



CRIME IMPACT STATEMENT

45-47 Thomas Street, Manchester

Change of use from retail to mixed use
retail/bar/yoga studio/co-working area

FOR: MORPARK LTD

VERSION A: 28/10/2024

REFERENCE: 2024/0228/CIS/01

Greater Manchester Police

designforsecurity

45-47 Thomas Street, Manchester

2024/0228/CIS/01

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Development supported

The change of use and refurbishment of the premises is welcomed. The proposals will result in a more intensive use of the building, greater levels of street activity and an increase footfall to the area. Passive surveillance of the surrounding public realm will be enhanced.

There are no significant issues to address from a crime prevention perspective but, to improve the overall security of the building, a number of recommendations are included, the main ones are summarised as follows:

- The premises should be covered with a comprehensive CCTV and monitored alarm system.
- Where possible, new external doors, windows & glazing should be certified to a burglary resistant standard.

At the planning application stage, Greater Manchester Police will support the application. Given the emphasis of the application is for a change of use, a Secured by Design condition is not appropriate instead we are likely to recommend a condition requiring the developer to adhere to the recommendations set out within this report wherever feasible.

Matthew Granelli

Design for Security Consultant

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
1 Visual Audit

The proposed development site can be seen on the adjacent map, edged in red. The site is located within the Northern Quarter area of Manchester City Centre.

The site is located on the north side of Thomas Street. The sides and rear boundary are shared with the neighbouring properties, with the building fronting onto Thomas Street.

The site is currently vacant but secured by metal shutter to the ground floor. There are some signs of graffiti on the shutters, but it is unknown whether this is commissioned by previous tenants.

The surrounding buildings are mixture of commercial, retail and residential developments, it benefits from good levels of natural surveillance. The Northern Quarter is one of the main night time economy areas in the city centre and one of the main vehicular/pedestrian routes into the city centre.



2 Crime Statistics & Analysis

All data below is based on crimes recorded between 1st October 2023 to 30th September 2024.

2.1 Crime Summary

Figure 1: Recorded Crime within 500m of Site

Domestic Burglary	Non-Domestic Burglary	Criminal Damage	Less Serious Wounding	Theft	Robbery	Serious Wounding	Theft from Motor Vehicle	Theft of Motor Vehicle	Bicycle Theft
35	182	406	2,708	835	324	76	407	26	97

- 2.1.1 The overall rate of crime over the past 12 months has been high, which is to be expected given that the site is located in the city centre. Less serious wounding, criminal damage and theft have been the highest recorded offences taking place. These types of crime are typical of those experienced in or within close proximity of district, town or city centres where there is a higher concentration of retail, commercial and licensed premises, leading to a higher number of crime and disorder issues.
- 2.1.2 Less serious wounding offences have occurred throughout the local area, with a higher concentration to the southwest of the site. Assaults, harassment and public order offences have been the most reported less serious wounding, with incidents often occurring over the weekend period in the evening and late at night, and alcohol consumption being a factor.
- 2.1.3 Theft offences have also occurred all throughout the local area. Offenders have used distraction and pickpocketing techniques in order to remove items stored on the person such as mobile phones, wallets and purses. Offenders have also targeted insecure items on tables and benches in public spaces, restaurants and retail outlets, as well as parcels left on doorsteps and in communal areas of apartment buildings.
- 2.1.4 Theft from motor vehicle has been the most reported vehicle crime taking place. Offenders have targeted vehicles parked on the streets and within parking facilities throughout the local area. Offenders have in most cases used implements in order to smash glazing in the windows before removing items from within, as well used tools to remove vehicle parts and registration plates.

2.2 Common Use-Specific M.O.s (Modus Operandi)

- 2.2.1 Opening secure doors (all door types) using bodily pressure and implements to access the premises.

Possible Solution – All external doors should be certified to a burglary resistant standard (see section 4.2) which are designed to withstand a prolonged attempt to gain entry.

- 2.2.2 Breaking glazing in doors and windows, mainly to the front of the premises, using implements to gain access.

Possible Solution – Any ground floor or easily accessible glazing should contain a pane of laminate glazing, which cannot be easily smashed or shattered to gain entry.

- 2.2.3 Theft of personal property from table tops or from bags hung on chairs or stored under tables.

Possible Solution - A particular issue in drinking establishments within the Manchester city centre area is the theft of personal effects; handbag and mobile phone theft is a particular issue. Consideration should be given to fixing 'Chelsea Clips' (see image), Grippa clips, or simple hooks to the underside of tables to allow customers to secure bags or jackets to the table while keeping it in view; a more secure option than, for example, tabletops or back of chairs, where belongings can be liable to theft.



The internal layout of the premises can also help deter theft by promoting surveillance and creating an

uncluttered, environment, avoiding pinch points or areas of concealment. The precise arrangement of internal furnishings should aid circulation and aim to achieve a balance between intimacy and visibility.

- 2.2.5 Entering the property as a legitimate customer and then moving into restricted areas, usually through insecure counters or doors.

Possible Solution – There should be a secure area for staff to store their belongings while at work and all staff-only, back-of-house areas should be secured to prevent unauthorised public access. All staff should understand and accept the need for security measures and should be trained to be vigilant and to report any suspicious behaviour.

- 2.2.6 Exploitation of insecure windows and doors.

Possible Solution – All staff should understand and accept the need for security measures and should be trained in the procedure of securing the premises at closing time and when the floors change use.

- 2.2.7 Using implements to force open shutters.

Possible Solution – Any shutters should be certified to a recognised security standard (i.e. LPS 1175 SR2). Shutters certified to a burglary resistant standard are able to withstand prolonged, opportunist, attacks by criminals.

2.3 Risk Factors - Retail

The typical security risks for a development of this nature are:

- Commercial burglary
- Cash robbery
- Unauthorised access to private spaces/Tailgating
- Shoplifting
- Employee theft
- Theft of customer / staff property
- Criminal damage to property

2.4 General Risk Factors - Offices

The typical security risks for a development of this nature are:

- Burglary
- Violence towards staff
- Theft of personal belongings at work
- Criminal damage to property and vehicles
- Unauthorised access to buildings/private space
- Arson
- Cycle theft
- Employee theft
- Theft of/from parked vehicles
- Theft and criminal damage during the construction period


2.5 Risk Factors – Drinking Establishment

The typical security risks for a development of this nature are:

- Burglary
- Robbery to business
- Criminal damage to property
- Alcohol-fuelled violence/conflict
- Miscellaneous theft to customers
- Rowdy and inconsiderate behaviour
- Conflict of use with neighbouring venues
- Violence towards staff
- Safety of staff personal belongings
- Robbery / wounding of patrons leaving premises
- Theft and criminal damage during the construction period

2.6 Non-Domestic Burglary Risk Analysis – Retail Premises

The data below relates to non-domestic burglary offences within / against retail facilities, recorded in the Manchester area during 2018 - 2019.





2.6.1 **Day / Time Range:** The risk of burglary at retail premises in Manchester is consistently high throughout the week, peaking on a Wednesday. During the day the risk of burglary at retail premises increases in the early hours of the morning (12am – 6am). Burglaries at commercial premises frequently take place during the night, when they are closed, and the streets are quiet. Offenders perceive the risk of being witnessed or apprehended at its lowest.

2.6.2 **Point of Entry:** In the local area the following entry points and MO's have been the occurred most frequently:

- Smashed glazing in windows and doors to gain entry to premises.
- Posing as a legitimate customer and tailgating / exploitation insecure doors to gain access to staff only areas.
- Forcing open shutters using bodily force and implements to gain entry.
- Opening secure doors using bodily pressure and implements to gain entry.

2.7 Theft Retail Facilities: Risk Analysis


The data below relates to thefts within / against retail facilities, recorded in the Manchester area during 2018 - 2019.




- 2.7.1 **Day / Time Range:** The risk of theft from retail premises in Manchester is consistently high throughout the week, peaking on a Friday and Saturday. During the day the risk of theft at retail premises peaks in the late morning and into the evening (10:30am – 8pm). Small, personal items are being targeted, mostly mobile phones, purses, and bags.

2.8 Non-Domestic Burglary (Offices): Risk Analysis

The data below relates to non-domestic burglary offences within/against offices, recorded in the Manchester area.




- 2.8.1 **Day/Time Range:** During the week, the risk of burglary at office premises in Manchester is greatest on Tuesday, Thursday and Sunday. During the day, the risk of burglary at Manchester office premises rises into the evening/late at night. Such premises are often targeted at these times when they are closed and unoccupied, meaning offenders can attempt to gain unauthorised access without fear of being disturbed or identified.



- 2.8.2 **Point of Entry:** The majority of burglaries at offices in Manchester have been committed through doors. Burglaries against office buildings in this area do not appear to be opportunistic, with offenders often bringing tools with them that can be used to force open doors and cut locks. Offenders have also smashed glazed panels in doors and windows to gain entry. A large proportion of burglaries have been committed through 'unknown' and 'legitimate' points of entry, which are likely to have been where offenders (posing as legitimate customers, visitors or employees) have gained unauthorised access to staff only areas (i.e. through insecure doors, tailgating etc.) to steal property.

2.9 Theft (Offices): Risk Analysis


The data below relates to thefts within/against offices, recorded in the Manchester area.



- 2.9.1 **Day/Time Range:** During the week, the risk of theft at Manchester offices is greatest on Monday and Tuesday and is generally lower over the weekend (when many are shut). During the day, the risk of theft is concentrated during normal working hours – peaking around midday. During these times, many office workers will take their lunch breaks, leaving unattended property at desks or in insecure areas. Thefts can also often happen at the end of the working day, when members of staff are finishing work and premises is likely to be less secure, such as while cleaning operations are carried out.

2.10 Non-Domestic Burglary (Licenced Premises): Risk Analysis

The data below relates to non-domestic burglary offences within/against licenced premises, recorded in the Manchester area.





2.10.1 **Day / Time Range:** In Manchester, the risk of burglary at licensed premises between Monday and Wednesday and is lowest on Friday. The risk of burglary is highest in the early hours of the morning. Burglaries at commercial premises frequently take place during the night, when they are closed and the areas/streets where they are typically found are quieter than during the day – meaning offenders perceive the risk of being detected or identified as low.

2.10.2 **Point of Entry:** In the local area the following entry points and MO's have been utilised most frequently:

- Forcing open secure doors and windows – mostly fire doors located to the side and rear of the property are targeted – using bodily pressure and implements to gain access.
- Posing as a legitimate customer and exploiting insecure doors/ tailgating staff into restricted areas, taking property belonging to employees and the business.
- Forcing open shutters using bodily pressure and implements to access the doors and windows located below.
- Broken glazing to windows and doors – located mostly to the front of the property, with glass in doors highly targeted- using bricks or implements located around the scene.

2.11 Theft (Licenced Premises): Risk Analysis



The data below relates to thefts within/against licenced premises, recorded in the Manchester area.



- 2.11.1 **Day/Time Range:** During the week, the risk of theft at Manchester licensed premises peaks over the weekend. On these days, many premises within the city centre area experience higher levels of attendance than during the week. Premises are also usually open for longer at the weekend and so the opportunity for offenders to commit theft is greater. The risk of theft peaks late at night and into the early morning. This reflects the times when licensed premises are at their busiest and therefore the opportunities to commit theft are greater. Handbags, purses / wallets, cash and phones belonging to customers are the most routinely stolen items - usually stolen from table tops, from bags hung on chairs/stored under tables or via pickpocketing and distraction methods. Theft of property belonging to staff is also common, with offenders posing as legitimate customers to gain access to unauthorised areas.

2.12 Vehicle Crime: Risk Analysis

The data below relates to vehicle crime committed within 500m of the site.



- 2.12.1 **Day/Time Range:** The risk of vehicle crime is highest on Saturday in the evening (21:00-22:00). Offenders often target vehicles at this time when they tend to be left unattended and out of sight of the owners for long periods of time, creating a perceived low risk opportunity for offenders.

3 Layout Appraisal

3.1 Proposed development

- 3.1.1 The ground floor of the proposal will offer a bar with a book and record store operating in a small area. The first floor will be a studio that will host yoga, wellness classes and other community projects during the day and an event space in the evening. The second floor will have a coworking space with meeting rooms and podcast studios.
- 3.1.2 The first floor studio will close at 5.00 pm and open an event space/venue at 7.30 pm. The second floor coworking space will close at 5.30 pm.

3.2 Positive Aspects of the Proposal

The following proposed features would make a positive contribution to the prevention of crime and fear of crime.

- 3.2.1 The proposed development will bring additional activity to Thomas Street during the day and in the evening, deterring criminals and those antisocially minded from operating in the area.
- 3.2.2 The re-use of the property is welcomed. Properties that remain vacant for some months are often targeted by thieves and vandals. The resulting visible signs of decay can attract further abuse, which is then likely to affect the neighbouring residents and nearby properties.
- 3.2.3 The proposed use is in keeping with the uses in the city centre area.
- 3.2.4 The main entrance to the building is positioned on Thomas Street where it is well overlooked.
- 3.2.5 The mix of uses in the building will generate activity at different times of the day.

3.3 Changes Needed and Recommendations

The following points have been identified for further consideration and would need to be addressed for Design for Security to support the proposed scheme.

- 3.3.1 Access to the second floor coworking space outside of operating hours should be to staff members only.
- 3.3.2 There should be a way to secure the books and records in the evening hours.
- 3.3.3 There should be a way to secure the door to the left of the front elevation, so access is easier to manage and supervise when the manned by security personnel.
- 3.3.4 Ideally, existing roller shutters should be retained and used in the hours the building is not in use.
- 3.3.5 Any new elements of the shopfront should be certified to a burglary resistant standard. New doors or windows should be certified to BS PAS 24 or LPS 1175 SR2. Glazing within the shopfront should be certified to a minimum of BS EN 356 P4A. Shutters, if replaced, should be certified to LPS 1175 SR2 (or SR1 if perforated).
- 3.3.6 Licensed premises in the city centre area are frequently the scenes of assaults both between patrons, and additionally, staff have been targeted by patrons. It is highly recommended that the premises is covered by a comprehensive CCTV system to deter unwanted behaviour and that any incidents are recorded and used as evidence. As a minimum the infrastructure should be provided for an alarm to be easily installed. CCTV recording equipment should be located in the staff room.
- 3.3.7 Access to staff/storage areas should be restricted to staff. It is recommended that doors into areas restricted to staff operate on an access control system (i.e. fob or swipe card) or that they are lockable by key, a door closer should be installed to ensure the door locks as staff enter/leave this area. Signage should indicate which areas are only for members of staff.
- 3.3.8 Lockers should be provided for staff to securely store their property whilst at work.
- 3.3.9 Theft of personal property is a common occurrence in licensed premises in the city centre. It is recommended that 'Chelsea Clips' or simple hooks are fitted to the underside of tables to allow customers to secure bags or jackets to the table while keeping it in view; a more secure option than, for example, tabletops or back of chairs, where belongings can be liable to theft.

- 3.3.10 Consideration should be given to a chute deposit safe (certified to LPS 1183) behind any till/bar area, or an alternative management practice, which would reduce the amount of cash held in tills during busy periods. Cash should be stored securely in a safe within a secure back office.
- 3.3.11 The premises should be covered with a monitored intruder alarm. As a minimum, if an alarm system is not provided, then the infrastructure should be provided for one to be easily installed.

4 Physical Security

The following checklist forms the physical security requirements for this scheme to achieve Secured by Design accreditation.

4.1 Doors

- ☐ External doors must be compliant with and certified to BS PAS 24, STS202, LPS 1175 SR2, LPS 2081 SR B, or STS 222. Staff should be given flexibility over permitting access into the building at different times of the day and night.
- ☐ External escape-only doors (as with external doors in general) should be certified to BS PAS 24, LPS 1175 SR2, LPS 2081 SR B, or STS 222. It is crucial that the door ironmongery is permitted for use on these doors under the security certification of the product.
- ☐ All doors/frames to staff areas/stores/offices should be robust/solid core (minimum 44mm thick) and fitted with auditable access controls. Staff should only be allowed access to areas required for their work. Keys/passes should only be carried if required for duties and should be accounted for at all times.

4.2 Windows

- ☐ Ground floor and easily accessible windows must be compliant with and certified to BS PAS 24, LPS 1175 SR2, LPS 2081 SR A, STS 204, or STS 222.
- ☐ Any new shutters must be tested and certified to STS 202 or LPS 1175 SR2 (or SR1 if perforated laths are required) and installed in accordance with manufacturer's instructions.

4.3 Glazing

- ☐ Glazing to a height of 2400mm (or if otherwise accessible) must incorporate at least one pane of glass with a 1.5mm PVB interlayer (e.g. 7.5mm laminated glass), or a glass rated as P4A under EN 356. The remaining pane in a double-glazed unit may be toughened glass.

4.4 Alarms

- ☐ A monitored alarm system should be installed to cover the entire building, linked to contacts on all external doors and PIR detectors covering all ground floor areas with windows, with a signal terminating at a recognised Alarm Receiving Centre (ARC) or security control room. As a minimum, there should be the infrastructure for the tenant to easily install one.

4.5 Access Control

- ☐ Access control systems should be operable by swipe card or fob, and not numeric keypads. The following areas/doors should operate on access control:
 - Doors needed to provide internal zoning and restrict access to parts of the building not in use (e.g. during evenings/weekends or community use)
 - Doors to staff only areas

4.6 Lighting

- ☐ Dusk-to-dawn lighting, operated by photoelectric cell/daylight sensor, and producing 'white' light, should be installed to all external doors and the building elevation.

-
- ☐ Fittings should produce 'white' light, as opposed to yellow/orange light. Metal halide (or bulbs with a comparable output) should be used, as these offer superior colour rendition over alternatives such as high and low pressure sodium bulbs.

4.7 CCTV

- ☐ A CCTV system should be installed with cameras monitoring activity inside and around the outside of the premises. Recording equipment must be housed in a secure location within the premises or images recorded off site by a suitable monitoring company.

4.8 Other

- ☐ All high value equipment (e.g. podcast equipment, computers, projectors, flat screen monitors / televisions, tools etc.) should be property marked and securely fixed or stored to deter damage / theft. An accurate record should be maintained which logs all such items.

5 Internal Layout Guidance

The internal layout of licensed premises, cafes & restaurants and events spaces should be carefully considered, so as to maximise surveillance over customers and reduce the opportunities for criminals to exploit. It is highly recommended that the following good practice principles are adopted where applicable, so as not to undermine the security of the building shell.

5.1.1 Licensed premises, cafes & restaurants and events spaces can, if poorly managed, generate crime for the following reasons:

- Opportunities - Large numbers of people congregating in such premises generates opportunities for crime. Unlike on-street populations, patrons are stationary for long periods of time, making them easier to target.
- Lack of attention - The movement of people, noise, social interaction and other factors mean patrons can be easily distracted.
- Cohesion – Particularly during busy periods, the large numbers and wide variety of groups of people that tend to frequent such premises means that such a venue would lack 'community territoriality' (i.e. regular customers displaying an awareness of and care for the environment around them). This can limit any self-policing that might otherwise occur.
- Customer turnover – High turnover with high levels of customer movement within an establishment, are more likely to allow offenders to go unnoticed.
- Valuable goods – Often available and possibly on show, a particular problem in external seating areas. Patrons are likely to carry small, valuable, concealable goods – such as mobile phones, purses, wallets, keys etc.
- Stealth - Busy venues provide the anonymity necessary to commit offences.


5.1.2 The incidence and severity of disorder issues in large licensed/event venues and their environs are often linked to physical features of these locations, such as:

- High concentration of people;
- Crowd congestion;
- Services that do not cater for demand, i.e. insufficient serving staff;
- Physical hazards arising from type and placement of furniture/ancillary structures; and
- Insufficient and unclean toilets.

In order to minimise these issues, it is recommended that the following good practice principles are adhered to:

5.1.3 The main entrances to the premises must be effectively managed at busy periods to control numbers, ensure safe access/egress and avoid potential conflicts arising.

- 5.1.4 Customers entering/leaving the premises should be easily observed by staff. Staff should also have clear views of any W/Cs to monitor their use.
- 5.1.5 The internal layout of premises should be generally uncluttered with few places for concealment, allowing staff to monitor customer behaviour. The precise arrangement of internal furnishings should aid circulation and aim to achieve a balance between intimacy and visibility.
- 5.1.6 Consideration should be given to high/wide bars/service counters, which increase the distance between staff and any potentially aggressive patrons and aid surveillance of all parts of the premises. Tills should be positioned away from customers' reach, but preferably fronting towards customers. Casual access to the rear of any bars/service counters should be prevented (e.g. with lockable doors or hatches that cannot be easily scaled). Sufficient levels of service staff should be provided at busy periods to reduce waiting times and the potential for frustration, aggression and conflict.
- 5.1.7 All back-of-house/staff areas should not be publicly accessible (see Section 4.2) and there should be a secure area for staff to store their belongings whilst at work.
- 5.1.8 It is highly recommended that any customer tables are fitted with Chelsea Clips, to reduce the opportunities for theft (see below).



- 5.1.9 Adequate signage should be deployed to direct people throughout the venue, but also to deter unauthorised access to staff-only/back-of-house areas.
- 5.1.10 Public toilets can give rise to crime and disorder issues and the following issues should be considered:
- Fittings should be flush to avoid tampering and concealed cisterns, pipe work etc. should be used.
 - Graffiti and vandal resistant materials, such as stainless steel, laminates and plastics should be considered.
 - Consider hanging cubicle doors as outward opening as this will aid gaining access in an emergency. An alternative measure is to reduce toilet doors in size by a minimum of 200mm from the floor and to reduce the top height.
 - Provide 'Chelsea Clip'/karibina style hooks on the back of cubicle doors or partitions for bags and coats.
 - Consider the safety of vending machines. Cash boxes can be tampered with, consider fitting them with alarms.
 - Consider setting out a rota and putting notices in toilet facilities that make users aware that regular checks will be carried out. A built in visited/checked chart should be provided.

6 Management & Maintenance

- 6.1.1 Active continuous management and maintenance of the premises can reduce the likelihood of crime and disorder occurring. An operating/maintenance plan should be created to promote good management of the premises, this plan should focus on issues such as:
- Opening and closing of premises, including staff arrival and departure.
 - Any cash management within the premises.

- Any cash-in-transit collections/deliveries and banking practices (which should take place in a secure room with a certified safe to meet insurance needs).
 - Management of stock deliveries (servicing activities should not require any service doors to remain open unattended for prolonged periods).
 - Details of staff security training.
 - Location and management of any smoking areas.
 - Repairing damaged external and internal fittings, particularly security features e.g. alarm system, CCTV cameras etc.
 - Cleaning and prompt removal of graffiti, litter etc; and
 - Refuse collection arrangements.
- 6.1.2 There should be regular reviews/exercises to ensure that it remains accurate, workable and up to date. All staff should understand and accept the need for security measures, and it should be made easy for people to raise concerns or report observations.
- 6.1.3 The opening hours of the premises should be consistent with other such premises in the local area and should not unduly conflict with other nearby uses. Service of drinks should end approximately 30 minutes before the premises closes, in order to aid effective dispersal of customers.
- 6.1.4 All high value equipment (e.g. computers, flat screen monitors/televisions etc.) should be properly marked and securely fixed or stored to deter damage/theft. An accurate record should be maintained which logs all such items.
- 6.1.5 The upkeep of a development over its lifetime can be crucial to the level of security and safety within. Aspects of a development, which are left to deteriorate, have the potential to attract further crime – a process known as ‘the broken window theory’. A maintenance plan should be drawn up to address issues that arise.

7 Construction

- 7.1.1 Untidy sites and their surroundings can be littered with debris accessible to vandals who often use loose materials as missiles to commit crime. The client should take measures appropriate to secure their site during construction, and control pedestrian and vehicular access in to and out of the site curtilage. It is also recommended that the contractor on this scheme is a member of the ‘Considerate Constructors Scheme’, who has committed to be a considerate and good neighbour, as well as clean, respectful, safe, environmentally conscious, responsible and accountable.
- 7.1.2 Site security contractors should be SIA (Security Industry Authority) approved to ensure professional standards are adhered to (please see <http://www.sia.homeoffice.gov.uk/pages/acs-intro.aspx> for more details).

8 Useful References

8.1 Secured by Design (SBD)

- 8.1.1 Secured by Design focuses on crime prevention at the design, layout and construction stages of homes and commercial premises and promotes the use of security standards for a wide range of applications and products. To apply for Secured by Design certification for your development, visit our online application form at: <http://www.designforsecurity.org/secured-by-design/sbd-accreditation/>

A Contact register

Date	Contact With	Summary of Contact
16/10/24	Savills	CIS Application
17/10/24	DfS	CIS Fee Proposal
17/10/24	Savills	CIS Confirmation
21/10/24	DfS	Site Visit

B Associated Documents

This report is based on the following drawings and supplementary information submitted by the applicant.

Drawing No.	Drawing Title	Date	Rev
111_A102	Elevations		
111_A101	Existing floor plans		
111_100	Location and Site Plan		
111_A101	Proposed floor plans		

PLEASE NOTE - In the event of any subsequent material changes to the scheme, it will be necessary for Design for Security to reassess the comments made within this report.

C CIS Version History

Version	Revisions Made	Date
A		