



CRIME IMPACT STATEMENT

A development of 24 apartments

AT 58-66 King Street, Manchester

FOR: **Recom Solutions Ltd**

VERSION A: **10.01.23**

2021/0320/CIS/01

Greater Manchester Police

design**for**security

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Development supported

The proposed development has been well considered from a crime prevention perspective. We welcome the continuing investment in residential accommodation within the city centre and support the proposals.

From a crime prevention perspective, the positive features of the development include: the development will result in the re-use of largely vacant floorspace; the buildings will be more animated; there will be an appropriate number of apartments; and, the development will focus activity in appropriate areas whilst also facilitating passive surveillance of the surrounding streets.

Advice is included in the report, which we consider will enhance security of the development and this set out in sections 3.3 and 4. The principal recommendations relate to consolidating the entrance doors to the residential lobby, securing the building and individual apartments within it appropriately, as well as controlling access through external doors and controlling progress of non-residents through the development.

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1 The Site and Surroundings

The application site and its surroundings are shown on the plan and photographs below. The site, numbers 58-66 King Street, and 47-53 South King Street, edged in red on the plan, is situated in the St Ann's Square Conservation Area, in the retail core of Manchester city centre. The site is part of King Street which is dominated by retail and food and drink premises with upper floor use dominated by offices with some residential uses. The premises immediately adjacent to the site include a travel agency and a vacant retail unit. El Gato Negro, a restaurant situated a short distance west, includes a small area of outdoor seating on the street. King Street is also pedestrianised in the vicinity of the site. Permanent, removable, and automated bollards prevent vehicles entering the street at both Deansgate and Cross Street, although access for loading is allowed between the hours of 08.00-11.00 each morning. Primarily a service route for vehicles accessing the rear of properties that face King Street, South King Street traverses the southern side of the site. It is one-way only in the immediate vicinity of the site, allowing access from Cross Street to the east. There is some limited on-street parking opposite the site, but the carriageway is narrow and double-yellow lines restrict parking elsewhere. One St James Square, a multi-tenanted, office building, is situated directly opposite the site's southern elevation. Steam Packet House, a grade II listed, commercial building stands obliquely opposite the site at the corner of South King Street and Cross Street. The upper floors are in office use whilst the ground floor uses include a bank. Four Yards, a narrow, pedestrian-only alleyway adjoins the eastern boundary of the site and connects King Street to South King Street. The building on the eastern side of Four Yards, Eagle House is also a grade II listed and has food and beverage units on the ground floor with offices on the upper floors.

A 2020 Google image of King Street looking towards the site on the right from the west




A 2019 Google image of the shopfront of number 62 King Street



A view of the buildings that make up the application site from South King Street



A 2019 Google image of the recessed entrance at the corner of South King Street and Four Yards and stepped entrance to the left



The upper floors of the King Street elevation of numbers 58-66 King Street



Looking west along South King Street with the site on the right



The application site comprises the basement floor of includes the basement floor of numbers 51 and 53 South King Street, the ground floor of number 62 King Street and numbers 51 and 53 South King Street, and the upper floors of 58-66 King Street, and 47-53 South King Street. Of these buildings only number 62 is listed (grade II), the ground floor of which was formerly a shop occupied by Cath Kidson with a traditional shopfront with a central recessed doorway and display windows on either side. Diocesan Chambers (number 51 South King Street) and Kingsgate (number 51) appear as a single building that stands at the corner with Four Yards. Diocesan Chambers has a stepped entrance and a pair of ornate timber doors. Although renovation works are underway and timber hoardings around the site restrict a clear view, Google's Street View images show that Kingsgate's entrance door is within a chamfered recess, with display windows on either side. The ground floor, rear elevation of the of the vacant, Cath Kidson shop is secured with roller shutters, behind which is a door that connects the basement floor to the street and a shopfront. There is another door immediately west of this that appears to allow access to the upper floors of all the buildings within the application site.

2 Crime Statistics & Analysis

2.1 Crime in the neighbourhood

The data below relates to crimes recorded between 1st November 2021 to 31st October 2022, committed within 500m of the site.

All crime

Domestic burglary	Non-domestic burglary	Criminal damage	Use, or threat, of violence	Theft - including shoplifting	Robbery	Drug offences	Theft from motor vehicle	Theft of motor vehicle	Bicycle theft
16	204	288	2908	2928	208	171	281	51	149



- 2.1.1 There were 7,303 recorded crimes in the neighbourhood around the development site during the period analysed. This volume of crime is extremely high but typical for a neighbourhood within city centre Manchester.
- 2.1.2 The most common crimes recorded were:
- the use, or threat, of violence - 40%
 - theft (including bicycle theft and shoplifting) - 42%
 - vehicle crime, i.e., theft of, theft from and criminal damage to a vehicle - 5%
 - criminal damage – 4%
 - burglary - 3%
 - robbery – 3%
 - drug offences 2%.
- 2.1.3 Crimes involving the use or threat of violence occurred throughout the area analysed, but there were concentrations at, and near, licensed premises on Deansgate and Peter Street, as well as in Piccadilly Gardens, where large numbers of people congregate. Offences mostly occurred over the weekend period, and during the late evening and early hours of the morning, which reinforces the consumption of alcohol being a significant factor in determining when and where such crimes occur.
- 2.1.4 Incidents of theft have taken place throughout the area, with hotspots at Piccadilly Gardens, licensed premises on Deansgate, Peter Street and Quay Street, and at retail premises in Market Street and the Arndale Centre. As well as shoplifting, offenders used pick-pocketing and distraction techniques to steal mobile phones, bags, and purses/wallets. Offenders have also targeted insecure items (mostly bags and mobile phones) left on or under tables in bars and restaurants.
- 2.1.5 The streets where the most crimes were recorded were:
- Market Street
 - Peter Street
 - Deansgate
 - Corporation Street

Crime on King Street and South King Street

- 2.1.6 There were 157 crimes recorded on King Street and South King Street – theft (including shoplifting) and crimes involving the use or threat of violence were most common.

Domestic burglary

- 2.1.7 There were 16 burglaries committed within the neighbourhood during the period analysed. The burglary rate is very much lower than the City of Manchester average for neighbourhoods of the same size and also significantly lower than rates across the conurbation and the country. There were no particular street or buildings where offences occurred. Offenders gaining entry to apartments was particularly rare, more common was theft of parcels or bicycles from communal areas of a building and neither were common. On two occasions offenders gained entry to an apartment via scaffolding erected whilst the building was undergoing refurbishment works, otherwise entry tended to be gained by tailgating residents or visitors through communal entrance doors.





- 2.1.8 The risk of domestic burglary is greater peaks on a Monday, Wednesday and Friday, and the most common times for offences to be committed are the late afternoon and evening.



2.2 Crime rate comparison

Comparing crime rates in the neighbourhood around the site to those in Manchester, Greater Manchester, and England & Wales

The rates below relate to crime committed within 500m of the site. England & Wales data was last recorded for January – December 2021.



- 2.2.1 The rate of domestic burglaries per 1000 dwellings in the neighbourhood around the site is **83% lower** than the rate for Manchester, **78% lower** than the Greater Manchester rate and **77% lower** than the rate for England & Wales.
- 2.2.2 The rate of wounding per 1000 dwellings in the neighbourhood around the site is **185% higher** than the rate for Manchester, **288% higher** than the Greater Manchester rate and **641% higher** than the rate for England & Wales.



2.2.3 The rate of criminal damage per 1000 dwellings in the neighbourhood around the site is **111% higher** than the Manchester rate, **177% higher** than the Greater Manchester rate and **237% higher** than the rate for England & Wales.

2.2.4 The rate of vehicle crime per 1000 dwellings in the neighbourhood around the site is **366% higher** than the Manchester rate, **668% higher** than the Greater Manchester rate and **833% higher** than the rate for England & Wales.

2.3 Typical modus operandi used in committing burglary and theft at residential and retail premises in Manchester, & measures to reduce vulnerabilities

2.3.1 Communal entrance and apartment entrance doors were targeted when left insecure

To minimise the risk of offenders tailgating through communal doors or entering apartments through insecure doors:

- communal entry doors should be self-closing and lock securely upon closure;
- install a secondary set of secure doors (airlock/secure lobby), that are also self-closing and self-locking;
- install lifts that are operated by a fob or card access control system;
- install CCTV cameras in the entrance lobby;
- apartment doors should be self-closing with a thumb-turn lock on the inner side that meets fire regulations, with clear, yet discreet, permanent instructions on the door to inform the resident that the door is not secure until the lock is turned; and,
- employ a concierge to supervise the entrance lobby.

2.3.2 Doors have been forced open

To minimise the risk of offenders forcing doors:

- all external doors and apartment entry doors should be certified to PAS 24 security standard - PAS 24 rated doors are very difficult to force open;
- 'recess-free' entrances should be installed so that entrance doors are easily visible - offenders will be less inclined to target properties where their actions may be witnessed;
- all external doors should be illuminated with dusk-to-dawn lighting. Light suggests a property may be occupied and may deter offenders from targeting a premise. Lighting will also support CCTV systems and highlight the actions of an offender, increasing the chance of a crime being witnessed; and,
- CCTV should be considered, to record activity within circulation spaces within the building and around exterior of the building.

2.3.3 Ground floor windows were prised open, or the glazing smashed to gain access

To minimise the risk of offenders prising open windows or breaking glass to gain entry:

- avoid installing opening windows at street level;
- install window locks and opening restrictors to any windows that are accessible from street level; and,
- install laminate glass on street level windows and doors.

2.3.4 Offenders have entered communal cycle stores and stolen bicycles

To minimise the risk of offenders entering cycle stores:

- cycle stores should be secure rooms or stores;
- appropriate CCTV and PIR lighting should be installed within a store; and,
- doors or gates to cycle stores should be fitted with good quality locks (ideally a maglock or similar with a resistance force of around 4500N), be self-closing and lock automatically upon closure.

2.3.5 Doors, windows, shutters, and grilles on commercial properties have been forced open

To minimise the risk of offenders forcing entry:

- install LPS 1175 security-rated doors, window frames, shutters, or grilles on commercial units; and,
- avoid designing windows or doors on secluded, poorly supervised elevations or in deep recesses on the building.

2.3.6 Offenders posing as legitimate customers, gaining access to staff-only areas of commercial premises

To minimise the risk of offenders gaining access to staff-only areas:

- access control systems should be considered to secure sensitive areas of premises – e.g., stock rooms, staff rest rooms and offices;
- staff should be required to wear an appropriate form of clearly visible ID and/or a company uniform;
- doors separating public areas, from staff-only areas should be monitored by CCTV; and
- lockers should be provided for staff to secure their personal belongings whilst at work.

2.3.7 Theft of plant and machinery, and criminal damage during the construction period.

To minimise the risk of offenders targeting the construction site:

- a secure boundary should be erected around the site;
- access should be restricted to contractors and authorised visitors;
- security staff should patrol during non-working hours;
- lighting and CCTV should be installed to illuminate and record activity;
- at the end of the working day, plant and machinery should be arranged to prevent forced access onto the site; and,
- plant and machinery should be fitted with a tracking device.

2.4 Environmental features of the site and surroundings that may influence crime patterns

2.4.1 Features of the physical environment can influence patterns criminal and anti-social behaviour. They affect a potential offenders' perceptions about a possible crime site, their evaluations of the circumstances surrounding a potential crime site, and the availability and visibility of one or more witnesses, who might intervene, at or near a site. Offenders may decide whether or not to commit a crime in a location after they determine the following:

- How easy will it be to enter the area?
- How visible, attractive, or vulnerable do targets appear?

- What are the chances of being seen?
- If seen, will the people in the area do something about it?
- Is there a quick, direct route for leaving the location after the crime is committed?

2.4.2 Aspects of the local environment that might help to reduce the risk of crime and disorder at the site are as follows:

- public sector bodies and partners are more pro-active management and maintenance of the private and public spaces in this part of the city centre;
- the city centre has a broad and complementary range of retail, commercial, cultural, civic and leisure uses, which attracts a diverse range of people;
- the emergence of food and beverage uses on King Street in the vicinity of the site attracts people into the area long into the evening when shops have closed;
- there is a growing number of residential properties in this part of the core of the city centre;
- the environmental quality of King Street and South King Street is very good;
- King Street is pedestrian-friendly, such urban environments can encourage people to use the town centre, and feel safe in doing so;
- the northern, southern, and eastern edges of the site are visible to passing pedestrians, shoppers, and customers of the nearby premises. Activity and passive surveillance generated by these groups of people can act as a deterrent to those intent on committing crime or anti-social activities;
- private and public CCTV cameras monitor activity along King Street; and,
- the shopfront and doorway at the rear of the Cath Kidson unit are currently secured with roller shutters, although this method securing doors and shopfronts is not always appropriate in a conservation area.

2.4.3 There are also some features that might facilitate crime and disorder, and these include:

- there is a high level of crime in the city centre, indicating that offenders are active in the area, although retail premises and the night-time economy seem to be a particular focus for such activity;
- there is regular footfall on King Street and South King Street, some of the people passing the site may be intent on criminal or anti-social activity;
- the permeability of this part of the city centre presents would-be offenders with easy and convenient routes to and from the site;
- external doorways tend to be most common means by which offenders enter residential properties; the number of doors on the South King Street elevation presents an offender with several alternative means of entering the development;
- semi-secluded and recessed doorways can become focal points for anti-social behaviour, which can affect the quality of life of neighbouring residents; and,
- during the construction phase of any development, the presence of the site compound can be an attraction for offenders, who may also target property in the vicinity of the compound.

3 Development Appraisal

3.1 The proposed development

3.1.1 The proposed development includes the conversion of the upper floors of the buildings within the application site to residential use together with works to the ground and basement floor to facilitate the residential use and reconfiguration of the Cath Kidson shop unit.

3.1.2 The primary use of the basement floor will be for bicycle storage; the sole means of access to the basement will be via an outward opening, access-controlled, powered door on the South King Street elevation and a series of steps, with a channel for bicycle wheels. The store will be fitted with 'Sheffield'

stands that and accommodate 24 bikes. An existing opening that connects the front and rear spaces within the basement will be sealed. There will also be a plant room in the basement.

- 3.1.3 The ground floor of the Cath Kidson unit will be reconfigured such that a shop unit and shopfront is retained on the King Street elevation with the rear, South King Street focussed, part of the unit separated off. This rear part of the shop will become the refuse store for the residents of the proposed apartments above. A pair of aluminium doors will secure the South King Street entrance to the refuse store, but the existing shopfront will be retained, albeit with new structural walls with access panels fitted inside the shopfront to enhance security.
- 3.1.4 The means of escape door to the west of the Cath Kidson unit, on the South King Street elevation, will be replaced with new, wider doors
- 3.1.5 The existing entrance into the Diocesan Chambers will be retained and fitted with new access-controlled, powered doors. It will become the primary residential entrance with the doors opening inwards into a postal lobby and, ultimately, the residential entrance lobby. The Kingsgate entrance door, at the corner of the building, will be retained and fitted with an inward opening, access-controlled, power-assisted door. This will be the accessible, residential entrance and will open directly into the lobby. A new lift will be installed giving access to the upper floor of the development. The existing staircase will be reconfigured to facilitate the inclusion of a route to the internal door to the residents' refuse store.
- 3.1.6 The upper floors will be converted to residential use. There will be seven apartments on each of the first, second and third floors (including one duplex apartment that spans the third and fourth floor), and three further apartments on the fourth floor. There will be 16 two-bedroom and 8 one-bedroom apartments. There are no changes to the fenestration on any floor of any of the buildings that make up the application site.

3.2 Positive aspects of the proposals

General

- 3.2.1 The re-use of the property is welcomed. Properties that remain vacant for some months are often targeted by thieves and vandals. The resulting visible signs of decay can attract further abuse, which is then likely to negatively affect neighbouring premises.
- 3.2.2 The proposed uses will bring activity and passive surveillance to King Street and South King Street during the day and long into the evening.

Retail unit

- 3.2.3 The retention of the Cath Kidson retail unit facing King Street will create interest on the most appropriate elevation and further promote activity and surveillance over the 'street'.
- 3.2.4 Small units tend to be less attractive to offenders, who prefer to mingle anonymously in larger, busy premises before carrying out acts of theft. Staff and customers tend to be more vigilant in more intimate premises.
- 3.2.5 The shop unit will have a single entrance, which is easier to manage than stores with multiple entrances.
- 3.2.6 Public transport and taxi ranks are located close-by.

Residential

- 3.2.7 The scheme is one of a very high quality. Such developments tend to be more actively managed by managing agents and by the residents
- 3.2.8 There will be twenty-four apartments in the development, which is considered sufficient to provide a reasonable prospect of a presence of residents throughout the day and particularly at night, who will provide activity and passive supervision within the development, which can help to deter offenders from targeting the property.
- 3.2.9 Residents of smaller developments are more likely to interact with their neighbours as they come and go, and the presence of strangers in the building, or at the entrance doors, is more likely to be challenged by residents. Such positive behaviours can deter offenders from attempting to enter the property.

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- 3.2.10 Access controls will be deployed at the bicycle entrance door and the communal entrance doors in order to restrict access to residents and authorised visitors.
 - 3.2.11 The communal entrance doors will be located where they can be easily identified and are visible to residents and visitors.
 - 3.2.12 Apartment windows will facilitate surveillance over the surrounding streets.
 - 3.2.13 A post lobby will be provided.
 - 3.2.14 Secure cycle parking is included in the scheme as is a secure refuse store.

3.3 Recommendations to improve the security of the development

Retail unit

- 3.3.1 The shop unit should be fitted with security-certified, entrance door.
- 3.3.2 The shopfront should include laminate glazing.
- 3.3.3 Provision should be made for the inclusion of an intruder alarm and CCTV.
- 3.3.4 There must be a dedicated area for waste storage within the unit.

Consider a single entrance door

- 3.3.5 The security of the development would be enhanced by limiting residential entrances to a single door rather than the proposed two doors. The Diocesan Chambers door is less likely to be used than the Kingsgate door as it is slightly less convenient, less prominent and includes steps. The scheme will be more secure with just a single entrance i.e., that located in the most convenient and most visible part of the South King Street elevation. The Diocesan Chambers door may be retained but could be locked shut.

Control entry into the residential lobby from South King Street

- 3.3.6 The communal entrance door(s) must be security-rated, self-closing and lock securely upon closure. It/they should be secured with an electrically operated, multi-point lock, activated with a residents' fob. A single door is a more secure option than a pair of doors. The door should be monitored by CCTV and brightly illuminated during the hours of darkness.
- 3.3.7 An audio-visual unit, with a link to each apartment should be fitted at the entrance door(s) to enable residents to vet callers prior to releasing the lock and allowing access to *bona fide* visitors only.

Control movement from the residential lobby to the apartments

- 3.3.8 In order to reduce the risk of visitors or intruders tailgating into the building without due supervision, a secure lobby should be created. The operation of the lift should be restricted to residents holding a suitably programmed fob. In addition, the doors that connect stair A with the circulation corridors at each level should be fitted with a fob-operated, electronic lock, and the doors should be self-closing and lock upon closure.

Apartment security

- 3.3.9 Each apartment should be fitted with a security-rated entrance door, fitted with a door viewer and opening limiter.

Means of escape door

- 3.3.10 The external means of escape doors on the South King Street elevation should be security-rated, be self-closing and self-locking. These doors should be alarmed and only used in an emergency not as a means to leave the building. Signs should advise residents and visitors against misuse of the doors.

Cycle store

- 3.3.11 The door to the cycle store on the South King Street elevation should be security-rated, be self-closing and lock upon closure, and be fitted with a fob-operated, electronic lock.

Refuse store

- 3.3.12 The doors to the refuse store on the South King Street elevation should be security-rated, be self-closing and lock upon closure, and be fitted with a fob-operated, electronic lock. These doors should be

alarmed and only used by contractors, not as a means to leave the building. Signs should advise residents and visitors against misuse of the doors.

- 3.3.13 The internal door linking the entrance lobby to the store should be FD-30 rated and fitted with a fob-operated, electronic lock, and the door should be self-closing and lock upon closure.

[Intruder alarm and CCTV](#)

- 3.3.14 Ideally, each apartment should be fitted with an intruder alarm.
- 3.3.15 The developer should consider installing a modest CCTV system, with cameras capable of monitoring the entrance door(s), entrance lobby and mailboxes, cycle store and its entrance door, and the means of escape door on the South King Street elevation.

[Parcel store](#)

- 3.3.16 Consider installing a parcel storage box that is accessible to delivery staff and residents only.

4 Physical Security

The following specification should be adopted, which meets the security requirements for this scheme to achieve Secured by Design accreditation.

4.1 Doors and Access Controls

[Retail unit](#)

- ☐ The entrance doors should be compliant with, and certified to BS PAS 24, STS202, or LPS 1175 SR2.

[Residential](#)

- ☐ The residents' entrance door should be compliant with, and certified to, BS PAS 24, STS202, or LPS 1175 SR2. It must include an electronic lock capable of being operated via an access control system and be fitted with a door closer and a locking system that automatically secures the door upon closure. The outer handle should be fixed.
- ☐ An intercom, with two-way audio and one-way video, should be provided at the visitor entrance door (Kingsgate door), linked to a handset in each apartment to allow residents to vet visitors prior to allowing entry via a remote door release.
- ☐ Apartment entrance doors must also be compliant with, and certified to, BS PAS 24 and be fitted with a door viewer and chain opening limiter. These doors must also be self-closing and, ideally, lock upon closure.
- ☐ The lift should be operated with a residents' fob.
- ☐ Doors connecting stair A to residential corridors on each level should be fitted with an electronic lock operated by a residents' fob.
- ☐ The cycle store entrance door should be compliant with, and certified to, BS PAS 24, STS202, or LPS 1175 SR2.
- ☐ The means of escape door should be compliant with, and certified to, BS PAS 24, STS202, or LPS 1175 SR2.
- ☐ They external doors to the refuse store should be compliant with, and certified to, LPS 1175 SR2.
- ☐ The internal door to the refuse store should be at least FD-30 rated and include an electronic lock operated via residents' fob and be fitted with a door closer and a locking system that automatically secures the door upon closure.

4.2 Glazing

- ☐ Glazing to all external doors and shopfronts should be P4A-rated, laminate.
- ☐ Glazing is not advised on the cycle store or means of escape door.

4.3 Signage

- ☐ Signage to indicate the name of the development should be included at the communal entrance.
- ☐ Signs should be mounted at other on the South King Street elevation to direct visitors to the appropriate visitor and delivery entrance.

4.4 Intruder alarm

- ☐ An alarm should be fitted in the retail unit.
- ☐ It is good practice to fit an alarm to each apartment.

4.5 CCTV

- ☐ The retail unit should have CCTV cameras fitted.
- ☐ A CCTV system should be considered for the residential part of the development.

4.6 Lighting

- ☐ External lighting should be provided to all external doors, to the cycle store and the refuse store.
- ☐ With the exception of the refuse and cycle stores, lights should be operated by photoelectric cell/daylight sensor. PIR should be used in the refuse and cycle stores.
- ☐ Fittings should produce 'white' light, as opposed to yellow/orange light. Metal halide (or bulbs with a comparable output) should be used, as these offer superior colour rendition over alternatives.

5 Management & Maintenance

- ☐ A maintenance plan should be drawn up for the residential element of the building, to address issues such as cleaning of communal areas and maintenance of lighting, CCTV, and access controls.

6 Construction

- ☐ The developer should take appropriate measures to secure the site during construction, and control pedestrian and vehicular access in and out.
- ☐ The contractor should be a member of the 'Considerate Constructors Scheme'.
- ☐ Site security contractors should be Security Industry Authority, SIA, approved, (please see <http://www.sia.homeoffice.gov.uk/pages/acs-intro.aspx> for more details).

7 Secured by Design (SBD)

- ☐ Secured by Design focuses on crime prevention at the design, layout and construction stages of homes and commercial buildings, and promotes the use of security standards for a wide range of applications and products. To apply for Secured by Design certification for your development, visit our online application form at: <http://www.designforsecurity.org/secured-by-design/sbd-accreditation/>

A Contact Register

Date	Contact	Summary of Contact
03.11.22	Jane Shaw, Recom Solutions Ltd	Request for Crime Impact Statement
07.12.22		Site visited
10.01.23	Jane Shaw, Recom Solutions Ltd	Report issued

B Associated Documents

This report is based on the following:

Drawing No.	Drawing Title	Date	Rev
11702-AEW-XX-SI-DR-A-0500	Location Plan	12/03/21	P02
11702_AEW_XX_SI_DR_A_1000	Proposed Site Plan	31/08/21	P02
11702_AEW_XX_SI_DR_A_0800	Existing ground Floor Plan	31/08/21	P02
11702_AEW_XX_04_DR_A_0814	Existing Fourth Floor Plan	31/08/21	P02
11702_AEW_XX_03_DR_A_0813	Existing Third Floor Plan	31/08/21	P02
11702_AEW_XX_02_DR_A_0812	Existing Second Floor Plan	31/08/21	P02
11702_AEW_XX_01_DR_A_0811	Existing First Floor Plan	31/08/21	P03
11702_AEW_XX_00_DR_A_0810	Existing Ground Floor Plan	31/08/21	P03
	Proposed Floor Plans		

In the event of any changes to the scheme, it may be necessary for Design for Security to review the recommendations made within this report.

C CIS Version History

Version	Revisions	Date
A		10.01.223

D Glossary

Burglary Resistance Standards

BS 7950, 1997

Specification for enhanced security performance of casement and tilt/turn windows.

BS 4873, 2005: Specification for aluminium windows.

BS 7412, 2007: Specification for plastic windows made from PVC-U extruded hollow profiles.

BS 644-1, 2003: Wood windows. Specification for factory assembled windows - various types.

BWF:TWAS: Timber window accreditation scheme.

BS 6510, 2005: Specification for steel windows, sills, window boards & doors.

BS PAS 23-1, 1999

General performance requirements for door assemblies.

A performance standard for door sets, which certifies that a particular door set is fit for purpose. Door products must also have BS PAS 24 certification.

BS PAS 24-1, 2012

General security performance requirements for door assemblies.

An attack test standard for door sets, which certifies that a particular door, frame, lock and hardware set has withstood a series of physical tests. This is the minimum police requirement for Secured by Design dwellings, and is also applicable to French/double doors, and sliding doors.

ENV 1627-30 (Security Ratings WK1 to WK6)

Windows, doors, shutters - Burglar resistance Requirements and classification

The classification system used in ENV 1627-30 is aimed at the commercial market and is based on five elements:

- a) Resistance of glazing
- b) Performance of hardware
- c) Resistance to static loading
- d) Resistance to dynamic loading
- e) Burglary resistance by manual intervention

LPS 1175 (Security Ratings 1 to 6)

Specification for testing and classifying the burglary resistance of building components

This includes doors, shutters, garage doors and grilles typically for commercial premises and higher risk domestic premises and is acceptable to the ABI and the Police. The standard has 6 levels, 6 being the highest, with levels 1 and 2 equivalent in many respects to BS PAS 24 and BS 7950.

STS01 Issue 4: 2012

Enhanced security requirements for doorsets and door assemblies for dwellings to satisfy the requirements of PAS23 and PAS24

As the title suggests this is an equivalent test standard to PAS 24, incorporating PAS 23 (fitness for purpose), published by Warrington Certification.

STS02 Issue 3: 2011

Requirements for burglary resistance of construction products including hinged, pivoted, folding or sliding doorsets, windows, curtain walling, security grilles, garage doors and shutters.

This specifies a broadly similar range of attack tools and times to those specified at the lower levels of LPS1175. However, STS02 does not extend to cover the higher levels of risk addressed within LPS1175 and the attack methods used differ.

EN 356, 2000 (Ratings P1A to P8A)

Glass in building. Security glazing. Testing and classification of resistance against manual attack.

A performance standard for manual attacks on glazing. P2A is comparable to the performance of a 6.8mm laminated glass, and P4A to that of a 9.5mm laminated glass.

Commonly Used Acronyms

CIT

Cash in transit (refers to vehicles, personnel and routines).

CPTED

Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design
(Learn more at www.designforsecurity.org/about/cpted)

CRS

Crime Reduction Specialist. Sometimes known as CPO (Crime Prevention Officer)

INPT

Integrated Neighbourhood Policing Team.

PVB/PolyVinyl Butyral (Glazing interlayer)

A commonly used interlayer used in the production of laminated glass.

LPCB (Loss Prevention Certification Board)

A brand of the BRE Global (Building Research Establishment) family. The LPCB work with insurers, Government, police, designers, manufacturers, contractors and end users to develop methods of assessing performance and reliability of security products to ensure their fitness for purpose.

UKAS (United Kingdom Accreditation Service)

The sole national accreditation body recognised by government to assess, against internationally agreed standards, organisations that provide certification, testing, inspections and calibration services.

Useful Websites

Design for Security

www.designforsecurity.org

Secured by Design

www.securedbydesign.com

RIBA Product Selector

www.ribaproductselector.com

LPCB – Red Book Live

www.redbooklive.com

Crime Reduction (Home Office)

www.crimereduction.homeoffice.gov.uk

DAC (Design Against Crime) Solution Centre

www.designagainstcrime.org

Building for Life

www.buildingforlife.org

CLG (Communities and Local Government)

www.communities.gov.uk