

CRIME IMPACT STATEMENT

Plot 9B, First Street

Purpose Built Student Accommodation (861 No. Bedrooms)

FOR: VITA MEADOWS LTD

VERSION B: 18/12/2024

REFERENCE: 2024/0208/CIS/01

Greater Manchester Police

designforsecurity

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CPT
CRIME PREVENTION TEAM

Plot 9B, First Street

2024/0208/CIS/01

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Recommendations Made

This development has been assessed against the principles of 'Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design' (CPTED - http://designforsecurity.org/about/crime-prevention-through-environmental-design/), in order to reduce the opportunities for crime and the fear of crime. The proposed residential development is suitable for this area, which has a number of similar developments proposed in the local area. Further consideration should be given to the following points:

- A visually permeable fence line installed next to the bicycle store, to maintain visibility and reduce loitering.
- The main entrance into the development should be capable of being operated on an access control system so that access can be restricted when the reception area is not staffed or out of hours.
- The buildings should be built to Secured by Design standards to ensure a high level of security is achieved.

Additionally, there are a number of recommendations made in section 3.3 of this report which would enhance the security of the development and it is highly recommended that these are considered for the proposed development. GMP will seek the inclusion of a planning condition requiring the development to achieve Secured by Design accreditation.

Matthew Granelli

Design for Security Consultant

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1 Visual Audit

The proposed development site can be seen on the adjacent map, edged in red.


The site is located on the outskirts of Manchester city centre.

The site is located on the junction of Medlock Street and Hulme Street and is rectangular with the above roads forming the West and South boundaries respectively. The North and East boundaries currently fall within the First Street development, which will be developed into an access road and the extension of First Street respectively.

The site is currently undergoing major developments on the surrounding plots. With the footprint of 9b being used for storage and site accommodation.

Access and egress into the site is located on River Street. The boundary around the entire First Street development is formed of a mixture of temporary weld mesh metal hording and solid wooden boarding.


The surrounding buildings are mixture of commercial and residential developments. As a result, it benefits from good levels of natural surveillance and overlooking.











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2 Crime Statistics & Analysis

All data below is based on crimes recorded between 1st September 2023 to 31st August 2024.

2.1 Crime Summary

Recorded Crime within 500m of Site									
Domestic Burglary	Non-Domestic Burglary	Criminal Damage	Less Serious Wounding	Theft	Robbery	Serious Wounding	Theft from Motor Vehicle	Theft of Motor Vehicle	Bicycle Theft
26	39	123	531	198	43	14	227	18	30

2.1.1 The overall rate of crime over the past 12 months has been high for the Manchester division, with less serious wounding, vehicle crime and theft having been the highest recorded offences taking place. These types of crime are typical of those experienced in or within close proximity of district, town or city centres where there is often a higher concentration of retail, commercial and licensed premises, leading to a higher number of crime and disorder issues. Whilst the offences are occurring throughout the local area, centre there is a higher concentration occurring to the northwest of the proposed site towards Deansgate, and to the northeast at locations around to Oxford Road.

2.1.2 Less serious woundings have taken place throughout the local area, particularly at the hotspots mentioned above where assaults, harassment and public order offences have been the most reported less serious woundings taking place. Offences have mostly occurred during the late evening and early hours of the morning, with incidents involving disputes between both known and unknown associates in public spaces, bars and restaurants, as well as some cases of domestic violence.

2.1.3 Theft from motor vehicle has been the most reported vehicle crime taking place, whereby offenders have targeted vehicles parked on the streets and within parking facilities throughout the local area. Offenders have used implements in order to smash glazing in the windows of cars and vans before removing items from within, as well has having used tools to remove vehicle parts and registration plates.

2.1.4 Theft offences have also occurred all throughout the area surrounding the site, particularly at the hotspots at Deansgate tram stop and Oxford Road Train Station. Offenders have used pickpocketing and distraction techniques in order to obtain items stored on the person such as mobile phones, purses and wallets, as well as targeting insecure items (mostly mobile phones and bags) left on or under tables in bars and restaurants or benches in public spaces. There have also been cases of parcels being stolen from communal areas of apartment buildings.

2.2 Common Local M.O.s (Modus Operandi)

2.2.1 Smashed glazing in windows and doors.

Possible Solution – All ground floor/accessible glazing should include a laminated pane, which forms a much more robust barrier against shattering and penetration (see Section 5.3). Any glazed panels in or around doors should be small and set well-away from locking points.

2.2.2 Using bodily pressure or implements in order to force open secure windows and doors or have been targeted when left insecure by residents.

Possible Solution – All external doors and windows should be certified to recognised security standards (see Section 4.1 & 4.2), which are independently proven to reduce the risk of forced entry and thus increase the chances of detection. The communal entrance doors should be self-closing and locking, thus reducing the opportunity of them being left insecure.

All individual apartments should also be secured with a robust entrance doorset (see Section 4.1), to ensure that any offender who may have gained access to the building (e.g. by tailgating, posing as a legitimate visitor etc.) cannot gain further access without drawing the attention of other residents. Doors off internal corridors should not be located in deep recesses, where an offender could operate without fear of detection.

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2.2.3 Posing as a legitimate resident and gaining access to communal areas of apartment buildings by tailgating residents and via insecure doors.

Possible Solution – A robust access control system should be in place to allow residents to vet visitors to the building before allowing them access (see Section 4.1). The main communal entrance should be located in a highly visible position and should be well-lit to deter offenders from trying to gain unauthorised access. Consideration could also be given to 'airlock' lobby system, which features a secondary entrance door that only releases when the external door has closed, reducing the opportunities for tailgating unnoticed.

2.3 Risk Factors

The typical security risks for a development of this nature are:


- Domestic burglary
- Theft from gardens, sheds or garages
- Criminal damage to dwellings and vehicles
- Theft of, or from, vehicles
- Bogus callers and distraction burglary
- Anti-social behaviour
- Neighbour disputes
- Theft and criminal damage during the construction period
- Unauthorised access to private spaces
- Poor maintenance of access control systems

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
2.4 Crime Rates Comparison

The rates below relate to crime committed within 500m of the site. England & Wales data was last recorded for January – December 2021.


Comparison of Domestic Burglary Rates at Site (Km), Manchester, and Greater Manchester




Comparison of Wounding Rates at Site (Km), Manchester, and Greater Manchester



Comparison of Criminal Damage Rates at Site (Km), Manchester, and Greater Manchester



Comparison of Vehicle Crime Rates at Site (Km), Manchester, and Greater Manchester



2.4.1 The rate of domestic burglaries per 1000 dwellings is **83% lower** than Manchester as a whole, **78% lower** than Greater Manchester and **78% lower** than England & Wales.

2.4.2 The rate of woundings per 1000 dwellings is **67% lower** than Manchester as a whole, **55% lower** than Greater Manchester and **15% lower** than England & Wales.

2.4.3 The rate of incidents of criminal damage per 1000 dwellings is **58% lower** than Manchester as a whole, **45% lower** than Greater Manchester and **34% lower** than England & Wales.


2.4.4 The rate of incidents of vehicle crime per 1000 dwellings is **12% lower** than Manchester as a whole, **45% higher** than Greater Manchester and **77% higher** than England & Wales.

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
2.5 Domestic Burglary: Risk Analysis

The data below relates to domestic burglaries committed within 500m of the site.


Burglary Dwelling – Day Range



Burglary Dwelling – Time Range



Burglary Dwelling – Point of Entry



2.5.1 Day/Time Range: The risk of domestic burglary is highest on Tuesday and Saturday just after midnight (00:00-01:00). Offenders tend to target dwellings late at night when it is dark and there is less footfall in the area, giving them the perception that they are less likely to be caught or identified.

2.5.2 Point of Entry: In the local area the following entry points and MO's have been utilised most frequently:


- In cases where the entry point has been recorded as 'unknown', it is likely that the offender has exploited insecure windows or doors.
- Doors and windows have also been forced open with bodily pressure/implements.
- Glazing has been smashed within doors and windows to gain entry.

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
2.6 Vehicle Crime: Risk Analysis

The data below relates to vehicle crime committed within 500m of the site.

Vehicle Crime – Day Range



Vehicle Crime – Time Range



2.6.1 Day/Time Range: The risk of vehicle crime is highest on Saturday in the evening (19:00-20:00). Offenders often target vehicles at this time when they tend to be left unattended and out of sight of the owners for long periods of time, creating a perceived low risk opportunity for offenders.

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3 Layout Appraisal

3.1 Proposed development

3.1.1 The proposal is to development a 33-storey tower for up to 861 no. purpose-built rooms for student accommodation. The ground floor of the building will offer residents a bike store, refuse store, laundry room and a gym. The bike store is externally accessed from the rear only. The ground floor will also have a parcel room, which will be located behind the reception area.

3.1.2 The study and communal areas are on the ground floor. With smaller rooms for group study on the ground and first floor. A quiet study room is located on the first floor.

3.2 Positive Aspects of the Proposal

The following proposed features would make a positive contribution to the prevention of crime and fear of crime.

3.2.1 The scale of the building will generate significant residential activity in the area which typically deters offenders and those antisocially minded from operating.

3.2.2 The main entrance into the site is taken from the comer of First Street and Hulme Street in a highly visible location. The site entrance is overlooked by the staff office – which will allow staff to view those entering the site.

3.2.3 The reception desk is located in close proximity to the main entrance, allowing staff to easily vet those entering the building.

3.2.4 There will be a bicycle store for residents/staff. The parcel store will be positioned internally which will afford a high level of security to items stored within.

3.2.5 The presence of staff on site will keep a close eye on the management of the facility.

3.2.6 The majority of the proposed bedrooms will be provided well-above street level, meaning that residents' possessions cannot be easily observed and unauthorised entry is more effectively prevented. This also reduces the potential impacts of excessive noise, nuisance and anti-social behaviour (particularly at night).

3.2.7 There will be a deliveries room/parcel store located in the lobby area, allowing secure delivery and retrieval of parcels.

3.3 Changes Needed and Recommendations

The following points have been identified for further consideration and would need to be addressed for Design for Security to support the proposed scheme.

3.3.1 Sheltered areas can generate antisocial behaviour, due to opportunities of being concealed from view and shelter from the weather to the detriment of residents/staff. It is recommended that the fence line that covers the cycle store entrances are made of material that allows clear view to the other side. If the fence line obscures the view to the entrance, then the cycle store entrance should be fitted with a view panel so users can look out to check the exit is clear of groups. The entrance to the cycle store should be illuminated to a high standard and covered by monitored CCTV which can be viewed by staff in either case.

3.3.2 The main entrance into the development should be capable of being operated on an access control system so that access can be restricted when the reception area is not staffed or out of typical visiting hours, such as late in the evening and during the night. Access from main lobby/reception area into residential areas of the building should be restricted with an access control system, restricting access to residents, staff, and legitimate visitors. Use of the lifts should be restricted to staff/residents, operating on an access control system, or the lift lobby on each floor should have an access control door.

3.3.3 The development should be covered with a comprehensive CCTV system. Coverage should be provided of all external spaces, external doors, reception/lobby area, cafe/multipurpose space and study spaces.

3.3.4 External communal access doors must be compliant with and certified to BS PAS 24, STS202, or LPS 1175 SR2, including a lock capable of being operated via an electronic access control system. The communal entrance doors should be self-closing and secured with a multi-point electronic lock operating

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with an electronic access control system, these features should be permitted under the scope of the certification.

3.3.5 There should be a secondary access-controlled door into the circulation cores of the building to reduce the potential for tailgating.

3.3.6 Access to each floor should only be permitted to residents of that floor.

3.3.7 Doors into cycle store should operate on an access control system, operated with resident's key card/fob. Access into cycle stores should be restricted to genuine users rather than every resident of the building/block.

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4 Physical Security

The following checklist forms the physical security requirements for this scheme to achieve Secured by Design accreditation.

4.1 Doors

- ☐ External communal access doors must be compliant with and certified to BS PAS 24, STS201, or LPS 1175 SR2. The communal entrance doors should be self-closing and secured with a multi-point electronic lock and capable of being operated via an electronic access control system, these features should be permitted under the scope of the certification. There should be no unrestricted trade access into the building.
- ☐ Where secure postal rooms are to be created, the entrance door must be certified to BS PAS 24, STS201, or LPS 1175 SR2, including a lock capable of being operated via an electronic access control system.
- ☐ To reduce the potential for tailgating there should be a minimum of 2 no. access control door sets before reaching the circulation core / residential corridors.
- ☐ Apartment entrance doors must be compliant with and certified to BS PAS 24, STS201, or LPS 1175 SR2. Apartment entrance doors must have a door viewer.
- ☐ External escape-only doors (as with external doors in general) should be certified to BS PAS 24, or LPS 1175 SR2. It is crucial that the door ironmongery is permitted for use on these doors under the security certification of the product.

4.2 Windows

- ☐ Windows must be compliant with and certified BS PAS 24, LPS 1175 SR2, LPS 2081 SR A, STS 204, or STS 222.
- ☐ Ground floor and easily accessible opening lights (escape requirements permitting) must be key-lockable and have fixed/lockable opening restrictors (not releasable from the outside) limited to 100mm.
- ☐ If shutters are installed, they must be tested and certified to STS 202 or LPS 1175 SR2 (or SR1 if perforated laths are required) and installed in accordance with manufacturer's instructions.

4.3 Glazing & Building Fabric

- ☐ Glazing to a height of 2400mm (or if otherwise accessible) must incorporate at least one pane of glass with a 1.5mm PVB interlayer (e.g. 7.5mm laminated glass), or a glass rated as P4A under EN 356. The remaining pane in a double-glazed unit may be toughened glass.
- ☐ Any curtain walling panels should include laminated glazing and should be securely fixed directly to the floor slabs where possible, rather than to perimeter columns.
- ☐ There should be a block work wall or material of similar strength (e.g. welded-steel mesh) behind or within any new cladding/insulated panels to the building, to a minimum height of 2000mm from ground level, to ensure that the fabric of the building itself is not vulnerable to attack.

4.4 Alarms

- ☐ If an alarm is installed, then it should comply with either:
  - BS EN 50131 and PD 6662 for wired systems.
  - BS 6799 for wireless systems.

4.5 Access Control

- ☐ Access control systems should be operable by swipe card or fob, and not numeric keypads. The following areas/doors should operate on access control:

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- Building Entrance.
- Communal areas / Study rooms.
- Circulation cores.
- Lobby door on each floor.
- Bicycle store.
- Refuse store.
- Parcel room and any other staff only rooms.

4.6 Bicycle Parking Areas

☐ Doors into the cycle parking area(s) must be certified to BS PAS 24, STS202, or LPS 1175 SR2, the doors should be self-closing and have a lock capable of being operated via an electronic access control system, with access restricted to registered residents (i.e. genuine bicycle owners).

☐ Cycle stands should either be U-profile or Sheffield style stands. If rack storage is used it should be possible for both wheels and the frame to be secured.

4.7 Boundaries / Fencing

☐ There should be no fencing that could inadvertently create hidden areas or loitering spots. These features can encourage anti-social behaviour and raise the fear of crime.

4.8 Lighting

☐ External lighting must be provided to pedestrian routes within the development in accordance with BS 5489. Lighting should be taken from a variety of sources and levels (i.e. columns, up lighting) to provide a greater level of coverage and avoid shadows/pooling.

☐ Fittings should produce ‘white’ light, as opposed to yellow/orange light. Metal halide (or bulbs with a comparable output) should be used, as these offer superior colour rendition over alternatives such as high and low pressure sodium bulbs.

☐ Dusk ‘til dawn lights, operated by photoelectric cell/daylight sensor, should be installed to all external doors, including the entrance to the bike store and the refuse store.

☐ Elevations of the building should be illuminated.

4.9 CCTV

☐ Any CCTV system that may be used within this proposal will require certain specifications and intelligent placement of cameras to compliment the design of the development. Designers should consider the following points when planning a CCTV strategy:

☐ CCTV systems (and lighting that support them) require regular cleaning and maintenance to remain effective.

☐ Where necessary cameras that are vulnerable to damage should be protected from attack either by relocation to a higher level and using a bigger lens to achieve the view required or through the fitting of a vandal resistant housing.

☐ With regards to the retention of footage, the police prefer quality over quantity. The overall retention period should be dictated by what the system is designed to achieve, though it would be better to have good quality images over a 14-day period than poor ones over a 30-day period.

☐ Procedures for recovery of recordings are recommended to be established (e.g. trained staff / the CCTV system instruction manual to be readily available). This is to ensure that the images produced will be of an acceptable standard that will allow for identification of an individual which will stand up to scrutiny in court.

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☐ **Acceptable Standard** - this generally requires a resolution of 720x576 pixels at a real time frame rate of 25 frames per second. (N.B. Both the camera and DVR must be capable of this – if the camera will only send low resolution images, then it does not matter how high the resolution of the recording unit is).

☐ **Identification** – One of three levels of field of view. To identify an individual, the image must capture no less than 120% of the field of view (at least from the top of the individuals head to their knees). The remaining two levels of field of view are 'Overview' and 'Recognition', which whilst effective for observational purposes, are less likely to result in the identification of a person/offender.

☐ The intelligent placement of cameras helps to provide clear facial identification of individuals.

4.10 Other

☐ Any public open space or amenity areas not under the ownership of residents should be subject to an effective maintenance contract. This should ensure that all damage is rectified in a timely manner, and that any such space will not be detrimental to its surroundings.

5 Management & Maintenance

5.1.1 The upkeep of a development over its lifetime can be crucial to the level of security and safety within. Aspects of a development, which are left to deteriorate, have the potential to attract further crime – a process known as 'the broken window theory'. A maintenance plan should be drawn up to address issues such as:

- Litter removal.
- Repair to communal areas (lighting, signage, access controls).
- Trimming and pruning to shrubs and trees.

5.1.2 Any public open space or amenity areas not under the ownership of residents should be subject to an effective maintenance contract. This should ensure that all damage is rectified in a timely manner, and that any such space will not be detrimental to its surroundings.

6 Construction

6.1.1 Untidy sites and their surroundings can be littered with debris accessible to vandals who often use loose materials as missiles to commit crime. The client should take measures appropriate to secure their site during construction, and control pedestrian and vehicular access in to and out of the site curtilage. It is also recommended that the contractor on this scheme is a member of the 'Considerate Constructors Scheme', who has committed to be a considerate and good neighbour, as well as clean, respectful, safe, environmentally conscious, responsible and accountable.

6.1.2 Site security contractors should be SIA (Security Industry Authority) approved to ensure professional standards are adhered to (please see http://www.sia.homeoffice.gov.uk/pages/acs-intro.aspx for more details).

7 Useful References

7.1 Secured by Design (SBD)

7.1.1 Secured by Design focuses on crime prevention at the design, layout and construction stages of homes and commercial premises and promotes the use of security standards for a wide range of applications and products. To apply for Secured by Design certification for your development, visit our online application form at: http://www.designforsecurity.org/secured-by-design/sbd-accreditation/

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A Contact register

Date	Contact With	Summary of Contact
05/06/24	Deloitte	CIS Application
06/06/24	DFS	CIS Fee Proposal
04/09/24	Deloitte	CIS Confirmation
11/09/24	DFS	Site Visit
19/09/24	Deloitte	Project Introduction Meeting
07/10/24	DFS	CIS Version A Issued
08/11/24	Deloitte	Email regarding changes
10/12/24	Deloitte	Email containing revised drawings

B Associated Documents

This report is based on the following drawings and supplementary information submitted by the applicant.

Drawing No.	Drawing Title	Date	Rev
1207-TGA-XX-XX-RP-A-FI_10_10-00250	Design and Access Statement		P02
1207-TGA-ZZ-ZZ-SH-A_FI_90_90_00-0095	Document Issue Register		P02
VS9B-TGA-G100-PL-XX-95020			P02
VS9B-TGA-G100-PL-XX-95021			P02
VS9B-TGA-G200-EL-ZZ-95050			P02
VS9B-TGA-G200-EL-ZZ-95051			P02
VS9B-TGA-G200-EL-ZZ-95052			P02
VS9B-TGA-G200-EL-ZZ-95053			P02
VS9B-TGA-G200-EL-ZZ-95054			P02
VS9B-TGA-G200-EL-ZZ-95055			P02
VS9B-TGA-G200-EL-ZZ-95056			P02
VS9B-TGA-G200-EL-ZZ-95057			P02
VS9B-TGA-G200-EL-ZZ-95058			P02
VS9B-TGA-G200-EL-ZZ-95059			P02
VS9B-TGA-G200-EL-ZZ-95060			P02
VS9B-TGA-G200-EL-ZZ-95061			P02
VS9B-TGA-G200-PL-00-95030			P02
VS9B-TGA-G200-PL-01-95031			P02
VS9B-TGA-G200-PL-02-95032			P02
VS9B-TGA-G200-PL-04-95033			P01
VS9B-TGA-G200-PL-12-95034			P02
VS9B-TGA-G200-PL-13-95035			P02
VS9B-TGA-G200-PL-32-95036			P02
VS9B-TGA-G200-PL-33-95037			P02
VS9B-TGA-G200-SE-ZZ-95040			P02
VS9B-TGA-G200-SE-ZZ-95041			P02
VS9B-TGA-G251-DE-XX-95210			P01
VS9B-TGA-G251-DE-XX-95211			P01
VS9B-TGA-G251-DE-XX-95213			P01
VS9B-TGA-G251-DE-XX-95215			P01
VS9B-TGA-G251-DE-XX-95216			P01
VS9B-TGA-G251-DE-ZZ-95212			P01
VS9B-TGA-G251-DE-ZZ-95214			P01

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VS9B-TGA-G251-DE-ZZ-95217			P01
VS9B-TGA-G251-DE-ZZ-95218			P01
VS9B-TGA-G251-DE-ZZ-95219			P01

PLEASE NOTE - In the event of any subsequent material changes to the scheme, it will be necessary for Design for Security to reassess the comments made within this report.

C CIS Version History

Version	Revisions Made	Date
A		
B	CIS updated in line with revised drawings	18/12/24

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