

CRIME IMPACT STATEMENT

Former Bauer Millet site Albion Street

Residential apartments, Hotel, Bar/Restaurant & Public Realm works

For: **SALBOY CENTRAL LIMITED**

Version B: **13/11/24**

Ref: **2023/0619/CIS/01**

Greater Manchester Police

designforsecurity

Produced by Greater Manchester Police
Copyright reserved by The Chief Constable

Former Bauer Millet site Albion Street

2023/0619/CIS/01

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Development Supported

This development has been assessed against the principles of 'Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design' (CPTED), in order to reduce the opportunities for crime and the fear of crime.

Advice is included in the report, which we consider will enhance security of the development and this set out in sections 3.3 and 4. The principal recommendations relate to securing the site, and the commercial and apartment buildings appropriately, and encouraging high quality in the private and public realm. The recommendations are summarised as follows:

- the private and public realm should be of a high quality, including such measures as distinctive surfacing, lighting and signage.
- include measures to prevent anti-social parking.
- secure the site's southern boundary.
- install appropriate controls at the communal entrance doors and entry gates to restrict access to residents and *bona fide* visitors.
- Robust control of access in/and around the buildings.
- Service vehicle entrance/egress access.
- Control of access into/around the hotel – including access controls to main entrance out-of-hours, upper floor bedroom corridor/access core to prevent non-guest access and staff-only access to ground floor/basement back-of-house areas.
- Access controlled cycle storage.
- Reception desk location and staffing levels
- Ground floor external material protection against graffiti.
- Management and maintenance policy

If these issues can be addressed as described within the report and the other physical security measures are incorporated, I would be happy to support the development.

Please note: At the planning application stage, Greater Manchester Police will support the application subject to the design team suitably addressing the recommendations contained in the report (Sections 3.3, 4 & 5), and will seek the inclusion of a planning condition requiring the development to achieve Secured by Design accreditation.

David Maher *Dip Arch*
Consultant

e: david.maher@gmp.police.uk

Copyright reserved by The Chief Constable

Contents

1 Visual Audit 5

2 Crime Statistics & Analysis 6

2.2 Common Use-Specific M.O.s (Modus Operandi)

2.3 Risk Factors - Residential

2.4 Risk Factors - Hotels

2.5 Risk Factors – Bar/Restaurants

2.6 Comparing crime rates in the neighbourhood around the site to those in Manchester and Greater Manchester

2.7 Domestic Burglary: Risk Analysis

2.8 Burglary Risk Analysis (Hotels)

2.9 Theft Risk Analysis (Hotels)

2.10 Burglary Risk Analysis (Restaurants/Cafés)

2.11 Theft Risk Analysis (Restaurants/Cafés)

2.12 Vehicle Crime: Risk Analysis

3 Layout Appraisal 16

3.1 Proposed development

3.2 Positive Aspects of the Proposal

3.3 Public Realm influences over crime patterns

4 Changes Needed and Recommendations 19

5 Physical Security (Residential) 21

5.1 Doors

5.2 Windows

5.3 Glazing

5.4 Alarms

5.5 Access Control

5.6 Boundaries

5.7 Landscaping

5.8 Lighting

5.9 Other

6 Physical Security (Non-residential) 23

6.1 Doors

6.2 Shutters

6.3 Windows

6.4 Glazing

6.5 Alarms

6.6 Access Control

6.7 Lighting

6.8 CCTV

7 Management & Maintenance 24

8 Construction 25

9 Useful References 25

9.1 Secured by Design (SBD)

Copyright reserved by The Chief Constable

Appendix

A Contact register 26
B Associated Documents 26
C CIS Version History 27
D Glossary 28

Produced by Greater Manchester Police
Copyright reserved by The Chief Constable

1 Visual Audit

The development site is indicated by the red outline on the plan adjacent and is supported with existing site context photographs taken around the site.

The site lies to the south of M/cr Central Convention Centre, and is bound by Great Bridgewater St to the north, Trafford St to the south and Albion St to the east.

The existing site is currently undergoing redevelopment of phase 1, 'Viadux', a residential apartment tower.

The site is located south of M/cr Central Convention Centre, an area where the night-time economy is popular and centred on Peter Street.


At the southern end of Watson St & Great Bridgewater St a large new residential & commercial development is under construction; Viadux.


The Great Northern Warehouse is a large mixed-use leisure complex to the northwest of the site: Public square & public realm spaces; Great Northern Warehouse, a grade II* listed building is at the centre of the site and houses the casino, food and beverage outlets with the upper floors let as a multi-storey car park. Deansgate Terrace, a continuous terrace of two and three storey commercial units facing Deansgate, with upper floor units at the rear facing an elevated street that connects the warehouse to Great Bridgewater Street.

The eastern part of the site faces onto the busy road junction of Great Bridgewater St & Lower Mosley St. Further to the west, along Great Bridgewater St are 3 pubs.

The site will see pedestrian activity as it connects to Deansgate Metrolink station. There are 4 pedestrian entry points to the tram stop; 3 from Whitworth St West & 1 from Great Bridgewater St.

Located off Whitworth St West is Deansgate Locks, a popular nighttime economy destination in the area.





1 – View towards site & along Greta Bridgewater St.



2 – View towards the site below the tram bridge.



3 – View towards the future pedestrian entrance.


4 – Proposed resident entrance locations.


5 – New pedestrian access point to metroling tram stop.


6 – View along Trafford St.


7 – Existing service ramp over Trafford St.


8 – View across metrolink tracks towards the site.

2 Crime Statistics & Analysis

All data below is based on crimes recorded between 1st October 2023 to 30th September 2024.

Crime Summary

Figure 1: Recorded Crime within 500m of Site

Domestic Burglary	Non-Domestic Burglary	Criminal Damage	Less Serious Wounding	Theft	Robbery	Serious Wounding	Theft from Motor Vehicle	Theft of Motor Vehicle	Bicycle Theft
14	60	206	1,274	438	81	26	386	27	34

2.1.1 The overall rate of crime over the past 12 months has been high for the Manchester division, with less serious wounding, criminal damage and theft having been the highest recorded offences taking place. These types of crime are typical of those experienced in or within close proximity of district, town or city centres where there is often a higher concentration of retail, commercial and licensed premises, leading to a higher number of crime and disorder issues. Whilst the offences are occurring throughout the local area there is a higher concentration occurring to north of the proposed site towards the city centre and at a hotspot of offences around Deansgate tram stop.

2.1.2 Less serious woundings are taking place throughout the local area, particularly to the northeast of the proposed site at locations along Quay Street and Oxford Road as well as at the hotspot of offences at Deansgate tram stop. Assaults, harassment and public order offences have been the most reported less serious woundings, with the majority of incidents taking place in the late evening and early hours of the morning over the weekend period, which is when licenced premises have a larger attendance and are open for longer periods. Instances of assaults have mainly involved disputes between unknown associates.

2.1.3 Thefts have mainly occurred at a large hotspot at the junction of Quay Street with Deansgate, as well as at a smaller hotspot at Deansgate tram stop. This is due to the higher footfall in these areas which leads to more potential targets and opportunities for offenders. Pickpocketing and distraction methods have been used to in order to remove items stored on the person such as mobile phones, wallets and purses, as well as offenders targeting insecure items and bags on tables and benches around the licenced premises, retail outlets and restaurants in the area.

2.1.4 Theft from motor vehicle has been the most common vehicle crime offence occurring in the local area, whereby offenders have most commonly smashed the glazing in car windows before removing items from within. The local area has a large number of parking facilities and on street parking, which increases the number of opportunities for offenders.

2.2 Common Use-Specific M.O.s (Modus Operandi)

2.2.1 **Offenders posing as legitimate customers, visitors or employees have gained unauthorised access to staff only areas to steal property.**

Possible Solution – There should be a secure area for staff to store their belongings while at work and all staff-only, back-of-house areas should be secured to prevent unauthorised public access (see Section 4.4).

2.2.2 **Offenders forcing open doors to hotel rooms to commit theft.**

Possible Solution - All individual bedroom doors should ideally be security-certified to recognised security standards (see Section 4.1), which are independently proven to reduce the risk of forced entry and thus increase the chances of detection. Where this is not possible, access controls should be incorporated to limit and regulate access to bedroom floors.

2.2.3 **Offenders entering rooms using forged or stolen electronic key cards or fobs.**

Possible Solution - Auditable electric locking systems (such as Vingcard or similar) should be used, which can be easily activated/disabled electronically by reception staff.

2.2.4 **Offenders, posing as guests or legitimate customers, accessing staff-only/restricted areas to steal property.**

Copyright reserved by The Chief Constable

Possible Solution - The main reception should be located to have full view of everyone entering and leaving the premises and all routes to bedrooms and staff areas. All staff should understand and accept the need for security measures and should be trained to be vigilant and to report any suspicious behaviour. Access controls should be used to restrict access to vulnerable areas and there should be a secure area for staff to store their belongings while at work.

2.2.5 **Theft of personal property from tabletops or from bags hung on chairs or stored under tables.**

2.2.6 Possible Solution - Consideration should be given to tables and chairs designed to facilitate secure storage of belongings or adapted with 'Chelsea Clips' to reduce the opportunities to steal bags/coats. The layout of the premises can also help deter occurrences and increase surveillance opportunities. It should be generally uncluttered, allowing clear views of all spaces and avoiding any pinch points or areas of concealment. External seating areas should be enclosed to clearly define them as separate from adjacent pedestrian routes.

2.2.7 **Shutters have been prised open to target doors/windows behind them.**

Possible Solution - To minimise the risk of offenders forcing shutters:

- security-certified roller shutters (to LPS 1175) should be used wherever possible;
- where the size limits the availability of certified shutters, CCTV and lighting should be deployed to increase the security of these larger openings.

2.2.8 **Forcing open secure windows and doors (mostly front doors and fire exit doors) using bodily pressure and implements in order to gain entry to the premises.**

Possible Solution - All external doors should be certified to recognised security standards (see Section 4.1), which are independently proven to reduce the risk of forced entry and thus increase the chances of detection. Security-certified doors are the best long-term measure to address this risk and can be obtained to suit virtually all operational requirements.

2.2.9 **Broken glazing in windows and doors.**

Possible Solution – All new ground floor/accessible glazing (including in and around doors) should include a laminated pane (see Section 4.3), which forms a much more robust barrier against shattering and penetration. The strength of the laminated glass should be relative to the strength of the door or window system in which it is fitted. Where possible, the size of any glazed elements within/directly adjacent to doors should be reduced and set well away from locking points. In vulnerable locations, shutters, grilles or perforated protective panels may be necessary to provide extra protection–

2.2.10 **General: Exploitation of insecure windows and doors.**

Possible Solution - Front doors should include a split spindle mechanism which locks on closure and can only be opened from outside with a key.

2.2.11 **General: Forcing open secure windows and doors using bodily pressure and implements in order to gain entry to the property.**

- Possible Solution – All ground floor/accessible windows should be certified to recognised security standards (see Section 5.4), with key operated locks and opening restrictors. All ground floor/accessible glazing should also include a laminated pane, which forms a much more robust barrier against shattering and penetration (see Section 5.4). Any glazed panels in or around doors should be small and set well-away from locking points.

2.2.12 **General: Forcing open shutters using implements and tools in order to gain access to the doors and windows located beneath.**

Possible Solution - Roller shutters can appear secure in that they are difficult to penetrate, however physical security products are only as strong as their weakest component. A security-certified shutter (see Section 5.2) has an independently proven level of resistance, and ensures that all aspects of the shutter (locks, rails, laths etc) have been scrutinised by professionals. Avoid locating shutters in concealed areas where a concerted attack from an offender is unlikely to be witnessed. Ensure that parked vehicles and stored materials do not obscure sight lines.

2.2.13 **General: Smashed glazing in windows and doors using implements.**

Possible Solution – All ground floor / accessible glazing should include a laminated pane which forms a much more robust barrier against shattering and penetration. Ensure that rubbish and loose material is

Copyright reserved by The Chief Constable

removed from the areas around the site. Where possible, the size of any glazed elements within or directly adjacent to doors should be reduced and set well away from locking points.

2.2.14 **Commercial: Posing as a legitimate customer and entering restricted areas by means of insecure doors and tailgating employees.**

Possible Solution – There should be a secure area for staff to store their belongings while at work and all staff-only, back-of-house areas should be secured to prevent unauthorised public access (see Section 5.1).

2.2.15 **Office: Organised burglars targeting expensive I.T. equipment.**

Possible Solution - Secure storerooms, where such items can be kept, should be incorporated into the design of the building or fit-out. These rooms should have solid blockwork walls or be reinforced with expanded metal mesh and certified door sets (to BS PAS 24). Valuable items should not be easy to remove and should be uniquely identified using an appropriate property marking system. Portable equipment should not be positioned in communal areas where there may be regular visitor access. Effective access controls within the building should assist in restricting entry of visitors and potential intruders.

2.2.16 **Theft of plant and machinery, and criminal damage during the construction period.**

To minimise the risk of offenders targeting the construction site:

- a secure boundary should be erected around the site.
- access should be restricted to contractors and authorised visitors.
- security staff should patrol during non-working hours.
- lighting and CCTV should be installed to illuminate and record activity.

at the end of the working day, plant and machinery should be arranged so as to prevent forced access onto the site; and, plant and machinery should be fitted with a tracking device.

2.3 Risk Factors - Residential

The typical security risks for a development of this nature are:

- Domestic burglary
- Criminal damage to dwellings and vehicles
- Theft of, or from, vehicles
- Bogus callers and distraction burglary
- Anti-social behaviour
- Neighbour disputes
- Theft and criminal damage during the construction period
- Unauthorised access to private spaces
- Poor maintenance of access control systems

2.4 Risk Factors - Hotels

The typical security risks for a development of this nature are:

- Burglary of hotel rooms
- Robbery to business
- Theft of personal belongings at work
- Criminal damage to property and vehicles

Copyright reserved by The Chief Constable

- Unauthorised access to buildings/private space
- Arson
- Cycle theft
- Employee theft
- Violence towards staff
- Theft and criminal damage during the construction period

2.5 Risk Factors – Bar/Restaurants

The typical security risks for a development of this nature are:


- Burglary
- Robbery to business
- Criminal damage to property
- Alcohol-fuelled violence/conflict
- Miscellaneous theft to customers
- Rowdy and inconsiderate behaviour
- Conflict of use with neighbouring venues
- Violence towards staff
- Safety of staff personal belongings
- Robbery/wounding of patrons leaving premises
- Theft and criminal damage during the construction period

Produced by Greater Manchester Police
Copyright reserved by The Chief Constable


2.6 Comparing crime rates in the neighbourhood around the site to those in Manchester and Greater Manchester

The rates below relates to crime committed within 500m of the site. England & Wales data was last recorded for January – December 2021.


Comparison of Burglary Dwelling Rates at Site (Km), Manchester, and Greater Manchester




Comparison of Wounding Rates at Site (Km), Manchester, and Greater Manchester



Comparison of Criminal Damage Rates at Site (Km), Manchester, and Greater Manchester



Comparison of Vehicle Crime Rates at Site (Km), Manchester, and Greater Manchester



2.6.1 The rate of domestic burglaries per 1000 dwellings is **91% lower** than Manchester as a whole, **89% lower** than Greater Manchester and **89% lower** than England & Wales.

2.6.2 The rate of woundings per 1000 dwellings is **32% lower** than Manchester as a whole, **7% lower** than Greater Manchester and **78% higher** than England & Wales.

2.6.3 The rate of incidents of criminal damage per 1000 dwellings is **37% lower** than Manchester as a whole, **18% lower** than Greater Manchester and **0% higher** than England & Wales.


2.6.4 The rate of incidents of vehicle crime per 1000 dwellings is **69% higher** than Manchester as a whole, **178% higher** than Greater Manchester and **237% higher** than England & Wales.

Produced by Greater Manchester Police
Copyright reserved by The Chief Constable


2.7 Domestic Burglary: Risk Analysis

The data below relates to domestic burglaries committed within 500m of the site.


Burglary dwelling – Day Range



Burglary dwelling – Time Range



Burglary Dwelling – Point of Entry



2.7.1 Day/Time Range: The risk of domestic burglary peaks on Thursday in the morning (10:00-11:00) and in the afternoon (13:00-14:00). Offenders tend to target dwellings in the morning and afternoon during the working week when they are often left empty whilst the owners are out at work, giving them the perception that they are less likely to be caught or identified.

2.7.2 Point of Entry: In the local area the following entry points and MO's have been utilised most frequently:


- In cases where the entry point has been recorded as "unknown", it is likely that the offenders has exploited insecure windows or doors.
- Smashed glazing in windows and doors.
- Forcing open secure windows and doors.

Produced by Greater Manchester Police
Copyright reserved by The Chief Constable


2.8 Burglary Risk Analysis (Hotels)

The data below relates to non-domestic burglary offences within/against hotels, recorded in the Manchester area during 2018 - 2019.


Manchester Hotel Burglary – Day Range



Manchester Hotel Burglary – Time Range



Manchester Hotel Burglary – Point of Entry



2.8.1 Day/Time Range: The risk of burglary at Manchester hotels fluctuates throughout the week, peaking on Tuesday. During the day, the risk of burglary peaks during the early hours of the morning. It is likely that offenders target hotels at these times when guests are likely to be out of their rooms or when staffing levels are likely to be lower – allowing offender's time to attempt to gain unauthorised access without being detected.

2.8.2 Point of Entry: Point of Entry: In the local area the following entry points and MO's have been utilised most frequently:


- Offenders posing as legitimate customers to gain entry before targeting insecure doors/ restricted areas.
- Opening secured doors using bodily pressure and implements to gain access.
- Exploitation of insecure doors to gain entry to hotel room.
- In cases of unknown point of entry offenders have often gained possession of the hotel room key card and accessed the room, removing personal and business property.

Produced by Greater Manchester Police
Copyright reserved by The Chief Constable


2.9 Theft Risk Analysis (Hotels)

The data below relates to thefts within/against hotels, recorded in the Manchester area during 2018 - 2019.

Hotel Theft – Day Range



Hotel Theft – Time Range




2.9.1 Day/ Time Range: The risk of theft at Manchester hotels generally increases over the weekend. It is possible that the risk increases at these times when hotels typically have more guests and the opportunity to carry out such offences is greater. However, offenders do also target hotels between Monday and Friday, when they are typically less busy, and they perceive a lower risk of being caught/challenged. The risk of theft is greatest around lunchtime and in the evening/early hours of the morning. This is when hotel restaurants, bars and gyms are likely to be at their busiest and, therefore, the opportunities to commit theft are greater. Thefts of personal property (such as mobile phones, bags and purses/wallets) are the most routinely stolen items.

Produced by Greater Manchester Police
Copyright reserved by The Chief Constable


2.10 Burglary Risk Analysis (Restaurants/Cafés)

The data below relates to non-domestic burglary offences within/against restaurants and cafés, recorded in the Manchester area during 2018-2019.


Restaurant/Cafe Burglary – Day Range



Restaurant/Cafe Burglary – Time Range



Restaurant/Cafe Burglary – Point of Entry



2.10.1 Day/Time Range: The risk of burglary at restaurants/cafes in Manchester fluctuates throughout the week, peaking on Monday, Thursday and Sunday. The risk of burglary peaks during the early hours of the morning, when premises are usually closed.


2.10.2 Point of Entry: In the majority of cases where entry points are known, offenders have entered Manchester restaurants/cafes through external doors. Doors have been forced open with bodily pressure and tools/implements and glazing within doors/windows has been smashed to gain entry. Offenders have also posed as legitimate customers before targeting insecure doors, tailgating, or using force to open internal doors to restricted areas when premises are open to the public.

Produced by Greater Manchester Police
Copyright reserved by The Chief Constable


2.11 Theft Risk Analysis (Restaurants/Cafés)

The data below relates to thefts within/against restaurants and cafés, recorded in the Manchester area during 2018-2019.

Restaurant/Cafe Theft – Day Range



Restaurant/Cafe Theft – Time Range




2.11.1 Day/Time Range: During the week, the risk of theft at Manchester restaurants/cafes peaks over the weekend. Many premises experience higher levels of attendance at the weekend than during the week. Premises are also usually open for longer at the weekend and so the opportunities for offenders to commit theft is greater. The risk of theft peaks in the afternoon and into the evening. This reflects the times when restaurants/cafes are typically at their busiest and, therefore, the opportunities to commit theft are greater. Handbags, purses/wallets and mobile phones belonging to customers are the most routinely stolen items. Offenders have also targeted.


2.12 Vehicle Crime: Risk Analysis

The data below relates to vehicle crime committed within 500m of the site.

Vehicle Crime – Day Range



Vehicle Crime – Time Range



2.12.1 Day/Time Range: The risk of vehicle crime is highest on Saturday in the evening (20:00-21:00). Offenders tend to target vehicles in the evening when they are often left unattended and out of sight of the owners for long periods of time, creating a perceived low risk opportunity for offenders.

Produced by Greater Manchester Police
Copyright reserved by The Chief Constable

3 Layout Appraisal

3.1 Proposed development

3.1.1 The Site is located in Manchester city centre. It is bounded by the Manchester Central Conference Complex and Great Northern Warehouse to the north, Albion Street to the east, the Deansgate Castlefield Metrolink station and Deansgate Locks to the south, and the Beetham Tower to the west. It extends to 1.49ha.

3.1.2 The Proposed Development will be delivered across two plots:

- Plot 2a is located immediately east of the recently completed Phase 1 building, on land partially comprising the grade II listed Castlefield Viaduct. This plot will deliver a 76-storey mixed use tower comprising a hotel (Use Class C1) with associated bar and restaurant and residential units above comprising 1, 2 and 3 bed, and penthouse apartments (Use Class C3) with associated residential amenity spaces. Secure cycle spaces, serving this and the Phase 1 building, are provided at the ground floor level. At viaduct level, a redesigned service yard for the conference centre is enclosed by a new podium structure with residents' external amenity space above. A section of the Great Bridgewater Street bridge (deck) is removed to bring light into the street below.
- Plot 2b, located at the western-most section of the Site between the viaduct and Beetham Tower, consists of a 23-storey residential building accommodating 133 affordable 1-, 2- and 3-bed apartments (Use Class C3), 133 secure cycle parking spaces, circa 200 sq m flexible commercial units (Use Class E) opening onto the viaduct, and public realm enhancements on Great Bridgewater Street.

3.2 Positive Aspects of the Proposal

The following proposed features would make a positive contribution to the prevention of crime and fear of crime.

3.2.1 The proposals will result in the redevelopment of an underutilised site, which contributes little to the vitality and viability of the neighbourhood, indeed it adds to the general feeling of insecurity in the area and the poor quality of the local environment. The redevelopment of the site is welcomed.

3.2.2 The introduction of natural daylight via the proposed lightwell above Great Bridgewater Street is welcomed. This new feature will help to reduce the appearance of a long dark tunnel, thus helping to lower any sense of anxiety and highlight the main residential entrance.

3.2.3 The redevelopment will result in a significantly lower level of vehicle crime in the neighbourhood.

3.2.4 The scheme design is of a very high quality, both visually and from a crime prevention perspective.

3.2.5 The development will help to continue to repopulate this part of the city and create activity through the day and at weekends.

3.2.6 A management presence (concierge) is particularly welcome as visible staff in the development will not only discourage offender attempts to gain entry to the scheme but also gives residents a readily accessible contact to whom they may report management issues. Such provision can help to instil confidence in residents that the development is secure and that maintenance issues will be dealt with promptly.

3.2.7 There are a significant number and of apartments within the development, which increases the likelihood of residents being from a broader age range, including young singles, older residents and families with children.

3.2.8 The proposed building plots provide further ground floor activity in the form of resident reception lobbies/Bar & restaurant space and new public realm leading to a dedicated resident and hotel entrance reception space. In-turn these uses offer good levels of activity and natural surveillance of the adjacent streets. Cycle storage is in a dedicated storage room accessed off Great Bridgewater St.

3.2.9 Resident amenity spaces provide opportunities for residents to meet and foster community relations within the development. Schemes which have good social communities are less likely to tolerate inappropriate behaviour and are more willing to challenge unfamiliar faces in the development.

Copyright reserved by The Chief Constable

3.2.10 Where ground floor amenity spaces have been located, consideration appears to have been taken through the use of external facing materials, glazing, providing good levels of activity.

3.2.11 The entrance lobbies incorporate a concierge which provides a good view of people entering each building. Entry to the stairs and lifts from the lobby should require access-controlled-operation. All visitors to the residents of the apartments will be required to enter via the concierge. Mailboxes for residents should be located within the lobby area so that regular delivery personnel do not need to be given access to the residential parts of the building.

3.2.12 The residential cycle store will be enclosed within the secure area. Ensure that each entrance/exit point is provided with access control to prevent illegitimate access.

3.2.13 Cycle stores for residents and workers are provided within the buildings. Entry to the stores must be restricted to genuine cyclists only, on application to the managers of the building. Racks within the enclosures should allow cyclists to lock the frame and both wheels.

3.2.14 There are clearly defined, entirely separate entrances into each of the different uses proposed, which reduces the opportunities for confusion and conflict and reduces the opportunities to criminals. The residential blocks and commercial units each have single access/egress points in prominent locations off the public realm, which are capable of being robustly managed to control access.

3.2.15 The central landscaped area and public realm will be well-overlooked by the proposed buildings and should benefit from legitimate activity and passive surveillance at all times of the day and night, promoting a greater sense of safety in the public realm.

3.2.16 The main entrance will be accessed via an electronic access control fob system for residents and staff. The arrangement of the lobby space is greeted and controlled via a concierge.

3.2.17 Security measures carefully incorporated into the building design can ensure the building is reasonably secure, without visibly announcing that the design was concerned about crime. The proposed development provides the opportunity to include security features built into the design and construction of the building and avoid the need for obtrusive retrofitted security measures that can increase the fear of crime.

3.3 Public Realm influences over crime patterns

3.3.1 Features of the physical environment can influence patterns criminal and anti-social behaviour. They affect potential offenders' perceptions about a possible crime site, their evaluations of the circumstances surrounding a potential crime site, and the availability and visibility of one or more witnesses, who might intervene, at or near a site. Offenders may decide whether to commit a crime in a location after they determine the following:

- How easy will it be to enter the area?
- How visible, attractive, or vulnerable do targets appear?
- What are the chances of being seen?
- If seen, will the people in the area do something about it?
- Is there a quick, direct route for leaving the location after the crime is committed?

3.3.2 Aspects of the local environment that might help to reduce the risk of crime and disorder at the site are as follows:

- being located on well-trafficked streets and overlooked by routinely occupied buildings. the site is subject to surveillance by local businesses and residents as well as passers-by on foot and in cars. The casual observations by residents and passers-by may deter some offenders.
- the site is well connected to the core of the city centre. Pedestrian routes are generally busy during the daytime, particularly that they pass along Peter Street to Deansgate, and include commercial spaces with largely 'active' frontages and regular pedestrian flows, especially during the working day.

3.3.3 There are also some features that might facilitate crime and disorder and the fear of crime, these include:

Copyright reserved by The Chief Constable

- A development in this location, is very likely to attract the interest of criminals should they become aware of it whilst going about their everyday activities. Opportunists, criminal damage to buildings, theft and vehicle crime are all likely to affect a development on this site.
- vacant buildings and plots of vacant land in the vicinity of the site sometimes attract those intent on criminal damage (e.g. smashing glazing and graffiti), burglary and theft (particularly metals).
- A site wide management strategy should work in tandem with existing and new bar/restaurant and leisure uses. Door staff should be present to monitor queues and keep them flowing when appropriate, as patrons enter and leave the premises.

3.3.4 The design and layout of the public realm surrounding the blocks should be carefully considered. It should not include any hard/soft landscaping features that may impede surveillance opportunities or foster loitering/gathering, nuisance, anti-social behaviour or misuse. The following issues should be addressed with the public realm/landscaping strategy (also see Section 4.7):

- The proposed public realm features and any changes in ground levels, with step/ramp features to accommodate them. Such features can sometimes impede surveillance opportunities and provide features that can be mis-used. These features, as well as benches and any other hard landscaping features, should be designed to deter and withstand any such treatment and to maximise surveillance opportunities of/from them.
- Public realm furniture items should be robust to sustain constant daily use and form part of the management and maintenance regime. Damaged features which are not tended to over a period of time can lead to further decline and respect for the area.
- In particular, the potential to foster nuisance and anti-social behaviour issues at night. The central public realm area will benefit from levels of footfall, activity and will rely on passive surveillance from the residential properties overlooking this area. The area must be well-lit and designed to maximise surveillance opportunities and eliminate hiding places. Any windows or doors adjacent to these areas may also need additional protection.

3.3.5 Any cycle parking areas located throughout the public realm area should be located where they can be overlooked from routinely occupied areas.

3.3.6 The long-term redevelopment of the area should seek to address and remove the concealment and shelter provided by structures and improve visual links between spaces, green spaces, bridges, buildings and adjacent streets / premises.

3.3.7 The development of this public realm space would encourage further significant pedestrian footfall in the area, with people spending longer in the area, rather than it simply being passed through as part of a journey from A to B. The aspirations of the plans also seek to extend the use of this space beyond event times.

3.3.8 Engagement at the very early RIBA stages has previously proven to afford those involved in the development the opportunity to ‘build-in’ protective measures, which often results in more aesthetically pleasing, cost-effective measures in the long-run.

Copyright reserved by The Chief Constable

4 Changes Needed and Recommendations

The following points have been identified for further consideration and would need to be addressed for Design for Security to support the proposed scheme.

4.1.1 The junctions between any newly formed traffic free/controlled pedestrianised zones and existing traffic roads should be carefully considered. Maintenance of newly installed control measure (rising bollards, lighting, gates and all access control features), should be incorporated into the management & maintenance procedures.

4.1.2 The location of the MCCC service yard, is directly underneath the landscaped terrace and building(s). This will mean that large vehicles e.g., service vehicles or production lorries will require access. This presents several risks 1) potentially a large VBIED could be detonated right under the building or 2) the supporting structure could be attacked attempting a building collapse. It is recommended that robust access control measures are put in place before vehicle entre the service area, and that blast protection is considered in the building design.

4.1.3 As the proposed public spaces and plots are developed consideration needs to be given towards external lighting. The proposals are to incorporate a lighting scheme that will distribute illumination evenly around the space without areas of shadowing or pooling and work coherently with the wider security requirements of the site such as CCTV.

4.1.4 Consideration for safe bicycle storage should be embedded within the landscape design. Short-stay cycle parking stands should be located where they can be readily observed. The location of cycle stores within proposed buildings should consider the position, inherent physical security and safety of cyclists using the facility.

4.1.5 The layout appears generally free of obstacles to vision allowing people to see and be seen within the area and maintains sight lines across the site. Planting and street furniture has been aligned to avoid creating potential hiding places and avoids blocking sight lines. However, the choice of trees and other plant species should allow some visible permeability through the canopies and foliage so that people cannot be concealed within the public spaces.

4.1.6 Street furniture and landscape features should be used to prevent unwanted parking or access onto pedestrian only surfaces. It should be very clear in which spaces, or on which streets, vehicle parking is authorised.

4.1.7 Access beyond the reception lobby should be controlled so that intruders cannot easily reach restricted parts of the building. Access to the stair core and lifts from the entrance lobby should require passage through access-controlled turnstiles or doors. The main entrance doors should be capable of being controlled remotely by reception staff if required, to prevent unauthorised access or nuisance/antisocial behaviour in / around the entrance lobbies.

4.1.8 Glazing to proposed elevations along or in close proximity to crowded pedestrian spaces/routes should incorporate laminated glass (see section 4.3 for further detail).

4.1.9 The gates (at night) and doors (all times) should be secured, and the locks activated with a programmable fob.

4.1.10 An intercom system should be installed at each gate (night-time use) and entrance doors. There should be an audio-visual link to each apartment (and concierge), to enable residents or staff to vet visitors prior to releasing the gate or door locking mechanism and allowing *bona fide* visitors entry into the development or lobby. Residents should meet visitors in the lobby areas before being escorted to the relevant apartment.

Other external doors

4.1.11 The external entrance doors to cycle stores, plant and refuse rooms should be security certified. Cycle store doors should be fitted with an electronic lock that forms part of the door certification, be self-closing and lock upon closure. The external doors to the refuse stores should also be self-closing and self-locking and include an alarm that emits an audible sound to alert the concierge that the doors are not secure. Signs should be erected within the store to indicate that these doors are to be used by contractor and management use only and not as a means to leave the buildings.

4.1.12 The cycle store doors or gates should be self-closing and self-locking. There should be distinction between residents' cycle parking and visitor/public parking within the store.

Copyright reserved by The Chief Constable

4.1.13 The entrance gates must be:

- be fitted with an electronic lock with a holding force of around 4500N.
- be self-closing and locking upon closure.

4.1.14 The communal entrance doors to the residential buildings must be:

- certified to a suitable security standard.
- be fitted with an electronic lock that forms part of the door certification.
- be self-closing and locking upon closure.

4.1.15 The gates (at night) and doors (all times) should be secured, and the locks activated with a programmable fob.

4.1.16 Means of escape doors must be security-rated and be self-closing and locking upon closure.

Internal doors

4.1.17 Doors connecting the lobbies to the respective building core must have a fob-activated, electronic lock fitted and be self-closing, locking securely upon closure.

4.1.18 The internal doors linking the refuse stores to the core should be fitted with an electronic lock, be self-closing and lock upon closure. A residents' fob, rather than a push button, should be required to exit the refuse store and return to the core.

Apartment security

4.1.19 Each apartment should be secured with a security-rated entrance door that has been fitted with a door viewer and opening limiter.

Bar/Restaurant unit

4.1.20 Shopfronts should be fitted with laminate glazing and security-certified door sets. If roller shutters are fitted, they too should be security-rated.

4.1.21 Internal or external service or escape doors should be security-rated.

4.1.22 All commercial units should include provision for a CCTV system and an intruder alarm.

4.1.23 The hours of opening of any food and beverage outlets should be limited to respect nearby residents.

CCTV

4.1.24 A CCTV system should be installed, with cameras monitoring all facades of the development as well as entrance lobbies, cycle stores, and the commercial units.

4.1.25 The residential stairs and lift cores in the blocks will require access control allowing only building staff and residents' access beyond the reception space to upper floors, in order to create a secure lobby area.

4.1.26 Due to the complex nature of the scheme in terms of the mix of uses within the development, the architecture and signage should clearly direct visitors to the appropriate apartment entrance or communal entrance door.

4.1.27 An intercom system should be installed at each gate (night-time use) and entrance doors. There should be an audio-visual link to each apartment (and concierge), to enable residents or staff to vet visitors prior to releasing the gate or door locking mechanism and allowing *bona fide* visitors entry into the development or lobby. Residents should meet visitors in the lobby areas before being escorted to the relevant apartment.

4.1.28 Post. Reception and distribution of post within the building should be considered. Incoming post and deliveries should be processed at one single point, in an area that can be easily isolated. Post rooms should not be located close to main exit routes as this could affect prompt evacuation.

Copyright reserved by The Chief Constable

5 Physical Security (Residential)

In addition to the layout issues highlighted in section 3, the following checklist (sections 4-7) forms the physical security requirements for this scheme to achieve Secured by Design accreditation if required.

5.1 Doors

- ☐ External communal access doors must be compliant with and certified to STS202 BR2 or LPS 1175 SR2. The communal entrance doors should be self-closing and secured with a multi-point electronic lock and capable of being operated via an electronic access control system, these features should be permitted under the scope of the certification.
- ☐ Arrangements for residents to admit visitors. Communal entrance and inner lobby / zone doors should be capable of being controlled by means of a video entry phone system (with the picture viewable on a phone unit, rather than on a television set) so that residents can confirm the identity of visitors before allowing them access themselves.
- ☐ Where secure lobbies are to be created, the secondary communal door must be to the same specification as the outer door - certified to BS PAS 24, STS 201 or LPS 1175 SR2, including a lock capable of being operated via an electronic access control system. The post boxes themselves should be of robust construction, with letter box apertures to a maximum size of 260mm x 40mm (incorporating anti-fishing measures). All other deliveries should be made directly to residents via the access-controlled main entrance.
- ☐ Apartment entrance doors must be compliant with and certified to BS PAS 24, STS 201 or LPS 1175 SR2. It is advised that these doors do not have fixed sidelights and are provided with door viewers instead.
- ☐ Any letterboxes within doors must be located a minimum of 400mm away from internal handle and locking hardware.
- ☐ Doors to storage / meter rooms should have 44mm solid core doors, 3 hinges, with a mortised sash lock to BS3621/8621 to allow the rooms to be secured when not in use.
- ☐ External escape-only doors (as with external doors in general) should be certified to BS PAS 24, STS 201 or LPS 1175 SR2. It is crucial that the door ironmongery is permitted for use on these doors under the security certification of the product.
- ☐ The doors to the cycle store should be compliant with and certified to BS PAS 24 or LPS 1175 SR2, or be steel gates within steel frames. These doors/gates should both be self-closing and lock securely upon closure and be accessible by a programmable fob allowing secure entry and exit.

5.2 Windows

- ☐ Windows must be compliant with and certified to BS PAS 24.
- ☐ Ground floor and easily accessible opening lights (escape requirements permitting) must be key-lockable, and have fixed/lockable opening restrictors (not releasable from the outside) limited to 100mm.

5.3 Glazing

- ☐ Glazing within the vicinity of crowded places should incorporate laminated glazing. Glazing to a height of 2400mm (or if otherwise accessible) must incorporate 6mm outer pane and at least one pane of glass with a 1.5mm PVB interlayer (e.g. 7.5mm laminated glass), or a glass rated as P4A under EN 356. The remaining pane in a double glazed unit may be toughened glass. It is recommended that glazing to elevations adjoining pubic areas or evacuation routes should also be laminated.
- ☐ All new glazing up to a height of 2400mm (or if otherwise accessible) should incorporate at least one pane of a glass rated as P4A under EN 356. The remaining pane in a double glazed unit may be toughened glass.

Copyright reserved by The Chief Constable

5.4 Alarms

☐ If an alarm is installed, then it should comply with either:

- BS EN 50131 and PD 6662 for wired systems
- BS 6799 for wireless systems

☐ If an alarm is installed, it should be linked to contacts on all external doors, and PIR detectors should cover all ground floor rooms with windows.

5.5 Access Control

☐ Access control systems should be operable by swipe card or fob, and not numeric keypads. The following doors should operate on access control:

- All external doors where regular staff access is required.
- Doors separating internal zones / lobbies
- Any internal doors to obvious high risk or controlled areas (e.g. storage / server / locker rooms)
- Cycle store

5.6 Boundaries

☐ Any courtyard apartment windows to the garden courtyard elevations of the podium that will not front onto the front garden spaces described above must be protected by defensive planting beds. They should have only small opening lights fitted with opening restrictors to avoid providing opportunities to criminals.

☐ Boundary treatments to gardens adjacent to apartments should be designed to discourage comfortably sitting on or leaning against them, which could potentially cause nuisance and intimidation to residents.

5.7 Landscaping

☐ In vulnerable locations such as entrances, parking areas and footpaths, low planting should not exceed 1000mm in height, and tree canopies should fall no lower than 2m from the ground. This is in order to allow people to see their surroundings better, make a rational choice of routes and eliminate hiding places. A maintenance agreement should stipulate that these planting dimensions would be adhered to.

☐ Loose surface materials in the publicly accessible areas of the scheme should be avoided. Small fragments of ground covering can be used as missiles against people and premises (both to gain entry and to commit criminal damage).

☐ Planting must be avoided that will aid climbing over boundary treatments. The security of fences can be compromised if trees or street furniture are placed close by

5.8 Lighting

☐ External lighting must be provided to pedestrian routes within the site in accordance with BS 5489.

☐ Dusk ‘til dawn lights, operated by photoelectric cell/daylight sensor, should be installed to all external doors (manual override is also permissible).

☐ Fittings should produce ‘white’ light, as opposed to yellow/orange light. Metal halide (or bulbs with a comparable output) should be used, as these offer superior colour rendition over alternatives such as high and low pressure sodium bulbs.

5.9 Other

☐ Meter cupboards to apartments should be located to the fronts of properties only or within a secure cupboard / room inside the block but not inside individual apartments. Smart meters are acceptable.

Copyright reserved by The Chief Constable

☐ Partition walls between flats and corridors should be of masonry construction or include reinforcement such as a layer of expanded metal mesh.

☐ Consideration should be given to use of alternatives to lead in construction and minimise the amount of metal on visible elevations of the buildings. Inspection covers should be capable of securing to reduce potential access to cabling.

6 Physical Security (Non-residential)

6.1 Doors

☐ External doors must be compliant with and certified to BS PAS 24, STS02, or LPS 1175 SR2.

☐ Sliding doors should be tested and certified to ENV 1627-30 (WK2+). If circumstances could prevent this, please consult with Design for Security.

☐ External escape-only doors (as with external doors in general) should be certified to BS PAS 24:2012, or LPS 1175 SR2. It is crucial that the door ironmongery is permitted for use on these doors under the security certification of the product.

☐ Internal doors to storage rooms should be solid core, minimum 44mm thick with a multi-point locking mechanism.

☐ Garage or sectional overhead doors must be tested and certified to LPS 1175 SR2. If circumstances could prevent this, please consult with Design for Security.

6.2 Shutters

☐ Where grilles or shutters are required for additional protection the minimum certification required is:

- LPS 1175: Issue 7 Security Rating 1
- STS 202: Issue 3, Burglary Rating 1

6.3 Windows

☐ Windows must be compliant with and certified to BS PAS 24 or BS 7950.

☐ Ground floor and easily accessible opening lights (escape requirements permitting) must be key-lockable, and have fixed/lockable opening restrictors (not releasable from the outside) limited to 100mm.

6.4 Glazing

☐ All glazing up to a height of 2400mm (or if otherwise accessible) should incorporate at least one pane of glass with a 1.5mm PVB interlayer (e.g. 7.5mm laminated glass), or a glass rated as P4A under EN 356. The remaining pane in a double glazed unit may be toughened glass.

6.5 Alarms

☐ A monitored alarm system should be installed to cover all building on the site, linked to contacts on all external doors/shutters and PIR detectors covering all ground floor areas with windows, with a signal terminating at a recognized Alarm Receiving Centre (ARC) or security control room.

6.6 Access Control

☐ Access control systems should be operable by swipe card or fob, and not numeric key pads. The following doors should operate on access control:

- All external doors where regular staff access is required.
- Doors separating internal zones / lobbies
- Any internal doors to obvious high risk or controlled areas (e.g. storage / server / locker rooms)

Copyright reserved by The Chief Constable

6.7 Lighting

- ☐ External lighting must be provided to pedestrian routes within the site in accordance with BS 5489.
- ☐ Lighting to vehicle circulation areas, service yards should be in accordance with BS 5489, and display an average lux level of 20 with a uniformity level of no less than 25%. These figures should be evidenced by a lighting layout/lux plan.
- ☐ Dusk 'til dawn lights, operated by photoelectric cell/daylight sensor, should be installed to all external doors.
- ☐ Fittings should produce 'white' light, as opposed to yellow/orange light. Metal halide (or bulbs with a comparable output) should be used, as these offer superior colour rendition over alternatives such as high and low pressure sodium bulbs.
- ☐ Lighting fixtures must not be positioned to provide climbing aids over boundary treatments. Electrical and architectural layouts should be developed together to avoid this.
- ☐ Internal lighting should be operated by detection devices which will automatically switch lights on with movement activity in each room.

6.8 CCTV

- ☐ Any CCTV system that may be used within this proposal will require certain specifications and intelligent placement of cameras to compliment the design of the development. Designers should consider the following points when planning a CCTV strategy:
- ☐ CCTV systems (and lighting that support them) require regular cleaning and maintenance to remain effective.
- ☐ Where necessary cameras that are vulnerable to damage should be protected from attack either by relocation to a higher level and using a bigger lens to achieve the view required or through the fitting of a vandal resistant housing.
- ☐ With regards to the retention of footage, the police prefer quality over quantity. The overall retention period should be dictated by what the system is designed to achieve, though it would be better to have good quality images over a 14-day period than poor ones over a 30-day period.
- ☐ Procedures for recovery of recordings are recommended to be established (e.g. trained staff / the CCTV system instruction manual to be readily available). This is to ensure that the images produced will be of an acceptable standard that will allow for identification of an individual which will stand up to scrutiny in court.
- ☐ **Acceptable Standard** - this generally requires a resolution of 720x576 pixels at a real time frame rate of 25 frames per second. (N.B. Both the camera and DVR must be capable of this – if the camera will only send low resolution images then it does not matter how high the resolution of the recording unit is).
- ☐ **Identification** – One of three levels of field of view. To identify an individual, the image must capture no less than 120% of the field of view (at least from the top of the individuals head to their knees). The remaining two levels of field of view are 'Overview' and 'Recognition', which whilst effective for observational purposes, are less likely to result in the identification of a person/offender.
- ☐ The intelligent placement of cameras helps to provide clear facial identification of individuals. Suitable locations would be: Entrances to site, external areas all around the new building and ancillary facilities, external doors including emergency egresses / hatches, access-controlled doors & cycle parking areas

7 Management & Maintenance

7.1.1 The upkeep of a development over its lifetime can be crucial to the level of security and safety within. Aspects of a development, which are left to deteriorate, have the potential to attract further crime – a process known as 'the broken window theory'. A maintenance plan should be drawn up to address issues such as:

- Litter removal
- Repair to communal areas (lighting, signage, access controls)

Produced by Greater Manchester Police
Copyright reserved by The Chief Constable

- Trimming and pruning to shrubs and trees

7.1.2 Any public open space or amenity areas not under the ownership of residents should be subject to an effective maintenance contract. This should ensure that all damage is rectified in a timely manner, and that any such space will not be detrimental to its surroundings.

8 Construction

8.1.1 Untidy sites and their surroundings can be littered with debris accessible to vandals who often use loose materials as missiles to commit crime. The client should take measures appropriate to secure their site during construction, and control pedestrian and vehicular access in to and out of the site curtilage. It is also recommended that the contractor on this scheme is a member of the 'Considerate Constructors Scheme', who has committed to be a considerate and good neighbour, as well as clean, respectful, safe, environmentally conscious, responsible and accountable.

8.1.2 Site security contractors should be SIA (Security Industry Authority) approved to ensure professional standards are adhered to (please see http://www.sia.homeoffice.gov.uk/pages/acs-intro.aspx for more details).

9 Useful References

9.1 Secured by Design (SBD)

9.1.1 Secured by Design focuses on crime prevention at the design, layout and construction stages of homes and commercial premises and promotes the use of security standards for a wide range of applications and products. To apply for Secured by Design certification for your development, visit our online application form at: http://www.designforsecurity.org/secured-by-design/sbd-accreditation/

Copyright reserved by The Chief Constable

A Contact register

Date	Contact With	Summary of Contact
22/11/23	Deloitte LLP	Scheme presentation
06/12/23	Deloitte LLP	CIS application submitted
13/12/23	Deloitte LLP	Client confirmation
11/12/23	GMP CTSA	CTSA Scheme presentation
05/01/24	DfS	Site visit
13/02/24	DfS	CIS completed & issued
16/10/24	Deloitte LLP	Revised scheme presentation
01/11/24	GMP CTSA	CTSA revised scheme presentation
13/11/24	DfS	CIS completed & issued

B Associated Documents

This report is based on the following drawings and supplementary information submitted by the applicant.

Drawing No.	Drawing Title	Date	Rev
10448-SHP-ZZ-A-B5D9-G000-XP-00-001	Existing Site Location Plan Level 00		
10448-SHP-ZZ-A-B5D9-G100-PL-01-001	Master plan Level 01 Plan		
10448-SHP-ZZ-A-B5D9-G100-PL-02-001	Master plan Level 02 Plan		
10448-SHP-ZZ-A-B5D9-G100-PL-03-001	Master plan Level 03 Plan		
10448-SHP-ZZ-A-B5D9-G100-PL-04-001	Master plan Level 04 plan		
10448-SHP-ZZ-A-B5D9-G100-PL-05-001	Master plan Level 05 plan		
10448-SHP-ZZ-A-B5D9-G100-PL-71-001	Master plan Level 71 plan		
10448-SHP-ZZ-A-B5D9-G100-PL-RF-001	Masterplan Level roof plan		
10448-SHP-ZZ-A-B5D9-G100-EL-EE-001	Master plan Est Elevation Albion Street		
10448-SHP-ZZ-A-B5D9-G100-EL-EN-001	North Elevations Bridgewater Street		
10448-SHP-ZZ-A-B5D9-G100-EL-ES-	South Elevations Trafford Street		
10448-SHP-ZZ-A-B5D9-G100-EL-EE-	West Elevations Watson Street		
10448-SHP-ZZ-A-B5D9-G100-SE-AA-	Section AA		
10448-SHP-ZC-A-B5D9-G200-PL-B1-	General Arrangement Basement plan		
10448-SHP-ZC-A-B5D9-G200-PL-00-	Ground floor plan		
10448-SHP-ZC-A-B5D9-G200-PL-01-	Level 01 plan		
10448-SHP-ZC-A-B5D9-G200-PL-02-	Level 02 plan		
10448-SHP-ZC-A-B5D9-G200-PL-03-	Level 03 plan		
10448-SHP-ZC-A-B5D9-G200-PL-04-	Level 04 plan		
10448-SHP-ZC-A-B5D9-G200-PL-TY-	Type A plan (Levels 05, 18, 31, 44 & 57)		
10448-SHP-ZC-A-B5D9-G200-PL-TY-	Type B plan (Levels 06, 19, 32, 45 & 58)		
10448-SHP-ZC-A-B5D9-G200-PL-TY-	Type C plan (Levels 07, 20, 33, 46 &		
10448-SHP-ZC-A-B5D9-G200-PL-TY-	Type D plan (Levels 08, 21, 34, 47 &		
10448-SHP-ZC-A-B5D9-G200-PL-TY-	Type E plan (Levels 09, 22 & 35)		
10448-SHP-ZC-A-B5D9-G200-PL-TY-	Type F plan (Levels 10, 23, 36 & 49)		
10448-SHP-ZC-A-B5D9-G200-PL-TY-	Type G plan (Levels 11, 24, 37 & 50)		

Produced by Greater Manchester Police
Copyright reserved by The Chief Constable

10448-SHP-ZC-A-B5D9-G200-PL-TY-I01	Type I plan (Levels 13, 26, 39 & 52)		
10448-SHP-ZC-A-B5D9-G200-PL-TY-	Type J plan (Levels 14, 27, 40 & 53)		
10448-SHP-ZC-A-B5D9-G200-PL-TY-	Type K plan (Levels 15, 28, 41 & 54)		
10448-SHP-ZC-A-B5D9-G200-PL-TY-	Type L plan (Levels 16, 29, 42 & 55)		
10448-SHP-ZC-A-B5D9-G200-PL-TY-	Type M plan (Levels 17, 30, 43 & 56)		
10448-SHP-ZC-A-B5D9-G200-PL-48-	Level 48 Plan- Intermediate plant room		
10448-SHP-ZC-A-B5D9-G200-PL-61-	Level 61 Plan		
10448-SHP-ZC-A-B5D9-G200-PL-62-	Level 62 plan		
10448-SHP-ZC-A-B5D9-G200-PL-63-	Level 63 Plan		
10448-SHP-ZC-A-B5D9-G200-PL-64-	Level 64 Plan		
10448-SHP-ZC-A-B5D9-G200-PL-65-	Level 65 Plan		
10448-SHP-ZC-A-B5D9-G200-PL-66-	Level 66 plan		
10448-SHP-ZC-A-B5D9-G200-PL-67-	Level 67 Plan		
10448-SHP-ZC-A-B5D9-G200-PL-68-	Level 68 Plan		
10448-SHP-ZC-A-B5D9-G200-PL-69-	Level 69 Plan		
10448-SHP-ZC-A-B5D9-G200-PL-70-	Level 70 Plan		
10448-SHP-ZC-A-B5D9-G200-PL-71-	Level 71 Plan		
10448-SHP-ZC-A-B5D9-G200-PL-72-	Level 72 Plan		
10448-SHP-ZC-A-B5D9-G200-PL-73-	Level 73 Plan		
10448-SHP-ZC-A-B5D9-G200-PL-74-	Level 74 Plan		
10448-SHP-ZC-A-B5D9-G200-PL-75-	Level 75 Plan		
10448-SHP-ZC-A-B5D9-G200-PL-RF-	Roof plan		
10448-SHP-RP-CP082		29/10/24	

PLEASE NOTE - In the event of any subsequent material changes to the scheme, it will be necessary for Design for Security to reassess the comments made within this report.

C CIS Version History

Version	Revisions Made	Date
A		

Copyright reserved by The Chief Constable

D Glossary

Burglary Resistance Standards

BS PAS 23-1, 1999
General performance requirements for door/window assemblies.

A performance standard for door-sets and windows, which certifies that a particular door-set is fit for purpose. Door products must also have BS PAS 24 certification.

BS PAS 24-1, 2012
General security performance requirements for door/window assemblies.

An attack test standard for door-sets and windows. This is the minimum police requirement for Secured by Design dwellings, and is also applicable to French/double doors, and sliding doors.

ENV 1627-30 (Security Ratings WK1 to WK6)
Windows, doors, shutters - Burglar resistance Requirements and classification

The classification system used in ENV 1627-30 is aimed at the commercial market and is based on five elements:

a) Resistance of glazing

b) Performance of hardware

c) Resistance to static loading

d) Resistance to dynamic loading

e) Burglary resistance by manual intervention

LPS 1175 (Security Ratings 1 to 6)
Specification for testing and classifying the burglary resistance of building components

This includes doors, shutters, garage doors and grilles typically for commercial premises and higher risk domestic premises and is acceptable to the ABI and the Police. The standard has 6 levels, 6 being the highest, with levels 1 and 2 equivalent in many respects to BS PAS 24 and BS 7950.

STS201 Issue 4: 2012
Enhanced security requirements for door-sets and door assemblies for dwellings to satisfy the requirements of PAS23 and PAS24

STS202 Issue 3: 2011
Requirements for burglary resistance of construction products including hinged, pivoted, folding or sliding door-sets, windows, curtain walling, security grilles, garage doors and shutters.

This specifies a broadly similar range of attack tools and times to those specified at the lower levels of LPS1175.

EN 356, 2000 (Ratings P1A to P8A)

Glass in building. Security glazing. Testing and classification of resistance against manual attack.

A performance standard for manual attacks on glazing. P2A is comparable to the performance of a 6.8mm laminated glass, and P4A to that of a 9.5mm laminated glass.

Commonly Used Acronyms

CIT
Cash in transit (refers to vehicles, personnel and routines).

CPTED
Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design

CRS
Crime Reduction Specialist. Sometimes known as CPO (Crime Prevention Officer)

INPT
Integrated Neighbourhood Policing Team.

PVB/PolyVinyl Butyral (Glazing interlayer)
A commonly used interlayer used in the production of laminated glass.

LPCB (Loss Prevention Certification Board)
A brand of the BRE Global (Building Research Establishment) family. The LPCB work with insurers, Government, police, designers, manufacturers, contractors and end users to develop methods of assessing performance and reliability of security products to ensure their fitness for purpose.

UKAS (United Kingdom Accreditation Service)
The sole national accreditation body recognised by government to assess, against internationally agreed standards, organisations that provide certification, testing, inspections and calibration services.

Useful Websites

Design for Security
www.designforsecurity.org

Secured by Design
www.securedbydesign.com

RIBA Product Selector
www.ribaproductselector.com

LPCB – Red Book Live
www.redbooklive.com

Crime Reduction (Home Office)
www.crimereduction.homeoffice.gov.uk

DAC (Design Against Crime) Solution Centre
www.designagainstcrime.org

Building for Life
www.buildingforlife.org
CLG (Communities and Local Government)
www.communities.gov.uk

Copyright reserved by The Chief Constable