



CRIME IMPACT STATEMENT

The communications Academy, Silchester Drive
Enlargement of an existing artificial turf pitch plus
construction of a new adjacent car park.

For: **MCARDLE SPORT-TEC LTD**

Version A: **29/10/24**

Ref: **2014/0030/CIS/03**

Greater Manchester Police

designforsecurity

The communications Academy, Silchester Drive

2014/0030/CIS/03

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Development Supported / security additions advised.

This development has been assessed using the principles of 'Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design' (CPTED), in order to expose any opportunities for crime and the fear of crime within the proposal.

The proposed development is welcomed. The design of the scheme is very positive from a pedestrian safety perspective, with an interest in maintaining a safe and secure environment.

Given the low levels of crime in the area currently for a facility of this nature, it is also likely that offenders will be attracted to the development. Consequently, the site and the premises within it will need to be secure, with security an integral element of the design and management of the development.

The following issues have been identified as potential generators of insecurity, and must be addressed as described within the report (see Section 3.3 for more details):

- Installing fencing and gates to secure the perimeter of the site when the development is closed for business.
- Installing appropriate lighting, CCTV and intruder alarm systems

Our support for this scheme is subject to the above issues being satisfactorily addressed, as described within the report.

Please note: Greater Manchester Police Design for Security will recommend to the local planning authority that a planning condition is added that reflects the physical security specification listed within Section 4 of this report.

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1 Visual Audit

The development site is indicated by the red outline on the plan adjacent and is supported with existing site context photographs taken around the site.

The site is situated off Silchester Drive in the Monsall district of Manchester, approx. 1km south from Harpurhey town centre and 4km north from Manchester city centre.

The area is mixed with a combination of commercial, retail and residential uses. However, the prominence in the vicinity of Rochdale Road in this area is predominately residential. The local residential stock is predominately social housing and pockets of private ownership.

The prominent housing type to the north west of the site is 70's 'Radburn' estate housing.




Within the local estates there are a small number of community facilities; leisure centre, social clubs and places of worship.

Public transport for the area is supported by a local bus service with bus stops on Rochdale.

An existing metal mesh fence controls the boundary of the main school campus. The site north of Lathbury Road has a metal mesh boundary, approx. 2.2m high. Gates into the site were open during the site visit.

There was evidence of fly-tipping along some of the green spaces along Lathbury Road.

A public footpath connects Lathbury Road to Monsall Road dissecting the northern site.



2 Crime Statistics & Analysis

All data below is based on crimes recorded between 1st September 2023 to 31st August 2024.

2.1 Crime Summary

Figure 1: Recorded Crime within 500m of Site

Domestic Burglary	Non-Domestic Burglary	Criminal Damage	Less Serious Wounding	Theft	Robbery	Serious Wounding	Theft from Motor Vehicle	Theft of Motor Vehicle	Bicycle Theft
8	<5	46	249	23	20	11	<5	8	<5

- 2.1.1 The overall rate of crime is below average for the Manchester division, with less serious wounding and criminal damage having been most commonly reported. These offences have occurred throughout the residential neighbourhoods in the surrounding area, particularly to the north of the proposed site around Lathbury Road, as well as to the southeast around Monsall tram stop.
- 2.1.2 Assaults, harassment and public order offences have been the most reported less serious woundings taking place. The majority of these incidents have involved disputes between known associates and neighbours, as well as some cases of domestic violence.
- 2.1.3 Criminal damage offences have primarily been carried out against vehicles and buildings. Offenders have used objects and bodily pressure in order to cause damage to the windows and external doors of dwellings, as well as damaging the bodywork and windows of cars and vans.

2.2 Common Use-Specific M.O.s (Modus Operandi)

- 2.2.1 **Sports Facilities: Offenders have forced open doors using bodily pressure and implements/tools, smashed glazed panels within doors or targeted them when left insecure by staff.**

Possible Solution - All external doors should be certified to recognised security standards (see Section 4.1), which are independently proven to reduce the risk of forced entry and thus increase the chances of detection. Security-certified doors are the best long-term measure to address this risk and can be obtained to suit virtually all operational requirements. Good use of perimeter boundaries, lighting and CCTV (see Sections 4.6, 4.8 and 4.9) can also deter criminals by preventing access to vulnerable areas and increasing the chances of them being seen by staff, users or passers-by.

- 2.2.2 **Sports Facilities: Windows have also been targeted, with offenders prised them open, removing the beading/glazing or smashing the glazing to gain unauthorised access.**

Possible Solution - All windows should be certified to recognised security standards (see Section 4.2), which are independently proven to reduce the risk of forced entry and thus increase the chances of detection. All ground floor/accessible glazing should also include a laminated pane, which forms a much more robust barrier against shattering and penetration (see Section 4.3). Where possible, the size of any glazed elements within/directly adjacent to doors should be reduced and set well away from locking points. In vulnerable locations, shutters, external bars or perforated protective panels may be necessary to provide extra protection.

- 2.2.3 **Sports Facilities: Offenders have gained access to insecure rooms/areas unnoticed, before targeting school equipment.**

Possible Solution – There should be robust access control systems in place to ensure that visitors to the building are vetted and/or met and escorted before being allowed access to all areas. All visitors should report to reception for vetting before gaining further access into the school. Reception staff should be given flexibility over permitting access into the building at different times of the day. Effective access controls within the buildings should assist in restricting entry to vulnerable areas.

- 2.2.4 **Sports Facilities: Shutters have been forced upwards to gain unauthorised access or to access doors/windows behind them.**

Possible Solution - Roller shutters can appear secure in that they are difficult to penetrate, however physical security products are only as strong as their weakest component. A security-certified shutter has an independently proven level of resistance and ensures that all aspects of the shutter (locks, rails, laths etc.) have been scrutinised by professionals. If external shutters are used, the shutter boxes and guides should be built into the fabric of the building to deter tampering/attack.


2.3 Risk Factors

The typical security risks for a development of this nature are:

- Burglary
- Theft of user / staff belongings
- Other theft from premises
- Theft of / from parked cars
- Uncontrolled access
- Criminal damage to property and vehicles
- Arson
- Violence towards staff and other users
- Cycle security
- Cash robbery / attacks on vending machines
- Anti-social behaviour
- Loitering groups
- Theft and criminal damage during the construction period

2.4 Non-Domestic Burglary (Leisure Facilities): Risk Analysis

The data below relates to non-domestic burglary offences within / against leisure facilities (including leisure centres, sports centres and gyms), recorded in the Greater Manchester area.





2.4.1 Day/Time Range: During the week, the risk of burglary at leisure facilities in the Greater Manchester area peaks on Thursday/Friday and is slightly lower on Saturday. During the day, the risk of burglary peaks during the late afternoon/early evening and during the early hours of the morning. During the late afternoon / early evening, leisure facilities are often at their busiest, meaning offenders can take advantage of busy staff and anonymity among higher numbers of legitimate customers. Offenders often target commercial properties at night, when they are often closed (or operate with a reduced number of on-site staff), it is dark and the streets/areas in which they are typically located are quieter than during the day – meaning offenders perceive a lower risk of being observed or detected.

2.4.2 Point of Entry: The following entry points and MO's have been utilised most frequently by offenders targeting leisure facilities:

- Doors and windows have been forced open by offenders using bodily pressure and implements.
- The glazing within doors and windows has been smashed to gain entry.
- Where the point of entry is 'legitimate' or 'unknown', this is likely to have been where offenders have posed as legitimate customers to gain access to premises when they are open, before targeting insecure doors, tailgating or using force to open internal doors to restricted areas without being noticed.

2.5 Theft (Leisure Facilities): Risk Analysis



The data below relates to thefts within / against leisure facilities (including leisure centres, sports centres and gyms), recorded in the Greater Manchester area.



- 2.5.1 **Day/Time Range:** During the week, the risk of theft at leisure facilities within the Greater Manchester area peaks on Tuesday, but remains consistently high throughout the week. During the day, the risk of theft rises in the afternoon and peaks in the evening. This is when leisure facilities are typically at their busiest and the opportunities to offend are greater. Personal property belonging to staff and customers, such as mobile phones and cash, are the most routinely targeted items – taking place most often in changing / locker rooms and staff-only areas.

2.6 Vehicle Crime: Risk Analysis

The data below relates to vehicle crime committed within 500m of the site.



- 2.6.1 **Day/Time Range:** The risk of vehicle crime is highest on Tuesday in the late afternoon (16:00-18:00). Offenders tend to target vehicles at this time during the working week when they are often left unattended when the owners return home from work, creating a perceived low risk opportunity for offenders.

3 Layout Appraisal

3.1 Proposed development

- 3.1.1 The proposals incorporate the refurbishment and enlargement of an existing artificial turf pitch plus construction of a new adjacent car park.

3.2 Positive Aspects of the Proposal

The following proposed features would make a positive contribution to the prevention of crime and fear of crime.

- 3.2.1 The new development will create a controlled entrance area allowing staff to observe user movement in, out and around the proposal. Increasing the staff control of the entrance and improvements in natural surveillance within the scheme provides a safe and enjoyable experience for all users.
- 3.2.2 The increased activity, improved lighting and natural surveillance associated with the development will greatly enhance the experience of the range of uses and pedestrian environment in this area of Harpurhey and Monsall.
- 3.2.3 Opening the views across the zones and pitches will facilitate mutual surveillance between the pitches and the public realm spaces around.
- 3.2.4 The proposed development provides the opportunity to include security features built into the design and construction of the building and avoid the need for obtrusive retrofitted security measures that can increase the fear of crime. Security measures carefully incorporated into the design can ensure the building is reasonably secure, without visibly announcing that the design was concerned about crime.

3.3 Recommendations

The following points have been identified for further consideration and would need to be addressed for Design for Security to support the proposed scheme.

- 3.3.1 Secure all boundaries of the development with suitable high robust fencing. Particularly where the fencing line abuts existing buildings.
- 3.3.2 Buildings used to accommodate the business and any storage containers used should meet the LPS 1175 standard (or at least adhere to the principles of LPS 1175 certification), to allow management staff too securely store stock and close up the units overnight.
- 3.3.3 Avoid measures and/or the location of structures adjacent to the club house which could aid climbing onto the roofs to by-pass formal security measures.
- 3.3.4 Providing secure cycle parking for staff and customers.
- 3.3.5 Provide a secure place for staff to store personal property whilst working.
- 3.3.6 Provide a secure area for refuse storage at the rear of the site.
- 3.3.7 Install a CCTV system to monitor the site throughout the day and night. External areas around the buildings should be capable of surveillance by staff from inside the premises. Where direct views are not possible, a monitored CCTV system should be visible on a screen at the reception point.
- 3.3.8 All back-of-house/staff areas should not be publicly accessible and there should be a secure area for staff to store their belongings whilst at work.
- 3.3.9 It is highly recommended that all of the physical security measures listed below are incorporated into the scheme. Integrated, risk-commensurate security measures aim to place secure physical barriers or surveillance in the path of the criminal – making crime harder to commit and raising the risk of detection and possible capture, as well as promoting a feeling of safety in residents and visitors.

4 Physical Security

The following checklist forms the physical security requirements for this scheme to achieve Secured by Design accreditation.

4.1 Alarms

- ☐ The intruder alarm should be linked to contacts on all external doors, and PIR detectors should cover all ground floor rooms with windows.
- ☐ It is strongly recommended that any alarm system is monitored, with a response facility (be that an alert to the key holder, or to a security patrol team).

4.2 Boundaries

- ☐ The 4500mm high ball stop fencing enclosing the football pitch and associated storage/maintenance areas should be formed by rigid-panel, welded-wire mesh fencing, ideally to a police preferred specification to effectively prevent unauthorised access (please see <https://www.securedbydesign.com/member-companies/accredited-product-search> for a list of Police approved perimeter security suppliers).
- ☐ Care should be taken to ensure that posts are secured in concrete and panels are fixed securely to the posts, preventing tampering or removal. The boundary treatment should ideally be positioned on hard standing ground. Where this is not possible, ground conditions should be reviewed as extra measures may be required to create a secure boundary. There should be no large gaps underneath the panels or gates and no low-level horizontal bars that could aid climbing. Exposed hinges and large sliding bolt apertures/locking points should be avoided, or fitted with shrouding/protective plates (see opposite) to avoid the creation of footholds.



4.3 Landscaping

- ☐ In vulnerable locations such as entrances, parking areas and footpaths, low planting should not exceed 1000mm in height, and tree canopies should fall no lower than 2m from the ground. This is in order to allow people to see their surroundings better, make a rational choice of routes and eliminate hiding places.
- ☐ Planting must be avoided that will aid climbing over boundary treatments. The security of fences can be compromised if trees or street furniture are placed close by.
- ☐ Use of loose surface materials in the publicly accessible areas of the scheme should be avoided. Small fragments of ground covering can be used as missiles against people and premises (both to gain entry and to commit criminal damage).

4.4 Lighting

- ☐ Consideration should be given to locating the floodlight columns within the secure enclosure of the pitch so that they do not form a climbing aid over the fence line. If not, they should not be located immediately adjacent to the fence line or should incorporate measures to deter scaling (e.g. anti-climb collars). Care should also be taken to ensure there are no trees or branches immediately adjacent that could be used as a climbing aid to scale the fencing. Any such features should be pruned or removed where possible.
- ☐ The proposed floodlighting should not be operated by a timer. The lighting columns should only be used when the football pitch is in use and should be switch off at all other times.
- ☐ The maintenance equipment store should be of robust steel construction, ideally with internal hinges to any openings, recessed lock boxes (preventing access to locks) and door bolts top and bottom to opening leafs. It should be secured with container locks or padlocks to CEN Insurance Grade 4 or Sold Secure rating Silver/Gold.

4.5 Car parking

- ☐ If at all possible, the surface of the car park should be even tarmac or similar with no loose material that can be used to commit crime – such as damage to parked vehicles. Bays and directional markings should be clearly demarcated to avoid confusion or conflict.
- ☐ The car park should be lit to an adequate and uniform level in accordance with BS 5489, with an average lux level 20 and a uniformity level of no less than 25% to avoid pooling and shadowing. Fittings should produce 'white' light, as opposed to yellow/orange light. LED (or bulbs with a comparable output) should be used, as these offer superior colour rendition over alternatives. All fixtures, fittings and wiring associated with the lighting system should be protected from damage, whether deliberate or accidental. Power supplies to the lighting should be secure and should not be capable of being tampered with.
- ☐ Low planting should not exceed 1000mm in height and tree canopies should fall no lower than 2000mm from the ground. This is in order to allow clear views across the car park and eliminate hiding places. A maintenance agreement should stipulate that these planting dimensions would be adhered to. Care should also be taken to ensure that the proposed trees do not impede lighting levels or any CCTV coverage.
- ☐ There should be clear signage to the car park, which should include:
 - The name of the facility, details of the owner/operator and means of how to contact them.
 - Copy of the owners/operators Terms & Conditions.
 - Including clear information on the operational hours and use of the facility, to be located near the vehicle entrance.
 - Clear and visible directional signage should also be provided to identify entrances, exits, any customer help points etc.
 - Advisory signage reminding users not to leave valuables in their vehicles.
 - Data Protection Act compliant CCTV signs.
- ☐ The owner/operator should monitor the condition and cleanliness of all signage and should report and repair any defects as soon as possible.

4.6 CCTV

- ☐ Any CCTV system that may be used within this proposal will require certain specifications and intelligent placement of cameras to compliment the design of the development. Designers should consider the following points when planning a CCTV strategy:
- ☐ CCTV systems (and lighting that support them) require regular cleaning and maintenance to remain effective.
- ☐ Where necessary cameras that are vulnerable to damage should be protected from attack either by relocation to a higher level and using a bigger lens to achieve the view required or through the fitting of a vandal resistant housing.
- ☐ With regards to the retention of footage, the police prefer quality over quantity. The overall retention period should be dictated by what the system is designed to achieve, though it would be better to have good quality images over a 14-day period than poor ones over a 30-day period.
- ☐ Procedures for recovery of recordings are recommended to be established (e.g. trained staff / the CCTV system instruction manual to be readily available). This is to ensure that the images produced will be of an acceptable standard that will allow for identification of an individual which will stand up to scrutiny in court.
- ☐ **Acceptable Standard** - this generally requires a resolution of 720x576 pixels at a real time frame rate of 25 frames per second. (N.B. Both the camera and DVR must be capable of this – if the camera will only send low resolution images then it does not matter how high the resolution of the recording unit is).
- ☐ **Identification** – One of three levels of field of view. To identify an individual, the image must capture no less than 120% of the field of view (at least from the top of the individuals head to their knees). The

remaining two levels of field of view are 'Overview' and 'Recognition', which whilst effective for observational purposes, are less likely to result in the identification of a person/offender.

- ☐ The intelligent placement of cameras helps to provide clear facial identification of individuals. Suitable locations would be: [Main entrances](#), [building perimeter](#), [synthetic pitch](#), [cycle parking](#).

4.7 Other

- ☐ The proposed amenity lighting to the circulation routes between the car park and the 3G FTP should only be utilised when the facilities are in use and should be turned off at all other times. This is to deter the sports ground from fostering loitering/gathering, nuisance and anti-social behaviour issues out-of-hours and deter anyone from walking through the area late at night, when levels of activity, footfall and passive surveillance are low.
- ☐ The proposed cycle shelter should preferably include individual secure lockers (for example [Diamond Rated Secure Cycle Lockers UK Wide](#) | [BikeAway Warrior Cycle Lockers](#)). If not, it should at least include 'Sheffield' style racks, or similar, that allow residents to lock both wheels and the crossbar to a stand, rather than just the crossbar (wheel slots and butterfly racks are not suitable). For further information, please refer to our cycle storage guidance document: www.designforsecurity.org/all-downloads/.

5 Management & Maintenance

- 5.1.1 A comprehensive security regime for the management of the 3G football turf pitch and car park must be prepared and remain in place for its day-to-day running. There should be regular reviews/exercises to ensure that it remains accurate, workable and up-to-date. All staff should understand and accept the need for security measures, and it should be made easy for people to raise concerns or report observations.
- 5.1.2 Poor management and maintenance of public spaces can lead to a downward spiral of neglect and loss of environmental quality, encouraging nuisance, vandalism and other anti-social or criminal behaviour. If signs of disorder (such as criminal damage, graffiti, littering etc.) are not repaired/removed immediately, they can often attract further abuse.
- 5.1.3 An operating/maintenance plan should also focus on issues such as:
- Opening and closing of facility, including staff arrival and departure;
 - Secure storage of equipment;
 - Details of staff security training;
 - Regular perimeter fencing checks;
 - Lighting and CCTV maintenance/repair schedule;
 - Repairing damaged fittings, particularly security features e.g. locks, gates etc;
 - Cleaning and prompt removal of graffiti, litter etc; and
 - Management of any deliveries or refuse/waste collections.
 - Any high value equipment should be property marked, with an accurate record maintained which logs all such items.

6 Construction

- 6.1.1 Untidy sites and their surroundings can be littered with debris accessible to vandals who often use loose materials as missiles to commit crime. The client should take measures appropriate to secure their site during construction, and control pedestrian and vehicular access in to and out of the site curtilage. It is also recommended that the contractor on this scheme is a member of the 'Considerate Constructors Scheme', who has committed to be a considerate and good neighbour, as well as clean, respectful, safe, environmentally conscious, responsible and accountable.

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- 6.1.2 Site security contractors should be SIA (Security Industry Authority) approved to ensure professional standards are adhered to (please see <http://www.sia.homeoffice.gov.uk/pages/acs-intro.aspx> for more details).

7 Useful References

7.1 Secured by Design (SBD)

- 7.1.1 Secured by Design focuses on crime prevention at the design, layout and construction stages of homes and commercial premises and promotes the use of security standards for a wide range of applications and products. To apply for Secured by Design certification for your development, visit our online application form at: <http://www.designforsecurity.org/secured-by-design/sbd-accreditation/>

A Contact register

Date	Contact With	Summary of Contact
10/05/2024	McArdle Sport-Tec Ltd	CIS instruction received
04/09/2024	McArdle Sport-Tec Ltd	Fee / authorisation confirmed
21/09/2024	DfS	Site visit
04/09/2024	GMP	Invoice issued
29/10/2024	GMP	CIS completed

B Associated Documents

This report is based on the following drawings and supplementary information submitted by the applicant.

Drawing No.	Drawing Title	Date	Rev
12805-WMS-ZZ-XX-D-C-39501-S2-P2-	GENERAL_ARRANGEMENT	05/09/24	
12805-WMS-ZZ-XX-D-C-39510-S2- P1-F13	SITE_ENTRANCE_GA	05/09/24	
MUGA Mitigation		05/09/24	
MCA-MUK3213-01	Proposed Scheme	05/09/24	
MCA-MUK3213-02	Proposed Scheme	05/09/24	

PLEASE NOTE - In the event of any subsequent material changes to the scheme, it will be necessary for Design for Security to reassess the comments made within this report.

C CIS Version History

Version	Revisions Made	Date
A		

D Glossary

Burglary Resistance Standards

BS PAS 24

General security performance requirements for door/window assemblies.

An attack test standard for doorsets and windows. This is the minimum police requirement for Secured by Design dwellings, and is also applicable to French/double doors, and sliding doors.

BS EN 1627 (Security Ratings RC1 to RC6)

Windows, doors, shutters - Burglar resistance Requirements and classification

The classification system used in BS EN 1627 is aimed at the commercial market and is based on five elements:

- a) Resistance of glazing*
- b) Performance of hardware*
- c) Resistance to static loading*
- d) Resistance to dynamic loading*
- e) Burglary resistance by manual intervention*

LPS 1175 (Security Ratings 1 to 6)

Specification for testing and classifying the burglary resistance of building components

This includes doors, shutters, garage doors and grilles typically for commercial premises and higher risk domestic premises and is acceptable to the ABI and the Police. The standard has 6 levels, 6 being the highest, with levels 1 and 2 equivalent in many respects to BS PAS 24 and BS 7950.

STS 201

Enhanced security requirements for doorsets and door assemblies for dwellings to satisfy the requirements of PAS 24

STS 202

Requirements for burglary resistance of construction products including hinged, pivoted, folding or sliding doorsets, windows, curtain walling, security grilles, garage doors and shutters.

This specifies a broadly similar range of attack tools and times to those specified at the lower levels of LPS 1175.

BS EN 356 (Ratings P1A to P8A)

Glass in building. Security glazing. Testing and classification of resistance against manual attack.

A performance standard for manual attacks on glazing. P2A is comparable to the performance of a 6.8mm laminated glass, and P4A to that of a 9.5mm laminated glass.

Commonly Used Acronyms

CIT

Cash in transit (refers to vehicles, personnel and routines).

CPTED

Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design

CRS

Crime Reduction Specialist. Sometimes known as CPO (Crime Prevention Officer)

INPT

Integrated Neighbourhood Policing Team.

PVB/PolyVinyl Butyral (Glazing interlayer)

A commonly used interlayer used in the production of laminated glass.

LPCB (Loss Prevention Certification Board)

A brand of the BRE Global (Building Research Establishment) family. The LPCB work with insurers, Government, police, designers, manufacturers, contractors and end users to develop methods of assessing performance and reliability of security products to ensure their fitness for purpose.

UKAS (United Kingdom Accreditation Service)

The sole national accreditation body recognised by government to assess, against internationally agreed standards, organisations that provide certification, testing, inspections and calibration services.

Useful Websites

Design for Security

www.designforsecurity.org

Secured by Design

www.securedbydesign.com

RIBA Product Selector

www.ribaproductselector.com

LPCB – Red Book Live

www.redbooklive.com

Crime Reduction (Home Office)

www.crimereduction.homeoffice.gov.uk

DAC (Design Against Crime) Solution Centre

www.designagainstcrime.org

Building for Life

www.buildingforlife.org

CLG (Communities and Local Government)

www.communities.gov.uk