



CRIME IMPACT STATEMENT

Plot H5, Airport City,

Chicago Avenue

Hotel - 276 No Bedrooms

FOR: MANCHESTER AIRPORT GROUP PLC

VERSION B: 17th October 2024

REFERENCE: 2024/0309/CIS/01

Greater Manchester Police

designforsecurity

Premises at Plot H5, Airport City, Chicago Avenue

2024/0309/CIS/01

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Recommendations made

The proposed development has been assessed using the principles of 'Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design' (CPTED - <http://designforsecurity.org/about/crime-prevention-through-environmental-design/>), in order to reduce the opportunities for crime, the fear of crime, and anti-social behaviour. The location and the proposed development is generally acceptable; however, hotels can attract criminal and antisocial behaviour. There are a number of recommendations made in section 3.3, including but not limited to:

- There should be a comprehensive CCTV system, particularly covering the restaurant/bar area and hotel lobby/corridors.

These measures will improve the security of the buildings, deter criminals, and alert staff to unwanted/suspicious behaviour. These measures, and those detailed in section 3.3 of this report should be implemented where possible.



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1 Visual Audit


The proposed development site can be seen on the adjacent map edged in red. The site is located within the Manchester Airport City area and forms plot H5 of the development masterplan for the area.

The site boundaries are formed by Tribe Hotel to the North, to the East by a staff surface car parking area, to the South by Chicago Avenue/Voyager House (ofices/hotel), and to the West more surface car parking.

Tribe Hotel has ben recently completed to the North of the site, and to the West of the site there is a Holiday Inn Hotel and an Ibis Hotel which have been completed within the last few years.

The site is currently tarmacked with no existing boundaries, other than temporary fencing that defines the park parking area to the East.

To the North of the site here is a new pedestrian bridge that connects the terminal to the area to the North which will be commercial developments (Plots E1, E2, E3 Of The 2018 Revised Airport City North Masterplan).



2 Crime Statistics & Analysis

All data below is based on crimes recorded between 1st September 2023 to 31st August 2024.

2.1 Crime Summary

Figure 1: Recorded Crime within 500m of Site

Domestic Burglary	Non-Domestic Burglary	Criminal Damage	Less Serious Wounding	Theft	Robbery	Serious Wounding	Theft from Motor Vehicle	Theft of Motor Vehicle	Bicycle Theft
<5	6	31	273	237	<5	<5	73	8	8

- 2.1.1 The overall rate of crime in the past 12 months is above average for the Manchester division, with less serious wounding, theft and vehicle crime having been most commonly reported. These offences have primarily occurred to the south and east of the proposed site within Manchester airport, with large hotspots at terminals 1 and 2.
- 2.1.2 Less serious woundings have occurred throughout the local area, particularly at the hotspots mentioned above where assaults, public order and possession of weapon offences have been most reported. The majority of these incidents have involved disputes between passengers and unknown associates within the airport. In cases of possession offences, offenders have been caught at airport security with weapons in their bags such as knives, knuckledusters and pepper spray.
- 2.1.3 In most cases of theft offences offenders have used pickpocketing and distraction techniques in order to remove items stored on the person such as mobile phones, wallets and purses, as well as having targeted insecure items, bags and coats left on tabletops or benches within the airport terminals and surrounding areas.
- 2.1.4 Theft from motor vehicle has been the most reported vehicle crime taking place, whereby offenders have targeted vehicles within parking facilities throughout the local area, particularly around terminal 1. Offenders have in most used objects or implements in order to smash glazing in the windows before removing items from within, as well used tools to bypass locks and remove vehicle parts/registration plates.

2.2 Common Use-Specific M.O.s (Modus Operandi)

- Offenders, posing as guests or legitimate customers, accessing staff-only/restricted areas to steal property
Possible Solution - There should be a robust access control system in place (see section 4.4) to ensure that callers to the building are vetted and/or met and escorted before being allowed entry into the building. All individual rooms should be capable of being secured when unoccupied and there should be a secure area for staff to store their belongings while at work.
- Offenders entering rooms using forged or stolen electronic key-cards/fobs or by exploiting insecure doors.
Possible Solution - Hotel bedroom doors/frames should be robust/solid core (minimum 44mm thick) and fitted with auditable access controls (i.e. VingCard or similar). Doors should have a door closer to ensure that doors cannot be left ajar accidentally by residents when they leave their room.
- Doors have been forced open with bodily pressure and tool/implements to gain entry
Possible Solution - All external doors should be certified to recognised security standards (see section 4.1), which are independently proven to reduce the risk of forced entry and thus increase the chances of detection.
- Theft of personal property from tabletops or from bags hung on chairs or stored under tables
Possible Solution – Consideration should be given to tables and chairs designed to facilitate secure storage of belongings or adapted with ‘Chelsea Clips’ (see below) to reduce the opportunities to steal bags/coats. The internal layout of the premises can also increase surveillance opportunities

and help deter offenders. It should be generally uncluttered, allowing clear views of all spaces and avoiding any pinch points or areas of concealment.


2.3 Risk Factors - Hotels

The typical security risks for a development of this nature are:

- Burglary of hotel rooms
- Robbery to business
- Theft of personal belongings at work
- Criminal damage to property
- Unauthorised access to buildings / private space
- Employee theft
- Violence towards staff
- Acts of criminal damage during the construction period

2.4 Non-Non-Domestic Burglary Hotels: Risk Analysis

The data below relates to non-domestic burglary offences within/against hotels, recorded in the Manchester area.





2.4.1 **Day/Time Range:** The risk of burglary at Manchester hotels fluctuates throughout the week, peaking on Tuesday. During the day, the risk of burglary peaks during the early hours of the morning. It is likely that offenders target hotels at these times when guests are likely to be out of their rooms or when staffing levels are likely to be lower – allowing offender's time to attempt to gain unauthorised access without being detected.

2.4.2 **Point of Entry:** In the local area the following entry points and MO's have been utilised most frequently:

- Offenders posing as legitimate customers to gain entry before targeting insecure doors/ restricted areas.
- Opening secured doors using bodily pressure and implements to gain access.
- Exploitation of insecure doors to gain entry to hotel room.
- In cases of unknown point of entry offenders have often gained possession of the hotel room key card and accessed the room, removing personal and business property.

2.5 Theft Hotels: Risk Analysis



The data below relates to thefts within/against hotels, recorded in the Manchester area.



- 2.5.1 **Day/ Time Range:** The risk of theft at Manchester hotels generally increases over the weekend with the risk of theft increasing around lunchtime and in the evening/early hours of the morning. This is when hotel restaurants, bars and gyms are likely to be at their busiest and, therefore, the opportunities to commit theft are greater. It is possible that the risk increases at these times when hotels typically have more guests and the opportunity to carry out such offences is greater. Thefts of personal property (such as mobile phones, bags and purses/wallets) are the most routinely stolen items.

2.6 Vehicle Crime: Risk Analysis

The data below relates to vehicle crime committed within 500m of the site.



- 2.6.1 **Day/Time Range:** The risk of vehicle crime is highest on Tuesday and Sunday in the early morning (05:00-06:00). Offenders tend to target vehicles at this time when it is dark with less footfall in the area and they tend to be left unattended for long periods of time, creating a perceived low risk opportunity for offenders.

- 3.3.3 Doors into hotel room corridors should only be accessible/operable by guest key card, ensuring that access can only be gained by guests of that specific area of the hotel.
- 3.3.4 Access into staff only areas should be restricted to staff. Signage should be provided so that it is clear which areas are restricted to staff, to prevent confusion being used a legitimate excuse for accessing staff only areas.
- 3.3.5 It is highly recommended that the hotel is covered with a comprehensive CCTV system.

4 Physical Security

The following checklist forms the physical security requirements for this scheme to achieve Secured by Design accreditation.

4.1 Doors

- ☐ External doors must be compliant with and certified to BS PAS 24, STS201, LPS 1175 SR2, LPS 2081 SR B, or STS 222.
- ☐ Sliding/revolving doors should be tested and certified to LPS 1175 SR2.
- ☐ Hotel bedroom doors/frames should be robust/solid core (minimum 44mm thick) and fitted with auditable access controls (i.e. VingCard or similar).
- ☐ Each bedroom should have a small wall or floor safe, operated by a personal identification number (PIN) selected by each new guest.
- ☐ External escape-only doors (as with external doors in general) should be certified to BS PAS 24, or LPS 1175 SR2. It is crucial that the door ironmongery is permitted for use on these doors under the security certification of the product.
- ☐ All doors/frames to staff areas/stores/offices should be robust/solid core (minimum 44mm thick) and fitted with auditable access controls. Staff should only be allowed access to areas required for their work. Keys/passes should only be carried if required for duties and should be accounted for at all times.

4.2 Windows & Building Fabric

- ☐ Ground floor windows must be compliant with and certified to BS PAS 24, LPS 1175 SR2, LPS 2081 SR A, STS 204, or STS 222.
- ☐ Ground floor and easily accessible opening lights (escape requirements permitting) must be key-lockable, and have fixed/lockable opening restrictors (not releasable from the outside) limited to 100mm.
- ☐ Any curtain walling panels should include laminated glazing (see below) and should be securely fixed directly to the floor slabs where possible, rather than to perimeter columns.

4.3 Glazing

- ☐ In double glazed units the inner pane should not be less than 7.5mm laminated glass (2 x 3mm glass plies with an approx. 1.5mm PVB interlayer) and the outer pane should be a minimum of 6mm toughened or 6.8mm laminated glass (2 x 3mm glass plies with an approx. 0.8mm PVB interlayer).

4.4 Access Control

- ☐ Access to first floor, and above, should be restricted to hotel residents and staff. Hotel guests should only be able to access the specific floor that they are staying on.
- ☐ Access control systems should be operable by swipe card or fob, and not numeric key pads. The following areas/doors should operate on access control:
 - Main entrances
 - External doors
 - Stairs/lifts

- Offices
- Staff only areas

4.5 Cash Office

- ☐ Storage of cash and other high value items should be within a secure room. The room should have solid walls, rather than stud partitions/similar and the ceiling should be reinforced with expanded metal mesh. The door into this room should be certified to BS PAS 24 or LPS 1175 SR2 and there should be a safe certified under LPS 1183 (the correct size and category of safe should be determined by an assessment of prospective takings and to meet insurance need) and consideration should be given to having the safe on a time delay (with appropriate signage to deter would-be offenders).

4.6 Landscaping

- ☐ In vulnerable locations such as entrances, parking areas and footpaths, low planting should not exceed 1000mm in height, and tree canopies should fall no lower than 2m from the ground. This is in order to allow people to see their surroundings better, make a rational choice of routes and eliminate hiding places. A maintenance agreement should stipulate that these planting dimensions would be adhered to.
- ☐ There should be no hard landscaping that could inadvertently create seating or loitering spots (except within secure designated or otherwise-controlled areas). These features can encourage anti-social behaviour and raise the fear of crime.

4.7 Lighting

- ☐ External lighting must be provided to pedestrian routes within the site in accordance with BS 5489.
- ☐ Fittings should produce 'white' light, as opposed to yellow/orange light. Metal halide (or bulbs with a comparable output) should be used, as these offer superior colour rendition over alternatives such as high and low pressure sodium bulbs.
- ☐ Dusk 'til dawn lights, operated by photoelectric cell/daylight sensor, should be installed to all external doors.

4.8 CCTV

- ☐ The proposed development should be covered by a comprehensive CCTV system. Individual industrial units should have the infrastructure for the easy installation of a CCTV system if required by a tenant.
- ☐ It is important that an operational requirement for CCTV is drawn up for commercial premises in accordance with their specific use and that the objectives for the CCTV system are clearly established before a tendering process is started. A useful reference to help achieve this goal is the CCTV Operational Requirements Manual 2009 ISBN 978-1-84726-902-7 Published April 2009 by the Home Office Scientific Development Branch.
- ☐ The CCTV system must have a recording format that is acceptable to the police with images of evidential quality. Staff should be sufficiently trained to operate the system and be able to make recordings available to police on request and an operational requirement must take account of this fact.
- ☐ Whilst the location of cameras is a site-specific matter it would be normal practice for the system to observe all vehicular and pedestrian entrances. Early discussions with an independent expert and potential installers can resolve a number of matters including:
 - monitoring and recording requirements
 - activation in association with the intruder alarm
 - requirements for observation and facial recognition/identification
 - areas to be monitored and field of view
 - activities to be monitored
 - the use of recorded images
 - maintenance of equipment and the management of recording

- subsequent ongoing training of operatives

- ☐ TV systems must be installed to BS EN 50132-7: CCTV surveillance systems for use in security applications.
- ☐ The CCTV system should be compatible with the existing or planned lighting system.
- ☐ CCTV systems should be registered with the Information Commissioner's Office (ICO) and be compliant with guidelines in respect to Data Protection and Human Rights legislation. Further information is available at this website: www.ico.org.uk
- ☐ For guidance on the use of CCTV images as legal evidence see BS 7958: 215 Closed circuit television (CCTV). Management and operation. Code of practice. This document provides guidance and recommendations for the operation and management of CCTV within a controlled environment where data that may be offered as evidence is received, stored, reviewed or analysed. It assists owners of CCTV systems to follow best practice when gathering information of evidential quality. Remotely monitored detector activated CCTV systems must be installed in accordance with BS 8418: 2015 Installation and remote monitoring of detector operated CCTV systems - Code of practice.

4.9 Other

- ☐ There must be no features of the building envelope which create sheltered/hiding places or ledges, which could endanger passers-by or encourage loitering.
- ☐ Any bin stores should be secure, lockable, and fire resistant enclosures. A strategy should be defined to ensure waste collection can take place whilst retaining a secure development.

5 Management & Maintenance

- 5.1.1 Comprehensive security regimes for the management of the aparthotel and the commercial units must also be prepared and remain in place for the day-to-day running of the units. There should be regular reviews/exercises to ensure that it remains accurate, workable and up to date. All staff should understand and accept the need for security measures and it should be made easy for people to raise concerns or report observations. The operating/maintenance plans should focus on issues such as:
- Opening and closing of premises, including staff arrival and departure;
 - Cash management within the premises - consideration should be given to a chute deposit safe (certified to LPS 1183) behind any bar/till area, or an alternative management practice, which would reduce the amount of cash held in tills during busy periods;
 - Cash-in-transit collections/deliveries and banking practices (which should take place in a secure room with a certified safe to meet insurance needs);
 - Management of stock deliveries (servicing activities should not require any service doors to remain open unattended for prolonged periods);
 - Details of staff security training;
 - Location and management of any smoking areas;
 - Repairing damaged external and internal fittings, particularly security features e.g. access control systems, alarm systems, CCTV cameras, lighting etc;
 - Cleaning and prompt removal of graffiti, litter etc; and
 - Refuse collection arrangements.
- 5.1.2 The opening hours of any retail units or café/restaurant premises should be consistent with other such premises in the locale and should not unduly conflict with other nearby uses. Sufficient levels of service staff should be provided at busy periods to reduce waiting times and the potential for frustration, aggression and conflict.
- 5.1.3 Any high value equipment (e.g. computers/TVs, tools etc.) should be property marked and securely fixed or stored to deter damage/theft. An accurate record should be maintained which logs all such items.

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- 5.1.4 Adequate signage should be deployed in all areas not only to direct people throughout the site and each of the premises, but also to deter unauthorised access to staff-only/back-of-house areas.
 - 5.1.5 Refuse collection arrangements should not require bins to be left accessible for extended periods. Servicing activities should also not require any service doors to remain open and unattended for prolonged periods.

6 Construction

- 6.1.1 Untidy sites and their surroundings can be littered with debris accessible to vandals who often use loose materials as missiles to commit crime. The client should take measures appropriate to secure their site during construction, and control pedestrian and vehicular access in to and out of the site curtilage. It is also recommended that the contractor on this scheme is a member of the 'Considerate Constructors Scheme', who has committed to be a considerate and good neighbour, as well as clean, respectful, safe, environmentally conscious, responsible and accountable.
- 6.1.2 Site security contractors should be SIA (Security Industry Authority) approved to ensure professional standards are adhered to (please see <http://www.sia.homeoffice.gov.uk/pages/acs-intro.aspx> for more details).

7 Useful References

7.1 Secured by Design (SBD)

- 7.1.1 Secured by Design focuses on crime prevention at the design, layout and construction stages of homes and commercial premises and promotes the use of security standards for a wide range of applications and products. To apply for Secured by Design certification for your development, visit our online application form at: <http://www.designforsecurity.org/secured-by-design/sbd-accreditation/>

A Contact register

Date	Contact With	Summary of Contact

B Associated Documents

This report is based on the following drawings and supplementary information submitted by the applicant.

Drawing No.	Drawing Title	Date	Rev
06050-5PA-B1-00-DR-A-900002	Plot H5 Airport City Manchester Site plan		
06050-5PA-B1-00-DR-A-900008	Proposed GA Section		
06050-5PA-B1-00-DR-A-900020	Proposed Ground Floor GA		
06050-5PA-B1-00-DR-A-900021	Proposed First Floor GA		
06050-5PA-B1-00-DR-A-900022	Proposed Second Floor GA		
06050-5PA-B1-00-DR-A-900023	Proposed Third Floor GA		
06050-5PA-B1-00-DR-A-900024	Proposed Fourth Floor GA		
06050-5PA-B1-00-DR-A-900025	Proposed Fifth Floor GA		
06050-5PA-B1-00-DR-A-900026	Proposed Sixth Floor GA		
06050-5PA-B1-00-DR-A-900027	Proposed Seventh Floor GA		
06050-5PA-B1-00-DR-A-900028	Proposed Eighth Floor GA		
06050-5PA-B1-00-DR-A-900029	Proposed Roof GA		
06050-5PA-B1-00-DR-A-900050	Proposed Elevations		
06050-5PA-B1-00-DR-A-900051	Proposed Elevations Cleaning and Maintenance strategy		

PLEASE NOTE - In the event of any subsequent material changes to the scheme, it will be necessary for Design for Security to reassess the comments made within this report.

C CIS Version History

Version	Revisions Made	Date
A		
B	Minor revisions	17/10/2024