame rate of 25 frames per second. (N.B. Both the camera and DVR must be capable of this – if the camera will only send low resolution images then it does not matter how high the resolution of the recording unit is).

Identification – One of three levels of field of view. To identify an individual, the image must capture no less than 120% of the field of view (at least from the top of the individuals head to their knees). The remaining two levels of field of view are [overview](#) and [recognition](#), which whilst effective for observational purposes, are less likely to result in the identification of a person/offender.

- ☐ The intelligent placement of cameras helps to provide clear facial identification of individuals. Suitable locations would be: [the street frontages of the unit](#), [the entrance to the premises](#) and [the service desk/waiting area](#), [the stair core/entrances to each basement level](#) and [any cash office](#).

4 Management & Maintenance

- 4.1.1 Active continuous management and maintenance of the premises can reduce the likelihood of crime and disorder occurring. An operating/maintenance plan should be created to promote good management of the premises, this plan should focus on issues such as:
- Opening and closing of premises, including staff arrival and departure;
 - Any cash management within the premises;
 - Any cash-in-transit collections/deliveries and banking practices (which should take place in a secure room with a certified safe to meet insurance needs);
 - Management of stock deliveries (servicing activities should not require any service doors to remain open unattended for prolonged periods);
 - Details of staff security training;
 - Location and management of any smoking areas;
 - Repairing damaged external and internal fittings, particularly security features e.g. alarm system, CCTV cameras etc;
 - Cleaning and prompt removal of graffiti, litter etc; and
 - Refuse collection arrangements.
- 4.1.2 There should be regular reviews/exercises to ensure that it remains accurate, workable and up-to-date. All staff should understand and accept the need for security measures and it should be made easy for people to raise concerns or report observations.
- 4.1.3 The opening hours of the premises should be consistent with other such premises in the locale and should not unduly conflict with other nearby uses.
- 4.1.4 All high value equipment (e.g. computers, flat screen monitors/televisions etc.) should be property marked and securely fixed or stored to deter damage/theft. An accurate record should be maintained which logs all such items.
- 4.1.5 Toilets can give rise to problems and the following issues should be considered:
- Fittings should be flush to avoid tampering and concealed cisterns, pipe work etc. should be used.
 - Graffiti and vandal resistant materials, such as stainless steel, laminates and plastics should be considered.
 - Consider hanging cubicle doors as outward opening as this will aid gaining access in an emergency. An alternative measure is to reduce toilet doors in size by a minimum of 200mm from the floor and to reduce the top height.
 - Provide 'Chelsea Clip'/karibina style hooks on the back of cubicle doors or partitions for bags and coats.
 - Consider the safety of vending machines. Cash boxes can be tampered with, consider fitting them with alarms.
 - Consider setting out a rota and putting notices in toilet facilities that make users aware that regular checks will be carried out. A built in visited/checked chart should be provided.
- 4.1.6 Adequate signage should be deployed in all areas not only to direct people throughout the premises, but also to deter unauthorised access to back-of-house/staff-only areas.
- 4.1.7 Refuse collection arrangements should not require bins to be left accessible for extended periods. Servicing activities should also not require any service doors to remain open and unattended for prolonged periods.

5 Construction

- 5.1.1 Untidy sites and their surroundings can be littered with debris accessible to vandals who often use loose materials as missiles to commit crime. The client should take measures appropriate to secure their site during construction, and control pedestrian and vehicular access in to and out of the site curtilage. It is also recommended that the contractor on this scheme is a member of the 'Considerate Constructors Scheme', who has committed to be a considerate and good neighbour, as well as clean, respectful, safe, environmentally conscious, responsible and accountable.
- 5.1.2 Site security contractors should be SIA (Security Industry Authority) approved to ensure professional standards are adhered to (please see <http://www.sia.homeoffice.gov.uk/pages/acs-intro.aspx> for more details).

6 Useful References

6.1 Secured by Design (SBD)

- 6.1.1 Secured by Design focuses on crime prevention at the design, layout and construction stages of homes and commercial premises and promotes the use of security standards for a wide range of applications and products. To apply for Secured by Design certification for your development, visit our online application form at: <http://www.designforsecurity.org/secured-by-design/sbd-accreditation/>

A Contact Register

Date	Contact With	Summary of Contact
5 th August 2024	SMB Town Planning Ltd	Receipt of CIS instruction form & plans
6 th August 2024	SMB Town Planning Ltd	Quote issued & request for additional info
9 th August 2024	SMB Town Planning Ltd	Confirmation of instruction/fee
28 th August 204	SMB Town Planning Ltd	Request for & receipt of additional info. Email correspondence re: timescales & payment
4 th September 2024	GMP Finance Dept	Confirmation of payment

B Associated Documents

This report is based on the following drawings and supplementary information submitted by the applicant.

Drawing No.	Drawing Title	Date	Rev
RP0001	Site Location Plan & Site Block Plan	June 2023	-
RP0002	Existing Floor Plans	June 2023	A
RP0003	Proposed Floor Plans	June 2023	D
RP0004	Proposed Elevations	June 2023	B
RP0005	Shopfront Existing Photos	June 2023	-

PLEASE NOTE - In the event of any subsequent material changes to the scheme, it will be necessary for Design for Security to reassess the comments made within this report.

C CIS Version History

Version	Status	Revisions Made
A	Design changes not required	

D Glossary

Burglary Resistance Standards

BS PAS 24

General security performance requirements for door/window assemblies.

An attack test standard for doorsets and windows. This is the minimum police requirement for Secured by Design dwellings, and is also applicable to French/double doors, and sliding doors.

BS EN 1627 (Security Ratings RC1 to RC6)

Windows, doors, shutters - Burglar resistance Requirements and classification

The classification system used in BS EN 1627 is aimed at the commercial market and is based on five elements:

- a) Resistance of glazing*
- b) Performance of hardware*
- c) Resistance to static loading*
- d) Resistance to dynamic loading*
- e) Burglary resistance by manual intervention*

LPS 1175 (Security Ratings 1 to 6)

Specification for testing and classifying the burglary resistance of building components

This includes doors, shutters, garage doors and grilles typically for commercial premises and higher risk domestic premises and is acceptable to the ABI and the Police. The standard has 6 levels, 6 being the highest, with levels 1 and 2 equivalent in many respects to BS PAS 24 and BS 7950.

STS 201

Enhanced security requirements for doorsets and door assemblies for dwellings to satisfy the requirements of PAS 24

STS 202

Requirements for burglary resistance of construction products including hinged, pivoted, folding or sliding doorsets, windows, curtain walling, security grilles, garage doors and shutters.

This specifies a broadly similar range of attack tools and times to those specified at the lower levels of LPS 1175.

BS EN 356 (Ratings P1A to P8A)

Glass in building. Security glazing. Testing and classification of resistance against manual attack.

A performance standard for manual attacks on glazing. P2A is comparable to the performance of a 6.8mm laminated glass, and P4A to that of a 9.5mm laminated glass.

Commonly Used Acronyms

CIT

Cash in transit (refers to vehicles, personnel and routines).

CPTED

Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design

CRS

Crime Reduction Specialist. Sometimes known as CPO (Crime Prevention Officer)

INPT

Integrated Neighbourhood Policing Team.

PVB/PolyVinyl Butyral (Glazing interlayer)

A commonly used interlayer used in the production of laminated glass.

LPCB (Loss Prevention Certification Board)

A brand of the BRE Global (Building Research Establishment) family. The LPCB work with insurers, Government, police, designers, manufacturers, contractors and end users to develop methods of assessing performance and reliability of security products to ensure their fitness for purpose.

UKAS (United Kingdom Accreditation Service)

The sole national accreditation body recognised by government to assess, against internationally agreed standards, organisations that provide certification, testing, inspections and calibration services.

Useful Websites

Design for Security

www.designforsecurity.org

Secured by Design

www.securedbydesign.com

RIBA Product Selector

www.ribaproductselector.com

LPCB – Red Book Live

www.redbooklive.com

Crime Reduction (Home Office)

www.crimereduction.homeoffice.gov.uk

DAC (Design Against Crime) Solution Centre

www.designagainstcrime.org

Building for Life

www.buildingforlife.org

CLG (Communities and Local Government)

www.communities.gov.uk