



CRIME IMPACT STATEMENT

AL SUNNAH MOSQUE, 13 WINTERFORD ROAD, CHEETHAM HILL
NEW MOSQUE (1,757sqm.)

Greater Manchester Police

designforsecurity

FOR: Al Sunnah Mosque

VERSION A: 24/11/2023

REFERENCE: 2016/0284/CIS/01

Al Sunnah Mosque, 13 Winterford Road, Cheetham Hill, Manchester

URN: 2016/0284/CIS/01

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Minor design changes/security additions required

This development has been assessed against the principles of 'Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design' (CPTED), in order to reduce the opportunities for crime and the fear of crime.

The layout of the proposed scheme is considered acceptable, as long as the issues discussed in more detail within Section 3.3 of this report are addressed, namely:

- Proposed landscaped area to the east of the building should be enclosed within the secure perimeter of the site. If absolutely unachievable, the feature benches must be relocated to be within the secure fence line and care should be taken to ensure the proposed trees do not form a climbing aid.
- Entrance/access arrangements to prevent unauthorised access and zoning of building so that particular floors, areas or rooms can be secured while other areas of the building are in use.
- Surveillance maximised over parking areas and robust construction/security of cycle store and racks.

If these issues can be addressed as described within the report and the other physical security measures are incorporated, we would be happy to support the development.

Please note: Greater Manchester Police Design for Security will recommend to the local planning authority that a planning condition is added that reflects the physical security specification listed within Section 4 of this report.



Bradley Hart MTCP

Design for Security Consultant

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1 Visual Audit


The site is bounded by Winterford Road to the north, Levenhurst Road to the east and Lanbury Drive to the south, in the Cheetham Hill area of north Manchester.

The site is currently enclosed with high welded-wire mesh fencing, pedestrian gates and a sliding vehicular gate off Winterford Road. The western portion of the building is occupied by a part single-storey, part two-storey building (with single-storey extension) previously is use as a day nursery and now is use as a local Mosque. The eastern portion of the site is formed by a hard standing parking area and a grassed landscaped area within the perimeter fencing to the site.

The surrounding area is primarily residential in nature – formed by Radburn style residential estates featuring pedestrian routes separated from vehicular movement (often to the rear of dwellings), communal areas of landscaping and communal parking areas that can be remote from the dwellings they serve. This type of layout can result in a lack of definition between public and private space, creating areas which can attract nuisance, anti-social behaviour and criminal damage. The networks of the pedestrian access routes through such estates often make them extremely permeable and also provide easy access/escape routes for criminals to utilise – particularly those which benefit from little/no natural surveillance and are likely to be infrequently used.

To the north of the site are residential properties backing onto Winterford Road and an area of grassed open space and to the west are residential properties that back onto the pedestrian route between them and the site – limiting the levels of direct overlooking the site from these directions. There is also an open area of grassland to the south-west and a short mews of residential properties fronting onto Lanbury Drive, which directly overlook the site itself.

To the east, on the opposite side of Levenhurst Road is an open area of landscaping (with some mature trees) and the rear of a Post Office and compound fronting onto Waterloo Road. The building has been heavily fortified with external grilles (to ground and first floor window openings), barbed wire and anti-climb rota-spikes to walls and single-storey eaves – indicating that it has experienced crime and disorder issues. While such overt, retro-fitted security measures can be effective, they can also be visually intrusive and can increase the fear of crime.



2 Crime Statistics & Analysis

The data below is based on crimes recorded between 1st November 2022 to 31st October 2023.

2.1 Crime Summary



Figure 1: Recorded Crime within 500m of Site

Domestic Burglary	Non-Domestic Burglary	Criminal Damage	Less Serious Wounding	Theft	Robbery	Serious Wounding	Theft from Motor Vehicle	Theft of Motor Vehicle	Bicycle Theft
40	16	78	442	45	17	10	40	19	5

- 2.1.1 The general volume of crime in the local area is high, with less serious wounding, criminal damage, theft and vehicle crime being the most prevalent types of recorded crime
- 2.1.2 Although offences have taken place throughout the local area, there are particular hotspots to the north-east of the site (around/off Cheetham Hill Road – where there is a district centre with a concentration of retail/commercial/licensed premises) and on the residential estate to the north-west (around/off Narbuth Drive). Assaults, harassment and public order offences have been the most common types of less serious wounding offences taking place, with disputes between known associates and domestic violence being the most commonly reported. Criminal damage to vehicles and dwellings has accounted for the majority of criminal damage offences taking place in the locale – with offenders targeting vehicles parked on-street (smashing windows and damaging vehicle bodywork) and smashing glazing within the front windows/doors of dwellings. Offenders have used pickpocketing and distraction methods to carry out personal thefts, particularly of wallets and mobile phones, as well as targeting insecure items and bags left unattended. There have also been many cases of parcels being stolen from doorsteps or communal areas within apartment buildings.
- 2.1.3 As this CIS relates to a proposed Mosque and car park, the more detailed analysis below will focus on burglary and thefts at Greater Manchester places of worship and local vehicle crime.


2.2 Non-Domestic Burglary (GM Places of Worship): Risk Analysis

The data below relates to non-domestic burglary offences within/against places of worship, recorded in the Greater Manchester area 2018-2019.



- 2.2.1 **Day Range:** During the week, the risk of burglary at places of worship in Greater Manchester is greatest on Friday and Tuesday.
- 2.2.2 **Time Range:** During the day, the risk of burglary peaks in the evening and into the early hours of the morning. Offenders frequently target buildings at these times, when it is dark, streets are typically quieter than during the day and they are likely to be unoccupied, resulting in them perceiving a lower risk of being observed or identified than during daylight hours.

GM Places of Worship Burglary – Point of Entry





2.2.3 **Point of Entry:** Across Greater Manchester, the following entry points and MO's have been utilised most frequently at places of worship:

- Doors have been targeted most frequently, both to the front and rear of buildings, and have been either forced open with bodily pressure/implements or have been targeted when left insecure.
- Windows (particularly to the rear of buildings) have also been prised open or exploited when left insecure.
- The glazing within doors and windows has been smashed to gain entry.
- In cases where access has been recorded as 'unknown' or 'legitimate', it is likely that offenders have posed as legitimate users while buildings are open to access restricted/non-public areas unnoticed.

2.3 Theft (GM Places of Worship): Risk Analysis

The data below relates to thefts within/against places of worship, recorded in the Greater Manchester area 2018-2019.





2.3.1 **Day Range:** During the week, the risk of theft at Greater Manchester places of worship is greatest on Thursday, Friday and Sunday.

2.3.2 **Time Range:** The risk of theft is greatest during the afternoon and into the early evening. During the day, when the majority of places of worship are open to the public, there are more opportunities for offenders to access buildings and private areas/rooms anonymously, before targeting both personal property (such as laptops, purses, bags etc.) and property belong to the place of worship. Offenders have also targeted building materials, particularly lead flashing, copper piping and paving slabs.

2.4 Local Vehicle Crime: Risk Analysis

The data below relates to vehicle crime committed within 500m of the site, recorded between 1st November 2022 to 31st October 2023.



- 2.4.1 **Day Range:** During the day, the risk of vehicle crime in the local area peaks mid-week (Wednesday/Thursday) and is lowest on Saturday.
- 2.4.2 **Time Range:** During the day, the risk peaks during the early hours of the morning – when it is dark, streets are quiet and offenders perceive a lower risk of being observed or detected. Vehicles are often more at risk when parked on street or in open communal parking areas (rather than when parked in-curtilage or within secure parking facilities) – where they are accessible to offenders and can be remote from their owners.
- 2.4.3 Offenders have smashed glazing to steal items from within vehicles, as well as the vehicles themselves. They have also stolen vehicle registration plates and car parts, as well as caused damage to vehicle bodywork.

2.5 General Risk Factors

- 2.5.1 **Places of worship:** The typical security risks for a development of this nature are:

- Burglary
- Theft of user/staff belongings
- Other theft from premises
- Theft of/from parked cars
- Unauthorised access to non-public areas
- Criminal damage to property and vehicles
- Arson
- Violence towards staff and other users
- Cycle security
- Theft and criminal damage during the construction period

2.6 Common Use-Specific M.O.s (Modus Operandi)

2.6.1 Having looked at the crime data for the site and the surrounding area, the most frequent M.O.s used by offenders when targeting Greater Manchester places of worship are listed below, along with suggested measures to reduce the risk of them being utilised at the proposed development:

- **GM Places of Worship:** Doors have been targeted most frequently, both to the front and rear of buildings, and have been either forced open with bodily pressure/implements or have been targeted when left insecure. Windows (particularly to the rear of buildings) have also been prised open or exploited when left insecure.

Possible Solution - All external doors and windows should be certified to recognised security standards (see Sections 4.1 & 4.2), which are independently proven to reduce the risk of forced entry and thus increase the chances of detection. It may be necessary for more vulnerable doors or windows to be fitted with security-certified shutters, bars, grilles or perforated metal/polycarbonate panels, in order to provide some additional protection. Good use of perimeter boundaries (see Section 4.6), lighting (see Section 4.7) and CCTV (see Section 4.9) can deter criminals from attempting entry by discouraging access to vulnerable areas and increasing the chances of them being seen by security personnel or passers-by.

- **GM Places of Worship:** The glazing within doors and windows has been smashed to gain entry.

Possible Solution – All ground floor/accessible glazing (including in and around doors) should include a laminated pane (see Section 4.3), which forms a much more robust barrier against shattering and penetration. The strength of the laminated glass should be relative to the strength of the door or window system in which it is fitted. Where possible, the size of any glazed elements within/directly adjacent to doors should be reduced and set well away from locking points. Any particularly vulnerable glazed windows or doors should also be secured with security-certified shutters out-of-hours (see Section 4.2).

- **GM Places of Worship:** In cases where access has been recorded as 'unknown' or 'legitimate', it is likely that offenders have posed as legitimate users while buildings are open to access restricted/non-public areas unnoticed.

Possible Solution – The main entrance to the building and all internal areas/rooms restricted to staff and officials should operate on an access control system, to restrict unauthorised entry. All individual rooms should be capable of being secured when unoccupied and there should be a secure area for staff/officials to store their belongings while at the premises.

3 Layout Appraisal

3.1 Proposed Development

- 3.1.1 The proposal is to erect a part 2/part 3 storey Mosque, with associated parking and landscaping. The proposed building will not only function as a place of worship, but as an educational and community centre that will host weekly prayers, classes for children/adults and social events.
- 3.1.2 The site will be enclosed with 2100mm high ornate railings, with a number of double and single pedestrian gates and a large sliding gate at the vehicular entrance off Winterford Road. The western portion of the site will be formed by 38 no. vehicle parking spaces, secure cycle and bin stores and a public cycle rack. A small landscaped area is proposed to the east of the building (along the Levenhurst Road frontage) with some feature benches.
- 3.1.3 The proposed building will occupy the eastern portion of the site. The basement of the building will house an open hall for private events (such as funerals, weddings etc.), a Janaza and back-of-house rooms (such as a staff room and lockers, as well as storage, plant and meter rooms). The ground floor of the building will be accessed via the main entrance off the car park to the west, with secondary entrances to each side elevation. It will house an entrance hall and main prayer hall (with rear door leading straight to the mihrab for the use of the Iman), as well as the Iman's office and male ablutions room and W/Cs. The first floor of the building will house another large prayer room, a meeting room with waiting area/staff room and brew station and female ablutions room and W/Cs. The second floor will house a multi-functional open area for religious, cultural or leisure events, an external terrace, a kitchen, a classroom, a staff office and W/Cs.

3.2 Positive Aspects of the Proposal

The following proposed features would make a positive contribution to the prevention of crime and fear of crime.

- 3.2.1 The proposed development will bring additional activity, overlooking and surveillance to the area.
- 3.2.2 The glazed façades of the proposed building offer both surveillance opportunities over the car park and a greater level of artificial light onto the surrounding streets/public realm.
- 3.2.3 The principal entrance to the building will be in a prominent position and will be capable of being clearly seen from the public realm and the car park.
- 3.2.4 All elevations of the building and vehicle/cycle parking areas will be enclosed within a secure perimeter fenceline, allowing it to be secured when required/out-of-hours to prevent unauthorised access. This will prevent access to where the sheltered colonnades of the building could foster loitering/gathering, nuisance and anti-social behaviour and where the hollow brisolei to the window openings could form a climbing aid to scale the facades of the building.
- 3.2.5 The proposed development provides the opportunity to include security features integral to the design and construction of the building and avoid the need for obtrusive retro-fitted security measures that can increase the fear of crime. Security measures carefully incorporated into the design can ensure the building is reasonably secure, without visibly announcing that the design was concerned about crime.

3.3 Points for Further Consideration

The following points have been identified for further consideration and would need to be addressed for Design for Security to support the proposed scheme.

- 3.3.1 The proposed landscaped area to the east of the building (containing grass, ornamental street trees and feature benches) currently sits outside of the secure perimeter of the site and is not well-overlooked from the building itself. As such, it has the potential to foster loitering/gathering, nuisance and anti-social behaviour issues, as well as being vulnerable to damage and the trees being used to scale the perimeter fencing. It is highly recommended that the landscaped area is enclosed within the perimeter fenceline, to allow access to it to be controlled during operational hours and prevented out-of-hours. If this is absolutely unachievable, at the very least, any feature benches should be relocated to be within the secure fenceline of the site (well overlooked from the frontage of the building) and care must be taken to ensure any trees to the area cannot be used to scale the fencing. More information relating to the secure fencing and gates enclosing the site can be found within Section 4.6.

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- 3.3.2 The proposed Mosque building is likely to have numerous ancillary uses and facilities, frequented by a large numbers of visitors and a wide range of user groups within the community. This can provide opportunities for criminals to legitimately and anonymously enter the building and target vulnerable areas. The main entrance to the building should be capable of being access-controlled (with all other doors secured) so that at quiet times, the entrance can be secured but visitors can still contact officials/staffs if they wish to enter (see Section 4.1 for more information). In addition to this, the interior of the building should be capable of being 'zoned' (see Section 4.4), so that particular floors, areas or rooms can be secured while other areas of the building are in use (e.g. securing the prayer halls or classrooms when the multi-purpose hall is hosting an event).
- 3.3.3 Surveillance opportunities should be maximised over the parking areas, which should be well-lit (see Section 4.7), be covered by CCTV (ideally monitored from within the building – see Section 4.9 for more information). The secure cycle store for the use of officials/staff members must be a secure structure, with an access-controlled, security-certified doorset (see Section 4.10 for more information). The public cycle parking area should be located in a well-overlooked location and should allow visitors to secure their cycles within lockers or to stands that allow multi-point locking (also see Section 4.10).
- 3.3.4 It is essential that all of the physical security measures listed below are incorporated into the scheme. Integrated, risk-commensurate security measures aim to place secure physical barriers or surveillance in the path of the criminal – making crime harder to commit and raising the risk of detection and possible capture, as well as promoting a feeling of safety in users.

4 Physical Security

The following checklist forms the physical security requirements for this scheme to achieve Secured by Design accreditation.

4.1 External Doors

- ☐ All external doors (both single and double leaf) must be compliant with and certified to BS PAS 24, STS 202 or LPS 1175 SR2.
- ☐ The main entrance to the building should be secured with a multi-point electronic lock permitted as part of the certification, capable of being operated via an audio-visual access control system linked to the Iman's office or staff office. Mosque officials or staff should be able to remotely secure and control access through main entrance if/when required (e.g. during quiet times or when classes/events for specific groups are being hosted).
- ☐ Any external escape-only doors should also be security-certified to one of the above standards. It is crucial that the door ironmongery is permitted for use on these doors under the security certification of the product. All escape-only doors should be alarmed (audible upon opening) and designed without visible external ironmongery.

4.2 Windows & Shutters

- ☐ Windows should be compliant with and certified to BS PAS 24 or LPS 1175 SR2 where possible. All other window designs/dimensions should take account of the requirements of the above standards, as certified products can carry dimensional restrictions. Any curtain walling panels should include laminated glazing (see below) and should be fixed with a secure glazing retention system (e.g. with security glazing tape, with a dedicated security sealant/gasket or a secure mechanical fixing system from the glazing retention tests within the BS PAS 24 or LPS 1175 standards).
- ☐ Any ground floor/accessible opening lights (escape requirements permitting) should be lockable and have fixed/lockable opening restrictors (not releasable from the outside) limited to 100mm.
- ☐ If any shutters are to be installed, they should be tested and certified to LPS 1175 SR2 (or SR1 if perforated laths are required) and installed in accordance with manufacturer's instructions. Ideally, any external shutters should have shutter-boxes and guides built into the fabric of the building – where they would be less vulnerable to attack and less visually intrusive.

4.3 Glazing & Building Fabric

- ☐ All ground floor and first floor glazing should incorporate at least one pane of glass with a 1.5mm PVB interlayer (e.g. 7.5mm laminated glass), or a glass rated as P4A under EN 356. The remaining pane in a double glazed unit may be toughened glass.
- ☐ There should be a block work wall (or material of similar strength e.g. welded-steel mesh) behind any cladding to the building, to a minimum height of 2000mm from external ground level, to ensure that the fabric of the building itself is not vulnerable to attack.
- ☐ As much as possible, given the proposed hollow brisolei to the window openings that have the potential to be scaled, there should be no features of the building (such as projecting window cills or brickwork features, canopies, exposed rainwater down pipes etc.) or nearby hard/soft landscaping features (such as nearby boundaries, retaining walls, trees, lighting columns, handrails etc.) that may provide climbing aids up to upper floor windows

4.4 Internal Security

- ☐ The proposed building includes a number of uses and facilities and is likely to be frequented by large numbers of visitors and a wide range of user groups. This can provide opportunities for criminals to legitimately and anonymously enter the building and target vulnerable areas without being noticed. It is therefore highly recommended that the building is capable of being 'zoned', to prevent unauthorised access to areas/floors of the building that are not being used. All floors/areas of the building should be capable of being independently secured when they are not in use, in order to prevent unauthorised

access when other parts of the building are occupied. All internal doors/frames to each floor (off the stair/lift lobbies) and to each of the halls, offices, meeting rooms, classrooms and stores/plant rooms should be solid core (FD30 or higher), with 3 hinges and a manual deadlock or an electronic lock operated by staff key card/fob, so that they can be secured when unoccupied.


- ☐ Any cash rooms/offices and any other rooms containing valuable equipment (such as audio/visual equipment, computers etc.) should have solid masonry walls, no adjacent false/suspended ceilings and a security-certified doorset (i.e. to BS PAS 24). All high value equipment should be property marked and securely fixed or stored to deter damage/theft. An accurate record should be maintained which logs all such items.
- ☐ There should be a secure area for staff/officials to store their belongings whilst at the Mosque, secured with a self-closing/locking solid-core door (ideally operated by staff key card/fob). Any lockers must be robust/secure and all users must be encouraged to use them and not leave belongings unattended.
- ☐ Any electric locking system to be used throughout the building/site should be fully auditable (i.e. allows the retention of data, such as who accessed where and when), to allow for a better investigation into any incidents. Cards/fobs should be capable of being easily and quickly activated/disabled to ensure that mis-use is prevented. Staff should only be allowed access to areas required for their work and keys/passes should only be carried if required for duties and should be accounted for at all times. The use of numeric keypads is not advised, as codes can be easily observed or shared and are rarely changed.

4.5 Alarm

- ☐ A monitored alarm system should be installed to cover the proposed building, linked to contacts on all external doors and PIR detectors to rooms with accessible windows, with a signal terminating at a recognized Alarm Receiving Centre (ARC).

4.6 Boundaries

- ☐ The site should be enclosed with railings and pedestrian/vehicular gates to a height of 2100-2400mm (please see <https://www.securedbydesign.com/member-companies/accredited-product-search> for a list of Police approved perimeter security suppliers). It is highly recommended that the landscaped area to the east of the building is incorporated into the secure perimeter of the site (see Section 3.3 for more details).
- ☐ Care should be taken to ensure that new panels are fixed securely to the posts (preventing tampering/removal) and that any level changes do not inadvertently facilitate climbing or leave large gaps underneath the panels/gates. There should be no centrally located horizontal bars to aid climbing and the gates should be located away from other climbing aids, such as low walls, streetlights, trees etc. Exposed hinges and large sliding bolt apertures/locking points should be avoided, or fitted with shrouding/protective plates (see opposite for example) to avoid the creation of footholds. The gap at the bottom of any gates should be small enough to stop anyone crawling through. Any release mechanism on the internal side of any pedestrian emergency egress gates should not be capable of being reached/operated from the external face of the fenceline/gate.
- ☐ The site boundary treatments should ideally be positioned on hard standing ground. Where this is not possible, ground conditions should be reviewed as extra measures may be required to create a secure boundary. Care should also be taken to ensure there are no trees or any other hard landscaping features (such as street furniture, lighting columns etc.) immediately adjacent and on the publicly accessible side of any secure boundaries that could be used as a climbing aid to scale the fencing. Any such features should be pruned or removed where possible. Any existing lighting columns immediately adjacent to new fencelines may need to be fitted with anti-climb collars.
- ☐ Any low boundaries/hard landscaping features that adjoin high boundaries should have transition panels/sections, in order to prevent them from being used as a climbing aid over the higher perimeter fencing/gates.



4.7 Car Park & Lighting

- ☐ Lighting to all parking areas should be in accordance with BS 5489, with an average lux level 20 and a uniformity level of no less than 25%.
- ☐ Dusk 'til dawn lights, operated by photoelectric cell/daylight sensor, should be installed to all external doors.
- ☐ Fittings should produce 'white' light, as opposed to yellow/orange light. LED (or bulbs with a comparable output) should be used, as these offer superior colour rendition over alternatives such as high and low pressure sodium bulbs. Lighting fixtures must not be positioned to provide climbing aids over boundary treatments or up to high level windows. Electrical and architectural layouts should be developed together to avoid this.
- ☐ The surface of the car park should be even concrete/tarmac. The integrity of the surface treatment should be maintained to ensure that there is no loose material that can be used to commit crime.
- ☐ Bays should be clearly demarcated to avoid confusion or conflict, with pedestrian routes/directions clearly signed. Traffic calming measures should ideally be incorporated to limit the speed of vehicles within the site.

4.8 Landscaping

- ☐ Any landscape features (hard or soft) to any public realm areas should not impede natural surveillance of/from the buildings or reduce the effectiveness of lighting (see Section 4.7) or any CCTV system (see Section 4.9).
- ☐ In vulnerable locations such as around entrances, building facades, parking areas and along pedestrian routes, low planting should not exceed approx. 1000mm in height and tree canopies should fall no lower than approx. 2000mm from the ground. This is in order to allow people to see their surroundings better, make a rational choice of routes and eliminate hiding places. A maintenance agreement should stipulate that these planting dimensions would be adhered to. Loose surface materials in publicly accessible areas of the scheme should be avoided. Small fragments of ground covering can be used as missiles against people, premises and parked vehicles (both to gain entry and to commit criminal damage).
- ☐ The design of any proposed hard landscaping features, such as any steps, ramps or benches, should be designed to withstand and discourage the potential for mistreatment or damage (e.g. from climbing, vandalism, skateboarding etc.). Any such features should be reduced in number to the minimum practicable and should be located where surveillance and overlooking opportunities are maximised, where they would not be publicly accessible out-of-hours.
- ☐ The robust management of landscaped spaces is essential to encourage active use and enjoyment, whilst making abuse less likely to occur. Poor management and maintenance can lead to a downward spiral of neglect and loss of environmental quality, encouraging nuisance, vandalism and other anti-social or criminal behaviour. If signs of disorder (such as criminal damage, graffiti, littering etc.) are not repaired/removed immediately, they can often attract further abuse.
- ☐ Planting must be avoided that will aid climbing over boundary treatments. The security of fences can be compromised if trees or street furniture are placed close by.

4.9 CCTV

Any CCTV system that may be used within this proposal will require certain specifications and intelligent placement of cameras to compliment the design of the development. Designers should consider the following points when planning a CCTV strategy:

- ☐ CCTV systems (and lighting that support them) require regular cleaning and maintenance to remain effective.
- ☐ Where necessary cameras that are vulnerable to damage should be protected from attack either by relocation to a higher level and using a bigger lens to achieve the view required or through the fitting of a vandal resistant housing.

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- ☐ With regards to the retention of footage, the police prefer quality over quantity. The overall retention period should be dictated by what the system is designed to achieve, though it would be better to have good quality images over a 14-day period than poor ones over a 30-day period.

- ☐ Procedures for recovery of recordings are recommended to be established (e.g. trained staff / the CCTV system instruction manual to be readily available). This is to ensure that the images produced will be of an *acceptable standard* that will allow for *identification* of an individual which will stand up to scrutiny in court.

Acceptable Standard - this generally requires a resolution of 720x576 pixels at a real time frame rate of 25 frames per second. (N.B. Both the camera and DVR must be capable of this – if the camera will only send low resolution images then it does not matter how high the resolution of the recording unit is).

Identification – One of three levels of field of view. To identify an individual, the image must capture no less than 120% of the field of view (at least from the top of the individuals head to their knees). The remaining two levels of field of view are *overview* and *recognition*, which whilst effective for observational purposes, are less likely to result in the identification of a person/offender.

- ☐ The intelligent placement of cameras helps to provide clear facial identification of individuals. Suitable locations would be: *all entrances/entrance lobbies, all facades of the building, all external and internal circulation areas and all parking areas/cycle stores*. It is highly recommended that the CCTV system covering the car park is capable of being monitored by staff within the building, so there can be an immediate response to any incidents being recorded.

4.10 Other

- ☐ The proposed secure cycle store building for the use of officials/staff should be of robust masonry construction, secured with a self-closing/locking security-certified doorset to BS PAS 24, STS 202 or LPS 1175 SR2 operated by staff key card/fob or key and containing 'Sheffield' style stands. Alternatively, secure cycle parking should be provided in individual secure lockers (for example [Diamond Rated Secure Cycle Lockers UK Wide](#) | [BikeAway Warrior Cycle Lockers](#)), which are also covered by CCTV (see above). Any cycle parking area for public use should be located where it can be well-overlooked from within the building and should also include 'Sheffield' stands, which both wheels and the crossbar can be locked to rather than just the crossbar (wheel slots and butterfly racks are not suitable). There should be no open shelter provided, which may foster loitering/gathering, nuisance and anti-social behaviour. For further information refer to our cycle storage guidance document: <http://designforsecurity.org/downloads>.
- ☐ The proposed bin store should be of robust construction, secured with multi-point locking steel doors to prevent damage, unauthorised access and mis-use. A strategy should be prepared to ensure waste collection can take place whilst retaining a secure development.

5 Management & Maintenance

- 5.1.1 A comprehensive security regime for the management of the site/building must be prepared and remain in place for the day-to-day running of the site. It should include issues such as:
- Opening and closing of the site/building, including staff arrival and departure;
 - Access-control procedures;
 - Any cash management within premises;
 - Management of any deliveries (servicing activities should not require any service doors to remain open unattended for prolonged periods); and
 - Details of staff security training.
- 5.1.2 The upkeep of a development over its lifetime can be crucial to the level of security and safety within. Aspects of a development, which are left to deteriorate, have the potential to attract further crime – a process known as ‘the broken window theory’. A maintenance plan should be drawn up to address issues such as:
- Litter/graffiti removal
 - Repair to communal areas (lighting, signage, access controls, CCTV etc.)
 - A weekly physical check of all perimeter fencing to check for evidence of breaches
 - Trimming and pruning to shrubs and trees
- 5.1.3 There should be regular reviews/exercises to ensure that security regimes and maintenance plans remain accurate, workable and up-to-date. All staff should understand and accept the need for security measures and it should be made easy for people to raise concerns or report observations.
- 5.1.4 Adequate signage should be deployed in all areas not only to direct people throughout the site/building, but also to deter unauthorised access to staff-only/back-of-house areas.

6 Construction

- 6.1.1 Untidy sites and their surroundings can be littered with debris accessible to vandals who often use loose materials as missiles to commit crime. The client should take measures appropriate to secure their site during construction, and control pedestrian and vehicular access in to and out of the site curtilage. It is also recommended that the contractor on this scheme is a member of the ‘Considerate Constructors Scheme’, who has committed to be a considerate and good neighbour, as well as clean, respectful, safe, environmentally conscious, responsible and accountable.
- 6.1.2 Site security contractors should be SIA (Security Industry Authority) approved to ensure professional standards are adhered to (please see <http://www.sia.homeoffice.gov.uk/pages/acs-intro.aspx> for more details).

7 Useful References

7.1 Secured by Design (SBD)

- 7.1.1 Secured by Design focuses on crime prevention at the design, layout and construction stages of homes and commercial premises and promotes the use of security standards for a wide range of applications and products. To apply for Secured by Design certification for your development, visit our online application form at: <http://www.designforsecurity.org/secured-by-design/sbd-accreditation/>

A Contact Register

Date	Contact With	Summary of Contact
20 th September 2023	Seed Architects	Receipt of CIS instruction form & plans
21 st September 2023	Seed Architects	Quote issued & request for additional info
24 th October 2023	Seed Architects	Confirmation of instruction/fee & receipt of additional info
14 th November 2023	GMP Finance Dept	Payment Confirmation
15 th to 16 th November 2023	Seed Architects	Email correspondence re: timescales

B Associated Documents

This report is based on the following drawings and supplementary information submitted by the applicant.

Drawing No.	Drawing Title	Date	Rev
3283 LP01	Location Plan	24/08/23	-
3283 SP00	Existing Site Plan	24/08/23	-
3283 SP01	Proposed Site Plan	24/08/23	-
3283 S01	Basement and Ground Floor Plans	24/08/23	-
3283 S02	First and Second Floor Plans	24/08/23	-
3283 S03	North and South Elevations, Section AA	24/08/23	-
3283 S04	East and West Side Elevations, Section BB_Option A	24/08/23	-
3283 S06	Proposed Visuals	24/08/23	-
3283 S07	Proposed Visuals	24/08/23	-
3283 S10	Boundary Treatment	18/10/23	-
3283 DA001	Design & Access Statement	Apr 2023	A

PLEASE NOTE - In the event of any subsequent material changes to the scheme, it will be necessary for Design for Security to reassess the comments made within this report.

C CIS Version History

Version	Revisions Made	Date
A		

D Glossary

Burglary Resistance Standards

BS PAS 24

General security performance requirements for door/window assemblies.

An attack test standard for doorsets and windows. This is the minimum police requirement for Secured by Design dwellings, and is also applicable to French/double doors, and sliding doors.

BS EN 1627 (Security Ratings RC1 to RC6)

Windows, doors, shutters - Burglar resistance Requirements and classification

The classification system used in BS EN 1627 is aimed at the commercial market and is based on five elements:

- a) Resistance of glazing*
- b) Performance of hardware*
- c) Resistance to static loading*
- d) Resistance to dynamic loading*
- e) Burglary resistance by manual intervention*

LPS 1175 (Security Ratings 1 to 6)

Specification for testing and classifying the burglary resistance of building components

This includes doors, shutters, garage doors and grilles typically for commercial premises and higher risk domestic premises and is acceptable to the ABI and the Police. The standard has 6 levels, 6 being the highest, with levels 1 and 2 equivalent in many respects to BS PAS 24 and BS 7950.

STS 201

Enhanced security requirements for doorsets and door assemblies for dwellings to satisfy the requirements of PAS 24

STS 202

Requirements for burglary resistance of construction products including hinged, pivoted, folding or sliding doorsets, windows, curtain walling, security grilles, garage doors and shutters.

This specifies a broadly similar range of attack tools and times to those specified at the lower levels of LPS 1175.

BS EN 356 (Ratings P1A to P8A)

Glass in building. Security glazing. Testing and classification of resistance against manual attack.

A performance standard for manual attacks on glazing. P2A is comparable to the performance of a 6.8mm laminated glass, and P4A to that of a 9.5mm laminated glass.

Commonly Used Acronyms

CIT

Cash in transit (refers to vehicles, personnel and routines).

CPTED

Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design

CRS

Crime Reduction Specialist. Sometimes known as CPO (Crime Prevention Officer)

INPT

Integrated Neighbourhood Policing Team.

PVB/PolyVinyl Butyral (Glazing interlayer)

A commonly used interlayer used in the production of laminated glass.

LPCB (Loss Prevention Certification Board)

A brand of the BRE Global (Building Research Establishment) family. The LPCB work with insurers, Government, police, designers, manufacturers, contractors and end users to develop methods of assessing performance and reliability of security products to ensure their fitness for purpose.

UKAS (United Kingdom Accreditation Service)

The sole national accreditation body recognised by government to assess, against internationally agreed standards, organisations that provide certification, testing, inspections and calibration services.

Useful Websites

Design for Security

www.designforsecurity.org

Secured by Design

www.securedbydesign.com

RIBA Product Selector

www.ribaproductselector.com

LPCB – Red Book Live

www.redbooklive.com

Crime Reduction (Home Office)

www.crimereduction.homeoffice.gov.uk

DAC (Design Against Crime) Solution Centre

www.designagainstcrime.org

Building for Life

www.buildingforlife.org

CLG (Communities and Local Government)

www.communities.gov.uk