



CRIME IMPACT STATEMENT

114 CHAIN ROAD, BLACKLEY, MANCHESTER
5,045sqm. MULTI-USE WORSHIP CENTRE WITH
COMMUNITY FACILITIES & CAR PARKS

FOR: Winners Chapel International

VERSION A: 16/09/2024

REFERENCE: 2018/1009/CIS/01

Greater Manchester Police

designforsecurity

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Security improvements/additions required

This development has been assessed against the principles of 'Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design' (CPTED), in order to reduce the opportunities for crime and the fear of crime.

The layout of the proposed scheme is considered acceptable, as long as the issues discussed in more detail within Section 3.3 of this report are addressed, namely:

- The site should only be accessed from Chain Road/the existing access route to the south, in order to concentrate all activity/surveillance opportunities. A separate cycle/pedestrian access point from the public right of way to the west is not recommended.
- Given the site is somewhat remote/isolated, which could leave the building vulnerable to attack unseen at night/when not in use, the western and southern elevations of the building (as well as the existing large areas of landscaping) should be enclosed and secured at night to prevent unauthorised access. The recessed, partially enclosed courtyard between the two projecting arms at the front of the building also benefits from limited levels of overlooking at night and includes sheltered, undercroft areas that could foster loitering/gathering, nuisance and anti-social behaviour issues - it is also highly recommended that this space is secured at night/when not in use or the undercroft spaces are designed-out.
- The overflow car park is remote from the proposed building and benefits from little/no natural surveillance – it should be securely enclosed/gated and only utilised when required during busy periods. The main parking areas should be separated from the open space to the north, include definition/protection to the adjacent rear boundaries of the dwellings fronting onto Northridge Road, be defined by low-level railings or robust knee-rails along their frontages and have vehicular access/egress points capable of being secured at night to prevent mis-use.
- Entrance/access arrangements to prevent unauthorised access and zoning of multi-use building, so that particular floors, areas or rooms can be secured while other areas of the building are in use.

If these issues can be addressed as described within the report and the other physical security measures are incorporated, we would be happy to support the development.

Please note: Greater Manchester Police Design for Security will recommend to the local planning authority that a planning condition is added that reflects the physical security specification listed within Section 4 of this report.



Bradley Hart MTCP

Design for Security Consultant

Contents

1	Visual Audit.....	5
	1.2	
2	Crime Statistics & Analysis.....	6
	2.1 Crime Summary	
	2.2 Non-Domestic Burglary (GM Places of Worship): Risk Analysis	
	2.3 Theft (GM Places of Worship): Risk Analysis	
	2.1 Non-Domestic Burglary (GM Community Centres): Risk Analysis	
	2.2 Theft (GM Community Centres): Risk Analysis	
	2.3 Non-Domestic Burglary (M/cr Educational Facilities): Risk Analysis	
	2.4 Theft (M/cr Educational Facilities): Risk Analysis	
	2.5 Non-Domestic Burglary (Manchester Offices): Risk Analysis	
	2.6 Theft (Manchester Offices): Risk Analysis	
	2.7 Non-Domestic Burglary (Manchester Restaurants/Cafés): Risk Analysis	
	2.8 Theft (Manchester Restaurants/Cafés): Risk Analysis	
	2.9 Local Vehicle Crime: Risk Analysis	
	2.10 General Risk Factors	
	2.11 Common Use-Specific M.O.s (Modus Operandi)	
3	Layout Appraisal.....	18
	3.1 Proposed Development	
	3.2 Positive Aspects of the Proposal	
	3.3 Points for Further Consideration	
4	Physical Security	21
	4.1 Doors & Access Controls	
	4.2 Windows & Shutters	
	4.3 Glazing & Building Fabric	
	4.4 Alarm	
	4.5 Boundaries	
	4.6 Car Parks	
	4.7 Lighting	
	4.8 CCTV	
	4.9 Landscaping	
	4.10 Other	
5	Cafe Layout Guidance.....	26
6	Management & Maintenance	28
7	Construction	28
8	Useful References	29
	8.1 Secured by Design (SBD)	

Appendix

A	Contact Register	30
B	Associated Documents.....	30
C	CIS Version History	30
D	Glossary	31

1 Visual Audit

The site lies off Chain Rad in Blackley, north-east Manchester.

It is currently occupied by a number of vacant buildings that formed The Convent of the Good Shepherd, along with a Presbytery, a garage colony, hard standing access routes/parking areas and large areas of grassed/wooded landscaping. The vacant buildings and the landscaped area to the south of them have been enclosed with high welded-wire mesh fencing and gates along the access road to the north and east.

The site is accessed via a private road taken off the northern end of Chain Road. The road also serves St. Euphrasia's Care Home to the immediately north of the site, with wooded open space to the north and north-east up to the M60 motorway.




To the south of the site lies Meade Hill SEN School (which is also accessed via the route leading to the site) and Our Lady's Sports Centre. Our Lady's Roman Catholic High School and North Ridge SEN High School lie to the south-west.

To the east of the site are residential properties fronting onto Northridge Road, which back onto the open space along the eastern edge of the site and to the north of the site.

Along the western boundary of the site is a narrow, unmade/unlit vehicular/pedestrian right of way running between Our Lady's RC High School/North Ridge High School and Our Lady's Sports Centre, off Alworth Road to the south. The route links to Boothroyden Road to the west and narrows to a pedestrian-only route to the north – running underneath the M60 motorway. The site is separated from the route by high Palisade fencing and high brick walls (which have been heavily graffitied in places), along with mature vegetation.

The site is somewhat remote/isolated, accessed via a narrow route that benefits from limited levels of activity, footfall, passive surveillance and direct overlooking. It is also surrounded by open land and routes that could provide opportunities for offenders to exploit.

Open land/routes adjacent to (and particularly to the rear of) buildings and sites can often lead to nuisance and anti-social behaviour issues and secluded routes can leave legitimate users intimidated/vulnerable, particularly after dark. Adjacent properties can also often be vulnerable to unauthorised access, as they can provide easy access/escape routes that benefit from little/no natural surveillance or direct overlooking.



2 Crime Statistics & Analysis

2.1 Crime Summary

The data below is based on crime recorded between 1st September 2023 to 31st August 2024.



Figure 1: Recorded Crime within 500m of Site

Domestic Burglary	Non-Domestic Burglary	Criminal Damage	Less Serious Wounding	Theft	Robbery	Serious Wounding	Theft from Motor Vehicle	Theft of Motor Vehicle	Bicycle Theft
17	6	22	96	17	7	<5	7	5	<5

- 2.1.1 The general volume of crime in the local area is low for the Manchester division - although the study area does include large areas of open space and transport infrastructure, which lower the density of development and typically attract fewer crime and disorder incidents.
- 2.1.2 The most prevalent type of recorded crime has been less serious wounding, with the majority of offences occurring around the educational facilities and residential estates to the south of the site. Assaults, harassment and public order offences have been the most commonly reported types of less serious wounding offences – most of which have involved disputes between known associates, as well as some cases of domestic violence.
- 2.1.3 As this CIS report relates to a multi-purpose place of worship/community building, the more detailed analysis below will focus on use-specific burglary and theft.


2.2 Non-Domestic Burglary (GM Places of Worship): Risk Analysis

The data below relates to non-domestic burglary offences within/against places of worship, recorded in the Greater Manchester area 2018-2019.



- 2.2.1 **Day Range:** During the week, the risk of burglary at places of worship in Greater Manchester is greatest on Friday and Tuesday.
- 2.2.2 **Time Range:** During the day, the risk of burglary peaks in the evening and into the early hours of the morning. Offenders frequently target buildings at these times, when it is dark, streets are typically quieter than during the day and they are likely to be unoccupied, resulting in them perceiving a lower risk of being observed or identified than during daylight hours.

GM Places of Worship Burglary – Point of Entry





2.2.3 **Point of Entry:** Across Greater Manchester, the following entry points and MO's have been utilised most frequently at places of worship:

- Doors have been targeted most frequently, both to the front and rear of buildings, and have been either forced open with bodily pressure/implements or have been targeted when left insecure.
- Windows (particularly to the rear of buildings) have also been prised open or exploited when left insecure.
- The glazing within doors and windows has been smashed to gain entry.
- In cases where access has been recorded as 'unknown' or 'legitimate', it is likely that offenders have posed as legitimate users while buildings are open to access restricted/non-public areas unnoticed.

2.3 Theft (GM Places of Worship): Risk Analysis

The data below relates to thefts within/against places of worship, recorded in the Greater Manchester area 2018-2019.





2.3.1 **Day Range:** During the week, the risk of theft at Greater Manchester places of worship is greatest on Thursday, Friday and Sunday.


2.3.2 **Time Range:** The risk of theft is greatest during the afternoon and into the early evening. During the day, when the majority of places of worship are open to the public, there are more opportunities for offenders to access buildings and private areas/rooms anonymously, before targeting both personal property (such as laptops, purses, bags etc.) and property belong to the place of worship. Offenders have also targeted building materials, particularly lead flashing, copper piping and paving slabs.

2.1 Non-Domestic Burglary (GM Community Centres): Risk Analysis

The data below relates to non-domestic burglary offences within/against community centres, recorded in the Greater Manchester area 2018-2019.



- 2.1.1 **Day/Time Range:** During the week, the risk of burglary at Greater Manchester community centres remains relatively consistent, with the exception of Tuesday – when it is slightly lower. During the day, the risk of burglary peaks in the early hours of the morning and during the early evening. At night, when it is dark and streets are quiet, offenders often perceive a lower risk of being observed or detected. During the early evening, community centres are likely to be at their busiest, meaning offenders posing as legitimate patrons can attempt to gain unauthorised access to restricted areas without being noticed.





- 2.1.2 **Point of Entry:** The following entry points and M.O.s have been the occurred most frequently:

- The majority of incidents have occurred through 'unknown' entry points, which is likely to have been where offenders posing as legitimate service users have gained entry to internal restricted areas by forcing doors, by tailgating or by targeting insecure doors unnoticed.
- Doors (particularly fire doors) have been forced open with bodily pressure/implements/tools or have been targeted when left insecure to gain access.
- Windows have also been prised open and targeted when insecure.
- The glazing within doors and windows has been smashed to gain entry.
- Shutters have been forced upwards/penetrated to gain access to the doors and windows behind them.

2.2 Theft (GM Community Centres): Risk Analysis



The data below relates to thefts within/against community centres, recorded in the Greater Manchester area 2018-2019.



- 2.2.1 **Day/Time Range:** Incidents of theft at Greater Manchester community centres peak on Monday and are lowest on Tuesday. During the day, the risk of theft is concentrated in the afternoon/early evening. This aligns with the standard opening and closing times for many community centres, when more people attend them and, therefore, the opportunities for theft are greater. The most routinely targeted items are items of personal property belong to patrons and staff members, particularly laptops, mobile phones and handbags.


2.3 Non-Domestic Burglary (M/cr Educational Facilities): Risk Analysis

The data below relates to non-domestic burglary offences within/against educational facilities, recorded in the Manchester area 2018-2019.



- 2.3.1 **Day Range:** During the week, the risk of burglary at Manchester educational premises peaks on Sunday, when many are likely to be closed.
- 2.3.2 **Time Range:** The risk of burglary fluctuates throughout the day, peaking late at night and during the early hours of the morning. The opportunities for burglary often rise in the afternoon (at breaks and at the end of the school day), when large numbers of students are entering/leaving buildings, staff presence is likely to be lower and parents/carers enter school sites – providing anonymity to offenders. Offenders often target educational buildings at night when they are closed, it is dark, streets are typically quieter than during the day and they perceive a lower risk of being detected.

Manchester Education Burglary – Point of Entry




2.3.3 **Point of Entry:** At Manchester educational facilities, the following entry points and MO's have been utilised most frequently by offenders:

- Offenders have forced open doors using bodily pressure and implements/tools, smashed glazed panels within doors or targeted them when left insecure by staff.
- Windows have also been targeted, with offenders prised them open, removing the beading/glazing or smashing the glazing to gain unauthorised access.
- Where the point of entry is unknown, this is likely to have been when offenders have gained access to insecure rooms/areas unnoticed, before targeting school equipment.
- Shutters have been prised open with bodily pressure/implements to gain access to doors/windows behind them.


2.4 Theft (M/cr Educational Facilities): Risk Analysis

The data below relates to thefts within/against educational facilities, recorded in the Manchester area 2018-2019.

Manchester Educational Theft – Day Range



Manchester Educational Theft – Time Range





2.4.1 **Day Range:** The risk of theft at educational facilities in Manchester is greatest on Tuesday and is generally lower over the weekend than during the working week. The risk of crime is likely to be low at the weekend, when the majority of schools/colleges are closed or are used for limited periods by organisations/groups.


2.4.2 **Time Range:** The majority of thefts are concentrated during the school day, with offences frequently taking place during breaks, when pupils and teachers leave personal property in unlocked rooms, where they are accessible and vulnerable to theft. Mobile phones, bags and laptops are the most routinely stolen items.

2.5 Non-Domestic Burglary (Manchester Offices): Risk Analysis

The data below relates to non-domestic burglary offences within/against offices, recorded in the Manchester area 2018-2019.





- 2.5.1 **Day Range:** During the week, the risk of burglary at office premises in Manchester is greatest on Tuesday, Thursday and Sunday.
- 2.5.2 **Time Range:** During the day, the risk of burglary at Manchester office premises rises into the evening/late at night. Such premises are often targeted at these times when they are closed and unoccupied, meaning offenders can attempt to gain unauthorised access without fear of being disturbed or identified.



- 2.5.3 **Point of Entry:** The majority of burglaries at offices in Manchester have been committed through doors. Burglaries against office buildings in this area do not appear to be opportunistic, with offenders often bringing tools with them that can be used to force open doors and cut locks. Offenders have also smashed glazed panels in doors and windows to gain entry. A large proportion of burglaries have been committed through 'unknown' and 'legitimate' points of entry, which are likely to have been where offenders (posing as legitimate customers, visitors or employees) have gained unauthorised access to staff only areas (i.e. through insecure doors, tailgating etc.) to steal property.

2.6 Theft (Manchester Offices): Risk Analysis



The data below relates to thefts within/against offices, recorded in the Manchester area 2018-2019.



- 2.6.1 **Day Range:** During the week, the risk of theft at Manchester offices is greatest on Monday and Tuesday and is generally lower over the weekend (when many are shut).
- 2.6.2 **Time Range:** During the day, the risk of theft is concentrated during normal working hours – peaking around midday. During these times, many office workers will take their lunch breaks, leaving unattended property at desks or in insecure areas. Thefts can also often happen at the end of the working day, when members of staff are finishing work and premises is likely to be less secure, such as while cleaning operations are carried out.


2.7 Non-Domestic Burglary (Manchester Restaurants/Cafés): Risk Analysis

The data below relates to non-domestic burglary offences within/against restaurants and cafés, recorded in the Manchester area during 2018-2019.



- 2.7.1 **Day Range:** The risk of burglary at restaurants/cafes in Manchester fluctuates throughout the week, peaking on Monday, Thursday and Sunday.
- 2.7.2 **Time Range:** The risk of burglary peaks during the early hours of the morning, when premises are usually closed.

M/cr Restaurant/Cafe Burglary – Point of Entry




- 2.7.3 **Point of Entry:** In the majority of cases where entry points are known, offenders have entered Manchester restaurants/cafes through external doors. Doors have been forced open with bodily pressure and tools/implements and glazing within doors/windows has been smashed to gain entry. Offenders have also posed as legitimate customers before targeting insecure doors, tailgating, or using force to open internal doors to restricted areas when premises are open to the public.


2.8 Theft (Manchester Restaurants/Cafés): Risk Analysis

The data below relates to thefts within/against restaurants and cafés, recorded in the Manchester area during 2018-2019.

M/cr Restaurant/Cafe Theft – Day Range




M/cr Restaurant/Cafe Theft – Time Range



- 2.8.1 **Day Range:** During the week, the risk of theft at Manchester restaurants/cafes peaks over the weekend. Many premises experience higher levels of attendance at the weekend than during the week. Premises are also usually open for longer at the weekend and so the opportunities for offenders to commit theft is greater.
- 2.8.2 **Time Range:** The risk of theft peaks in the afternoon and into the evening. This reflects the times when restaurants/cafes are typically at their busiest and, therefore, the opportunities to commit theft are greater. Handbags, purses/wallets and mobile phones belonging to customers are the most routinely stolen items. Offenders have also targeted I.T equipment within premises, particularly tablets and laptops, as well as alcohol from storage rooms.

2.9 Local Vehicle Crime: Risk Analysis

The data below relates to vehicle crime committed within 500m of the site between 1st September 2023 to 31st August 2024.



2.9.1 **Day Range:** During the week, the risk of vehicle crime in the local area peaks on Tuesday.

2.9.2 **Time Range:** During the day, the risk peaks during the early afternoon.

2.9.3 Vehicles are often more at risk when parked on street or in open communal parking areas (rather than when parked in-curtilage of in secure parking facilities) – where they are accessible to offenders and can be remote from their owners.

2.10 General Risk Factors

2.10.1 **Places of Worship:** The typical security risks for a development of this nature are:

- Burglary
- Theft of user/staff belongings
- Other theft from premises
- Theft of/from parked cars
- Unauthorised access to non-public areas
- Criminal damage to property and vehicles
- Arson
- Violence towards staff and other users
- Cycle security
- Theft and criminal damage during the construction period

2.10.2 **Community Centres:** The typical security risks for a development of this nature are:

- Burglary
- Cash robbery
- Unauthorised access to private spaces
- Tailgating
- Employee theft
- Theft of customer and staff property
- Criminal damage to property
- Loitering groups/anti-social behaviour
- Cycle security
- Theft

- Other theft from premises
- Theft of/from parked cars
- Arson
- Violence towards staff and other users
- Theft and criminal damage during the construction period

2.10.3 **Educational Facilities:** The typical security risks for a development of this nature are:

- Burglary
- Criminal damage to property and vehicles
- Unauthorised access to buildings and non-public areas
- Anti-social behaviour/loitering groups (particularly out-of-hours)
- Internal theft
- Theft of staff/pupil belongings
- Cycle theft
- Bullying
- Staff, pupil and parent safety
- Acts of criminal damage during the construction period

2.10.4 **Offices:** The typical security risks for a development of this nature are:

- Burglary
- Violence towards staff
- Theft of personal belongings at work
- Criminal damage to property and vehicles
- Unauthorised access to buildings/private space
- Arson
- Cycle theft
- Employee theft
- Theft of/from parked vehicles
- Theft and criminal damage during the construction period

2.10.5 **Restaurants & Cafes:** The typical security risks for a development of this nature are:

- Burglary
- Robbery to business
- Criminal damage to property
- Alcohol-fuelled violence/conflict
- Miscellaneous theft to customers
- Rowdy and inconsiderate behaviour
- Conflict of use with neighbouring venues
- Violence towards staff
- Safety of staff personal belongings
- Robbery/wounding of patrons leaving premises
- Theft and criminal damage during the construction period

2.11 Common Use-Specific M.O.s (Modus Operandi)

2.11.1 Having looked at the crime data for the surrounding area and the proposed uses, the most frequent M.O.s used by offenders when targeting Greater Manchester places of worship/community centres and Manchester educational facilities/offices/cafes are listed below, along with suggested measures to reduce the risk of them being utilised at the proposed development:

- **GM Places of Worship, GM Community Centres, M/cr Educational Facilities, M/cr Offices & M/cr Restaurants/Cafes:** Doors have been targeted most frequently, both to the front and rear of buildings, and have been either forced open with bodily pressure/implements or have been targeted when left insecure. Windows (particularly to the rear of buildings) have also been prised open or exploited when left insecure.

Possible Solution - All external doors and windows should be certified to recognised security standards (see Sections 4.1 & 4.2), which are independently proven to reduce the risk of forced entry and thus increase the chances of detection. It may be necessary for more vulnerable doors or windows to be fitted with security-certified shutters, bars, grilles or perforated metal/polycarbonate panels, in order to provide some additional protection (see Section 4.2). Good use of perimeter boundaries (see Section 4.5, lighting (see Section 4.7) and CCTV (see Section 4.8) can deter criminals from attempting entry by discouraging access to vulnerable areas and increasing the chances of them being seen by security personnel or passers-by.

- **GM Places of Worship, GM Community Centres & M/cr Offices:** The glazing within doors and windows has been smashed to gain entry.

Possible Solution – All ground floor/accessible glazing (including in and around doors) should include a laminated pane (see Section 4.3), which forms a much more robust barrier against shattering and penetration. The strength of the laminated glass should be relative to the strength of the door or window system in which it is fitted. Where possible, the size of any glazed elements within/directly adjacent to doors should be reduced and set well away from locking points. Any particularly vulnerable glazed windows or doors should also be secured with security-certified shutters out-of-hours (see Section 4.2).

- **GM Places of Worship & GM Community Centres:** In cases where access has been recorded as 'unknown' or 'legitimate', it is likely that offenders have posed as legitimate users while buildings are open to access restricted/non-public areas unnoticed.

Possible Solution – The main entrance to the building and all internal areas/rooms restricted to staff and officials should operate on an access control system, to restrict unauthorised entry. All individual rooms should be capable of being secured when unoccupied and there should be a secure area for staff/officials to store their belongings while at the premises.

- **GM Community Centres, M/cr Educational Facilities:** Shutters have been forced upwards/penetrated to gain access to the doors and windows behind them.

Possible Solution - Roller shutters can appear secure in that they are difficult to penetrate, however physical security products are only as strong as their weakest component. A security-certified shutter (see Section 4.2) has an independently proven level of resistance, and ensures that all aspects of the shutter (locks, rails, laths etc.) have been scrutinised by professionals. If external shutters are used, the shutter boxes and guides should be built into the fabric of the building if possible to deter tampering/attack.

- **M/cr Educational Facilities:** Offenders have gained access to insecure rooms/areas unnoticed, before targeting school equipment

Possible Solution – There should be robust access control systems in place to ensure that visitors to the building are vetted and/or met and escorted before being allowed access to all areas. All visitors should report to reception for vetting before gaining further access into the school. Reception staff should be given flexibility over permitting access into the building at different times of the day. Effective access controls within the buildings should assist in restricting entry to vulnerable areas.

-
- **M/cr Educational Facilities:** Theft of insecure property belonging to students and staff
Possible Solution - All individual rooms should be capable of being secured when unoccupied and there should be secure areas for staff to store their belongings while at work. Staff-only areas/rooms should not be accessible to students. Students should also be encouraged to keep items of value with them or store them securely in lockers.
 - **M/cr Offices:** Offenders posing as legitimate customers/visitors to gain access and steal items of personal property
Possible Solution – There should be robust access control systems in place to ensure that callers to the office building are vetted and/or met and escorted before being allowed access into them (see Sections 4.1). All individual rooms should be capable of being secured when unoccupied and there should be secure areas for staff to store their belongings while at work. All staff should understand and accept the need for security measures and should be trained to be vigilant and to report any suspicious behaviour.
 - **M/cr Restaurants/Cafes:** A high number of burglaries are recorded as having 'legitimate' or 'unknown' entry points. This is likely to have been where offenders have posed as legitimate customers before targeting restricted/back-of-house areas (such as staff rooms, stock rooms etc.) unnoticed
Possible Solution – There should be a secure area for staff to store their belongings while at work and all staff-only, back-of-house areas should be secured to prevent unauthorised public access (see Section 4.1).
 - **M/cr Restaurants/Cafes:** Theft of personal property from table tops or from bags hung on chairs or stored under tables
Possible Solution – Consideration should be given to tables and chairs designed to facilitate secure storage of belongings or adapted with 'Chelsea Clips' to reduce the opportunities to steal bags/coats (see Section 5). The layout of any bars/restaurants/lounges can also help deter occurrences and increase surveillance opportunities. It should be generally uncluttered, allowing clear views of all spaces and avoiding any pinch points or areas of concealment. External seating areas should be enclosed to clearly define them as separate from adjacent pedestrian routes.

3 Layout Appraisal

3.1 Proposed Development

- 3.1.1 The proposal is to demolish the existing convent buildings and erect a large two storey worship centre with community facilities and associated parking and landscaping.
- 3.1.2 The site will be accessed via Chain Road to the south, with the existing route widened. The proposed building will be located approximately where the existing convent buildings are located with a bus drop off area in front of it and parking areas to the east (comprising of 12 no. accessible spaces, 20 no. staff spaces and 149 no. visitors spaces along the rear of the existing properties fronting onto Northridge Road) and south of the site (comprising of 26 no. overflow spaces to the south of Meade Hill School). The existing woodland landscaped area to the south of the building will be retained.
- 3.1.3 The building itself will feature two projecting arms to its frontage, forming a partially enclosed landscaped entrance space (with hard landscaping and benches). Rain Gardens and similar hard landscaping/benches will also be located along the southern elevation of the building, along with covered cycle shelters. The main element of the building will house a large entrance foyer and a 1,500 seater chapel auditorium with ancillary rooms at ground (including consulting and counselling rooms, hospitality and ordinance rooms, a medical room, stores and W/Cs) and first floor levels (including baptismal room, tech/media rooms and stores). The northern arm at the front of the building will house a wellness centre/gym, a bookshop and a restaurant/café at ground level (all with their own external entrances off the central landscaped courtyard) and office accommodation for the church and statutory bodies at first floor level. The southern arm will include a multi-purpose hall/youth development centre, a children's church/day nursery (with classrooms and ancillary spaces for toddlers, 3-4 year olds and 5-7 year olds) and a community development/CSR office at ground floor level, with a teens church (featuring junior and senior teens halls and classrooms/ancillary spaces for 8-10 year olds and 11-12 year olds) at first floor level.

3.2 Positive Aspects of the Proposal

The following proposed features would make a positive contribution to the prevention of crime and fear of crime.


- 3.2.1 The proposed development will bring additional activity and surveillance to the area at all times of the day and, likely, into the evening.
- 3.2.2 The wide range of uses within the building will likely mean that it will be occupied/in use more frequently, increasing the levels of legitimate activity and surveillance and deterring criminal activity.
- 3.2.3 The principal entrances to the building will be in a prominent position and will be capable of being clearly seen from the bus drop off area and some of the parking areas.
- 3.2.4 The glazed façades of the front arms of the building offer both surveillance opportunities and a greater level of artificial light onto the surrounding public realm.
- 3.2.5 The proposed parking areas will be visible from the access route and from the building to some degree, allowing some overlooking/natural surveillance opportunities. The parking areas will also be laid out in straight rows, with relatively few obstacles to views across them, further aiding surveillance opportunities.
- 3.2.6 There will be separate external entrances serving some of the different uses within the building, reducing the opportunities for confusion and conflict and reducing the opportunities for criminals to exploit. Internally, the building will be capable of being 'zoned' to prevent unauthorised access to each of the uses when required.
- 3.2.7 The proposed development provides the opportunity to include security features built into the design/construction of the scheme. Security measures carefully incorporated into the design/specification of the scheme can ensure it is reasonably secure, without visibly announcing that the design was concerned about crime.

3.3 Points for Further Consideration

The following points have been identified for further consideration and would need to be addressed for Design for Security to support the proposed scheme.

3.3.1 The site should only be accessed from Chain Road/the existing access route to the south. This will concentrate all vehicular, pedestrian and cycle movement to/from the site in one location, maximising activity and surveillance opportunities. The access road should be well-lit (see Section 4.7), as wide as possible, with clear views of and along it. It is understood that a separate cycle/pedestrian access point from the public right of way to the west is being considered. We would highly recommend such a route is not included, which could be exploited by offenders as an unseen access/escape route.

3.3.2 The site is somewhat remote/isolated, which could leave the building vulnerable to attack unseen at night/when not in use. The northern elevation of the building will be overlooked to some degree by the care home to the immediate north, but it is highly recommended that the western and southern elevations of the building are enclosed within secure fencelines/gates to prevent unauthorised access (see illustration opposite and Section 4.5 for more information), as well as the existing large areas of landscaping (as they are at present). These areas could be accessed through the building or through gates opened during operational hours, but secured at night to prevent the areas from fostering loitering/gathering, nuisance and anti-social behaviour issues and protect the more hidden windows, doors and building fabric from attack unseen. The recessed, partially enclosed courtyard between the two projecting arms at the front of the building also benefits from limited levels of overlooking at night and includes sheltered, undercroft areas (underneath the projecting first floor and roof terrace) that could foster loitering/gathering, nuisance and anti-social behaviour issues. It is also highly recommended that this space is enclosed with an ornate boundary treatment/gates that are left open during operational hours but are secured at night/when not in use (again, see illustration opposite and Section 4.5 for more information). Alternatively, the undercroft spaces could be designed-out.



3.3.3 The overflow car park lies to the south of the site (beyond Meade Hill School), remote from the proposed building and where it benefits from little/no natural surveillance. This car park is likely to be irregularly used (except during very busy periods), is likely to leave parked vehicles isolated/vulnerable to attack unseen and could be mis-used if left publicly accessible when not in regular use. It is therefore highly recommended that the overflow car park is enclosed with welded-wire mesh fencing and gates (see Section 4.5) and is only accessible/usable when required during busy periods. When in use, it should be well-lit (see Section 4.7) and covered by CCTV (see Section 4.8), ideally monitored from within the building so that there can be an immediate response to any issues recorded. Similarly, the proposed staff/visitor parking areas to the east of the site will be somewhat remote from the building, which could leave the parked vehicles vulnerable. Care should be taken to ensure the existing trees/vegetation between the car park and the building do not impede surveillance of and from the parking areas, which should be separated from the open space to the north to deter access and escape to/from this direction (see illustration above & Section 4.5 for more information). The adjacent rear boundaries of the dwellings fronting onto Northridge Road should be defined by secure fencing and protected by low-level defensive planting to deter casual access, damage and scaling and the street frontages of the parking areas should be defined by low-level railings or robust knee-rails, with the vehicular access/egress points capable of being secured with a vehicle arm barriers or retractable bollards when the building is not in use, to prevent mis-use of the car parks out-of-hours.

-
- 3.3.4 The proposed building will have numerous uses and facilities, frequented by a large numbers of visitors and a wide range of user groups and staff. This can provide opportunities for criminals to legitimately and anonymously enter the building and target vulnerable areas. It is highly recommended that there is a staffed reception desk within the main foyer space at ground floor level so that, at least during busy periods, staff can greet and direct visitors to the building and clearly overlook everyone entering/exiting the building through the main entrances. In addition to this, the building should be capable of being 'zoned' (see Section 4.1 for more information), to prevent unauthorised access to areas/floors of the building that are not being used when other parts of the building are. Access controls should be incorporated to prevent unauthorised access to the staff offices and any other staff-only/secure areas or rooms (see Section 4.1). The day nursery/children's church facilities should be robustly managed and controlled to ensure that parents/guardians are vetted/accompanied before being allowed access. All individual rooms must be capable of being secured when unoccupied.
- 3.3.5 The proposed external seating area should be immediately adjacent to the café and must be set-out and managed effectively to deter mis-use, crime and anti-social behaviour from occurring (see Section 5). It should be enclosed and defined as separate from the pedestrian footway/public realm by barriers/planters, to ensure that pedestrians cannot pass too close-by to the tables/chairs. The layout of the tables/chairs should be configured so that they are not located directly adjacent to the barriers, where it would be easy reach over and steal any items of value. Removable items of furniture etc. should be stored internally within the building when not in use.
- 3.3.6 It is essential that all of the physical security measures listed below are incorporated into the scheme. Integrated, risk-commensurate security measures aim to place secure physical barriers or surveillance in the path of the criminal – making crime harder to commit and raising the risk of detection and possible capture, as well as promoting a feeling of safety in users.

4 Physical Security

The following checklist forms the physical security requirements for this scheme to achieve Secured by Design accreditation.

4.1 Doors & Access Controls

- ☐ All external doorsets should be compliant with and certified to BS PAS 24, STS 202 or LPS 1175 SR2+. It is crucial that the door ironmongery to any external escape-only doors is permitted under the security certification of the product. All escape-only doors should be alarmed (audible upon opening) and designed without visible external ironmongery. Security-certified louvred doorsets are also available if required to plant rooms or refuse stores (see <https://www.securedbydesign.com/member-companies/accredited-product-search-for-SBD-approved-suppliers>).
- ☐ The main entrance doorsets to the building should be secured with a multi-point electronic lock permitted as part of the certification, capable of being secured and operated remotely by staff at the reception desk or within a security office if/when required (e.g. during quiet times or when classes/events for specific groups are being hosted).
- ☐ The external entrance doorsets to the staff offices and the day nursery should also be secured with a multi-point electronic lock permitted as part of the certification, controlled by staff key-fob/card and by means of a video access control system linked to an office reception or a nursery staff base, allowing office staff to vet visitors before allowing them access or nursery staff to vet parents/guardians before allowing them access/to collect children. The internal doors off the first floor office waiting area should also be access controlled to ensure all visitors are met and escorted.
- ☐ All internal entrances off the ground floor/first floor foyer areas to each of the uses within the building (i.e. to the chapel and ancillary facilities, the multi-purpose hall/youth development centre, the children's church, plant areas, teens church and staff rooms/offices) should be solid core (FD30 or higher), self-closing/locking, with 3 hinges and an electronic lock operated by staff key card/fob, in order to prevent unauthorised access if/when required.
- ☐ All doors/frames to individual rooms, classrooms, offices and stores within the building should be solid core (min. 44mm thick), with 3 hinges and a manual deadlock or an electronic lock operated by staff key card/fob, so that they can be secured when unoccupied. Any cash rooms and any other rooms containing valuable equipment (such as audio/visual equipment, computers etc.) should have solid masonry walls, no adjacent false/suspended ceilings and a security-certified doorset (i.e. to BS PAS 24).
- ☐ Any electric locking system to be used throughout the building should be fully auditable (i.e. allows the retention of data, such as who accessed where and when), to allow for a better investigation into any incidents. Cards/fobs should be capable of being easily and quickly activated/disabled to ensure that mis-use is prevented. Staff should only be allowed access to areas required for their work and keys/passes should only be carried if required for duties and should be accounted for at all times. The use of numeric keypads is not advised, as codes can be easily observed or shared and are rarely changed.

4.2 Windows & Shutters

- ☐ Windows should be compliant with and certified to BS PAS 24 or LPS 1175 SR2 where possible. All other window designs/dimensions should take account of the requirements of the above standards, as certified products can carry dimensional restrictions. Any curtain walling panels should include laminated glazing (see below) and should be fixed with a secure glazing retention system (e.g. with security glazing tape, with a dedicated security sealant/gasket or a secure mechanical fixing system from the glazing retention tests within the BS PAS 24 or LPS 1175 standards).
- ☐ Any ground floor/accessible opening lights (escape requirements permitting) should be lockable and have fixed/lockable opening restrictors (not releasable from the outside) limited to 100mm.

- ☐ If any shutters are to be installed, they should be tested and certified to LPS 1175 SR2 (or SR1 if perforated laths are required) and installed in accordance with manufacturer's instructions. Ideally, any external shutters should have shutter-boxes and guides built into the fabric of the building – where they would be less vulnerable to attack and less visually intrusive.

4.3 Glazing & Building Fabric

- ☐ All ground floor/accessible glazing should incorporate at least one pane of glass with a 1.5mm PVB interlayer (e.g. 7.5mm laminated glass), or a glass rated as P4A under EN 356. The remaining pane in a double glazed unit may be toughened glass.
- ☐ There should be a block work wall (or material of similar strength e.g. welded-steel mesh) behind any cladding to the building, to a minimum height of 2000mm from external ground level, to ensure that the fabric of the building itself is not vulnerable to attack.
- ☐ There should be no features of the building (such as projecting window cills or brickwork features, canopies, exposed rainwater down pipes etc.) or nearby hard/soft landscaping features (such as nearby boundaries, retaining walls, trees, lighting columns, handrails etc.) that may provide climbing aids up to upper floor windows or onto terraces.
- ☐ The balustrades to any first floor terraces should be fixed flush with the outer skin of the terrace/brickwork below, leaving no steps/gaps that could provide a climbing aid. The windows, doors and glazing to any such terraces should be to the same physical security standards as those at ground level (see Sections 4.1, 4.2 & 4.3).
- ☐ It is recommended that any glazed elevations of the building are protected by anti-ram bollards or hard landscaping features.
- ☐ Consideration should be given to an anti-graffiti coating to any large expanses of blank walls (e.g. such as 'easy-on' protective coating, please see www.urbanhygiene.com for more information) that prevent it from adhering to the surface. If the surface is defaced, it can then be easily and quickly removed.


4.4 Alarm

- ☐ A monitored alarm system should be installed to cover the entire building, linked to contacts on all external doors and PIR detectors, with a signal terminating at a recognized Alarm Receiving Centre (ARC) or security control room.

4.5 Boundaries

- ☐ The landscaping areas to the west and south of the building should be enclosed with railings or welded-wire mesh fencing and gates to a height of 2400mm (please see <https://www.securedbydesign.com/member-companies/accredited-product-search> for a list of Police approved perimeter security suppliers) - see Section 3.3 for illustration. The existing high Palisade fencing and high brick wall along the public right of way route to the west of the site should be retained and repaired where required. It is also highly recommended that the recessed, partially enclosed courtyard between the two projecting arms at the front of the building is enclosed with 2400mm high ornate railings and gates out-of-hours.
- ☐ The remote overflow car park should be enclosed/secured with 2100mm high welded-wire mesh fencing and vehicular gates when not in use.
- ☐ The rear boundaries of the dwellings fronting onto Northridge Road (along the eastern edge of the proposed main car park) should be defined by 2100mm high welded-wire mesh fencing or double-skinned close-boarded timber fencing (with no horizontal elements that could aid climbing) and protected by low-level defensive planting (formed by densely branched/thorny shrubs, mature when planted) to protect them from damage, scaling and penetration. The car park should also be separated from the open space to the north by 2100mm high welded-wire mesh fencing (see Section 3.3 for illustration). The street frontages of the main parking areas should be defined by low-level railings (e.g. 1200mm) or robust knee-rails and defensive planting beds and the vehicular access/egress points should be capable of being secured with vehicle arm barriers or retractable bollards when the building is closed, to prevent unauthorised vehicular access and mis-use of the car park out-of-hours.

- ☐ Care should be taken to ensure that fencing panels are fixed securely to the posts (preventing tampering/removal) and that any level changes do not inadvertently facilitate climbing or leave large gaps underneath the panels/gates. There should be no centrally located horizontal bars to aid climbing and the gates should be located away from other climbing aids, such as low walls, streetlights, trees etc. Exposed hinges and large sliding bolt apertures/locking points should be avoided, or fitted with shrouding/protective plates (see opposite for example) to avoid the creation of footholds. The gap at the bottom of any gates should be small enough to stop anyone crawling through. Any release mechanism on the internal side of any pedestrian gates required to provide emergency egress should not be capable of being reached/operated from the external face of the fenceline/gate.



- ☐ The site boundary treatments should ideally be positioned on hard standing ground. Where this is not possible, ground conditions should be reviewed as extra measures may be required to create a secure boundary. Care should also be taken to ensure there are no trees/branches or any other hard landscaping features (such as street furniture, lighting columns etc.) immediately adjacent and on the publicly accessible side of any secure boundaries that could be used as a climbing aid to scale the fencing. Any such features should be pruned or removed where possible. Any existing lighting columns immediately adjacent to new fencelines may need to be fitted with anti-climb collars.
- ☐ Any low boundaries/hard landscaping features that adjoin high boundaries should have transition panels/sections, in order to prevent them from being used as a climbing aid over the higher perimeter fencing/gates.

4.6 Car Parks

- ☐ Lighting to all parking areas should be in accordance with BS 5489, with an average lux level 20 and a uniformity level of no less than 25%.
- ☐ The surface of the car parks should be even concrete/tarmac. The integrity of the surface treatment should be maintained to ensure that there is no loose material that can be used to commit crime.
- ☐ Bays and directional markings should be clearly demarcated to avoid confusion or conflict, with pedestrian routes/directions clearly signed.
- ☐ Traffic calming measures should be incorporated to limit the speed of vehicles within the site.

4.7 Lighting

- ☐ External lighting must be provided to all access roads/pedestrian routes within the site, in accordance with BS 5489.
- ☐ Dusk 'til dawn lights, operated by photoelectric cell/daylight sensor, should be installed to all external doors and any undercroft areas.
- ☐ Fittings should produce 'white' light, as opposed to yellow/orange light. LED or bulbs with a comparable output should be used, as these offer superior colour rendition over alternatives such as high and low pressure sodium bulbs.
- ☐ Lighting fixtures must not be positioned to provide climbing aids over boundary treatments. Electrical and architectural layouts should be developed together to avoid this.

4.8 CCTV

Any CCTV system that may be used within this proposal will require certain specifications and intelligent placement of cameras to compliment the design of the development. Designers should consider the following points when planning a CCTV strategy:

- ☐ CCTV systems (and lighting that support them) require regular cleaning and maintenance to remain effective.
- ☐ Where necessary cameras that are vulnerable to damage should be protected from attack either by relocation to a higher level and using a bigger lens to achieve the view required or through the fitting of a vandal resistant housing.

- ☐ With regards to the retention of footage, the police prefer quality over quantity. The overall retention period should be dictated by what the system is designed to achieve, though it would be better to have good quality images over a 14-day period than poor ones over a 30-day period.

- ☐ Procedures for recovery of recordings are recommended to be established (e.g. trained staff / the CCTV system instruction manual to be readily available). This is to ensure that the images produced will be of an [acceptable standard](#) that will allow for [identification](#) of an individual which will stand up to scrutiny in court.

Acceptable Standard - this generally requires a resolution of 720x576 pixels at a real time frame rate of 25 frames per second. (N.B. Both the camera and DVR must be capable of this – if the camera will only send low resolution images then it does not matter how high the resolution of the recording unit is).

Identification – One of three levels of field of view. To identify an individual, the image must capture no less than 120% of the field of view (at least from the top of the individuals head to their knees). The remaining two levels of field of view are [overview](#) and [recognition](#), which whilst effective for observational purposes, are less likely to result in the identification of a person/offender.

- ☐ The intelligent placement of cameras helps to provide clear facial identification of individuals. Suitable locations would be: [all external entrances](#), [all facades of the building](#), [all external and internal circulation areas \(particularly the ground and first floor foyer areas\)](#) and [all parking areas/cycle stores](#). It is highly recommended that the CCTV system covering the car parks is capable of being monitored by staff within the building, so there can be an immediate response to any incidents being recorded.

4.9 Landscaping

- ☐ Any landscape features (hard or soft) to any public realm areas should not impede natural surveillance of/from the building or reduce the effectiveness of lighting (see Section 4.7) or any CCTV system (see Section 4.8).
- ☐ In vulnerable locations such as around entrances, building facades, parking areas and along pedestrian routes, low planting should not exceed approx. 1000mm in height and tree canopies should fall no lower than approx. 2000mm from the ground. This is in order to allow people to see their surroundings better, make a rational choice of routes and eliminate hiding places. A maintenance agreement should stipulate that these planting dimensions would be adhered to. Loose surface materials in publicly accessible areas of the scheme should be avoided. Small fragments of ground covering can be used as missiles against people, premises and parked vehicles (both to gain entry and to commit criminal damage).
- ☐ The design of any proposed hard landscaping features, such as any steps, ramps or benches, should be designed to withstand and discourage the potential for mistreatment or damage (e.g. from climbing, vandalism, skateboarding etc.). Any such features should be reduced in number to the minimum practicable and should be located where surveillance and overlooking opportunities are maximised, where they would not be publicly accessible out-of-hours.
- ☐ The robust management of any landscaped spaces is essential to encourage active use and enjoyment, whilst making abuse less likely to occur. Poor management and maintenance can lead to a downward spiral of neglect and loss of environmental quality, encouraging nuisance, vandalism and other anti-social or criminal behaviour. If signs of disorder (such as criminal damage, graffiti, littering etc.) are not repaired/removed immediately, they can often attract further abuse.
- ☐ Planting must be avoided that will aid climbing over boundary treatments. The security of fences can be compromised if trees or street furniture are placed close by.

4.10 Other

- ☐ Any proposed secure cycle store building for the use of officials/staff should be of robust masonry construction, secured with a self-closing/locking security-certified doorset to BS PAS 24, STS 202 or LPS 1175 SR2 operated by staff key car/fob or key and containing 'Sheffield' style stands. Alternatively, secure cycle parking should be provided in individual secure lockers (for example [Diamond Rated Secure Cycle Lockers UK Wide | BikeAway Warrior Cycle Lockers](#)), which are also covered by CCTV (see above). Any cycle parking area for public use should be located where it can be well-overlooked from within the building and should also include 'Sheffield' stands, which both wheels and the crossbar can be locked to rather than just the crossbar (wheel slots and butterfly racks are not suitable). Ideally, there should be no open shelters provided, which may foster loitering/gathering, nuisance and anti-


social behaviour. Alternatively, they could be provided in areas that are secured at night. For further information refer to our cycle storage guidance document: <http://designforsecurity.org/downloads>.

- ☐ Any external bin store should be a secure, lockable and fire resistant enclosure. A strategy should be defined to ensure waste collection can take place whilst retaining a secure development.
- ☐ Any high value equipment should be property marked and securely fixed or stored to deter damage/theft. An accurate record should be maintained which logs all such items.
- ☐ Any lockers must be robust/secure and all users/staff should be encouraged to use them and not leave belongs unattended.

5 Cafe Layout Guidance

The internal layout of the café premises should be carefully considered, so as to maximise surveillance over customers and reduce the opportunities for criminals to exploit. It is highly recommended that the following good practice principles are adopted where applicable, so as not to undermine the security of the building shell.

- 5.1.1 The main entrance to the premises must be effectively managed at busy periods to control numbers, ensure safe access/egress and avoid potential conflicts arising.
- 5.1.2 Customers entering/leaving the premises through the main entrance should be easily observed by staff. Staff should also have clear views of any W/Cs to monitor their use.
- 5.1.3 The internal layout of premises should be generally uncluttered with few places for concealment, allowing staff to monitor customer behaviour. The precise arrangement of internal furnishings should aid circulation and aim to achieve a balance between intimacy and visibility.
- 5.1.4 Consideration should be given to a high/wide service counter, which increase the distance between staff and any potentially aggressive patrons and aid surveillance of all parts of the premises. Tills should be positioned away from customers' reach, but preferably fronting towards customers. Casual access to the rear of any service counter should be prevented (e.g. with lockable hatches that cannot be easily scaled).
- 5.1.5 Consideration should be given to a chute deposit safe (certified to LPS 1183) behind any bar/till area, or an alternative management practice, which would reduce the amount of cash held in tills during busy periods.
- 5.1.6 All back-of-house/staff areas should not be publicly accessible and there should be a secure area for staff to store their belongings whilst at work.
- 5.1.7 It is highly recommended that any customer tables are fitted with Chelsea Clips, to reduce the opportunities for theft (see below).



- 5.1.8 The following measures should be adopted for any external seating area serving the café:
 - Any external seating areas should be clearly defined as separate from the pedestrian footway by screens, barriers or planters.
 - Tables and chairs, as well as any removable canopies, heaters or screens/barriers should be stored within the premises out-of-hours, in order to prevent damage or mis-use and prevent the space from fostering loitering/gathering, nuisance and anti-social behaviour when the premises are closed. Any awnings should also be retracted out-of-hours.
 - Consideration should be given to tables and chairs designed to facilitate secure storage of belongings or adapted with 'Chelsea Clips' (see above) to reduce the opportunities to steal bags/coats.
 - The layout of any external tables/chairs should be configured so that, as much as possible, they are not located directly adjacent to barriers where it would be easy reach over and steal any items of value. All external seating areas should be capable of being clearly overlooked from internal staff positions.

-
- The success of any external seating areas is largely dependent on the effective management of the space, particularly at peak times. Staff should closely monitor customer use/behaviour and should regularly clear away used crockery/cutlery to prevent theft or mis-use.

6 Management & Maintenance

- 6.1.1 A comprehensive security regime for the management of the site/building must be prepared and remain in place for the day-to-day running of the site. It should include issues such as:
- Opening and closing of the site/building, including staff arrival and departure;
 - Access-control procedures;
 - Any cash management within premises;
 - Management of any deliveries (servicing activities should not require any service doors to remain open unattended for prolonged periods); and
 - Details of staff security training.
- 6.1.2 The upkeep of a development over its lifetime can be crucial to the level of security and safety within. Aspects of a development, which are left to deteriorate, have the potential to attract further crime – a process known as ‘the broken window theory’. A maintenance plan should be drawn up to address issues such as:
- Litter/graffiti removal
 - Repair to communal areas (lighting, signage, access controls, CCTV etc.)
 - Frequent physical checks of all perimeter fencing to check for evidence of breaches
 - Trimming and pruning to shrubs and trees
- 6.1.3 There should be regular reviews/exercises to ensure that security regimes and maintenance plans remain accurate, workable and up-to-date. All staff should understand and accept the need for security measures and it should be made easy for people to raise concerns or report observations.
- 6.1.4 Adequate signage should be deployed in all areas not only to direct people throughout the site/building, but also to deter unauthorised access to staff-only/back-of-house areas.
- 6.1.5 Public toilets can give rise to problems and the following issues should be considered:
- Fittings should be flush to avoid tampering and concealed cisterns, pipe work etc. should be used.
 - Graffiti and vandal resistant materials, such as stainless steel, laminates and plastics should be considered.
 - Consider hanging cubicle doors as outward opening as this will aid gaining access in an emergency. An alternative measure is to reduce toilet doors in size by a minimum of 200mm from the floor and to reduce the top height.
 - Provide ‘Chelsea Clip’/karibina style hooks on the back of cubicle doors or partitions for bags and coats.
 - Consider the safety of vending machines. Cash boxes can be tampered with, consider fitting them with alarms.
 - Consider setting out a rota and putting notices in toilet facilities that make users aware that regular checks will be carried out. A built in visited/checked chart should be provided.

7 Construction

- 7.1.1 Untidy sites and their surroundings can be littered with debris accessible to vandals who often use loose materials as missiles to commit crime. The client should take measures appropriate to secure their site during construction, and control pedestrian and vehicular access in to and out of the site curtilage. It is also recommended that the contractor on this scheme is a member of the ‘Considerate Constructors Scheme’, who has committed to be a considerate and good neighbour, as well as clean, respectful, safe, environmentally conscious, responsible and accountable.
- 7.1.2 Site security contractors should be SIA (Security Industry Authority) approved to ensure professional standards are adhered to (please see <http://www.sia.homeoffice.gov.uk/pages/acs-intro.aspx> for more details).

8 Useful References

8.1 Secured by Design (SBD)

- 8.1.1 Secured by Design focuses on crime prevention at the design, layout and construction stages of homes and commercial premises and promotes the use of security standards for a wide range of applications and products. To apply for Secured by Design certification for your development, visit our online application form at: <http://www.designforsecurity.org/secured-by-design/sbd-accreditation/>

A Contact Register

Date	Contact With	Summary of Contact
21 st August 2024	MOJO Architects	Receipt of CIS instruction form & plans
23 rd August 2024	MOJO Architects	Quote issued
28 th August 2024	MOJO Architects	Confirmation of instruction/fee & receipt of additional info
16 th September 2024	MOJO Architects	Email sent re: report completion & payment
30 th September 2024	GMP Finance Dept	Confirmation of payment

B Associated Documents

This report is based on the following drawings and supplementary information submitted by the applicant.

Drawing No.	Drawing Title	Date	Rev
-	Site Location Plan	-	-
23040-MOJO-01-00-DR-A-900000	Existing Site Plan	19/08/2024	P01
23040-MOJO-01-ZZ-DR-A-900001	Proposed Site Plan	19/08/2024	P04
23040-MOJO-01-00-DR-A-900002	Proposed Ground Floor Plan	19/08/2024	P01
23040-MOJO-01-00-DR-A-000002	Proposed GA – Level 00	19/08/2024	P05
23040-MOJO-01-01-DR-A-000002	Proposed GA – Level 01	19/08/2024	P05
23040-MOJO-01-02-DR-A-000002	Proposed GA – Roof Level	19/08/2024	P02
	Proposed Elevations	28/08/2024	P01
-	Security Markup Sketch	-	-

PLEASE NOTE - In the event of any subsequent material changes to the scheme, it will be necessary for Design for Security to reassess the comments made within this report.

C CIS Version History

Version	Revisions Made	Date
A		

D Glossary

Burglary Resistance Standards

BS PAS 24

General security performance requirements for door/window assemblies.

An attack test standard for doorsets and windows. This is the minimum police requirement for Secured by Design dwellings, and is also applicable to French/double doors, and sliding doors.

BS EN 1627 (Security Ratings RC1 to RC6)

Windows, doors, shutters - Burglar resistance Requirements and classification

The classification system used in BS EN 1627 is aimed at the commercial market and is based on five elements:

- a) Resistance of glazing*
- b) Performance of hardware*
- c) Resistance to static loading*
- d) Resistance to dynamic loading*
- e) Burglary resistance by manual intervention*

LPS 1175 (Security Ratings 1 to 6)

Specification for testing and classifying the burglary resistance of building components

This includes doors, shutters, garage doors and grilles typically for commercial premises and higher risk domestic premises and is acceptable to the ABI and the Police. The standard has 6 levels, 6 being the highest, with levels 1 and 2 equivalent in many respects to BS PAS 24 and BS 7950.

STS 201

Enhanced security requirements for doorsets and door assemblies for dwellings to satisfy the requirements of PAS 24

STS 202

Requirements for burglary resistance of construction products including hinged, pivoted, folding or sliding doorsets, windows, curtain walling, security grilles, garage doors and shutters.

This specifies a broadly similar range of attack tools and times to those specified at the lower levels of LPS 1175.

BS EN 356 (Ratings P1A to P8A)

Glass in building. Security glazing. Testing and classification of resistance against manual attack.

A performance standard for manual attacks on glazing. P2A is comparable to the performance of a 6.8mm laminated glass, and P4A to that of a 9.5mm laminated glass.

Commonly Used Acronyms

CIT

Cash in transit (refers to vehicles, personnel and routines).

CPTED

Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design

CRS

Crime Reduction Specialist. Sometimes known as CPO (Crime Prevention Officer)

INPT

Integrated Neighbourhood Policing Team.

PVB/PolyVinyl Butyral (Glazing interlayer)

A commonly used interlayer used in the production of laminated glass.

LPCB (Loss Prevention Certification Board)

A brand of the BRE Global (Building Research Establishment) family. The LPCB work with insurers, Government, police, designers, manufacturers, contractors and end users to develop methods of assessing performance and reliability of security products to ensure their fitness for purpose.

UKAS (United Kingdom Accreditation Service)

The sole national accreditation body recognised by government to assess, against internationally agreed standards, organisations that provide certification, testing, inspections and calibration services.

Useful Websites

Design for Security

www.designforsecurity.org

Secured by Design

www.securedbydesign.com

RIBA Product Selector

www.ribaproductselector.com

LPCB – Red Book Live

www.redbooklive.com

Crime Reduction (Home Office)

www.crimereduction.homeoffice.gov.uk

DAC (Design Against Crime) Solution Centre

www.designagainstcrime.org

Building for Life

www.buildingforlife.org

CLG (Communities and Local Government)

www.communities.gov.uk