CRIME IMPACT STATEMENT

Longsight Bowling Green, East Road

20 No. Houses

FOR: VIEWS

VERSION A: 26/07/2024

REFERENCE: 2024/0241/CIS/01

Greater Manchester Police

designforsecurity

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CPT
CRIME PREVENTION TEAM

Longsight Bowling Green, East Road

2024/0241/CIS/01

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Minor security improvements recommended

This development has been assessed against the principles of 'Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design' (CPTED), in order to reduce the opportunities for crime and the fear of crime.

The layout of the proposed scheme is considered acceptable, as long as the issues discussed in more detail within Section 3.3 of this report are addressed, namely:

- Boundaries should be appropriately high and robust. Rear and side boundaries that are adjacent to public space should have a masonry (or other hardwearing) base, with timber fence above.
- Access to the green space around the perimeter of the site should be restricted to residents to prevent misuse via the use of a robust fence line and/or gate.
- Where there is a communal gate providing access to multiple gardens it should be of robust construction (i.e. metal railings), self-closing, and be capable of being secured from both sides.

If these issues can be addressed as described within the report and the other physical security measures are incorporated into the proposed scope of work where appropriate, we would be happy to support the development.

Matthew Granelli

Design for Security Consultant

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1 Visual Audit

The development site is indicated by the red outline on the plan adjacent and is supported with existing site context photographs taken around the site.


The site is located in Longsight which is approximately 3km south east of Manchester city centre. The site is a rectangular shape which is occupied by a bowling green.

The vehicle access to the site is a route through Longsight Cricket Club that which is accessed from Armitage Ave.

The boundary to the east and west currently abuts the rear boundaries of the houses on Northmoor Rd and Armitage Ave. the north boundary abuts the pavement of East Rd and the south is undefined as the existing site will be split to allow for the development.

The state of the current site is secured and well maintained.

The surrounding area is predominantly residential properties.











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2 Crime Statistics & Analysis

All data below is based on crimes recorded between 1st July 2023 to 30th June 2024.

2.1 Crime Summary

Recorded Crime within 500m of Site									
Domestic Burglary	Non-Domestic Burglary	Criminal Damage	Less Serious Wounding	Theft	Robbery	Serious Wounding	Theft from Motor Vehicle	Theft of Motor Vehicle	Bicycle Theft
49	<5	74	347	43	19	8	39	20	<5

2.1.1 The overall rate of crime in the past 12 months has been above average for the Manchester division, whereby less serious wounding, criminal damage and theft have been most commonly reported. These incidents have occurred all throughout the local area in the residential neighbourhoods surrounding the site, particularly around and close to main roads such as Stockport Road and Northmoor Road.

2.1.2 Less serious wounding offences have taken place all around the local area, where assaults, harassment and public order offences have been the most reported less serious woundings occurring. The majority of incidents have involved disputes between known associates and neighbours, as well as some cases of domestic violence.

2.1.3 Criminal damage against vehicles and dwellings have accounted for the majority of criminal damage offences taking place. In most cases offenders have targeted vehicles parked on the streets and in parking facilities by using objects or implements to smash the glazing in the windows and damage the bodywork of cars, vans and buses. Offenders have also used objects to smash the glazing in the front windows and damage external doors to properties. These offences have mostly occurred during disputes.

2.1.4 Domestic burglary offences have also occurred throughout the residential areas surrounding the site. Offenders have in most used implements in order to gain access to properties via secure doors and windows.

2.2 Common Local M.O.s (Modus Operandi)

2.2.1 Using bodily pressure or implements in order to force open secure windows and doors or have been targeted when left insecure by residents.

Possible Solution - All external doors and windows should be certified to recognised security standards (see Section 4.1 & 4.2), which are independently proven to reduce the risk of forced entry and thus increase the chances of detection.

Clearly defined defensible space between dwelling frontages and the 'street' can provide a degree of separation between public and semi-private space and act as a psychological barrier to some offenders, who are more likely to feel under observation/scrutiny from the street or overlooking properties. Such boundary definitions can also reduce the risk of criminal damage and nuisance/anti-social behaviour. All private spaces to the sides/rear of dwellings should be robustly enclosed, particularly where adjacent to publicly accessible space, to deter unauthorised access (see Section 4.5). Open pedestrian routes/accessible land to the rear of the properties should be avoided. Lighting to the front and rear of dwellings can also deter and reveal potential intruders, as well as reduce the fear of crime (see Section 4.7).

2.2.2 Smashed glazing in windows or doors.

Possible Solution – All ground floor/accessible glazing should include a laminated pane, which forms a much more robust barrier against shattering and penetration (see Section 4.3). Any glazed panels in or around doors should be small and set well-away from locking points.

2.2.3 Vehicles have been targeted, particularly when parked on-street.

Possible Solution - It is essential that the development is designed so that resident vehicles are secured and overlooked. It is preferable that all houses either have the provision to garage vehicles or have in-curtilage car parking arrangements, well-overlooked from habitable room windows.

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2.3 Risk Factors

The typical security risks for a development of this nature are:


- Domestic burglary
- Theft from gardens, sheds or garages
- Criminal damage to dwellings and vehicles
- Theft of, or from, vehicles
- Bogus callers and distraction burglary
- Anti-social behaviour
- Neighbour disputes
- Theft and criminal damage during the construction period
- Unauthorised access to private spaces
- Poor maintenance of access control systems

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
2.4 Crime Rate Comparison

The rates below relates to crime committed within 500m of the site. England & Wales data was last recorded for January – December 2021.


Comparison of Domestic Burglary Rates at Site (Km), Manchester, and Greater Manchester




Comparison of Wounding Rates at Site (Km), Manchester, and Greater Manchester



Comparison of Criminal Damage Rates at Site (Km), Manchester, and Greater Manchester



Comparison of Vehicle Crime Rates at Site (Km), Manchester, and Greater Manchester



2.4.1 The rate of domestic burglaries per 1000 dwellings is **2% higher** than Manchester as a whole, **31% higher** than Greater Manchester and **35% higher** than England & Wales.

2.4.2 The rate of woundings per 1000 dwellings is **32% lower** than Manchester as a whole, **7% lower** than Greater Manchester and **77% higher** than England & Wales.

2.4.3 The rate of incidents of criminal damage per 1000 dwellings is **20% lower** than Manchester as a whole, **4% higher** than Greater Manchester and **27% higher** than England & Wales.


2.4.4 The rate of incidents of vehicle crime per 1000 dwellings is **23% lower** than Manchester as a whole, **28% higher** than Greater Manchester and **55% higher** than England & Wales.

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
2.5 Domestic Burglary: Risk Analysis

The data below relates to domestic burglaries committed within 500m of the site.


Burglary Dwelling – Day Range



Burglary Dwelling – Time Range



Burglary Dwelling – Point of Entry



2.5.1 Day/Time Range: The risk of domestic burglary peaks on Saturday in the evening (20:00-21:00). Offenders tend to target dwellings at this time when it is dark and there is less footfall in the area, giving them the perception that they are less likely to be caught or identified.

2.5.2 Point of Entry: In the local area the following entry points and MO's have been utilised most frequently:


- In cases where the entry point has been recorded as 'unknown', it is likely that the offenders has exploited insecure windows or doors.
- Smashed glazing in the windows and doors.
- Using bodily pressure or implements in order to force open secure windows and doors.

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
2.6 Vehicle Crime: Risk Analysis

The data below relates to vehicle crime committed within 500m of the site.

Vehicle Crime – Day Range



Vehicle Crime – Time Range



2.6.1 Day/Time Range: The risk of vehicle crime is highest on Wednesday in the evening (21:00-22:00) and around midnight (00:00-01:00). Offenders often target vehicles at this time when they tend to be left unattended and out of sight of the owners for long periods of time, creating a perceived low risk opportunity for offenders.

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3 Layout Appraisal

3.1 Proposed development

3.1.1 The proposal is to construct 20 no. houses, with associated parking and landscaping.

3.1.2 Part of the site will be accessed via a new route from East Road. The houses will each be served by a single off-road parking space and will each have enclosed private rear gardens and open front gardens.

3.2 Positive Aspects of the Proposal

The following proposed features would make a positive contribution to the prevention of crime and fear of crime.

3.2.1 The proposed development will provide additional activity, surveillance and overlooking to the area at all times of the day and night.

3.2.2 The proportion of the proposed houses will front onto the proposed access road, allowing for clear views of/between dwellings and parked vehicles.

3.2.3 The houses will have habitable room windows to their front, maximising surveillance opportunities over the street, parked vehicles and between dwellings.

3.2.4 The footprint of the buildings has been kept simple, with no doors hidden in deep recesses or behind building lines (where they would be vulnerable to attack).

3.2.5 The proposed houses will be served by in-curtilage parking spaces directly in front of them, allowing residents to secure/overlook their own vehicles and limiting opportunities to criminals.

3.2.6 The proposed communal side/rear access alleyways running between/to the rear of dwellings are shown to be gated at their outermost point, this prevents unauthorised access to the rear of dwellings which could be attacked unseen and ensure that anyone attempting to gain unauthorised access can be clearly seen from the street.

3.3 Changes Needed and Recommendations

The following points have been identified for further consideration and would need to be addressed for Design for Security to support the proposed scheme.

3.3.1 Currently the site plan shows a strip of green space running around the perimeter of the site, Access to this area should be restricted to residents to prevent misuse via the use of a robust fence line and/or gate.

3.3.2 Boundaries should be appropriately high and robust. Rear and side boundaries that are adjacent to public space should have a masonry (or other hardwearing) base, with timber fence above to a total height of 2100mm. It is recommended that the top 300mm consist of trellis structure. Rear boundaries adjacent secure areas can 1800mm in height.

3.3.3 Where there is a communal gate providing access to multiple gardens it should be of robust construction (i.e. metal railings), self-closing, and be capable of being secured from both sides. It should be as close to the front elevation of dwellings as possible, to prevent creating a concealed area which could potentially be exploited by offenders.

3.3.4 Front gardens should be well defined with a low boundary treatment or low-level planting (i.e. to an approximate height of 1000mm).

3.3.5 Consideration should be given to a symbolic barrier to entry at the entrance to the development, such as a change of surface texture/colour, or brick pillars, which can convey the impression that the area beyond is private and discouraging anyone without a legitimate reason from entering.

3.3.6 The proposed access road should be illuminated to adoptable standard, to reduce the potential for crime and fear of crime.

3.3.7 It is highly recommended that the proposed dwellings be built to Secured by Design standards detailed in section 4 of this report.

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4 Physical Security

The following checklist forms the physical security requirements for this scheme to achieve Secured by Design accreditation.

4.1 Doors

- ☐ Front and rear doors to dwellings must be compliant with and certified to BS PAS 24, STS201, LPS 1175 SR2, STS 202 or LPS 2081 SRB.
- ☐ Any external French/double doors or sliding doors must be compliant with and certified to BS PAS 24.
- ☐ Front doors to properties should have fixed external handles or split spindles, meaning access is only possible with a key.
- ☐ Front doors should have either fixed sidelights or door viewers.
- ☐ Chain limiters are recommended but not generally essential.
- ☐ Letterboxes within doors must be located a minimum of 400mm away from internal handle and locking hardware.

4.2 Windows

- ☐ Windows must be compliant with and certified to BS PAS 24, LPS 1175 SR2, LPS 2081 SR A, STS 204, or STS 222.
- ☐ Ground floor and easily accessible opening lights (escape requirements permitting) must be key-lockable, and have fixed/lockable opening restrictors (not releasable from the outside) limited to 100mm. Windows can be fully openable from the inside to allow ventilation of the dwellings in accordance with Approved Document O but the window restrictor must reengage when the window is closed.

4.3 Glazing

- ☐ Glazing to a height of 2400mm (or if otherwise accessible) must incorporate at least one pane of glass rated as P1A under EN 356. The remaining pane in a double-glazed unit may be toughened glass.

4.4 Alarms

- ☐ If an alarm is installed, then it should comply with either:
  - BS EN 50131 and PD 6662 for wired systems
  - BS 6799 for wireless systems
- ☐ If an alarm is installed, it should be linked to contacts on all external doors, (including internal doors into garages) and, PIR detectors should cover all ground floor rooms with windows.
- ☐ If an alarm is not to be provided, there should be a 13amp, non-switched fuse spur to allow future residents to connect an alarm.

4.5 Boundaries

- ☐ Rear boundaries should generally be 1800mm high and of close boarded timber construction. It is recommended that the top 300mm consist of trellis structure.
- ☐ Rear boundaries that are adjacent to public space should have a masonry (or other hardwearing) base, with timber fence above to a total height of 2100mm. It is recommended that the top 300mm consist of trellis structure
- ☐ Rear boundaries adjacent publicly accessible open space should have a strip of defensible planting to protect rear boundaries.
- ☐ Sub-divisional rear boundaries may be as low as 1500mm.

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- ☐ The fronts of properties should be demarcated by low boundaries such as planting and/or railings to an approximate height of 1000mm.
- ☐ Any low boundaries that adjoin high boundaries should have transition panels/sections to prevent the low boundary being used as a climbing aid over the higher.
- ☐ Gates into the rear curtilage of dwellings should be in keeping with the height of adjacent boundary treatments and incorporate either:
  - A pad lockable bolt to the midpoint of the internal face, or
  - A key operable deadlock

4.6 Landscaping

- ☐ In vulnerable locations such as entrances, parking areas and footpaths, low planting should not exceed 1000mm in height, and tree canopies should fall no lower than 2m from the ground. This is in order to allow people to see their surroundings better, make a rational choice of routes and eliminate hiding places. A maintenance agreement should stipulate that these planting dimensions would be adhered to.
- ☐ Loose surface materials in the publicly accessible areas of the scheme should be avoided. Small fragments of ground covering can be used as missiles against people and premises (both to gain entry and to commit criminal damage).

4.7 Lighting

- ☐ External lighting must be provided to the front and rear of dwellings, operated by photoelectric cell/daylight sensor (manual override is also permissible). PIR security lighting is not recommended for these locations and should not be employed unless advised.
- ☐ Fittings should produce ‘white’ light, as opposed to yellow/orange light. Metal halide (or bulbs with a comparable output) should be used, as these offer superior colour rendition over alternatives such as high- and low-pressure sodium bulbs.
- ☐ Lighting fixtures must not be positioned to provide climbing aids over boundary treatments. Electrical and architectural layouts should be developed together to avoid this.

4.8 Other

- ☐ Meter cupboards should be located to the fronts of properties only, not in the private areas.
- ☐ Any rainwater pipes should be square in profile and fixed back to the building fabric to prevent climbing to upper floor windows.

5 Management & Maintenance

5.1.1 The upkeep of a development over its lifetime can be crucial to the level of security and safety within. Aspects of a development, which are left to deteriorate, have the potential to attract further crime – a process known as ‘the broken window theory’. A maintenance plan should be drawn up to address issues such as:

- Litter removal
- Repair to communal areas (lighting, signage, access controls)
- Trimming and pruning to shrubs and trees

5.1.2 Any public open space or amenity areas not under the ownership of residents should be subject to an effective maintenance contract. This should ensure that all damage is rectified in a timely manner, and that any such space will not be detrimental to its surroundings.

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6 Construction

6.1.1 Untidy sites and their surroundings can be littered with debris accessible to vandals who often use loose materials as missiles to commit crime. The client should take measures appropriate to secure their site during construction, and control pedestrian and vehicular access in to and out of the site curtilage. It is also recommended that the contractor on this scheme is a member of the 'Considerate Constructors Scheme', who has committed to be a considerate and good neighbour, as well as clean, respectful, safe, environmentally conscious, responsible and accountable.

6.1.2 Site security contractors should be SIA (Security Industry Authority) approved to ensure professional standards are adhered to (please see http://www.sia.homeoffice.gov.uk/pages/acs-intro.aspx for more details).

7 Useful References

7.1 Secured by Design (SBD)

7.1.1 Secured by Design focuses on crime prevention at the design, layout and construction stages of homes and commercial premises and promotes the use of security standards for a wide range of applications and products. To apply for Secured by Design certification for your development, visit our online application form at: http://www.designforsecurity.org/secured-by-design/sbd-accreditation/

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A Contact register

Date	Contact With	Summary of Contact
28/06/24	Paul Butler Associates	CIS Application
28/06/24	DfS	CIS Fee Proposal
04/07/24	Paul Butler Associates	CIS Confirmation
05/07/24	DfS	Site Visit

B Associated Documents

This report is based on the following drawings and supplementary information submitted by the applicant.

Drawing No.	Drawing Title	Date	Rev
A644_SK_11A	Proposed Site Plan – Option 2		
A644_SK_20D	House Type – 3b		
A644_SK_21D	House Type – 4a		
A644_SK_22C	House Type – 4b		
A795_SK_01	Proposed Site Plan		

PLEASE NOTE - In the event of any subsequent material changes to the scheme, it will be necessary for Design for Security to reassess the comments made within this report.

C CIS Version History

Version	Revisions Made	Date
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