



CRIME IMPACT STATEMENT

Palatine Road, Didsbury

Demolition of 3 existing detached buildings and creation
of a new build 5 storey apartment block with 54 apartments
Creation of under croft Parking to the rear of the site, with 8
Semi Detached houses and 8 Town houses

For: **Marco Living 3 Limited**

Greater Manchester Police

Version C: **21/11/24**

design**for**security

Ref: **2024/0369/CIS/01**

Palatine Road, Didsbury

2024/0369/CIS/01

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Development Supported – Minor security additions required.

This development has been assessed against the principles of 'Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design' (CPTED), in order to reduce the opportunities for crime and the fear of crime.

We consider the residential scheme appropriate and are happy to support the proposals.

From a crime prevention perspective, the positive features of the development include; there will be an appropriate number of dwellings on the site; the orientation of the houses and apartments will focus activity in appropriate areas whilst also facilitating passive surveillance of the public realm; off-street, car parking has been included in the scheme.

Advice is included in the report, which we consider will enhance security of the development and this set out in sections 3.3 and 4. The principal recommendations are:

- *install doors, locks, windows, glazing, and, ideally, intruder alarms that meet a recognised security standard.*
- *to emphasise the private nature of the apartment residents' car park and access road, we recommend enhancing the quality of the surfacing of both and including signs to clarify terms of use.*
- *provide secure cycle parking to all dwellings.*
- *install dusk to dawn lighting to all external doors of the houses and Main reception of the apartment blocks, and to the apartment car park and access road.*
- *Post & delivery arrangements for the apartment blocks.*
- *Defensible space around ground floor windows.*
- *Robust landscaping furniture.*

If these issues can be addressed as described within the report and the other physical security measures are incorporated, I would be happy to support the development.

Please note: Greater Manchester Police Design for Security will recommend to the local planning authority that a planning condition to meet Secure by Design accreditation is added that reflects the physical security specification listed within Section 4 of this report.

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1 Visual Audit

The development site is indicated by the red outline on the plan adjacent and is supported with existing site context photographs taken around the site.

The site is situated towards the southern edge on Palatine Rd, West Didsbury.

This section of Palatine Road in West Didsbury is a busy stretch of road network connecting Didsbury to Northenden and the motorway network.

Pedestrian footfall along this section of Palatine Rd is low. The main flow is vehicle traffic.

To the rear of the site is a large surface grade car park for the neighbouring Britania Hotel.


Northenden has good vehicle & public transport links to nearby popular destinations such as Sale and Didsbury. The M60 motorway provides excellent links to M/cr Airport and the wider Greater M/cr district.

The proposed site currently contains three separate residential Victorian blocks, subdivided into apartments with surface grade car parking at the front & rear.

The rear of the site is open access car parking with no access control or parking restrictions.

The parking area to the hotel is of poor quality with dense and overgrown landscaping towards the majority of the boundaries.

At the time of the site visit the main area to the rear of the existing blocks was being cleared. The site is relatively level, however there are some level changes between the hotel car park and the proposed site, approx. 1.5m/2m drop to the car park.



1 – Proposed site off Palatine Road.



2 – Neighbouring Britania Hotel.



3 – View towards proposed site across adjacent site.



4 – Existing car park within the Britania Hotel.



7 – View south along Palatine Road.



6 – View northwest within the site.



5 – Entrance off Palatine Rd to residential site opposite.

2 Crime Statistics & Analysis

All data below is based on crimes recorded between 1st November 2023 to 31st October 2024.

2.1 Crime Summary

Recorded Crime within 500m of Site									
Domestic Burglary	Non-Domestic Burglary	Criminal Damage	Less Serious Wounding	Theft	Robbery	Serious Wounding	Theft from Motor Vehicle	Theft of Motor Vehicle	Bicycle Theft
5	<5	11	54	<5	<5	<5	<5	<5	<5

- 2.1.1 The overall rate of crime in the past 12 months is low for the Manchester division, with less serious woundings having been most commonly reported. These offences have mainly taken place at locations along and close to Palatine Road, particularly at the current and neighbouring site to the north.
- 2.1.2 Less serious wounding offences have predominantly taken place at the locations mentioned above, where public order, assaults and harassment have been most reported. Most of the incidents have involved disputes between known associates or neighbours, as well as some cases of domestic violence.

2.2 Common Local M.O.s (Modus Operandi)

2.2.1 Forcing open secure windows and doors using bodily pressure and implements in order to gain access.

Possible Solution - All external doors should be certified to recognised security standards (see section 4.1 & 5.1), which are independently proven to reduce the risk of forced entry and thus increase the chances of detection. A robust access control system should be in place to allow residents to vet visitors into apartment blocks before allowing them access to the building (also see section 4.1). The main communal entrances should be located in a highly visible position and should be well-lit to deter offenders from trying to gain unauthorised access.

2.2.2 Gaining access to secure apartment complexes by means of tailgating residents and insecure doors, gaining access to resident only areas (mail rooms, bicycle storage and apartment doors).

Possible Solution - All individual apartments should be secured with a security-certified entrance doorset (see Section 4.1), to ensure that any offender who may have gained access to the building (e.g. by tailgating, posing as a legitimate visitor etc.), cannot gain further access without drawing the attention of other residents. Doors off internal corridors should not be located in deep recesses, where an offender could operate without fear of detection. A staffed 24/7 concierge desk will support the management and security of the entrance lobby.

2.2.3 Breaking of glazing in windows and doors using implements.

Possible Solution - An appropriate glazing specification should be used to adequately secure the building. All ground floor/accessible glazing should include a laminated pane, which forms a much more robust barrier against shattering and penetration (see Section 4.3). Where possible, the size of any glazed elements within/directly adjacent to doors should be reduced and set well away from locking points. In vulnerable locations, shutters or perforated protective panels may be necessary to provide extra protection. However, the layout of the building and position of windows should be designed to avoid vulnerabilities as much as possible. Any damage arising from vandalism should be repaired quickly in order to maintain a culture of care and respect, as a lack of maintenance can often attract further abuse.

2.2.4 Forcing open secure shutters using implements and tools (mostly metal bars) in order to gain access to the windows and doors located below.

Possible Solution - Roller shutters can appear secure in that they are difficult to penetrate, however physical security products are only as strong as their weakest component. A security-certified shutter (see Section 5.2) has an independently proven level of resistance, and ensures that all aspects of the

shutter (locks, rails, laths etc) have been scrutinised by professionals. If external shutters are used, ideally the shutter boxes and guides should be built into the fabric of the building to deter tampering/attack.

2.2.5 Prising open of windows, including windows on balconies and on the ground floor, using implements most likely screwdrivers, crowbars or similar at residential properties.

Possible Solution – All ground floor/accessible windows should be certified to recognised security standards (see Section 5.4), with key operated locks and opening restrictors. All ground floor/accessible glazing should also include a laminated pane, which forms a much more robust barrier against shattering and penetration (see Section 5.4). Any glazed panels in or around doors should be small and set well-away from locking points.





2.3 Risk Factors

The typical security risks for a development of this nature are:

- Domestic burglary
- Theft from gardens, sheds or garages
- Criminal damage to dwellings and vehicles
- Theft of, or from, vehicles
- Bogus callers and distraction burglary
- Anti-social behaviour
- Neighbour disputes
- Theft and criminal damage during the construction period
- Unauthorised access to private spaces
- Poor maintenance of access control systems

2.4 Comparing crime rates in the neighbourhood around the site to those in LPA Replace and Greater Manchester

The rates below relates to crime committed within 500m of the site. England & Wales data was last recorded for January – December 2021.



- 2.4.1 The rate of domestic burglaries per 1000 dwellings is **36% lower** than Manchester as a whole, **18% lower** than Greater Manchester and **16% lower** than England & Wales.
- 2.4.2 The rate of woundings per 1000 dwellings is **37% lower** than Manchester as a whole, **14% lower** than Greater Manchester and **65% higher** than England & Wales.
- 2.4.3 The rate of incidents of criminal damage per 1000 dwellings is **27% lower** than Manchester as a whole, **5% lower** than Greater Manchester and **16% higher** than England & Wales.
- 2.4.4 The rate of incidents of vehicle crime per 1000 dwellings is **52% lower** than Manchester as a whole, **21% lower** than Greater Manchester and **3% lower** than England & Wales.

2.5 Domestic Burglary: Risk Analysis

The data below relates to domestic burglaries committed within 500m of the site.





2.5.1 **Day/Time Range:** The risk of domestic burglary is highest on Sunday and in the early hours of the morning (02:00-03:00). Offenders tend to target dwellings late at night when it is dark and there is less footfall in the area, giving them the perception that they are less likely to be caught or identified.

2.5.2 **Point of Entry:** In the local area the following entry points and MO's have been utilised most frequently:

- In cases where the entry point is recorded as "unknown", it is likely that the offender has exploited insecure windows and doors.
- Smashed glazing in windows and doors.
- Using bodily pressure or implements in order to force open secure windows and doors.

2.6 Vehicle Crime: Risk Analysis

The data below relates to vehicle crime committed within 500m of the site.



- 2.6.1 **Day/Time Range:** The risk of vehicle crime peaks on Saturday in the evening (22:00-23:00). Offenders often target vehicles at this time when they tend to be left unattended and out of sight of the owners for long periods of time, creating a perceived low risk opportunity for offenders.

3 Layout Appraisal

3.1 Proposed development

- 3.1.1 Demolition of 3 existing detached buildings and creation of a new build 5 storey apartment block with 54 apartments fronting Palatine Road.
- 3.1.2 Creation of undercroft Parking to the rear of the site, with 8 Semi Detached houses and 8 Town houses (all 5 bedroom) with a centralised podium amenity area.

3.2 Positive Aspects of the Proposal

The following proposed features would make a positive contribution to the prevention of crime and fear of crime.

- 3.2.1 When left vacant, sites such as this, often attract anti-social behaviour in the form of criminal damage, fly-tipping, fire raising or graffiti. The redevelopment of the site will restrict the ability for such activities to take place.
- 3.2.2 The proposed residential development is an appropriate use for the site given the surrounding land uses.
- 3.2.3 There are a significant number and mix of houses and apartments within the development, which increases the likelihood of residents being from a broader age range, including young singles, older residents and families with children. Such a mix increases the likelihood of some of the residents of the houses and apartments being present throughout the day. The presence of residents or even just visible signs of people present - cars on driveways/the car park, lights on in dwellings, external lighting on at entrance doors, for example - will help to deter offenders.
- 3.2.4 The apartment buildings are suitably located and include off-street parking and a communal garden.
- 3.2.5 Front doors and principal room windows of the houses and windows of apartments face the communal landscaped amenity space and parking area at the front, which helps to promote natural surveillance.
- 3.2.6 'Defensible space', defined with a wall and railings is provided to the front of the houses.
- 3.2.7 Private amenity space is provided within rear gardens of the houses, which will be appropriately secured with suitably high, boundary fencing and gates.
- 3.2.8 The landscaping of the modest front gardens of the houses, will support the quality of the local environment. Well-maintained verdant environments tend to attract less crime and anti-social behaviour.
- 3.2.9 Where ground floor amenity spaces have been located, consideration appears to have been taken using external facing materials; glazing, providing good levels of activity.
- 3.2.10 Apartment main entry doors and internal doors to the stairs from the lobby should require access-controlled-operation. All visitors to the residents of the apartments will be required to enter via the lobby area. Mailboxes for residents should be located within the lobby area so that regular delivery personnel do not need to be given access to the residential parts of the building.
- 3.2.11 The proposed building plots provide further ground floor activity in the form of residential uses and new public realm leading to dedicated resident entrance front doors and apartment reception spaces. In-turn these uses offer good levels of activity and natural surveillance of the adjacent streets. Resident cycle storage areas are located in prominent locations.
- 3.2.12 The proposed mix of in-curtilage (garage) parking arrangements for the houses, and the below deck, car park courtyard for residents, will facilitate the security of vehicles. Controlled car parking provision that is separated from the passing public, are less likely to be targeted by offenders than cars parked on the street or within ill-defined, unsecured, communal, car parks.
- 3.2.13 Refuse provision has been considered for each property.
- 3.2.14 The central landscaped courtyard deck will be well-overlooked by the proposed buildings and should benefit from legitimate activity and passive surveillance at all times of the day and night, promoting a greater sense of safety in the public realm.

-
- 3.2.15 The proposed development provides the opportunity to include security features built into the design and construction of the building and avoid the need for obtrusive retrofitted security measures that can increase the fear of crime. Security measures carefully incorporated into the design can ensure the building is reasonably secure, without visibly announcing that the design was concerned about crime.

3.3 Changes Needed and Recommendations

The following points have been identified for further consideration and would need to be addressed for Design for Security to support the proposed scheme.

Houses and apartments

- 3.3.1 Security-certified, external, front and rear doors, and ground/lower ground floor window frames should be installed at each property. Laminate glass should be fitted to ground/lower ground floor windows and all external doors.
- 3.3.2 Given the semi-isolated location, it is recommended that fitting an intruder alarm to each property is recommended, particularly the houses and ground floor apartments.

Below deck car parking

- 3.3.3 The car park should be illuminated with low intensity, LED lighting from dusk to dawn.
- 3.3.4 Measures should be installed to prevent damage to boundary fencing around the fringe of the car park as a result of vehicles manoeuvring.
- 3.3.5 Install planters, bollards or knee-rails to prevent any vehicles parking in undesignated areas, particularly on the pathways and greenspaces.
- 3.3.6 Install signs to indicate the private nature of the car park and sanctions for misuse.

Cycle parking.

- 3.3.7 Cycle parking should be provided for apartment residents in a secure part of the site. Provision should include a secure, weatherproof shelter with Sheffield stands set in concrete. The door/gate should be self-closing and lock upon closure. Access controls/fob access should be provided to the cycle store door(s). Residents should apply to the management company for access to residents to only store bikes
- 3.3.8 Cycle parking should also be provided for residents of the houses in the rear gardens. The doors to the storage sheds in the rear gardens should be secured with a Sold Secure™, padlock and hasp and staple, and fitted with a Sold Secure™, ground anchor.

Boundary fencing

- 3.3.9 Definition of frontage. Front boundaries should be well-defined to indicate ownership, using low walls, railings, planting and / or surface materials, and discourage intruders from approaching the dwellings.
- 3.3.10 900mm high railings defining adjoining garden boundaries at the front of the houses are ideal.
- 3.3.11 It is recommended that the western, northern and southern boundaries are 2100mm high timber fences, which incorporate a trellis topping of 300mm.

Public realm and Landscaping

- 3.3.12 Street furniture and landscape features should be used to prevent unwanted parking or access onto pedestrian only surfaces. It should be very clear in which spaces, or on which streets, vehicle parking is authorised.
- 3.3.13 It is important to formalise the proposed road and pedestrian links across the new development.
- 3.3.14 The proposals are to incorporate a lighting scheme that will distribute illumination evenly around the space without areas of shadowing or pooling and work coherently with the wider security requirements of the site such as any CCTV for apartment entrances, car parking courts and the landscape courtyard.
- 3.3.15 Consideration for safe bicycle storage should be embedded within the landscape design. Short-stay cycle parking stands should be located where they can be readily observed. The location of cycle stores within proposed buildings should consider the position, inherent physical security and safety of cyclists using the facility.
- 3.3.16 Poor design, management and maintenance can lead to a downward spiral of neglect and loss of environmental quality, encouraging nuisance, vandalism and other anti-social or criminal behaviour. Any landscape features (hard or soft) should not impede natural surveillance of/from the buildings or reduce the effectiveness of lighting or any CCTV system. The design of any hard landscaping features or street furniture, in particular any steps, ramps or benches, should be designed to withstand and discourage the potential for mistreatment and damage (e.g. from vandalism, skateboarding, rough

sleeping etc.). Bollards or similar hard/soft landscaping features should also be incorporated to prevent unauthorised vehicles from accessing the courtyard.

- 3.3.17 It is essential that all of the physical security measures listed below are incorporated into the scheme. Integrated, risk-commensurate security measures aim to place secure physical barriers or surveillance in the path of the criminal – making crime harder to commit and raising the risk of detection and possible capture, as well as promoting a feeling of safety in residents and visitors.

3.4 Points for Further Consideration

- 3.4.1 Graffiti on surfaces. Expanses of blank wall exposed to public areas should be formed of a graffiti-resistant surface or have a resistant coating applied to enable easy removal of any unauthorised markings.
- 3.4.2 Vegetation Management. The proximity of bushes and trees to the fence line can undermine the security of the boundary by creating cover for an intruder or providing potential climbing aids. Overhanging branches and dense vegetation should be removed where it could be exploited in this way. Care must be taken to ensure the proposed landscaping to the perimeter of the site is maintained at an appropriate height (see Section 4.6), in order to prevent it impeding views to and from the site and avoid the creation of hiding places that could be exploited by offenders.
- 3.4.3 Residential post/parcel/grocery room. Arrangements for the delivery of post should not allow postal or grocery delivery staff to have access to internal areas of the residential block beyond the GF reception space. Postal workers should not be given unfettered access to the entire building as this could potentially leave apartments and residents vulnerable. (see Section 4.1 for more information)
- 3.4.4 Communal facilities and amenity space. The robust management of such areas is essential to encourage active use and enjoyment, whilst making abuse less likely to occur. Poor management and maintenance can lead to a downward spiral of neglect and loss of environmental quality, encouraging nuisance, vandalism and other anti-social or criminal behaviour.

4 Physical Security

The following checklist forms the physical security requirements for this scheme to achieve Secured by Design accreditation.

4.1 Doors (Houses)

- ☐ Front and rear doors to dwellings must be compliant with and certified to BS PAS 24, STS201, or LPS 1175 SR2.
- ☐ French/double doors or sliding patio doors must be compliant with and certified to BS PAS 24.
- ☐ Front doors to properties should have fixed external handles or split spindles, meaning access is only possible with a key.
- ☐ Front doors should have either fixed sidelights or door viewers.
- ☐ Chain limiters are recommended but not generally essential.
- ☐ Letterboxes within doors must be located a minimum of 400mm away from internal handle and locking hardware.

4.2 Doors (Apartments)

- ☐ External communal access doors must be compliant with and certified to STS202 BR2 or LPS 1175 SR2. The communal entrance doors should be self-closing and secured with a multi-point electronic lock and capable of being operated via an electronic access control system - these features should be permitted under the scope of the security certification.
- ☐ Where secure postal lobbies are to be created, the secondary communal door must be to the same specification as the outer door - certified to STS202 BR2, or LPS 1175 SR2, including a lock capable of being operated via an electronic access control system.
- ☐ Apartment entrance doors must be compliant with and certified to BS PAS 24:2012, WCL2, or LPS 1175 SR2. It is advised that these doors do not have fixed sidelights and are provided with door viewers instead.
- ☐ Communal doors located within the corridors should include glazed elements to assist sight lines.
- ☐ Ground floor external French/double doors or sliding patio doors must be compliant with and certified to BS PAS 24:2012.
- ☐ Chain limiters to apartment entrance doors are recommended but not generally essential.
- ☐ Any external escape-only doors (as with external doors in general) should be certified to BS PAS 24:2012, or LPS 1175 SR2. It is crucial that the door ironmongery is permitted for use on these doors under the security certification of the product.
- ☐ The main entrance door and doors off the lobby area should be controlled by means of a video entry phone system (with the picture viewable on the phone unit, rather than on a television set), so that residents can vet callers to the building before allowing them access.

4.3 Windows

- ☐ Windows must be compliant with and certified to BS PAS 24.
- ☐ Ground floor and easily accessible opening lights (escape requirements permitting) must be key-lockable and have fixed/lockable opening restrictors (not releasable from the outside) limited to 100mm.

4.4 Glazing

- ☐ Glazing to a height of 2400mm (or if otherwise accessible) must incorporate at least one pane of laminated glass rated as P1A under EN 356. The remaining pane in a double-glazed unit may be toughened glass.

4.5 Alarms

- ☐ If an alarm is installed, then it should comply with either:
 - BS EN 50131 and PD 6662 for wired systems
 - BS 6799 for wireless systems
- ☐ If an alarm is installed, it should be linked to contacts on all external doors, and PIR detectors should cover all ground floor rooms with windows.

4.6 Access Control

- ☐ Access control systems should be operable by swipe card or fob, and not numeric keypads. The following doors should operate on access control:
 - All external doors where regular staff access is required.
 - Doors separating internal zones / lobbies.
 - Any internal doors to obvious high risk or controlled areas (e.g. storage / server / locker rooms)
 - Cycle stores.

4.7 Boundaries

- ☐ Inward opening automatic gates to provide access to the sports courtyard area must be certified to one of the following standards:
 - LPS 1175: Issue 7, SR2
 - STS 202: Issue 3, BR2
 - Sold Secure Gold
 - PAS 68: 2013
- ☐ Any ground floor townhouse/apartment windows to the Street/courtyard elevations of the podium that will not front onto the front garden spaces described above must be protected by defensive planting beds. The windows themselves should preferably have as high cills as possible and be non-opening. If not, they should have only small opening lights fitted with opening restrictors to avoid providing opportunities to criminals.
- ☐ Boundary treatments to front gardens should be designed to discourage comfortably sitting on or leaning against them, which could potentially cause nuisance and intimidation to residents.
- ☐ The ground floor townhouses and apartments which front onto the public realm and the landscaped courtyard, must be protected by some defensible space, defined by dense low-level planting, creating front gardens areas in ownership/control of the residents themselves.

4.8 Landscaping

- ☐ In vulnerable locations such as entrances, parking areas and footpaths, low planting should not exceed 1000mm in height, and tree canopies should fall no lower than 2m from the ground. This is in order to allow people to see their surroundings better, make a rational choice of routes and eliminate hiding places. A maintenance agreement should stipulate that these planting dimensions would be adhered to.
- ☐ Loose surface materials in the publicly accessible areas of the scheme should be avoided. Small fragments of ground covering can be used as missiles against people and premises (both to gain entry and to commit criminal damage).
- ☐ Planting must be avoided that will aid climbing over boundary treatments. The security of fences can be compromised if trees or street furniture are placed close by

4.9 Lighting

- ☐ External lighting must be provided to pedestrian routes within the site in accordance with BS 5489.
- ☐ Dusk 'til dawn lights, operated by photoelectric cell/daylight sensor, should be installed to all external doors (manual override is also permissible).
- ☐ Fittings should produce 'white' light, as opposed to yellow/orange light. Metal halide (or bulbs with a comparable output) should be used, as these offer superior colour rendition over alternatives such as high- and low-pressure sodium bulbs.

4.10 Other

- ☐ Meter cupboards to apartments should be located to the fronts of properties only or within a secure cupboard / room inside the block but not inside individual apartments. Smart meters are acceptable.
- ☐ Partition walls between flats and corridors should be of masonry construction or include reinforcement such as a layer of expanded metal mesh.
- ☐ Consideration should be given to use of alternatives to lead in construction and minimise the amount of metal on visible elevations of the buildings. Inspection covers should be capable of securing to reduce potential access to cabling.

5 Management & Maintenance

- 5.1.1 The upkeep of a development over its lifetime can be crucial to the level of security and safety within. Aspects of a development, which are left to deteriorate, have the potential to attract further crime – a process known as 'the broken window theory'. A maintenance plan should be drawn up to address issues such as:
- Litter removal.
 - Repair to communal areas (lighting, signage, access controls)
 - Trimming and pruning to shrubs and trees
- 5.1.2 Any public open space or amenity areas not under the ownership of residents should be subject to an effective maintenance contract. This should ensure that all damage is rectified in a timely manner, and that any such space will not be detrimental to its surroundings.

6 Construction

- 6.1.1 Untidy sites and their surroundings can be littered with debris accessible to vandals who often use loose materials as missiles to commit crime. The client should take measures appropriate to secure their site during construction, and control pedestrian and vehicular access in to and out of the site curtilage. It is also recommended that the contractor on this scheme is a member of the 'Considerate Constructors Scheme', who has committed to be a considerate and good neighbour, as well as clean, respectful, safe, environmentally conscious, responsible and accountable.
- Site security contractors should be SIA (Security Industry Authority) approved to ensure professional standards are adhered to (please see <http://www.sia.homeoffice.gov.uk/pages/acs-intro.aspx> for more details).

7 Useful References

7.1 Secured by Design (SBD)

- 7.1.1 Secured by Design focuses on crime prevention at the design, layout and construction stages of homes and commercial premises and promotes the use of security standards for a wide range of applications and products. To apply for Secured by Design certification for your development, visit our online application form at: <http://www.designforsecurity.org/secured-by-design/sbd-accreditation/>

A Contact register

Date	Contact With	Summary of Contact
09/10/24	OMI Arch.	Development presentation
10/10/24	OMI Arch.	CIS application submitted
10/10/24	OMI Arch.	Client confirmation
13/11/24	DfS	Site visit
19/11/24	DfS	CIS completed
19/11/24	DfS	Front cover 'Client name' & Exec summary amended. CIS issued.
21/11/24	DfS	Minor text amendments CIS reissued

B Associated Documents

This report is based on the following drawings and supplementary information submitted by the applicant.

Drawing No.	Drawing Title	Date	Rev
	Palatine Road Plans	12/11/24	
	L1000-MASTERPLAN - LEVEL BASEMENT	14/11/24	
	L1001-MASTERPLAN - LEVEL 00	14/11/24	
	L1002-MASTERPLAN - LEVEL 01	14/11/24	
	L1003-MASTERPLAN - LEVEL 02	14/11/24	
	L1004-MASTERPLAN - LEVELS 03 & 04	14/11/24	
	L1005-MASTERPLAN - ROOF PLAN	14/11/24	
	L1600-PROPOSED SITE ELEVATION - NORTH	14/11/24	
	L1601-PROPOSED SITE ELEVATION - EAST	14/11/24	
	L1602-PROPOSED SITE ELEVATION - SOUTH	14/11/24	
	L1603-PROPOSED SITE ELEVATION - WEST	14/11/24	
	L1604-PROPOSED SITE ELEVATION - WEST 2	14/11/24	

PLEASE NOTE - In the event of any subsequent material changes to the scheme, it will be necessary for Design for Security to reassess the comments made within this report.

C CIS Version History

Version	Revisions Made	Date
A		

D Glossary

Burglary Resistance Standards

BS PAS 24

General security performance requirements for door/window assemblies.

An attack test standard for doorsets and windows. This is the minimum police requirement for Secured by Design dwellings, and is also applicable to French/double doors, and sliding doors.

BS EN 1627 (Security Ratings RC1 to RC6)

Windows, doors, shutters - Burglar resistance Requirements and classification

The classification system used in BS EN 1627 is aimed at the commercial market and is based on five elements:

- a) Resistance of glazing*
- b) Performance of hardware*
- c) Resistance to static loading*
- d) Resistance to dynamic loading*
- e) Burglary resistance by manual intervention*

LPS 1175 (Security Ratings 1 to 6)

Specification for testing and classifying the burglary resistance of building components

This includes doors, shutters, garage doors and grilles typically for commercial premises and higher risk domestic premises and is acceptable to the ABI and the Police. The standard has 6 levels, 6 being the highest, with levels 1 and 2 equivalent in many respects to BS PAS 24 and BS 7950.

STS 201

Enhanced security requirements for doorsets and door assemblies for dwellings to satisfy the requirements of PAS 24

STS 202

Requirements for burglary resistance of construction products including hinged, pivoted, folding or sliding doorsets, windows, curtain walling, security grilles, garage doors and shutters.

This specifies a broadly similar range of attack tools and times to those specified at the lower levels of LPS 1175.

BS EN 356 (Ratings P1A to P8A)

Glass in building. Security glazing. Testing and classification of resistance against manual attack.

A performance standard for manual attacks on glazing. P2A is comparable to the performance of a 6.8mm laminated glass, and P4A to that of a 9.5mm laminated glass.

Commonly Used Acronyms

CIT

Cash in transit (refers to vehicles, personnel and routines).

CPTED

Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design

CRS

Crime Reduction Specialist. Sometimes known as CPO (Crime Prevention Officer)

INPT

Integrated Neighbourhood Policing Team.

PVB/PolyVinyl Butyral (Glazing interlayer)

A commonly used interlayer used in the production of laminated glass.

LPCB (Loss Prevention Certification Board)

A brand of the BRE Global (Building Research Establishment) family. The LPCB work with insurers, Government, police, designers, manufacturers, contractors and end users to develop methods of assessing performance and reliability of security products to ensure their fitness for purpose.

UKAS (United Kingdom Accreditation Service)

The sole national accreditation body recognised by government to assess, against internationally agreed standards, organisations that provide certification, testing, inspections and calibration services.

Useful Websites

Design for Security

www.designforsecurity.org

Secured by Design

www.securedbydesign.com

RIBA Product Selector

www.ribaproductselector.com

LPCB – Red Book Live

www.redbooklive.com

Crime Reduction (Home Office)

www.crimereduction.homeoffice.gov.uk

DAC (Design Against Crime) Solution Centre

www.designagainstcrime.org

Building for Life

www.buildingforlife.org

CLG (Communities and Local Government)

www.communities.gov.uk